

Islam and Politics in Afghanistan

Asta Olesen

ISLAM AND POLITICS IN AFGHANISTAN

NORDIC INSTITUTE OF ASIAN STUDIES

Recent Monographs

60. THE ISLAMIZATION OF THE LAW IN PAKISTAN
Rubya Mehdi
61. JAPANESE WHALING
Arne Kalland and Brian Moeran
62. TECHNOLOGY IN A CONTROLLED ECONOMY
Per Hilding
63. SURVIVAL AND PROFIT IN RURAL JAVA
Sven Cederroth
64. THE STATE AND ITS ENEMIES IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Alexander Wanek
65. MISSION AND TAMIL SOCIETY
Henriette Bugge
66. FOLK TALES FROM KAMMU (VOLUME 5)
Kristina Lindell, Jan-Öjvind Swahn and Damrong Tayanin
67. ISLAM AND POLITICS IN AFGHANISTAN
Asta Olesen
68. EXEMPLARY CENTRE, ADMINISTRATIVE PERIPHERY
Hans Antlöv
69. FISHING VILLAGES IN TOKUGAWA JAPAN
Arne Kalland
70. THE HONG MERCHANTS OF CANTON
Weng Eang Cheong

**Islam
and
Politics
in
Afghanistan**

Asta Olesen

 **Routledge**
Taylor & Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK

Nordic Institute of Asian Studies
Monograph Series, No. 67

First published 1995 by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park,
Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN

ISBN 0-7007-0299-7 [Hardback]
ISBN 0-7007-0296-2 [Paperback]

All rights reserved

© Asta Olesen 1995

Reprinted 1996

Transferred to Digital Printing 2006

British Library Catalogue in Publication Data
A CIP catalogue record for this book
is available from the British Library

Publisher's Note

The publisher has gone to great lengths to ensure the quality of this reprint but points out that some imperfections in the original may be apparent

Contents

<i>List of Figures</i>	vii
<i>List of Maps</i>	viii
<i>Preface</i>	ix
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	xii
<i>Transcriptions from Arabic Script</i>	xiii
Islam - Ideology and Politics	1
The Concept of Ideology	3
Islamic Polity	6
The Classic Islamic Model of Legitimacy of Power	8
The Concept of <i>Jihād</i>	11
<i>Barakat</i> as a Political Factor	13
The Aesthetics of Reception	15
Afghanistan Towards the End of the Nineteenth Century	20
External Forces and the Growth of Afghanistan	21
Tribal Forces in the Development of Afghanistan	29
The 'Religious Situation' in Afghanistan	36
Summary	56
From Tribal State to Absolute Monarchy (1880-1901)	61
Ideology of the State	62
Islamization of the Legal System	65
Application of the Doctrine of <i>Jihād</i>	68
Subjugation of the <i>Ulamā</i>	71
Standardization of Faith	75
Relationship between the <i>Ulamā</i> and the State	81
Summary	89
Pan-Islamism and Anti-Colonialism (1901-1919)	94
The Policies of <i>Amīr</i> Habibullah	95
Political Groupings around the Court	100
Pan-Islamism and Anti-Colonialism	102
Summary	107
A New Ideological Paradigm: The Reform Policy of King Amanullah (1919-29)	111
Pan-Islamism	113
Ideology of the Young Afghan Movement	116
The Constitutional Monarchy	120
Islamic Modernism or Secularization?	126
King Amanullah and the Traditional Power Groups	133
The Loya Jirga of 1924	138

The Fall of King Amanullah	144
Ideological Content of the Revolt	150
The Mullahs and the Rebellion	160
Conclusion	165
Re-Establishment of the Social Order and Its Transformation (1930-1950s)	172
Relationship to British India	172
The Constitution of 1931	176
The Clergy and the State	183
Reforming Religious Education	186
The Secular School System	190
Disappearance of the 'Activist' Mullahs	192
The Struggle for Political Reform (1950s-1970s)	199
Socio-Economic Development	199
Demand for Political Liberalisation	201
'Modernisation' and Nationalism	203
The Constitution of 1964	206
The Re-Entry of Islam into Afghan Politics	212
Ideological Crisis in Society	216
The Palace Revolution of <i>Sardār</i> Mohammad Daoud	219
Summary	224
The Development of the Islamic Movement from the 1960s	227
Background of the Islamic Movement	227
Development of the Islamic Movement in Afghanistan	229
Membership of the Islamic Movement	235
Ideological Basis of the Islamic Movement	236
The Islamic State	240
<i>Jihād</i> and Martyrdom	245
The Islamist and Traditionalist	246
Summary	250
The PDPA and Islam	256
The PDPA's Islamic Strategy	257
Legitimacy of Power	263
The Fall of the PDPA	268
Ideological Class Struggle and the Aesthetics of Reception	269
The <i>Mujāhidīn</i> and Islam	274
Islam in the Popular Resistance	275
Divisions in the Resistance	281
The Present Struggle for Power	292
Conclusion	298
Centralization and Islamization	298
Islam and the Legitimacy of Power	299
Aesthetics of Reception	300
Glossary	304
Notes on the Sources	313
References	318
Index	341

List of Figures

1: The classic model of the legitimation of power	10
2: Dost Mohammad,	23
3: Afghan royal lineage since 1747	24
4: Model of the transmission of the legitimation of power 1747-1880	34
5: The Deoband <i>madrassa</i>	45
6: Descent of Mujaddidi family from <i>Shaykh</i> Ahmad Sirhindi	49
7: Abdul Rahman, <i>Amir</i> 1880-1901	61
8: Dichtomy in the legitimation of the transmission of power between 'classic Islamic model' and 'tribal state model'	64
9: Habibullah, <i>Amir</i> 1901-19	94
10: Obaidullah Sindhi	104
11: Amanullah, King 1919-29	111
12: Mahmud Tarzi	117
13: Duality in the legitimation of the transmission of power in the 1923 Constitution	122
14: <i>Hazrat Sāhib</i> Fazl Omar	149
15: King Nadir <i>Khān</i>	173
16: Model of the transfer of the legitimacy of power in the 1931 Constitution	178
17: Model of the transfer of the legitimacy of power in the 1964 Constitution	207
18: <i>Sardār</i> Mohammad Daoud	220
19: Model of the legitimation of power in the 1977 Constitution	223
20: Sebghatullah Mujaddidi	233
21: The Islamist model of the legitimacy of power:	241
22: Dr Najibullah, President 1986-92	256
23: PDPA political poster, Kabul 1981	261
24: The PDPA model of the transmission of power	264
25: Leadership profiles of the main Peshawar (Sunni) groups	284
26: Leadership profiles of the main Quetta (Shi'a) groups	285

List of Maps

- 1: Afghanistan todayxiv
- 2: Zones of contention between the Safavid and Mughal empires and the Uzbek Shaibanids in the sixteenth century20
- 3: The empire of Ahmad *Shāh* Durrani (ruled 1747-72).....21
- 4: British and Russian expansion on the Afghan periphery (1800-1900) ...26
- 5: Major ethnic groups in Afghanistan and distribution of Pashtuns in Pakistan30
- 6: Conquest and revolt during the reign of Abdur Rahman79

Preface

My interest in Afghanistan dates back to the 1970s, when I carried out anthropological fieldwork in eastern Afghanistan during 1975-76, and afterwards, during 1977-79, worked in a development project in northern Afghanistan. I thus witnessed the 'Saur Revolution' of April 1978 (the military coup that overthrew President Daoud and brought the Marxist PDPA — the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan — to power), the initial bewildered response of the population and the start of the military and ideological struggle for 'the thoughts and minds' of the Afghans which developed between the PDPA and opposition forces and ultimately led to full-scale civil war in 1979. Even though the PDPA regime was ousted by *mujāhidīn* forces in 1992, Afghanistan's military and ideological conflicts continue.

1978-79 were dramatic years throughout the region. The Pahlavi dynasty was toppled by an Islamic Revolution in neighbouring Iran and in Pakistan Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was hanged by the Islamic military regime of General Zia ul-Haq. This formed the regional context of the PDPA regime in Afghanistan, which for a time was rescued from a similar fate by the Soviet invasion of December 1979. However, in Afghanistan neither the military nor the ideological struggle ended with the invasion. While the military struggle to a large extent depended upon such external influences as the level of superpower commitment on either side, the ideological struggle for thoughts and minds had a dynamic of its own. This was conditioned by and played out in terms of the peculiar features of Afghanistan's history, decisively different from that of its neighbours.

It was precisely this ideological struggle, the struggle over who should define the dominant discourse of society, which interested me most, particularly the role which Islam has played in the political history of Afghanistan from the establishment of the modern state around 1880 until today.

Afghanistan did not exist as an independent entity until the establishment of the tribal confederacy of the Durrani empire in 1747, based upon the militarily dominant Pashtun tribes. The state developed from and was thus dependent upon the tribes, and it was not until the

reign of *Amīr* Abdur Rahman (1880-1901) that Afghanistan was transformed from a tribal confederacy into a centralized state. Afghanistan's heritage as a tribal state had and still has an important bearing on the question of the legitimacy of power, which contained tribal as well as religious elements. In recent years the concept of popular sovereignty has also been added to this discourse. The question of legitimacy of power has been on the agenda much of the time since 1880 and is reflected in the constitutions of 1924, 1931, 1964, 1977 and the Interim Constitution of 1980 as well as in the numerous rebellions challenging the legitimacy of power and of the ruler. The focus of this study has thus been on the constitutions, rebellions, social groups and discourses through which they have maintained or challenged the legitimacy of power. Legitimacy, like beauty, is in the eyes of the beholder, which means that ultimately the validity of any claim or challenge to legitimacy is determined by its reception in the wider population. In other words, the struggle for legitimacy is a struggle over the thoughts and minds of the recipients of the discourses, which is as true today as it was in 1880.

As such, this study begins with a discussion of Islam, ideology and politics that provides its theoretical framework. The classic Islamic model of the Legitimacy of Power is presented and an argument is made for the centrality of the concept of *jihād* as well as the potential political dimensions of *barakat*. The scene is then set with a sketch of Afghanistan as it was towards the end of the nineteenth century, especially its external situation, its status as a 'tribal state' and (an outline) of the religious situation.

The following chapters deal with the various epochs from 1880 through to the present day. The starting point is the centralization of the Afghan state by *Amīr* Abdur Rahman, his 'Islamization' policy, his claim to religious as opposed to tribal legitimacy and his subsequent conflicts with the religious establishment. Legitimacy of power was not at issue during the reign of *Amīr* Habibullah (1901-19) except to the extent that it was challenged by the politics of pan-Islamism. Where *jihād* in previous decades had been a concept central to the legitimacy of power, this became a keyword in the anti-colonial and pan-Islamic mobilization that culminated in the fall of Habibullah and the Third Afghan War. What followed was the promotion of Islamic modernism by King Amanullah (1919-29), which brought to an end the peaceful co-existence of state, tribes and *ʿulamā* and reopened the struggle for legitimacy first in the form of competitive discourses and secondly as an outright civil war.

While the reigns of Nadir *Shāh* and Zahir *Shāh* during 1930-64 were comparatively peaceful and 'uneventful' years in Afghanistan, Afghan society underwent considerable socio-economic changes. However, the final co-option of the religious establishment and institutions in the state, the expansion of the secular institutions and the emergence and consolidation of new urban classes changed the center of political gravity and paved the way for new political-ideological paradigms, with no room left for the old 'activist' mullahs of former times. The remaining chapters thus deal with the struggle for political reforms and the formulation of the new political paradigm in the form of the parliamentary democracy of the Constitution of 1964, its failure and the resulting ideological crisis in society. The stage was set for the ideological (and ultimately military) struggle between the discourse of the Afghan Left and that of the Islamists. While the Left failed to win popular support for its discourse and its claim to legitimate power, the question still remains whether the Islamists with their equally totalitarian discourse on the state are able to win the battle for 'the thoughts and minds' of the Afghan people.

As can be seen from the above summary, the scope of this study is necessarily wide. Such an approach had its drawbacks, especially regarding the source materials for this study, which were extremely varied and uneven. This meant that much of the field covered had to be 'reconstructed' from the ground up and that a number of methodological problems were posed for the research. (A fuller discussion on the source materials is appended.) This study also brought me from my 'native' field of social anthropology into the border areas of history, political science and religion. Altogether, then, the task that I began back in 1982 could at best be called very ambitious, at worst impossible. As to the results, it is up to the reader to judge.

Acknowledgements

The present study is a result of a long process that began in 1982 and was interrupted many times before its completion. Over so many years, receiving most valuable assistance and cooperation from people and institutions in several countries, I regret that it would be impossible to list by name all who deserve to be thanked for their help, encouragement and support. However, before anybody else I want to express my deep-felt thanks to my spiritual mentor through many years, Professor Klaus Ferdinand of the Department of Ethnography and Social Anthropology at Aarhus University, without whose never-failing support, encouragement and constructive criticism this work would never have been completed. I am also grateful to Dr. Mehdi Mozaffari of the Department of Political Science at Aarhus University and Professor Niels Steensgaard of the Department of History at Copenhagen University for reading the manuscript and offering valuable comments.


Further, I wish to thank Aarhus University and the State Research Council of Humanities for their financial support which enabled me to take on this study. Thanks also to the India Office Library & Records, London; National Archives of India (and its helpful staff), New Delhi; Christian Study Centre, Rawalpindi; Area Study Centre Central Asia, Peshawar where the generous assistance of Abdullah Jan Khalil was of great help; Bibliotheca Afghanica, Liestal; Dr. May Schinasi, Nice, for most generously opening her home and exquisite private library for me; and to Dr. Daniel Balland, Paris, who also made rare materials available. I also want to thank 'my Afghan professor', Professor Rasul Amin, whose office (WUFA) in Peshawar has always been a meeting place and centre for a good talk and a cup of tea during my visits to Pakistan; Dr. Zabiullah Mujaddidi who kindly spared his time and generously mediated contact to other knowledgeable people; Mr Shahm Mahmood Miakhel for sharing his knowledge on Afghan Sufis; and Mr. Masoud Khalili with whose kind assistance I managed to have an unforgettable meeting with his late father, Afghanistan's great poet Ustād Khalilullah Khalili.

To Mohammad Azim Safi and Ali Ohadi Esfahani I am grateful for their assistance with texts in Pashto and Persian and my thanks also to Dr. Claus Pedersen of Carsten Niebuhr Institute at Copenhagen University, who kindly reviewed my transcriptions from Arabic into Latin script. Further, I wish to thank Sven Dindler, Head Assistant at the Department of Ethnography and Social Anthropology, for all his help in printing the original manuscript and solving numerous 'computer technical' problems over the years. Finally, I also want to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to Ms. Nancy Sibtain, who over the years has struggled to correct my written English, and my deep-felt thanks to Gerald Jackson of NIAS for his great efforts in turning an 'unsurveyable' manuscript into a readable book.

Transcriptions from Arabic Script

An attempt has been made to transcribe all Afghan terms used in this book from Arabic script to their accepted Roman equivalent. These terms are listed in the Glossary. However, such a transcription has not been done for proper names (of people, places, dynasties, etc). This is because I have worked to improve the accessibility of this study by keeping to what is common usage for such names (hence for instance using 'Sufi' instead of 'Şūfi' and 'Habibullah' instead of 'Ḥabībollāh').

Map 1: Afghanistan today



CHAPTER 1

Islam - Ideology and Politics

Islam is both a religion and state...
(Muslehuddin: 1977:134)

Formulations like the above, implying the all-embracing character of Islam, can be found in most studies of Islam and Muslim societies. Islam is thus presented as an ideal type of an 'organic' religio-political system (Smith 1974) where religious and political functions are not differentiated but rest within a single structure and no distinctions can be made between the religious institution and the society. The social order is considered to be of divine origin, the ruler derives his authority from a spiritual force, and political leadership is exercised according to religious law and tradition.

While the theoretical distinction between God's domain and that of Caesar does not exist in Islamic theology, and sacred law incorporates the temporal within the spiritual, it is hardly justifiable, as has been characteristic of the Western Orientalist tradition and, albeit in a different way, of most Muslim scholars, to refer to 'Islam' as a 'substantial, stable, defined area (*in Islam*) where all kinds of categoric definitions, answers, rules, and practices are to be found at any time and in any society' (Arkoun 1988: 54). Although the word of God as revealed in the sacred scriptures remains unchanged, the understanding and interpretation of the revelation has changed over time according to the socio-political and cultural environment, the existential conditions of the *umma*, etc. The classic Orientalist tradition lacks this perspective of 'the ideological roots and functions of discourse produced by social groups in competition for power and, consequently the epistemological distance between ideation and ideology, and critical knowledge and controlled, offensive-defensive discourse' (Arkoun 1988: 55).

First of all, it is necessary to recognize the distinction between politico-theological dogmas and the actual political structure of Muslim societies throughout history. Discrepancies between 'ideal' and actual political realities were amply reflected in the al-Salafiyah movements of the last century and in the fundamentalist movements in this

century. However, it is also important to note that even these dogmas have varied and been interpreted variously over time. Arkoun (*ibid.*) approaches this problem by pointing out that, after the death of the Prophet, his integrated representation of live authority broke up in two processes: first, the collection, transmission, interpretation etc. of the Qurʾān and *hadith*; and second, the state for its own ends used this face of authority to exercise a political, cultural and concrete power, controlling more and more the first process, constituting the scriptural tradition. Throughout history, the state as a constraining and controlling power used authority as a necessary means of legitimizing a temporal power that lacked an intrinsic authority. We can thus speak of an official ideology imposing an image of legitimate power by misrepresenting the actual genesis of the state. Orthodoxy thus becomes no more than the official religion resulting from the collaboration of the majority of *ʿulamā* with the state (Arkoun 1988: 60). In his approach, Arkoun proceeds according to what he calls the regressive-progressive method: first going back into the past to reach the historical mechanisms and factors which produced given texts in the scriptural tradition and assigning them certain functions; and, since these texts are still alive and active as ideological systems of belief and knowledge shaping the future, the second step is to look at the process by which the initial contents and functions have been transformed into new ones.

It is exactly this temporality and contingency of Islamic interpretations and the way they are translated into political action that is of interest here, rather than reading some ultimate 'truth' about the Islamic polity out of the scriptures. Being concerned with the political use of Islam during a certain period in Afghan history, the focus is thus on certain dimensions of Islam; neither Islamic theology nor Islam as a religious experience or way of life is covered, although reference to both will be made when relevant to the discussion at hand.

Waardenburg (1978) suggests replacing the frequently claimed dichotomy between 'official' and 'popular' Islam with the distinction between 'normative' and 'practised' or 'lived' Islam in view of the absence of an 'official' institutional organization in Islam. The interaction between the normative/official Islam and the 'lived'/popular Islam can thus largely be understood as an interaction between the theoretical considerations of the religious scholars and the practical activities in the Muslim communities, where both employ religious concepts, symbols and interpretations in order to find guidance, sanctions and justification for all manner of activities. In terms of

political action this process can be called the 'operationalization of the concept of Islamic polity' (Ayoob 1979: 535-536).

It is the existence of Islam, not only as explicit ideology in society (in the form of the normative or official Islam of the *‘ulamā*) but also as implicit ideology (a communal moral consciousness of Islamic culture in its widest sense), which is an absolute precondition for the successful operationalization of the concept of Islamic polity. The actual political use of Islam depends upon the creation of a synthesis of a given political discourse with the implicit ideology current in society. Anything running counter to this implicit ideology is likely to be rejected.

The Concept of Ideology

The concept of ideology has, since it was coined by the philosopher Destutt de Tracy at the time of the French Revolution, been subject to differing definitions and interpretations. On the one hand, 'ideology' can be taken in the narrow sense as meaning "the integrated assertions, theories, and aims that constitute a sociopolitical program" (Johnson 1968: 76). Associated with this definition of ideology has been the negative notion whereby ideology is seen as being essentially 'false' as compared to assumed 'actual, scientific or rational' conceptions. This has been typical not only in Marxist and Hegelian philosophy, where 'ideology' is taken as an expression of false consciousness, but also Weber and Mannheim used the term ideology to imply idea systems which were the outcome or expression of certain interests. Likewise, for Freud, ideologies were the unconscious rationalization of class interests. Within the Marxist tradition, the critical conception of ideology still has its strong protagonists (see, for example, Thompson 1984).

On the other hand, the notion of ideology has also been invested with a broader and neutral meaning, predominant for example within the discipline of social anthropology, where 'ideology' in the formulation of Clifford Geertz (1964) is 'a schematic image of the social order'. Whereas ideology in the narrow sense refers to a comparatively explicit 'theory' directed at the explanation and transformation/maintenance of the external world in its present social and political dimensions, the neutral and broad concept of ideology encompasses the outlook and *Weltanschauung* of a society/nation/group etc. Accordingly, ideology may here be seen as the product of man's eternal need to impose intellectual order on the

world (Shils 1968: 69). It is this neutral conception of ideology which will be employed — in Therborn's formulation, 'that aspect of the human condition under which human beings live their lives as conscious actors in a world that makes sense to them to varying degrees. Ideology is the medium through which this consciousness and meaningfulness operate' (Therborn 1980: 2).

With the operation of ideology defined in terms of the constitution of human subjectivity, it follows according to Therborn that the structure of the ideological universe is to be sought in the dimensions of human subjectivity. He concludes that the universe of ideologies is structured by the four main analytical categories of construing or 'interpellation' that constitute the four fundamental forms of subjectivity (*ibid.*: 22-27):

- a) Inclusive-Existential Interpellations, which provide meanings related to being a member of the world, i.e. the meaning of life, death, suffering, the cosmos, etc.
- b) Inclusive-Historical Interpellations, which derive from human beings as conscious members of historical, social worlds. As an inclusive ideology it also draws a line of demarcation between membership and non-membership, i.e. it is also an ideology of exclusion.
- c) Positional-Existential Interpellations, which qualify one for a particular position in the world of which one is a member, i.e. Self-Other, position of the two genders, life-cycle placement, etc.
- d) Positional-Historical Interpellations, which define one's position in historical social worlds, i.e. placing the members of a family, inhabitants of a particular locality or occupation within a wider structure. Positions may be differentiated in terms of hierarchy, complementarity, competition.

The above distinctions are analytical, and do not represent actual types of ideologies, which may exhibit more than one of the four dimensions, either simultaneously or in different contexts (*ibid.*: 25-26).

Several consequences flow from the above formulations. First, the broad, neutral concept of ideology has finally been given an analytical framework in which it can contain phenomena as diverse as religious beliefs and political '-isms'. Thus, within this framework, religion can be analysed on the same basis as other, secular and mundane ideologies.

While religion, in line with other ideological phenomena, can thus be seen as man's attempt to bring order into the universal experience of disorder, the distinguishing characteristics of religion may be found in the particular types of questions it addresses and purports to answer. Religious 'answers' may be of a more fundamental, general and eternal kind than those of political ideologies which tend to be specific, local and time-bound. Equally, while religious 'answers' generally acquire their legitimacy from sources outside the temporal, material world, political and other types of ideologies are basically centred on this world alone. However, this does not mean, that religion is necessarily excluded from addressing this-worldly questions any more that it precludes political ideologies from being founded upon or derived from religious notions.

Second, the ideological universe is never solely reducible to class ideologies, socio-political doctrines or to metaphysics. Even in the most class-polarized and class-conscious societies (for example), the other fundamental forms of human subjectivity coexist with class subjectivities. The definitions of the subject contained in the existential interpellations will never be wholly reducible to the relations of production, i.e. to class position, since 'man does not live by bread alone' — but cannot survive without it either! Individuals will thus always be the meeting places of various interpellations, making different and perhaps even contrasting claims on their subjectivity, which taken together define them in the world, give meaning to their existence and supply them with a world-view.

At the social level, different types of interpellations (religious, national etc.) may thus coexist and be integrative elements within a specific ideological discourse — and within widely different discourses. The possible political nature of an ideological discourse can therefore not be determined from its constituent elements but from the structure of the interpellation, i.e. from its specific articulating principle. A case in point is the varied use of Islamic concepts, symbolism and appeals to Muslim identity employed in the 'Islamic Socialism' of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in Pakistan; the 'Islamic Marxism' of the Mujahidin-i Khalq of Iran; and Islam as the ideology of the oppressed in Ali Shariati's formulations as opposed to its use in the fundamentalism of *Āyatullāh* Khomeini or *Mawlānā* Abu A'la Maududi. While the common feature is that the constituent elements are religious, the political nature of these respective discourses depends on their differing articulation of the religious elements. In societies where Islam forms the basis of the dominant explicit and implicit ideology, the political discourses will thus frequently consist of antagonistic

articulations in which each group or class presents itself as the Defenders of 'true' Islam, etc., trying to harness people's identification as Muslims into their respective discourses, i.e. claiming religious, 'other-worldly' legitimacy for their activities in 'this-worldly' matters.

Islamic Polity

The operationalization of the concept of Islamic polity accordingly denotes the process whereby religious doctrines, concepts, symbols etc., i.e. interpellations in the widest sense which are constituent elements of a religious discourse, are turned into integral elements in a political discourse. As stated above, the 'political' content cannot be determined *a priori* but is acquired from the articulative structure of the political discourse.

Islam is all-encompassing in its scope, placing people both in the universe and in society, providing answers to existential and historical questions, defining both their (inclusive) membership of the *umma* as well as their (positional) interrelationships to fellow humans. In most, if not all Muslim societies, the Islamic heritage constitutes the main shared cultural identity, both at the philosophical level and in the popular traditions. As such, it has a relative historical continuity which stands in contrast to the historical discontinuities characteristic of class-based discourses.

On this basis, any political discourse aiming at reaching the majority of the people will have to articulate and integrate precisely those most common and shared ideological elements which are the very building blocks of any political discourse. Moreover, one particular political discourse becomes dominant to the extent that people can identify with it and recognize themselves in it. Ideological hegemony of a certain social class or group thus does not so much depend on its ability to impose a uniform conception of the world on the rest of society, but more on the extent to which it can articulate different visions of the world in such a way that potential antagonism is neutralized (Laclau 1977: 161). This is the reason why non-class interpellations are the main battlefield for competing ideological discourses in their struggle for hegemony (*ibid.*: 107-109).¹ (Here 'popular traditions' are understood in Laclau's sense: the complex of interpellations which express the opposition between 'the people' and 'the power bloc', reflecting the continuity of the individual's impotence vis-à-vis the powers that be, as distinct from the transience of class contradictions). As far as 'popular traditions' represent the

ideological crystallization of resistance to oppression in general, that is, to the very form of the state, they will be more durable than class ideologies and will constitute a structural frame of reference of greater stability. In view of this, it is obvious that divergent political movements may utilize the same ideological symbols in order to mobilize popular support (*ibid*: 167).

The above point links closely with Arkoun's observations on what he calls 'the popularized model of authority' as contrasted with the official, state-promoted model of authority. The popularized model, couched in the social imagery and transmitted through the sermons, narrations of the prophets, Companions etc., and via popular storytellers, presents authority as an articulated system of ideal, positive images of ethical-spiritual thinking and acting. As such, the model has a wider currency and longer durability than any 'official' model (Arkoun 1988: 61). The social imagery can easily be mobilized for an Islamic revolution, restoring the central themes of the model rooted through centuries in the collective soul and using the common Islamic imagery. The Islamic Revolution in Iran gives an excellent example of this process of translating Islamic popular traditions into a new, revolutionary political discourse, where the Battle of Karbala, Hussain's martyrdom and the host of legends and symbols of Shi'a Islam were articulated within both the revolutionary discourse and competing ideological discourses.² Anderson (1983) also touches upon this issue in his discussion of the dialectics of Pashtun (Ghilzai) tribalism, where he sees three cognate distinctions at work: *qaumwāli* (kinship, tribalism) versus *gundi* (factionalism), *atrāp* (countryside, i.e. tribal domain) versus *shahr* (city); and *yāghīstān* (the lands of freedom and unrestraint) versus *hukūmat* (the activity and seat of government). They articulate thematic tensions at work in the tribal society and also reveal that Islam is not the only source of social imagery but coexists with other sources, rooted in the tribal structure of society, which can be even more fundamental.

The articulation of religious elements within secular political ideologies has been the subject of many discussions. Above, it is argued that it is erroneous to deduce the actual political content from the religious elements entailed or from Islam in general. Another view, mainly represented by political opponents to 'Islamic' regimes, or by Marxist-inspired writers, tends to see the invocation of religious elements in political discourses as simply a manipulative gesture:

But I do not think that Islam is an autonomous *political* ideology at present. The Muslim faithful are often enough apolitical,

whether their faith encourages them in such an attitude or not... But the options in question can in no way be explained in terms of religious dogma. They remain aspects of these essentially secular ideologies ... and simply provide these secular ideologies with a religious garb and a religious justification. (Rodinson 1979: 199-200)

While the situation of religious elements being used as window-dressing can and does occur, it is hardly justifiable to consider all political articulation of religious elements as merely this, since that neglects the fact that in order to be successful a political discourse has to articulate the various 'non-political' and 'non-class' elements.

The Classic Islamic Model of Legitimacy of Power

Political discourses and ideologies are largely concerned with providing a coherent explanation for the maintenance or transformation of the distribution of political power in society, in such a way that its 'model' gains the widest acceptability. Popular acceptability is essential for the sustained exercise of political power which would otherwise be exclusively dependent upon the use of coercion. In contrast, authority is the recognized right to exercise power. Authority thus represents the set of rites, procedures, traditions, and norms that are regarded as binding when they are applied within a given social framework. The rules that establish and allocate authority also serve to limit the authority that they institutionalize. Thus in contrast to power, authority enjoins observance on obligatory and normative grounds rather than instrumental ones and power *without* authority will remain uninstitutionalized, labile and relative (Smith 1968: 193). Popular acceptability and authority for the exercise of governmental power are thus ultimately dependent upon to what extent the sources of *legitimacy* of power are generally recognized, whether they be divine right, popular sovereignty or something else.³ The political ideology of a given regime and type of government will thus contain a more or less coherent 'model of legitimacy' with the aim of generating popular support and acceptability for the exercise of power.


As pointed out by Arkoun (1988), after the death of the Prophet, the Muslim state used the authority vested in the interpretations of the Qur'ān as well as the transmitted *hadīth* to claim and exercise political power. This in turn increasingly shaped the development of the scriptural tradition, whereby orthodoxy became synonymous with

'official religion' (*ibid.*: 60). Because Islam draws no distinction between the religious and the temporal spheres of life, the Muslim state is by definition religious, with the ultimate source of legitimacy of power and of the ruler being derived from Allah and the Prophet. However, through the centuries, Sunni political theory has also been shaped by the acknowledgement that stability has precedence over ideal rule in the interests of the religious community. Such a *post hoc* rationalization of historical developments is illustrated in the saying, 'One day of lawlessness is worse than thirty years of tyrannical rule'. While the primary function of the office of the Caliph (*khalīfa*) had been only that of implementing the sacred law, the Sultans who replaced the Caliphs as actual rulers were declared to be 'Shadow of God on Earth' and dynastic rule gained currency from the time and onwards of the Umayyads (the first great Muslim dynasty to rule the empire of the Caliphate, A.D. 661-750). The final articulation of 'classic' Sunni political theory, by Ibn Taymiyah (A.D. 1263-1328), recognized the legitimacy of the first four Caliphs, but rejected the necessity of having a single Caliphate and allowed for the existence of many emirates and sultanates, provided that the ruler applied the religious law strictly and relied on it for his legal opinion. The ruler's subjects were, for their part, obliged to obey the established authority except where it required disobedience to God, every Muslim being required to 'will the good and forbid the evil' for the benefit of the common welfare. In spite of this development of granting religious legitimacy to 'pious sultans', the ruler could not become absolute because a basic restraint was placed upon him by the Sharī'a under which he held his authority and which he was duty-bound to follow and defend. The *ʿulamā* as the keepers of the scriptural tradition jealously upheld the sovereign position of the Sharī'a against the political authority, and 'the Pious Sultan theory' may be equated with a concordat between ruler and *ʿulamā* in which the implementation of Sharī'a was acknowledged in exchange for legitimacy (Schleifer 1983b: 185, see also Arkoun 1988). Hence, the 'classic' Islamic model for the transmission of the legitimacy of power may be sketched as follows overleaf.

Inherent in Islam is the concept of a closely-knit community of the faithful (*umma*), the brotherhood of believers, which is 'the best community produced for mankind', whose function it is 'to enjoin good and forbid evil' so that 'there is no mischief and corruption' on earth. In view of the constitution of the community as the power base, the doctrine of *jihād* was the logical outcome. The object of *jihād* is not the conversion of individuals to Islam but rather the gaining of political control over the collective affairs of societies to run them in

accordance with the principles of Islam (Encyclopaedia Britannica 1985, vol. 22: 8). While the Muslim ruler, as illustrated above, ruled with the divine sanction of Allah (and *not* with the divine right which justified European monarchies for centuries) this sanction could be removed in cases where the ruler was held to be violating Islam or going against the will of Allah. Then it became a religious *duty* for the believers to choose a just Muslim ruler: 'These are they who have bartered the guidance for error; their trade had not turned out profitable and they have not been rightly guided' (Qur^{ān} 3:87).

Figure 1: The classic model of the legitimation of power



The inspiration for this and the subsequent models of the transmission of the legitimacy of power has been Mozaffari's discussion of authority in Islam (Mozaffari 1987).

With the crystallization of Islamic jurisprudence during the course of the first centuries, based on its four sources — the Qur^{ān}, the *sunna* ('traditions'), *ijmā* ('consensus'), and *ijtihad* ('reasoning') — the religious scholars (*ulamā*) consolidated their position as keepers of the scriptural tradition, i.e. as interpreters of Sharī'a, whereby they also came to occupy a central position as the *mediators* of the transmission of legitimate power to the actual rulers. Equally so, they became key persons in determining the legitimacy (i.e. the religious sanction) of rebellion against oppressive rule. The notion of the divine sanction of power thus leads to the legitimation of the state as well as to legitimation of rebellion, under certain conditions, and to the centrality of the concept of *jihad*.

The Concept of *Jihād*

Throughout the Muslim era the concept of *jihād* has been one of the most forceful concepts of mediation between the spiritual and the political realm. Thus, the religious discourse on dogmas has in this respect been closely interlinked with the political discourse, with consequences for both spiritual and mundane authority as well as the identity of the *umma* (the Islamic community) as a political community. The case of Afghanistan during the last one hundred years will amply illustrate this.

The word *jihād* as it is generally used today refers to actual fighting or, as the Western media normally translate it, 'holy war'. However, the word in itself has a much wider semantic catchment, as it can broadly refer to exerting oneself for some praiseworthy aim (Peters 1979, chap. 4).⁴ Schleifer, focusing on the exoteric and esoteric aspects of *jihād*, points to the classic tradition where *jihād* means variously: struggle against a visible enemy; struggle against the Devil; and struggle against the *nafs* (the lower or passionate soul or self). The concept of *jihād* thus contains a movement from the outward, most visible and 'occasional' in time and space back to the inward and 'continuous' — or, as Schleifer also formulates it, *jihād* is the instrument of sacralization of the social-political order in Islam (Schleifer 1983a: 120-122). The goal of this inner or 'greater' *jihād* is thus to purify the spiritual heart (the way of *tarīqat*, of Sufism, is thus essentially that of the greater *jihād*) while the goal of the outward or 'lesser' *jihād*, is to purify the social order of disbelief. It is in this its most outward form that *jihād* came to be used by Muslims to signify generally the sacralization of combat, of holy war (*ibid*: 123). *Jihād* in the sense of fighting is restricted by the phrase, *fi sabil Allah* ('in the way of Allah') which implies that *jihād* is not just ordinary war, but must be connected with religion and the interests of the believers; it is thus declared as an instrument for the establishment of an Islamic social order. And *jihād* is not just the fighting itself, but everything that is conducive to victory.

One theory of *jihād* that developed in modern Islam concentrates upon the causes of warfare waged by the Muslims, and these fall into two categories: those connected with the propagation of Islam and those connected with the idea of defence. The causes connected with the latter concern:

- (a) Repelling aggression from an actual or expected attack by enemy forces on Muslim lives and property. This is founded on the

following *Sūra* from the Qurʾān (2:190): 'Fight in the Way of Allah those who fight you, but do not provoke hostility'.

- (b) Preventing oppression and persecution of Muslims outside the Territory of Islam (*dār al-Islām*, i.e. territory in which the edicts of Islam are fully promulgated).
- (c) Retaliating against the breaking of a pledge by the enemy. This is supported by the following *Sūra* (9:21): 'But if they violate their oaths after they have made a covenant and attack your religion, fight the leaders of unbelief; no oath will hold in their case; mayhap they will refrain' (Peters 1977).

In the intermediate field between the armed struggle of the lesser *jihād* and the contemplative practice of the greater or spiritual *jihād*, the concept of *jihād* relates to the everyday life of the believers and to the injunctions of Sharīʿa. In this respect, the concept mediates rather than juxtaposes *sharīʿat* and *tariqat*: The fundamental encounter in Islam is between Man and his Creator, but the 'rights' of the individual believer in Islamic society are acquired by submitting to the obligatory practice and ethical norms of Sharīʿa — in other words, by entering into a divinely governed community.⁵ It is exactly within this area, covering broadly-speaking the socio-political order of Muslim society, that the all too obvious contrast between the ideal and the actual appeared (at least after the era of the *Rāshidūn* Caliphs, i.e. the four immediate successors of the Prophet, referred to by Sunnis as 'the rightly guided caliphs'). Such a contrast has been reflected through the centuries in the continuing controversy regarding the application and interpretation of the concept of *jihād* and other dogmas. On the basis of the sacred texts, the jurists of the four schools of orthodox Sunni Islam identified a number of 'combat zones' where forces of disequilibrium were at work with detrimental effects to the faith, the community of believers and the just social order and where (external) *jihād* thus would be lawful: *jihād* against unbelievers and *jihād* against sedition and subversion inside the religious community.

The internal forces of disturbance could here take the form of tyranny, crime, vice, corruption, heresy and rebellion. Clearly, the concept of *jihād* hereby came to occupy a central position in the internal power struggles within the Muslim community with the question of who had authority to declare *jihād* being crucial (Schleifer 1983a: 126-127, see also Schleifer 1983b).

However, while the issue of *jihād* directed against an external enemy of Islam created political unity against the infidels, it did not

ensure internal unity. A case in point is the endemic power and succession struggles from which Afghanistan suffered during the nineteenth century in which the concept of *jihād* was repeatedly evoked. Any contender to the throne would seek to obtain a *fatwā* (religious pronouncement from a *muftī*) denouncing his opponent as an apostate of Islam, perhaps because of alleged cooperation with non-Muslims, an offence which would justify a *jihād* against him. The actual ruler, for his part, would declare *jihād* against sedition and subversion (*fitna*). While the ability to lead or direct *jihād* was the prerogative of the ruler, it could not be done without the sanctioning of the *‘ulamā*, who consequently became party to all internal political power struggles.

***Barakat* as a Political Factor**

Religious authority has thus constituted and to a greater extent still constitutes a key factor in the credibility and reception of any ideological discourse in Muslim society, including acceptance of the exercise of power as being legitimate. Religious authority can, broadly speaking, be said to be based on scriptural knowledge (as in the case of *‘ulamā*), sacred descent, or on mystical association, on which basis individuals claim to represent God and to have rightful authority over others and over social institutions (Edwards 1986a: 273). Yet the position of the religious ‘personnel’ is *not* ideologically constituted by a state institution, however powerful, and the fact that they are servants of that other power, manifested in the Divine Message, means that they have a symbolic and ideological base. This base is, and can be seen to be, distinct from that of the rulers, even though these people may be subservient to and dependent upon the politically dominant group (Gilsenan 1982: 52). Thus, the religious ‘personnel’ constitute a potential threat to any state authority and have on numerous occasions throughout history actually challenged the existing ruler.

An important aspect of the religious authority of persons of holy descent and of mystical association, although *not* their exclusive prerogative, is the quality of *barakat* (blessing), with which in principle God can endow any Muslim. The outward sign of *barakat* is the manifestation of special positive powers (*karāmāt*, ‘charisma’) and abilities which can take on many different forms. These range from the demonstration of an extremely pious and ascetic lifestyle to the ability to issue a curative or protective *ta‘wīz* (charm, amulet) and the performance of outright miracles, such as feeding an army on one loaf

of bread — or walking on water for that matter. A person's *barakat* in many cases has not been recognized until after his death, for example through miraculous events near his grave or curative powers connected to sacrifice and prayers at the grave which accordingly becomes a *zīyārat* (shrine or sacred tomb). The claim on *barakat* can also have a more profane aspect as Pastner (1980) describes in relation to the 'competitive saints of the Baluch'. He states that although altruism and spiritual detachment are present in the exploits of many saints, more than half of all the cases he collected had as their dominant theme rivalry, either with other saints or with secular enemies, although such competition had been transmogrified to a supernatural plane (1980: 40). The outward manifestations of the sacred force, *karāmāt*, consequently can cross the boundary between the sacred and the profane, particularly in cases where the *pīr* (spiritual leader) utilizes his position in support of more mundane goals such as in the political field.

The display of *barakat* is matched by people's willingness to recognize *barakat*: 'Though the *pīr* himself does not fly, his followers would have him fly' (Ahmed 1975:15), and 'Though of straw, the *pīr* is still sufficient (in charismatic awe) for his disciple' as two Afghan proverbs express it. Whether or not the *pīr* actually performs his amazing deeds is ultimately irrelevant. His followers must believe that he does, and as stories about a particular *pīr* are embellished, so too grows the sense of security and optimism of the believers (Pastner 1980:42).⁶ This responsiveness to the existence of *barakat* should be viewed in the context that perhaps the most vital function of the *pīrs* is that they serve as tangible reminders to their followers that divine forces are present in this world, that the sufferings and setbacks of man's life are but a prelude to the delights awaiting the devout in Paradise (*ibid*). In other words, miracles have a very general significance in the construction of the meaning of experience; in local understanding of the nature and working of power and knowledge; as a commentary and a challenge to the everyday world and its dominant orders (Gilsenan 1982: 76).

The intersection of the existential and the historical interpellations of the individual thus brings about the 'sacralization' of worldly pursuits and this particular quality means that the miracles of the holy men are always potentially dangerous. Anything that opposes the given order of things, that disrupts causality, and which by definition is not controlled but comes from an external, non-human, transcendent source is in essence subversive. A miracle thus destabilizes, puts into doubt and demonstrates that God has chosen other instruments,

whereby the ruler's claims are contradicted (Gilsenan 1982: 77). Against this background it is clear that, when a *pīr* identifies with the political and social dissatisfaction and aspirations of his followers and puts his whole spiritual reputation into the service of a political protest movement (for example by declaring *jihād*), he can become a formidable leader.

Those who challenge the miracle or the *barakat* of the holy man, by the very fact of their doubt, risk showing that they are incapable of seeing the inner and 'true' world. Their attempt to discredit is thus taken as a triumphant demonstration of their own failure, and they are themselves discredited (*ibid*: 79-80). Entering politics, however, is for the *pīr* also like walking on a tightrope, as his reputation of spiritual power may become tainted and a political defeat will reflect negatively on the recognition of his *barakat*.⁷ In fact, the Sufi attitude towards 'saints' miracles' (*karāmāt al-awliyā*) has general currency in the sense that while the existence of such miracles is recognized, the receiver of this gift of working miracles is supposed to display towards God all the more humility, submission, godly fear, abasement and self-contempt, and be all the more prompt in responding to God's claims on him. This humility and abasement on the saint's part are taken as a sign of the authenticity of the *karāmāt*, while the 'enemies of God' who work apparently similar deeds, become puffed up and attribute the merit to themselves alone.⁸ The abstention from secular politics in the case of the *Ākhund* of Swat may be such an indication, and equally so the worldly pursuits of his descendants, who were unable to maintain the spiritual reputation of the *Ākhund*.

In the following chapters we shall see how religious dignitaries in Afghanistan have managed to utilize their spiritual authority in times of crisis to identify existing local grievances with the cause of Islam and under this ideological banner unite disparate groups in temporary alliances for a common cause. The channelling and formulation of *existing* dissatisfaction in society seem to be essential for the political role of the religious leaders - i.e. like a banner the mullah shows his beauty in a head wind.⁹

The Aesthetics of Reception

In the above, it has been pointed out that for a political ideology to come into existence and meet with some success, it requires 'a cultural tradition from which to deviate and from which to draw the elements which it intensifies and raises to centrality' (Shils 1968: 69). The

problem, however, remains how to determine what constitutes mere embellishment and what is real integration of religious, popular-democratic or other elements in a political discourse. For example, was the appeal to Islam and the tribal code by the PDPA regime in Afghanistan mere rhetoric and 'window-dressing' or did it represent a real attempt at integrating Islamic and tribal elements in the regime's ideological discourse?

The general issue of 'hypocrisy versus sincerity' has probably always been inherent in political discourses. In the Muslim world the issue gained particular prominence in relation to one of last century's great Muslims thinkers, *Sayyid* Jamal ud-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897), who devoted his life to the propagation of pan-Islamism and anti-imperialism. The political expression of pan-Islamism was a response to the colonial expansion in the Muslim world during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and constituted a search for a unifying ideology which could mobilize the believers to join forces and resist the colonial, infidel onslaught. The pan-Islamism of Jamal ud-Din al-Afghani and Mohammad 'Abduh (1849-1905) was its most prominent expression. They explained the success so far enjoyed by the colonial powers by pointing to the weakness inherent in Muslim societies, which had given the European powers a chance to intrude into the Islamic world. According to the pan-Islamists, the ultimate weakness was religious laxity and decay, and the abandonment of the principles of Islam. Hence, the solution to the problems was clear and simple: the purification of Islam by returning to its original principles and purging it of un-Islamic innovations and corruptions. The monotheistic character of Islam was stressed and all kinds of polytheism (*shirk*) and unbelief (*kufur*) condemned (Peters 1979: 153).

The recourse to Shari'a was for al-Afghani and the pan-Islamists a means, rather than a goal in itself. The Shari'a, and the universal caliphate that it was employed to justify, existed as a moral resource to be utilized for the sake of *jihad*, which for them was the exoteric and central form of resistance to imperialism, and for the sake of Muslim unity. This was 'a total reversion of the traditional Islamic order wherein the jihad exists to be employed by the Caliph (State) for the sake of its universal mission of implementing Shari'a...' (Schleifer 1984: 40-41). In contrast to modern apologetics, al-Afghani reaffirmed the combative nature of Islam, but it was a combativeness drained of spiritual content, deprived of any accompanying contemplative dimension; it was a combativeness for the sake of political dynamics (*ibid*). As a consequence, in spite of his undoubted devotion to engineering a Muslim renaissance, al-Afghani's religious credibility

has been strongly doubted, with accusations of him being a Free-thinker and consequently hypocritical and manipulative in all his religious writings.¹⁰

Keddie has addressed this whole issue in terms of a discussion of 'symbols and sincerity in the Islamic discourse' (1963). She points out that the revealed nature of the Qur'ān has made belief in its divine character a prerequisite for membership in the Muslim community, and has thus forced all discourses to relate to, or at least not openly challenge, this position. Hence, even the most aberrant of sects, unorthodox mystical orders as well as the modernists of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries formally claimed Islamic legitimacy for their ideas. This outward ideological conformity has probably always, even inevitably, gone hand in hand with a marked elitist attitude:

One's own group — the theologians, the philosophers, a single sect or Sufi order — was often regarded as the only one whose members were capable of apprehending the full truth, while for the rest of the Muslims literalist belief in the law was accepted as the best goal. The idea of levels of teaching corresponding to the level of the hearer was present in orthodoxy as well as among the Sufis and the sects, and contradictory ideas directed to different audiences have been attributed to the theologians as well as the philosophers. (Keddie 1963: 33-34)

This standpoint had been expressed bluntly by the respected theologian, al-Ghazali (A.D. 1058-1111), who expressed the view that the *ʿulamā* should refrain from trying to explain difficult questions to the masses and from giving them the true symbolic meaning of texts. Only those for whom literal interpretations open up doubts and give rise to difficulties which cause them to lose faith should be exposed to any non-literal interpretation, and the truest interpretation should be reserved for those who devote themselves wholly to knowing God. There were thus held to be three levels of argument and the level of argument used must be adapted to the person (*ibid.*: 44-45).

This distinction between different levels of expression and understanding in religious discourse also permeates Sufi thought in terms of a dualism between the 'apparent', 'exterior' (*zāhir*) and the 'real', 'interior' (*bāṭin*). The exoteric aspect of Islam, with its focus on adherence to Shariʿa and the pillars of the faith, is essentially community-oriented, striving to establish the just society on earth. In contrast, Sufism, with its focus on the inner dimensions of the faith, is fundamentally individual-oriented in its search for the purity of the soul. And where in the exoteric aspects of faith the way to God (in

principle) is one, in the esoteric aspects, there are many ways (Nasr 1980). Sufism thus operates with the concept of the existence of a spiritual world beyond the temporal world, the spiritual world being the 'real' and 'true' world but veiled by the illusionary manifestations of the temporal world. Sufism has left a strong impact upon the spiritual life of the Muslim world and is, for example, reflected in most Persian poetry, describing the soul's longing for God, often symbolically expressed in the relationship between man and youth (Asmussen 1981: 367). Its metaphysical speculations and allegorical and symbolic expressions often balance on the verge of blasphemy and its *literal* expressions can even topple into heresy.

The whole tradition of discourse in Muslim societies has been characterized by an inevitable Islamic content while symbolic and allegorical interpretations of texts and speeches have flourished, giving at least the Arabic and Farsi languages their special qualities of double-entendre. This culturally defined pattern of discourse precludes too literal an interpretation and provides the field of exchange between the transmitter and receiver of a given ideological discourse with a fluidity and flexibility of meaning which, yet again, serves as a warning against a reductionist approach to the analysis of ideology.

Given the premises of the 'Muslim discourse', the ultimate judge of what is 'real' and 'fake' must necessarily be the 'recipient' of the discourse, the group who is addressed through this interpellation — as in the case of accepting the *pīr*'s claim of *barakat*. This would lead us to what can be called the aesthetics of reception: how a discourse (oral or written) is received by listeners and readers. As pointed out by Arkoun (1988: 58), this question can only be answered by reference to the conditions of perception fixed by each culture, or, more precisely, each level of culture corresponding to each social group in each phase of historical development. In other words, legitimacy, like beauty, is in the eyes of the beholder which means that the validity of any claim or challenge to legitimacy (or any ideological discourse for that matter) is determined by its reception in the wider population. Consequently, the struggle for legitimacy is a struggle over 'the thoughts and minds' of the recipients of the discourse.

In the following chapters, we shall try to show how different social groups at various times have attempted to integrate religious elements and appealed to religious authority in their competing ideological discourses in their struggle for state power in Afghanistan — as well as to look into the conditions for the comparative success and failure of these different attempts.


Notes

- 1 "To be able to speak of a popular-democratic interpellation, the subject addressed as 'the people' must be so in terms of an antagonistic relationship regarding the dominant bloc" (Laclau 1977: 107).
- 2 See Fischer (1980) for a fascinating study of the articulation of religious legends, symbols etc. within the political discourses leading up to the Islamic Revolution in Iran.
- 3 Legitimacy is the foundation of such governmental power as is exercised both with a consciousness on the government's part that it has a right to govern and with some recognition by the governed of that right. (D. Sternberger: 'Legitimacy', in *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Macmillan, 1968, vol. 9: 244).
- 4 Peters (1979) discusses the concept of *jihād*, showing how it has changed from the early days of Islam, when any war against unbelievers was a *jihād* until today. See also Schleifer (1983b) for a discussion of the development of the doctrine of *jihād*.
- 5 This is based upon the Qur'ānic imperative *al-amru bil mar'ufwa'nahyn anil munkar* (to enjoin the doing of what is right and forbid the doing of what is wrong).
- 6 See, for example, Edwards (1986a), referring to the miraculous deeds attributed to Afghan *pīrs*.
- 7 For further discussion of this aspect, see Edwards 1986a.
- 8 *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, vol. 4: 615-616, Leiden, 1973.
- 9 Accounts of the more detailed personal history of 'activist' mullahs are unfortunately very scarce, so we are precluded from studying the details of the process of how they established themselves as politico-religious leaders. However Ahmed (1982) presents a case study of the activities in the early 1970s of the so-called Mullah Wazir in South Waziristan, which gives many indications of how a mullah in a closed community can shift the role of a lower religious functionary to a veritable and dangerous political activist.
- 10 For a thorough study of al-Afghani and his ideas, see Keddie (1968, 1972).

CHAPTER 2


Afghanistan Towards the End of the Nineteenth Century

To analyse the political use of Islam in Afghanistan from 1880 till today, it is first necessary to give a sketch of the political and religious situation in the country during the latter part of the nineteenth century. The ethnically heterogeneous population and the delicate balance between tribes and state were two important aspects but, in turn, both the political and religious situations in the country during the nineteenth century were strongly affected by the country's international (i.e. geopolitical) position as a buffer state between the colonial empires of Tsarist Russia and British India.



© Asta Olesen and Nordic Institute of Asian Studies 1995.
Adapted from Embree (1988, vol. 3: 359)

Map 2: Zones of contention between the Safavid and Mughal empires and the Uzbek Shaibanids in the sixteenth century



© Asta Olesen and Nordic Institute of Asian Studies 1995.
Adapted from Dupree (1973: 320)

Map 3: The empire of Ahmad Shāh Durrani (ruled 1747-72)

External Forces and the Growth of Afghanistan

For millennia, the area now called Afghanistan has been a crossroad of cultures, empires and peoples which has given rise to a turbulent history. The area has been part of many empires, some of which had spread out from there, such as the Ghaznavids (tenth-eleventh centuries) and the Ghūrīds (twelfth century), succeeded by periods where the area was split up between independent, local principalities.

During the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries Afghanistan had no political identity of its own and was parcelled between the Mughal empire of India and the Safavid empire of Persia, the former holding Kabul north to the Hindu Kush mountains and the latter Herat and Farah. Kandahar was for many years in dispute and for a time the Uzbeks were also influential in the north and west (see map opposite). Periodic indigenous attempts were made to gain independence,¹ but not until the disintegration of the Safavid empire following the assassination of the ruler Nader Shāh, was it possible to establish a lasting independent rule in Afghanistan under the Durrani. The Durrani empire was founded in 1747 by the election, in a (Pashtun) tribal *jirga* (council), of Ahmad Khān Abdali as king (*shāh*), who henceforth was to be known as Ahmad Shāh Durrani (1747-72). He

succeeded in establishing his authority throughout the present Afghan area and extended Afghan rule from Mashhad to Kashmir and Delhi and from Amu Darya to the Arabian Sea (see Map 3 above).²

Already under Ahmad *Shāh's* son and successors (see Figure 2 overleaf) the empire began to disintegrate as a result of tribal rebellions and attacks from the Persians in the west and to the east the rising Sikh power in Punjab. By the turn of the eighteenth century, the growing interest in the area of the European colonial powers (primarily Britain and Russia) further affected the precarious existence of the Afghan state. The British were anxious to protect their expanding territorial acquisitions in India from French and Russian threats after Napoleon's alliance in 1801 with Tsar Alexander I. British missions were thus sent to Afghanistan, Persia and to Ranjit Singh of Punjab, resulting in the treaties of 1809 and 1814.³ The end of the Napoleonic Wars removed all British fear of the French in India. However, continued Russian territorial advances in Asia at the expense of Persia and the Ottoman empire led the British to adopt the so-called 'forward policy' designed to secure British hegemony in Persia and Afghanistan (see Map 4). Afghanistan was henceforth to be regarded as the 'frontier' of India and no European nation would be permitted to carry on commercial or political activities there, or to interfere, directly or indirectly, in Afghan affairs (Gregorian 1969: 96).

Meanwhile, rivalry inside the ruling dynasty, among the Saddozai Popalzai and the Mohammadzai Barakzai branches (see Figure 2 overleaf), led to the dismemberment of the Durrani empire, with each contender for the throne striving for regional control. While the Afghan rulers were fighting for control over the four areas of Kabul, Kandahar, Herat and the northern Uzbek khanates, Punjab, Sind, Kashmir and most of Baluchistan were lost, first to local rulers but ultimately to the British who were consolidating their possessions in India. As a dimension of imperial policy of the area, it should be mentioned that neither the Central Asian khanates, nor Persia, Afghanistan, China, or the North Indian principalities had firm and mutually-recognized borders, which caused these states to be more or less perpetually at war with all neighbouring states and raising claims on each others' territory (Wheeler 1964: 42).

The Persian threat to the Afghan state also continued and in November 1837 Mohammad *Shāh* of Persia laid siege to Herat with Russian support. The British, fearing that Persia was falling completely under Russian influence, i.e. thereby directly threatening India as Herat was considered 'the gateway to India' (Florinsky 1953: 984), entered into alliances with the rulers of Herat, Kandahar and Kabul.


The Afghan *Amir* Dost Mohammad, who controlled Kabul and the eastern parts of the country also hoped for British assistance in recovering Peshawar from the Sikh ruler Ranjit Singh of Punjab. However, the negotiations between Dost Mohammad and the British failed and when a Russian agent at the same time appeared in Kabul, the British in 1839 decided to protect their own interests by invading Afghanistan and reinstating the former Afghan king, *Shāh* Shuja ul-Mulk. This move had been prepared for by a British-initiated alliance treaty concluded in 1838 between *Maharaja* Ranjit Singh of Punjab, the exiled *Shāh* Shuja of Afghanistan and Britain. Under the treaty, the British government acquired control over the foreign policy of Afghanistan and the Punjab received some Afghan territory. In exchange Shuja ul-Mulk was promised he would be reinstated to the Afghan throne (Khalfin 1981:101). The popular reaction in Afghanistan was strong and the subsequent First Anglo-Afghan War (1839-42) resulted in a British withdrawal and Dost Mohammad recapturing the throne. During the next twenty years, he managed to consolidate his rule by occupying Kandahar (1855), the northern khanates south of Amu Darya (1859) and Herat (1863).

At the same time, British consolidation and expansion in India continued. In 1843 the British captured Sind and in 1849 fully conquered the Punjab, advancing right up to the Afghan border. But the British failure in the First Anglo-Afghan War had the result that a 'stationary policy' vis-à-vis Afghanistan prevailed for some years. Proponents of this policy argued that consolidation on the north-western frontier of India along the Sutlej River would ensure for Britain an effective government in India, would promote trade, provide greater security, and enable a greater economic hold over India. British interference in Afghan affairs was thus for some years restricted to more indirect means such as financial subsidies to the *Amir* and a friendship treaty in 1857. The expediency of this policy was soon proved to the British, as it prevented the Afghans from giving support to insurgent Hindu and Muslim sepoys in the Indian Mutiny of 1857.



Figure 2: Dost Mohammad,
Amir 1819-39, 1842-63

Figure 3: Afghan royal lineage since 1747



*Note: The Abdali have been known as the Durrani since Ahmad Shāh Durrani.

Source: L. Dupree 1973: 366-367.

However, the turbulent tribal frontier to the northwest remained a continuing source of harassment to settled British rule, and Pashtun raiders served as a constant lure and justification to champions of the 'forward policy'. Russian advances (i.e. a Russian version of a 'forward policy') were resumed in Central Asia in the 1860s (see map overleaf). This resumption was partly encouraged by the Indian Mutiny, which led Russian policy-makers to believe that the latent hostility to Britain could be exploited (Seton-Watson 1967: 441). With Russian influence thus reaching the banks of Amu Darya, plus the risk of the Russians exploiting non-Pashtun areas of northern Afghanistan as a foothold for an advance towards India, no further arguments were needed for a British return to the 'forward policy', i.e. to advance the frontier of the Indian empire beyond the Hindu Kush and right up to Afghanistan's northern frontier along the Amu Darya. However, problems of maintaining tranquillity in India kept the British busy for some further years so that their 'Afghan policy' was limited to border pacification measures, and the British kept out of direct interference in the continuous succession struggles in Afghanistan.

The Russian advances in Turkestan sufficiently alarmed Disraeli so that by 1874 when he came to power, a more vigorous, interventionist British line was taken with Kabul. The objectives of the 'forward policy' were to preclude Russian gains in Central Asia, to provide India with a 'scientific frontier' and to bring Afghanistan under tighter British supervision and control.⁴ The new viceroy of India, Lord Lytton, expressed the British attitude very bluntly:

Afghanistan is a state far too weak and barbarous to remain isolated and wholly uninfluenced between two great military empires... We cannot allow [Sher Ali] to fall under the influence of any power whose interests are antagonistic to our own. (Gregorian 1969: 111-112)



It is interesting to note here that, for the Russians, the concepts of securing imperial frontiers and of a 'civilizing mission' in Asia were as closely interconnected as they were for the British, and their fear of British designs on Central Asia beyond the Indus were as real (or unreal) as the British fear of Russian advances on India beyond the Amu Darya (Wheeler 1964: 61-62). In 1864, Prince Gorchakov, the Russian Imperial Chancellor, thus justified the Russian expansion in Central Asia in a memorandum circulated to Russia's European embassies:

...the interests of security on the frontier, and of commercial relations, compel the more civilized state to exercise a certain

ascendancy over neighbours whose turbulence and nomad instincts render them difficult to live with. (Fraser-Tytler 1967: 305)⁵

By 1873, the Russians and the British reached a territorial agreement regarding their respective spheres of influence in Asia whereby the Russians were not to expand beyond Amu Darya and Afghanistan took the status of a buffer state between the two empires.⁶ The competition for territorial conquest was thus to be replaced with competition for diplomatic influence.

Map 4: British and Russian expansion on the Afghan periphery (1800-1900)



© Asta Olesen and Nordic Institute of Asian Studies 1995. Adapted from Dupree (1973: 342) and Schwartzberg (1992: 64)

However, in 1878 the Russians despatched a diplomatic mission to Kabul led by General Stolietov seeking a mutual assistance treaty with Afghanistan in view of Russia's conflict with the Ottoman empire, which was supported by the British (Khalfin 1981: 105-106). In the circumstances, the British saw the alternatives to be either a negotiated diplomatic settlement with the Afghan *amir* that would permanently ensure British influence in Afghanistan or, failing that, the destruction of the Afghan kingdom and the conquest of as much Afghan territory as was necessary to secure the Indian frontier. Diplomacy failed and the outcome was the Second Anglo-Afghan War of 1878-80. The Afghan *Amir* Sher Ali sought help from the Russians who, however, advised him to make peace with the British. When Sher Ali died, it was his son and successor Yaqub *Khān* who signed the Treaty of Gandamak in 1879 with the British. They in turn recognized his *amir*ship. The treaty determined that Afghan foreign policy should be controlled by the British, that British representatives should be stationed in Kabul and in other strategic places and that there should be an extension of British control in the North-West Frontier region. In return, the *Amir* was to receive a subsidy of 600,000 rupees per annum (Hamilton 1906: 468).⁷

But the Treaty of Gandamak did not ensure peace. The British resident Sir Louis Cavagnari arrived in Kabul in July 1879 and was assassinated on 3 September. The British mission was then massacred in a popular uprising that was followed by the British occupation of the city and the abdication of Yaqub *Khān*. Nor were the objectives of the 'forward policy' achieved. With the return in 1880 of the Liberals to power in England, where this second British failure was a key electoral issue, the view predominated that a total dismemberment of Afghanistan might well weaken the Indian frontier and threaten the British presence in Punjab. Influenced by these considerations, a new British administration in India under Lord Ripon took a bold step in achieving a political settlement of the Afghanistan question by recognizing Abdur Rahman, cousin of the late *Amir* Sher Ali, as *Amir* of Kabul; and in 1881, the British forces also withdrew from Kandahar after having been defeated in the battle at Maiwand in July 1880. The recognition of Abdur Rahman as *Amir* was a somewhat daring move on the part of the British since he had spent some eleven years of exile in Russia after his involvement in internal warfare (with Sher Ali) over the succession and had presumably returned to Afghanistan with the approval of the Tsarist government, perhaps even with its financial assistance (Gregorian 1969: 117).

In the following years, British influence in Afghanistan was ensured through the control over the foreign policy as stated in the Treaty of Gandamak, sweetened by a handsome British subsidy to the *Amīr* rather than forced upon him through the exercise of physical power. In 1883, the subsidy was raised to 1,200,000 rupees annually (Hamilton 1906: 472) and for the Afghan *Amīrs* Abdur Rahman and Habibullah these subsidies became an essential means in their struggle to establish a strong and centralized state that was not exclusively dependent upon the tribes.

During the reign of *Amīr* Abdur Rahman, the boundaries of modern Afghanistan were drawn by the British and Russians through boundary commissions: in 1884 along the north-western frontier and in 1896 in the Pamirs.⁸ In 1893 the Durand Line agreement divided zones of responsibility for the maintenance of law and order between British India and Afghanistan.⁹ With Russian advances to Khiva in 1881, Merv in 1884 and Panjdeh in 1885, Afghanistan was geographically reduced to being a buffer state between Tsarist Russia and British India. The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 defined Central Asian 'spheres of influence' to be enjoyed by the two European rivals (Gregorian 1969: 92). The Afghan portion of this convention placed Afghanistan outside Russia's sphere but within Britain's, while Persia was divided between a northern zone of Russian interest and a south-eastern zone of British interest. Though the Afghan *Amīr* Habibullah refused to sign the convention, this agreement ensured Anglo-Afghan peace until after World War I.

The domestic consequences for Afghanistan of having been the matter at issue between the two imperialist powers had been, besides suffering two major wars, foreign occupation and annexation of territory, that the economy was dislocated with the urban sector almost completely in ruins. 'The two Afghan wars seriously damaged the country's meagre economy, especially the urban economy. The population and the economy of Kabul and of the Kandahar region declined sharply; the province of Herat also suffered enormous material losses. The modest achievements of the Amirs Dost Mohammad and Sher Ali were undone' (Gregorian 1969: 126). At the same time, the power of the religious leaders increased and tribal leaders consolidated their position vis-à-vis the central state.

It is to these two central forces of religion and tribe that we now turn in examining the domestic developments within Afghanistan during the late nineteenth century.

Tribal Forces in the Development of Afghanistan

While several of Afghanistan's many ethnic groups were, and still are, organized along tribal lines,¹⁰ we shall here concentrate on the Pashtuns as they have traditionally been the 'state-supporting' group.¹¹ The Durrani empire was in essence a confederacy of Pashtun tribes which conquered and lost adjoining territories, and the state and the Pashtun tribes have been closely interconnected and interdependent – or, in the words of R. Tapper (1983:4), 'tribes and state have created and maintained each other as a single system, though one of inherent instability'. Here and throughout this book, Tapper's definitions of tribe, confederacy and state are used: '*Tribe* may be used loosely of a localized group in which kinship is the dominant idiom of organization, and whose members consider themselves culturally distinct (in terms of customs, dialect or language, and origins)... The term *confederacy* 'should be used for a local group of tribes that is heterogeneous in terms of culture, presumed origins and perhaps class composition, yet is politically unified, usually under a central authority... The *state*, finally, is a territorially-bounded polity with a centralized government and a monopoly of legitimate force, usually including within its bounds different social classes and ethnic/cultural groups...' (*ibid.*: 9-11).

When the Durrani empire was founded in 1747 through the confederacy of Pashtun tribes electing Ahmad *Khān* Abdali as *shāh* (king), the state and government were essentially tribal in nature. Tribal leaders were confirmed in their possession of land, the main offices of state were distributed among the different tribes, and the king had to consult a council of nine tribal chiefs. Thus, the Durrani empire should be likened to a confederation of tribes and khanates (a tribal state) rather than to a centralized monarchy (R. Tapper 1983: 13, Gregorian 1969: 48, Elphinstone 1839/1972).


Politically, the tenuous authority structure in the tribes made them volatile and difficult to control or direct for any sustained period. Leadership in the tribes was much more dependent on the personal qualities of the leader than on obedience or loyalty to a hierarchy. In terms of the Pashtuns' own formulations, *khāns* are those who 'feed the people', there is 'no *khān* without *dastārkhwān*'¹² and they 'tie the knot of the tribe', while he 'who calls himself a *khān* is not a *khān*'. This picture encompasses all the dimensions of *khān*ship as compared to other types of leadership in terms of actions as well as predications (Anderson 1983:133-134).¹³

In dealing with the Pashtun tribes, which formed the military and political backbone of the kingdom, the Afghan monarchs were subject

to the same limitations of authority as the tribal chieftains of the basically egalitarian Pashtun tribes. Accordingly, the ruler was viewed by the tribes merely as a superior chief, a man of personal qualities admired by the tribes but no more than a *primus inter pares* (Poullada 1970; see also Bellew 1862: 121-122, Elphinstone 1839/1972).¹⁴

Lacking institutionalized means of power, the rulers exploited continuing tribal rivalries and feuds among the Pashtun tribes to consolidate central power.¹⁵ According to R. Tapper (1983:52), the relations between tribes and state are built on a paradox: while the state requires tribal unity of a certain measure through the mechanism of tribal leadership, in order to create and uphold the hierarchy required for indirect rule, it also exploits tribal fission in a 'divide-and-rule' fashion. Stronger rulers would control the tribes by nominating leaders, keeping members of chieftains' families as hostages, establishing marriage alliances between chieftains' and royal families, executing dissidents and fostering dissension between rivals for

Map 5: Major ethnic groups in Afghanistan and the distribution of Pashtuns in Pakistan



leadership or between neighbouring tribes. The constant state of tension and uneasy power balance between the tribes and the state is contained in the saying that the tribes in Afghanistan were both 'king-makers and -breakers' (Poullada 1970: 23).

During the period 1747-1880 the functions of the Afghan state were rather limited in scope and chiefly consisted of internal administration of justice, provision of military protection against external aggression, and revenue collection to finance the above functions. The tribal structure of the state permeated these three functions. First of all, it was only in the cities that the state was able to guarantee law and order through a judicial system staffed by *qāzīs* (judges) appointed by the king; in the countryside, resort to local measures such as *jirgas* (tribal councils) prevailed. The state-sanctioned legal system was not codified, but functioned on the basis of Shari'ca, modified by certain acknowledged parts of *Pashtunwāli* and customary law (*rawaj*) (Elphinstone 1839/1972, II: Ch. V). The *qāzīs* did not interpose unless an application was made to them. This happened infrequently in the remote areas where they were mainly employed in civil cases, others being dealt with by *jirgas*. Since acknowledged crimes were also most frequently dealt with at *jirgas*, the state-supported judicial system in fact only covered a fraction of the legal processes in the country, the rest being handled by tribal and other local institutions (*ibid*).

Military functions constituted one of the main expenses of the state. The Durrani clans were obliged to supply troops (Elphinstone reports a total of 12,000 at the time [*ibid*: Ch. VI]) in return for the rent-free lands granted to them. In addition, they also received three months' pay in a year when on active service. The king also recruited permanent troops among other ethnic groups of the country and the respective chiefs received payment by assignments of land for supplying men from their tribes or areas. Finally, various forces were raised in time of war, for example calculated as a specific percentage of the local population (e.g. one in each ten men). And, as Elphinstone points out (*ibid*), in case of foreign invasions, a spontaneous mobilization of the tribes of the area in question would also take place. However, the general recruitment to the army and its internal organization was based upon a conception of the population consisting of subject communities (rather than individuals), of various ranks (depending upon the history of conquest by the state), with the supply of officers being mainly the prerogative of the Durrani (*ibid*).

The principal source of income of the state was the revenue on land, assessed on the produce according to fixed proportions, which varied with the nature of land and from province to province. Other incomes

came from the sale of offices as well as from commutation money in lieu of troops which should have been supplied by certain tribes or districts. Collection of land revenue was frequently subject to a system of farming out from provincial level downward. The tribal structure of the state was also clearly reflected in the economically privileged position of the Pashtun tribes in the state, as reflected in the structure of revenue collection. The Durrani *shāhs'* main revenue (76.5%) came from the Indian provinces conquered by Ahmad *Shāh*: Kashmir, Multan, Dera Ismail Khan, Dera Ghazi Khan, Shikarpur, Muzaffarabad, Attok, Indian Hazara and Sukkur (Gankovsky 1981: 88). The taxes collected from non-Afghans in the Kabul, Herat and Kandahar areas played a lesser role, as did the nominal taxes paid by the Pashtun tribes. In Ahmad *Shāh's* own words, the West gave him warriors and the East gave him money (*ibid*: 86; see also Oesterdiekhoff 1978: Ch. 4, Elphinstone 1839/1972). Most privileged of all were the Durrani, as they were exempted from taxes on land, cattle, orchards and vineyards etc. Instead, the tribes were in some cases obliged to pay a certain (symbolic) tribute to the *shāh* as a token of their allegiance. But even when the *shāh* was taxing the tribes, a significant proportion remained with the respective *khān* as *jāgīr* (a quasi-feudal commission). The *jāgīr* system was part of the intricate balance between tribal leaders and monarch, and typically it spread mostly in the western parts of the Durrani empire where the tribal *khāns* (Durrani) were comparatively strong. However, while the *jāgīr* system may have been a cornerstone in the building of the empire, it also sowed the seed of its downfall as it tended to enfeeble the central government by the setting up of quasi-independent baronies, which in turn undermined the economic foundation of the state through the *jāgīrdārs* taking an ever-increasing proportion of the revenue. This impoverishment plus the continuous succession struggles weakened the state economically and politically. Gradually, the outlying (Indian) provinces fell away and, by the early nineteenth century, the state was so seriously undermined that it was close to disintegration.

The Durrani empire was thus in essence a 'conquering state', i.e. the revenue extracted from the outlying non-Pashtun areas served to maintain political support from the Pashtun tribes whose military strength maintained the sovereignty of the state throughout the area (Oesterdiekhoff 1978: Ch. 4). In this context it is also significant that after the secession of the Indian provinces from where the bulk of revenue was extracted, the Afghan rulers fell victim to the British policy of subsidy - which ultimately became an essential means of consolidating the state vis-à-vis the tribes.

The existence of a central power thus influenced the social structure of the tribes by strengthening the authority and power of the chieftains politically and economically, as mentioned through land grants and taxation rights, etc. However, this 'feudalization' process took place at a very uneven rate among the Pashtun tribes and was most pronounced among those closest to the seat of central power (i.e. among the Durrani - see Reisner 1981, Oesterdiekhoff 1978).¹⁶ On the other hand, the Pashtun tribes' reaction to the central state was also influenced by the considerable variation in socio-political forms between various regions (see Elphinstone 1839/1972, Reisner 1981, Gregorian 1969, Barth 1959, Ahmed 1976, etc.).¹⁷


Although more than ninety percent of the Afghan population were Muslims, Hanafi Sunni Islam being by far the dominant creed, the Afghan rulers after 1747 did *not* claim legitimacy for their rule on the basis of the 'Pious Sultan theory' which had sustained Muslim rulers since the thirteenth to fourteenth centuries (see Chapter 1). The reason for this situation was that as a distinctive feature of Afghan tribalism the legal and moral basis of society first and foremost was laid down in *Pashtunwāli* (the Pashtun tribal code), and only secondly in Shari'a. At the individual level, there was no conflict or contradiction between Islam and *Pashtunwāli*: on the contrary, for the Pashtun, Islam and *Pashtunwāli* supported each other: 'Paradise in Islam is acquired through Pashtu...the countless graces of Paradise come through Pashtu to the Pashtuns' (Ghani 1977:23).¹⁸ A Pashtun is by definition a Muslim as by birth he obtains an inalienable right to Pashtunness; hence, Pashtunness and Muslimness do not have to coalesce; they are within each other and the interiority of the former is assumed in the latter (Ahmed 1980: 115).

While the Pashtun tribesman saw no conflict in the fact that 'what is in the Qur'an is not in Khost - and what is in Khost is not in the Qur'an', the same did not necessarily apply to the people of religious calling operating among the tribesmen. Anderson (1984) thus refers to the conflict conceived by the Ghilzai between *Pashtunwāli* and *shar'at* (and to a lesser extent *tariqat*), and what was considered the 'politicizing' (*gund-bāzi*) of local mullahs, detrimental to tribal unity (*qaumwāli*) - this obviously is in opposition to the well-known role of religious persons acting as mediators in tribal conflicts. However, such a situation has basically developed through the present century and does not seem to reflect the situation prior to 1880. This discussion will accordingly be taken up later.

In accordance with the Afghan state having remained a tribal confederacy, *Pashtunwāli* also formed the primary ideological basis of

the state during the period 1747-1880. In the 'Tribal Model of Legitimacy of Power', the ultimate source authority was still Allah and the Prophet but, rather than being mediated through the *‘ulamā* to the temporal ruler in the person of the *shāh/amīr*, the tribes mediated this divine authority to the ruler through the institution of *jirga*. Chieftaincy thus did not possess any inherent authority and leaders, whether *khān* or *amīr*, only exercised the power they had been allocated by the *jirga*. Thus, the model constituted an interiorization of *Pashtunwāli* with Islam. The actions and decisions of the rulers had to conform to *Pashtunwāli*, to the *Sharī‘a* and especially to the decisions of the *jirga* which were based on the concept of communal authority. *Rawaj* (customary law) varied from tribe to tribe and from region to region and, taken together, *Pashtunwāli* and *rawaj* were given priority over the tenets of Islam (Elphinstone 1939/1972, I: 220), although in relation to *Sharī‘a* they were not seen as separate and distinct entities. The transmission of legitimacy of power during the period 1747-1880 can be sketched thus.

Figure 4: Model of the transmission of the legitimation of power, 1747-1880



Examples of the predominance of *Pashtunwāli* and *rawaj* can be found in matrimonial law and inheritance, where women are put at a disadvantage as compared to *Sharī‘a* and in adultery (*zinā‘*) where *Sharī‘a* demands four witnesses but *Pashtunwāli* is satisfied with the rumour only. According to Roy (1985: 52) the reason is, that where *zinā‘* in relation to *Sharī‘a* is a question of morals, it is a question of honour for *Pashtunwāli*. Generally speaking, in *Pashtunwāli* personal

law is based on self-determination (*ghayrat*) and on the revenge of degradations of personal integrity rather than on the precise punishment of derelicts laid down in the Sharī'ah and its definitions of punishment as communal interest (Anderson 1984: 276).

By definition the Afghan king was the hereditary chief and military commander of the Durrani tribe; in principle the ruler had to be confirmed by a tribal *jirga*, which in reality meant that he was bound by the will of the Durrani *sardārs* (leaders of the royal lineage) since his rule depended on their good will and military strength (Gregorian 1969: 46). With no formalized rule of succession, the tribal principle that leadership falls on the most able prevailed. As such, the struggle for power among the Durrani *sardārs*, which involved both patricide and fratricide, easily matched and became related to tribal feuds and rivalries in the country as a whole. However, from 1842 onwards the Mohammadzai lineage of the Durrans managed to provide Afghanistan with its rulers (except for a short spell in 1929), and thus continuously confirmed the principle of a royal lineage inside which succession had to be settled.

With its democratic spirit and tenets, the *jirga* defied political centralization, and its constant accommodation of regional interests made it a particularly divisive force in the drive to form a modern and unified state (Gregorian 1969: 40-41). *Pashtunwāli*, which set the limits of acceptable behaviour within the community and governed the relations between tribes,¹⁹ equally counteracted attempts at centralization of political power and legal and economic encroachments.

Summing up, it can be said that, by the end of the nineteenth century, central power – which both politically and militarily originated from and was based upon the Pashtun tribes – had not yet been able to supersede the structural limitations of the tribal state with its inherent tendencies to fragmentation and disunity. The picture changed somewhat at the end of the nineteenth century when Afghanistan, as a consequence of serving as a buffer state, received foreign subsidies that both directly and indirectly contributed to the establishment of a strong, centralized state. At the same time, however, the establishment of the Durand Line in 1893, dividing the state allegiance of many tribal groups, created a 'no man's land' between Afghanistan and British India that lay outside the effective control of either. Both the Afghan government and the British Indian authorities played these tribes against each other, giving them money and weapons. All parties involved realized the cynical power game involved and the fact that the tribes thus subsidized were furthering their *own* interests rather than that of any of the states involved and strengthening their political

position vis-à-vis the state. On the Afghan side of the border the result was that the ruler had to a large extent to accommodate the tribes in domestic policy, while on the British Indian side, the tribes managed to retain a considerable measure of autonomy which they still enjoy today in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan.

The 'Religious Situation' in Afghanistan

Although it may be argued that *Pashtunwāli* formed the ideological basis of the Afghan *state* from 1747 to the middle of the nineteenth century, this does not mean that *Pashtunwāli* constituted the main ideological frame of reference of the ethnically heterogeneous and divided *society*. This position had been enjoyed unchallenged by Islam for centuries: Islam was not only part of the legal and moral basis of society, mediated through and coexisting with tribal code and local customs, but also for many centuries all learning and education in the country had taken place within an exclusively religious framework. Consequently, each and every educated or learned person was trained in *religion* and all public offices required religious knowledge. People of religious training thus enjoyed a considerable influence: they were in charge of all education, of the interpretation of Shari'ah,²⁰ of administration of justice and the supervision (enforcement) of public morals. In other words, beyond the parochial, tribal and localized identities, religious leaders were the autonomous keyholders to the socialization into the wider, religious, community, the *umma*.

However, with the state's field of activities being more or less limited to the protection against external enemies and the maintenance of internal order as well as collection of revenue, the number of civil offices at state and provincial levels was also rather limited. Hence, religious experts directly *employed* by the state were comparatively few. Apart from the religious personnel connected with the King's household and mosque, Elphinstone (1839/1972, II: 277-278) reported the following salaried religious positions:

- (1) *Mullah Bāshi*, who selected the mullahs to be summoned to the *majlis-i-'ulamā* (presumably an ad hoc council of religious scholars) and acted as the channel of communication between the ruler and the mullahs.
- (2) *Shaykh al-Islām*, who administered the stipends and pensions to mullahs on instruction from the local *hākims* (provincial administrators).²¹

- (3) *Sadrs* (chiefs, magistrates) of the cities, who kept the register of all 'religious' land, whether granted by the king or bequeathed by private persons, and ensured its proper disposition, subject to the king's order.

In addition, for maintenance of law and order in the cities, the following positions were staffed by the state with personnel who had religious training (*ibid*: 262-265):

- (4) *Qāzī* (judge), in all large towns. They were appointed by the king but only a few were salaried by the state. Instead they were either paid by the local community or charged a fee for their services.
- (5) *Muftī* – while Elphinstone (*ibid*) does not specify whether the *muftī* occupied an official position, it appears that the *muftīs* carried no salary but charged a fee for their services.
- (6) *Dārughā* supervised the judicial process and ensured that all proceedings conformed to the law.²²
- (7) *Muhtasib* (always a mullah) enforced public morals, controlled adherence to religious obligations and prohibitions as well as administered punishments according to Shari'ah on possible offenders. In the towns the *muhtasibs* were salaried and also entitled to a small tax on shops; in the countryside, they levied an annual fee on the population.

Islam, and in particular Sunni Islam, does not display any 'church' structure, i.e. there are no institutional means either to define and defend orthodoxy or to represent the people of religious calling as a corporate body or to defend their interests. Hence, while the functioning of the Afghan state depended upon the above religious personnel and many others of religious learning, they for their part had neither formal hierarchy, centralized structure nor any national level organization. Religious leadership was consequently governed by local patterns and the attributes of individual *‘ulamā*, *pīrs*, etc.

Given the background of their legal, educational, spiritual and economic powers, this lack of corporate, centralized structure did not prevent religious leaders from exercising considerable influence and power at local as well as national level. However, this power and influence was exercised more in an individual capacity than as a group. Only when external onslaughts on their collective rights and privileges forced them together could a united stand be sustained.

But, even then, this unity might only include the 'top echelons' of the clergy as the existence of many hundreds of unattached religious scholars, not directly subject to any institutional sanction from their peers, meant that the rulers were generally able to co-opt individual scholars through *wazīfas* (religious allowances) or positions in return for endorsing their policies on Islamic grounds.

For the rulers, co-option through economic means was an important strategy towards religious as well as tribal leaders, which is illustrated by the fact that the major part of the country's revenue was spent on allowances to these two groups.²³ While the tribal leaders had more economic assets of their own to sustain their independence of the state, the religious leaders were to a large extent dependent upon grants and donations from devotees in general, from tribal leaders – and from the state. However, just as common as the silent endorsement by religious leaders of the de facto rule was the alliance of religious leaders with tribal groups in opposition to the central state. And even the British colonial regime tried to take part in these power games and vied for the support of the religious leaders through the assignment of allowances.

As discussed in the previous chapter, religious authority was (and is) not *ideologically* constituted by the state but broadly speaking was based upon scriptural knowledge, sacred descent, and mystical association. The main religious groups were thus the *‘ulamā* and *fuqahā* (legal scholars); *sayyids* and *khwājas* (persons of religious descent); *pīrs*; and, finally, the ordinary *imāms*. While the *‘ulamā* and *fuqahā* possessed exoteric religious knowledge obtained through religious education at *madrāsas* (colleges for higher studies) in or outside Afghanistan, the *pīrs* and people of religious descent possessed esoteric knowledge obtained through initiation into a Sufi order (*tariqat*) or through inherited *barakat*. These groups were not mutually exclusive but overlapped in many cases. Most of the mullahs working as *imāms* had only rudimentary religious training from local *madrāsas* or *maktabs* (lower-level religious schools). The primary functional units were correspondingly the *madrāsas* for religious education, the *khānaqāh* (Sufi dwelling for board and instruction), centres of esoteric learning associated with Sufi *tariqats*, the mosques for congregational worship – as well as the *zīyarat* (shrines) of holy men (*pīrs* and others of *barakat*) attracting devotees for pilgrimage.

In addition to this institutionalized power and influence in the legal, educational and spiritual spheres, the religious establishment also enjoyed economic self-sufficiency through direct land ownership

or control of religious endowments (*awqāf*) and through religious taxes. In 1815, Elphinstone described how many mullahs greatly increased their wealth and acquired a considerable share of the landed property of the kingdom by lending money at compound interest – i.e. through practising usury (*sūd*) – even though, generally, interest-taking (*ribā*) is understood to be prohibited in the Qurʾān. Others had achieved ecclesiastical office or pensions from the crown, many had land grants from the king or from village headmen and some had received legacies of land from individuals. Many groups of village *imāms* received a certain share of the harvest or from the flocks in their districts. Others lived by teaching and practising law, or as *mawlawīs* (scholars of religious learning) teaching at *madrāsas* or as tutors to the sons of rich men, while some lived from charitable allowances granted by the crown or donated by the population (Elphinstone 1839/1972, I: 285-286). And there were many of them: a census of mullahs in Khost only, in 1900, showed their number to be 600.²⁵

In addition, people of religious knowledge or those of holy descent often acted as intermediaries or served as peacemakers among warring tribes, roles which further increased their social and political influence. Religious peoples' role as mediators in conflicts and as charismatic leaders in times of crisis were mainly due to their position as 'outsiders' vis-à-vis the tribal society – since many came from tribally insignificant families and were settled outside their home area – as well as their claim on authority being external to the tribal system. They could thus act as a disinterested party in a conflict with the whole *umma* as their frame of reference rather than a mere tribal segment, while employing tribal as well as religious law.

A person of religious renown could, through skilful use of his spiritual and political potential, achieve and exercise considerable influence, especially in time of crisis when these particular gifts were greatly needed. This aspect in particular impressed British observers last century:

... and these advantages [i.e. control of education, practice of law and administration of justice], together with the respect which their superior knowledge commands among an ignorant and superstitious people, enable the Moollahs in some circumstances to exercise an almost unlimited power over individuals, and even over bodies of men; to check and control the governors and other civil officers; and sometimes to intimidate and endanger the King himself. (Elphinstone 1839/1972, I: 282)

However, as Ahmed (1976: 51-56) also stresses, the following and political leadership of religious persons are of an 'ephemeral nature': To maintain his spiritual authority, a religious person is expected to display moderation, piety, indifference to physical pleasure, and withdrawal from the petty and sordid aspects of common life (Barth 1965: 101), which may be invalidated by political involvement. Hence, there are numerous cases where religious leaders through their *jihād* campaigns or in other situations were transgressing the fine line between spiritual (i.e. disinterested) and political leadership. This brought them into the arena of tribal politics and subjected them to the rules of the secular power game of competition for followers, amply illustrating that they as much as the tribal leaders were nothing except for the support they could command among the population.

A religious leader who too often may have tried to exact tribute or raise a *lashkar* (tribal levy) to attack the infidels, but without winning any victories nor forwarding the interest of the tribe, may see the tribal leaders turn against him by questioning his personal integrity and accusing him of personal greed – that is, attacking the very foundation of his spiritual power. On the other hand, the religious leader may try to damage the position of tribal leaders by proving them to be bad Muslims through accusations of collaboration with the British, and even go as far as to excommunicate them.²⁶

At another level, the good-natured mocking of the alleged cunning and greed of the ignorant mullah, as embodied in tales of Mullah Nasruddin (known and loved throughout Muslim West Asia),²⁷ was and is also deeply ingrained in Afghan society. Contained in this is the opposition seen between the lofty spiritual aims of the religious profession and the profane and worldly ambitions of (some of) its practitioners, most pointedly formulated by the famous Pashto poet Khushhal Khan Khattak (1613-91):

I have observed the disposition
Of present-day divines
An hour spent in their company
And I'm filled with disgust

And:

The plunder these *shaikhs* carry off
While chanting God's great name
(Mackenzie 1965:79)

As such, individual differences among people of religious calling were profound: huge differences in terms of learning, of power and

influence, of economic means, of outlook as well as in the respect they commanded. The village *imām*, with little learning and a meagre income, and commanding only a limited respect as the religious functionary of the village, can thus hardly be compared with the powerful and learned *qāzī* (judge) or *muftī*. Nor can the Sufi *pīr* – with thousands of devotees, controlling extensive areas of *waqf* land and receiving royal grants – or the regionally powerful and rich *sayyid* families be compared to the wandering *darwīshes* (religious mendicants) and *faqīrs*, who had renounced all worldly attachments for a life of spiritual devotion.²⁸

The Madrasa

The religious leaders' most important institutional source of influence and authority in society was their absolute monopoly over the educational system, which, however, by the mid-nineteenth century was not yet structured as one coherent system. For the majority of the (male) population, education at best consisted of studying the Qur'ān in Arabic at the mosque under the guidance of the local *imām*, who himself was able to read the Qur'ān but hardly had any command of Arabic, and only a slight knowledge of *fiqh*. Some village *imāms* knew even less than this and acted mainly as prayer leaders, carrying out the basic religious functions in connection with birth, death and other such rites. In these Qur'ān-schools, *maktab*, children were also instructed in the basics of religion such as praying, fasting etc.

Those pursuing actual education would enrol in a *madrasa*. This system of education had spread all over the Muslim world since the Seljuq vizier Nizam ul-Mulk (A.D. 1018/19-1092) opened the first *madrasa* in Baghdad in A.D. 1066-67 in order to promote Sunni orthodoxy and counteract Shi'a 'propaganda' in the empire, as well as to train reliable, competent administrators schooled in Islamic Law. The traditionally recognized fields of learning became: Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*), Qur'ānic interpretation (*tafsīr*) and *hadīth* plus related commentaries, laws of inheritance (*mīrās*), philosophy (*ḥikma*) - Ibn Sina, Farabi etc., which included logic (*manṭiq*), metaphysics and grammar (*ṣarf* and *nahw*), theology – plus literary studies covering the Persian classics and natural sciences focused on ancient Greek medicine and astrology (*‘ilm nujūm*). Due to the uniformity in its religio-legal content, the *madrasa* also displayed a considerable uniformity in structure and teaching principles throughout the Muslim world. This means that, although there are few extant descriptions of *madrasas* in

Afghanistan, we can with reasonable certainty assume how they have functioned.²⁹

The *madrasa* functioned as a system of individual tutoring, with the (male only) student (*tālib*) studying under the guidance of a master-teacher, a *mawlawī*. Most *madrasa* in Afghanistan had only one teacher, while at the largest ones there might be between four and five teachers. A number of students studied under a teacher but on an individual basis so that only one subject was taught at a time and studied for as long as it would take the student to master it. Students of the *madrasa* were generally supported by the people of the local community and with financial support from the land endowments belonging to the *madrasa* that also provided the livelihood of the teacher. Although the teacher was supposed to have encyclopaedic knowledge, different teachers were normally known for their abilities within one discipline or another. As such, their fame might reach far and wide and thus attract students from distant places. Although the curriculum had remained fairly constant over the years, different *madrasa* became famous for being 'strong' in particular disciplines (by having teachers of renown within certain subjects) and the students could thus compose their own study programme by travelling to the places where such famous tutors were to be found. However, the student-teacher bond was a very close and personal connection, and it was a question of the teacher agreeing to become the tutor and spiritual guide of the student.

Students pursuing religious studies usually came from poor, landless families with no other prospects in life other than becoming a mullah or religious scholar. Better-off families did not send their sons for religious education and the rich and highly-positioned families engaged private tutors for their children (Majrooh 1986: 128). The *mawlawī* was himself educated at a *madrasa* and the majority of his students would either become ordinary mullahs or, if they were good and completed the cycles of learning, maybe *mawlawīs* or *qāzīs* (judges in Islamic courts) themselves. With the close connection between the *madrasa* system and Sufism in Afghanistan at the time, many an *‘ālim* or *mawlawī* would at the same time be a *pīr* (see below).

At the height of the Islamic civilization, *madrāsas* had been prominent centres of learning where not only religious studies but also natural sciences were encouraged and many outstanding scholars had been produced. However, they gradually declined and became rigid, closed structures.³⁰ Creativity was replaced by passive acquisition of already established knowledge even within the most favoured traditional fields of studies. 'Original texts of theology, philosophy,

jurisprudence, etc. were replaced by commentaries and by commentaries upon commentaries. Time was spent on refutation and counter-refutation and never on basic problems and research' (Majrooh 1986a: 129).

During the Timurid dynasty (from the fifteenth to the sixteenth century) Central Asia and Afghanistan had experienced a cultural bloom with cities like Samarkand, Bokhara, Balkh, Herat and Ghazni becoming the most prominent centres of scholarship and science in the Muslim world. However, in the case of Afghanistan, decline set in after the area became divided between the Safavid and Mughal empires and the Uzbeks in the north. Yet another factor was the discovery of the sea route to India which caused the decline of the trans-Asian caravan routes (the Silk Road) which had been an important factor in the flourishing urban culture of Afghanistan (including their centres of learning). Instead, the economic and political centre of gravity shifted to the countryside and to the control over landed property – essential features in the formation of the Durrani empire in the eighteenth century (Jäkel 1972:118-119). Afghanistan had thus been reduced to the 'cultural periphery' and in the nineteenth century reaching its lowest ever intellectual level. Majrooh (1986) gives examples of how for instance grammatical rules in Arabic were learned by heart while the student would never be able to make a sentence in Arabic nor understand an Arabic text. Knowing the grammar was an end in itself. Equally sterile was the traditional 'art of disputation' which basically consisted of being able to memorize the 'correct' arguments to standardized objections.

By this time *ṭālib*s would typically go abroad to some renowned centre to pursue further studies. The places most frequented by Afghan students were Samarkand and Bokhara in Central Asia and Deoband, Bareilly, Gopal, Delhi, Hyderabad and Swat on the Indian subcontinent. For Pashtuns, the nearby *madrasas* of Akora Khattak and Jame Haqania near Nowshera and the Jamia Ashrafia in Peshawar were particularly popular. This situation created an inter-regional connection among the *ṭulamā*, where for example ideas and attitudes prevalent at Deoband exerted a strong influence in Afghanistan.

In Afghanistan, the political commitment of the Indian-trained *ṭulamā* seems in general to have been much stronger than that of those trained in Central Asia. Sirat (1969: 217) recounts that most of those who studied in India were interested in teaching Islamic studies while those who went to Bokhara, Samarkand and Tashkent were more interested in Sufism and memorizing the Qur'ān. One reason for this difference may be that the intellectual revival among the Muslim

community in British India in the nineteenth century was formulated within a religious framework and reflected in the religious institutions (such as the establishment of *Dār ul-ʿUlūm* at Deoband in 1867 and the modernist Anglo-Mohammadan Oriental College at Aligarh in 1877). In Central Asia, or at least in the khanate of Bokhara which had the closest connections to Afghanistan, the situation in religious institutions was one of intellectual and cultural stagnation, as described by Alexander Burnes from his travels in 1831-33 (Burnes 1834/1975: 305-312). Bokhara was at that time a city of about 150,000 inhabitants with 366 colleges (*madrasa*) each of which had some 70-80 students, many of whom came from the neighbouring countries, apart from Persia. But at all the 366 colleges of Bokhara all learning but theology was despised and only the Qurʾān and its commentaries were studied, a state of affairs causing Burnes to give the following judgement: 'The students are entirely occupied with theology, which has superseded all other points. They are quite ignorant even of the historical annals of their country. A more perfect set of drones were never assembled together' (*ibid*: 307). Samarkand had fared even worse and declined from its former grandeur to a provincial town of 8,000 with only 3 *madrasas* functioning. Thus, the ideological battlefield between the *jadids* (modernists) and the *qadīmists* (conservatives) seems not only to have reached Bokhara at a comparatively late stage but also to have left the traditional religious schools more or less unaffected (Bennigsen & Wimbush 1979: 10).

Sufi Orders

Religious authority could also be based on mystical association in the form of initiation into a *tariqat*. In Afghanistan, as in Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent especially, adherence to Sufi orders was an integral part of religious practice with some of the major Sufi *tariqats* originating there. (One of the oldest *tariqats*, the now-extinct Adhamiya, was founded in Balkh in the second century A.H. [ninth century A.D.], with the Chishtiyya order also apparently founded in Afghanistan. As well, the Afghans like to count the Mawlawiya *tariqat* as being of Afghan origin due to the Afghan birth of its founder, even though it is not represented in Afghanistan).

As early as the ninth century, cities like Herat, Chisht and Jam counted among the most important Sufi centres attracting followers from other parts of the Islamic world. One of the greatest Sufi poets of the time was *Khawāja* Abu Ismail Abdullah Ansari (A.D. 1005-89) of

Herat, who attracted a large number of disciples. His tomb at Gazargah has up to this century been a *zīyārat* with an attached *khānaqāh* (Rizvi 1978: 77). In the twelfth century, in the city of Chisht, *Khawāja* Maudud Chishti became famous as a great Sufi and it is after him that the Chishtiyya *tariqat* is named. However, the deaths of *Khawāja* Maudud's disciples marked the end of the great spiritual peak in Sufism which had flowered in Chisht. Political unrest ultimately caused *Khawāja* Mu'in ud-Din Chishti, one of the greatest Sufis of the time, to leave Chisht and move the Chishtiyya *tariqat*'s spiritual centre to Ajmer in India (*ibid*: 114-116).³¹ However, western Afghanistan remained a




Figure 5: The Deoband *madrasa*

Dār ul-'Ulūm Deoband was one of the most famous traditional *madrasa* in British India. It was established in 1867 with the specific objective of reorienting the Muslim community to its original cultural and religious identity in view of the decline of the Mughal empire and the onslaught of British colonization. Particularly under the dynamic leadership of Mahmud al-Hassan (1859-1921) did Deoband achieve its international reputation. For details on *Dār ul-'Ulūm Deoband*, see the studies by A. Ahmad (1967), B. Metcalf (1978) and S.M. Rizvi (1980).

stronghold for the Chishtiyya order, and close ties were maintained with the centre in India. Before his death, *Khawāja* Maudud ordered one of his *khalifas*, *Shaykh* Wutu known as *Pir Kabir* (Great *Pir*) to return to his homeland, and his successors continued through the centuries following to maintain the Chishtiyya presence among the Afghan tribes (Rizvi 1983: 292-293). In the early seventeenth century, Balkh also experienced a strong Chishtiyya presence after the banishment of *Shaykh* Nizam Thanewari from India by the Emperor Jahangir (*ibid*: 343). In general importance, however, the Chishtiyya order was overshadowed in Afghanistan by the Qadiriyya and the Naqshbandiyya *tariqats*.

The Qadiriyya *tariqat* was founded by Abdul Qader Gailani (A.D. 1077/78-1166), in Baghdad and is thus one of the oldest of the *tariqats*. In India, however, it gained a footing only at the end of the fourteenth and during the fifteenth century. One of the outstanding Qadiriyya *pirs* in seventeenth century India was *Shaykh* Naushad, whose disciples were scattered throughout northern India and as far as Kabul. The most eminent was *Khawāja* Muhammad Fuzail who was personally trained by the *Shaykh* and sent to his hometown of Kabul to spread the Qadiriyya order in Afghanistan (*ibid*: 54-68). The order became particularly influential among the tribes in eastern Afghanistan during the nineteenth century, because of the presence of the famous Qadiriyya *pir*, *Shaykh* Najm ud-Din, the so-called Hadda Mullah.³² Most of the prominent mullahs in eastern Afghanistan and on the Frontier around the turn of the century, were either *murids* or *khalifas* of the Hadda Mullah (see Chapter 4). The presence of the order in Afghanistan was further strengthened in the beginning of this century when the brother of the *Naqib Sāhib* of Baghdad (i.e. the title given to the spiritual leader of the Qadiriyya *tariqat* by the Ottoman rulers) left Hijaz and settled, first in Quetta and then in Chaharbagh in the Ningarhar province of eastern Afghanistan, on the invitation of the Afghan *amir*. The Gailani family has since often intermarried with the Afghan royal family.

However, the leading *tariqat* in Central Asia and Afghanistan was the Naqshbandiyya order, founded by *Khawāja Sayyid* Baha ud-Din 'Naqshband' of Bokhara (1318-1389). Later on, the *Khawāja's* disciples established networks of Sufi centres throughout Central Asia and in Herat, Balkh and Badakhshan. During the Timurid dynasty (fourteenth-fifteenth century), the Naqshbandiyya *tariqat* thus formed the dominant factor in the spiritual and political life (Jäkel 1972: 117). The conquest of India by Babur in 1526 gave a considerable impetus to the development of the Naqshbandiyya order, and close spiritual

ties were maintained between Central Asia, Afghanistan and India through the travelling *murīds* and *murshids* (Rizvi 1983: 174-180). However, the strength of and widespread support for the *tariqat* in India and Afghanistan is mainly due to the reforming zeal of the Naqshbandi *pīr*, *Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi* (*Shaykh Rabbani*, 1564-1624), on whom the title *Mujaddid-i Alf-i Thani* (Restorer of the Second Millennium) was bestowed and who is the most outstanding example of how puritan orthodoxy and *tasawwuf* (Sufism) have been combined in India. The Naqshbandiyya, under the guidance of *Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi*, spearheaded the orthodox reaction to the Emperor Akbar's heresy, i.e. his attempt to introduce a syncretistic faith, *Dīn-i Ilāhi* (Rizvi 1983, Ahmad 1964).

In view of the critical state of Indian Islam, *Shaykh Ahmad's* main concern was to close the breach between the religious law (Shari'a) and the mystical doctrines of the Sufis, actually to weld them together in a single synthesis (Ahmad 1964:186). While *Shaykh Ahmad's* scholarship had firm roots in orthodoxy, he also practised as many as four *tariqats* – Chistiyya, Qadiriyya, Suhrewardiyya and Naqshbandiyya – but with strongest emphasis on the latter with which he has become identified.

Due to the Naqshbandiyya order's strong position in Central Asia and Afghanistan, fourteen of *Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi's* *khalīfas* came from here, while only six came from the Indian subcontinent. Among the Afghans three in particular were outstanding, *Mawlānā Ahmad*, *Shaykh Yusuf* and *Shaykh Hasan*; after initiation they were all sent back to their home area (Bark between Kabul and Kandahar). Three other disciples came from Badakhshan, one from Balkh and one from Kabul. Although hampered by the existence of rival Naqshbandiyya *pīrs*, *Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi* and his *khalīfas* were quite successful in Afghanistan and Transoxiana (Rizvi 1983:232- 241) and today, most Naqshbandiyya *pīrs* draw their *silsila* from *Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi*, and the *tariqat* is represented by some of his descendants, known under the name Mujaddidi.³³

Among his ancestors, *Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi* counted *Furrukh Shah al-Faruqi al-Kabuli*, who was a governor of Kabul in the Ghaznawi era (tenth-twelfth centuries). He renounced his worldly pursuits and chose the Sufi path, settling in Nejrab in Kapisa province, where his tomb reportedly still attracts pilgrims. While the major part of the family remained in Afghanistan, an elder relative of *Shaykh Ahmad*, *Imām Rafi ud-Din*, went to Sirhind in India where he founded the city of Sirhind and built a *khānaqāh*. The father of *Shaykh Ahmad*, *Shaykh Abdul Ahad*, was also known as a great *ʿālim* and *pīr*. During the

eighteenth century, the rise of Sikh power and their continuing invasions of Sirhind prompted the great-grandsons of *Shaykh* Ahmad to migrate elsewhere and gradually Delhi became their main centre (Rizvi 1983: 243-44). The present Mujaddidi family in Afghanistan traces their descent from *Shaykh* Ahmad Sirhindi as per Figure 6 (see opposite). While the main branch of the Mujaddidi family settled in the Shor Bazaar in Kabul, they also founded centres in Kohistan, Ghorband, Laghman and Logar. Another more distant section of the family maintained a *khānaqāh* at Jaghartan, Herat.³⁴

However, in spite of the massive presence of the Mujaddidi Naqshbandiyya, there are still other Naqshbandiyya *silsilas* represented in Afghanistan. For example the most prominent Naqshbandiyya presence in Herat is the *khānaqāh* at Karrukh, founded by Abdul Kasim, also called Sufi Islam, who originally came from Bokhara. Followers of Sufi Islam were, and still are, to be found among the Jamshidi, Taimuri, Firozkohi, Uzbek and Turkoman as well as by other Sunnis of Central Asia (For. & Pol. Dep., Dec. 1892, Nos. 28-45). Sufi Islam sacrificed his life in declaring *jihād* against the Persians for their attack on Herat in 1837 (Kakar 1979: 152). On his death, the grave of Sufi Islam became a *zīyārat*.

Tarīqat and Shari'at

Afghanistan, like the Indian subcontinent at large, was characterized by a close connection between Sufism and orthodoxy quite different from the opposition which has existed in many places. Historically this has been brought about by some of the important reformist movements being both a reaction to Hindu-influenced heterodoxy as well as being Sufi-inspired.

In India, because of the challenge and the risk of disintegration into Hindu mysticism, Sufism took special care to resolve its differences with orthodoxy. In Islamic religious history the tension between the religious assertion of the transcendence of God and the mystical aspiration for this immanence was perhaps nowhere more thoroughly resolved to a middle of the road position than in India where Islam was propagated mainly by the Sufis with a firm emphasis on the observance of the tenets of the Shari'a. (Ahmad 1964: 131)

The most prominent example of this was *Shaykh* Ahmad Sirhindi, who, apart from being a scholar, was also a most prominent Naqshbandiyya *pīr*. This combination of scholarly abilities and *pīr*-

Figure 6: Descent of Mujaddidi family from *Shaykh* Ahmad Sirhindi

Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi (1564-1624), *Mujaddid-i Alf-i-Thani*, shrine at Sirhind.

|

Khawāja Mahmud Ma'sum, *Zia-ul-Khaliqun*, shrine at Sirhind.

|

Khawāja Mohammad Sebghatullah (1622/23-1708/09), *Qayyum-i Zaman*, shrine at Sirhind.

|

Khawāja Mohammad Ismael, *Imām-ul-Arefin*, shrine at Sirhind.*

|

Hajjī Ghulam Mohammad Ma'sum-i Thani, *Qutb ul-Aqtab*, shrine at Sirhind.

|

Hajjī Safiullah, *Qayyum-i Jehān*. Founded the Mujaddidi family in Afghanistan where he settled as *Ḥaẓrat* of Shor Bazaar (Kabul) at the time of Timur *Shāh* (1772-1793) and Zaman *Shāh* Abdali (1793-1800). He died on *hajj* (pilgrimage) and his shrine is in Yemen.**

|

Shāh Abdul Baqi, shrine in Bala Koh, near Shor Bazaar, Kabul.

|

Khawāja Ghulam Siddiq, shrine in Bala Koh.

|

Shāh Ghulam Qayyum.

|

Fazl Mohammad al-Mujaddidi, *Shams ul-Mashayekh*, died 1923.

|

Fazl Omar al-Mujaddidi, *Noor ul-Mashayekh*, died 1956.

|

Mohammad Ibrahim Mujaddidi, *Zia ul-Mashayekh*, killed by PDPA government in 1979.

Notes:

* Beyond this point, the *silsila* reported by the Afghan Mujaddidi-family's biographer does not correspond to that given for example by Rizvi (1986) and Ahmad (1964). However, rivalries over succession had already started among the grandchildren of *Shaykh* Ahmad Sirhindi, and this may well be the reason for the discrepancy.

** Edwards (1986a) states that the family claims to have come to Afghanistan with Ahmad *Shāh* after his battle and victory at Panipat (1761) over the Maharattas.

Source: The information on the Mujaddidi family has been obtained through the kind assistance of Dr. Zabiullah Mujaddidi, who arranged an interview for me with the biographer of the family, Mr. Nadir Khuram. For a chart of the contemporary kinship relations of the Mujaddidis, see Adamec 1975.

hood was thus the rule rather than the exception on the subcontinent and in Afghanistan. The situation was particularly marked in the case of *Dār ul-'Ulūm Deoband*, which became known for its traditionalism while at the same time being closely associated with Sufism (mainly Naqshbandiyya or Qadiriyya). In fact, for most of the teachers, the *mawlawī-tālib* relationship was complemented by the *pīr-murīd* relationship.

The three orders which have been most widespread in Afghanistan are in general characterized by a close adherence to orthodoxy. The Chishtiyya order, which was presumably first represented in Afghanistan, has from the very beginning emphasized the importance of *hadith*; by some it is even considered as having precedence over mystical cognition. The founder of the order in India, Mu'in ud-din Chishti (1142-93), saw Sufism as an ethical discipline (*akhlāq*) of the mystics, which proceeds through four stages: first, strict conformity to the Shari'ah, which leads to the second stage of the mystic path (*tariqat*), which in turn leads to the third stage, of gnosis (*ma'rifa*), finally leading to the fourth stage of Truth (*haqiqat*) (Ahmad 1964: 133).

The Naqshbandiyya order, which together with the Qadiriyya order dominates the scene of Afghan Sufism, is the order which conforms closest to orthodoxy. Algar (1976) explains that insofar as the Naqshbandis regard their path as being that of the first generation of Muslims (i.e. Abu Bakr being the first link in the *silsila* after the Prophet - which also distinguishes them from other orders which trace their spiritual descent through Ali), they must also seek to emulate the combination of intense outward activity and inward devotion and tranquillity, which is supposed to have characterized the era of the 'rightly guided caliphs'. These considerations in turn are reflected in the Naqshbandi guiding principle of *khalwat dar anjuman* (i.e. solitude within society) whereby it is understood that devotion should not lead to seclusion from society, as that may lead to exaltation of the Ego. Another important Naqshbandi principle of *safar dar watan* (journey within the homeland) is equally emphasized as the inward journey, the journey of the homeland that is man's own inner world and the receptacle of God's grace. This is a divergence from the common feature of ascetic life, the travels around the world, the wandering *darwishes* etc., as the Naqshbandis see this outward journey as liable to become an end in itself rather than supporting the inward travel (*ibid*: 133-134).

The principle of *khalwat dar anjuman* has laid the basis for Naqshbandi involvement in political life and attempts to influence the rulers in order to protect the Muslims from the evil of oppressors. The activity

for securing the supremacy of Sharī'a and the welfare of the believers was thus seen as a step on the spiritual path, in itself a mode of devotion which by no means contradicts the inward cultivation of spirituality but rather complements it. The Naqshbandis have thus been very active both in relation to local Muslim rulers as well as in opposition to foreign domination. As an illustration of this it is only necessary to mention a few of the most outstanding Naqshbandi *shaykhs* in India such as *Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi*, *Shah Waliullah Dihlavi*, *Sayyid Ahmad Bareilly* and *Obaidullah Sindhi*, all of whom have been very closely associated with movements for the restoration of the true faith. Equally so, it was a Naqshbandi *pīr*, *Shaykh Shamil*, who led thirty years of resistance to tsarist Russian colonization of Dagestan (in the Caucasus region) in the nineteenth century. It is thus in full harmony with Naqshbandiyya tradition and principle, that the Naqshbandi *shaykhs*, the Mujaddidis, became the most prominent, politically involved religious leaders in Afghanistan in the twentieth century.

'Maraboutic' Sufism

As in the case of the Afghan *madrasas*, there can be little doubt that the great philosophical tradition of Afghan Sufism as it was earlier represented, particularly at centres around Herat and Balkh, was experiencing a decline during the nineteenth century (see also Utas 1980). In view of this, it is remarkable that throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century Sufi *pīrs* flourished, particularly in the eastern parts of Afghanistan and among the trans-border tribes in British India – areas where neither Sufism nor the scholarly tradition of Islam at any time approached the heights it reached in West and Central Asia. These *pīrs*, while enjoying the support of thousands of followers and exerting very great influence, did not belong to famous *silsilas* nor seem in any way to have revived or significantly contributed to the philosophical tradition of Sufism. The *khānaqāhs* and *madrasas* they set up were in most cases renowned only during the lifetime of the founder, while the *khalīfas* (either spiritual but in most cases also biological descendants of the founder) in general failed to live up to the legacy.

What we here encounter is a Sufism quite different from that of the old-established *tariqats* of West and Central Asia. Roy (1985) refers to this as the difference between a Sufism of maraboutic type and that of orthodox type. By orthodox Sufism, Roy understands the *tariqats*

characterized by individually initiated *murīds*, regularly participating in *dhikr*, and where the *pīr* at the same time (or at least frequently) acts as an *‘ālim* - i.e. the situation described above where the *pīr-murīd* relation often complemented the *‘ālim-tālib* relation. These orthodox *tariqats* can be found among all the orders in Afghanistan but were concentrated mainly in the north-western region, in the Kabul area plus a few places around Kandahar and Zabul (Roy 1985: 56-57).

Maraboutic Sufism, on the other hand, refers to a collective adherence of a clan or tribe to a *pīr* family, supposedly blessed with *barakat* (which may also be the case with the orthodox *pīr*). There is here no individual membership of the *tariqat* and neither initiation nor *dhikr*. The *pīr* practices *dhikr* on behalf of his followers who enjoy his *barakat* through blessings, cure of diseases, miraculous deeds etc. The followers, which Roy prefers to call a *mukhlis* (devotee) rather than *murīd*, thus indicating a less close relationship to the *pīr*, prove their devotion to the *pīr* through annual visits and offerings. In return, the *pīr* bestows hospitality and protection on his followers. In other words, the *pīr-mukhlis* relationship has the ingredients of a patron-client relationship, and it is the leading families of the clan or tribe who mediate the relationship between a *pīr* and his followers (Roy 1985: 57-58).

In many cases, the *pīr* would not have any particular scholarly qualifications, i.e. he would not count as an *‘ālim*. Roy makes this an absolute rule for the maraboutic *pīrs*, but in the case of the Naqshbandi *pīr* (*Hāzrat Sāhib* of Shor Bazar) and the Qadiri *pīr* (the *Naqīb* of Baghdad), both extremely influential among the eastern Pashtun tribes, the situation seems to have been otherwise: while in these areas they assumed the form of maraboutic *pīrs*, in other areas their followers were organized in the orthodox type of *tariqat*.

As for the particular flourishing of maraboutic *pīrs* in the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth in east Afghanistan and among the trans-border tribes, these were mainly of the Qadiriyya order, and most of them were appointed *khalīfas* of the *Ākhund* of Swat - or of his principal *khalīfa*, the *Hadda-i Sāhib* (see Chapter 4). It is mainly to these *pīrs* that reference is made in British sources under labels such as ‘mad mullah/*faqīr*’, ‘firebrand of the Frontier’, etc. The background for this is that, far from living the secluded life of an ascetic *darwīsh*, these *pīrs* were strongly involved in worldly affairs, particularly in the political life at local, national and international levels, and in most cases assumed the leadership in political uprisings against oppressive Afghan rulers but first and foremost against British colonialism. Presumably it is this situation which made Elphinstone pass the judgement on religious leaders that ‘in the west

[of Afghanistan] their power is much more limited, and their character much more respectable' (Elphinstone 1839/1972, I: 284).

Since there is little evidence of such a representation of Sufi *pīrs* in this area at earlier times, it is tempting to suggest that their appearance was more a political than religious phenomenon and should be seen in the light of the British expansionism which by the middle of the nineteenth century seriously began to affect this region. The appearance of these 'activist mullahs' can thus be seen as both a direct and indirect response to the colonial policy and to the feeling of 'Islam in danger' as perceived by the tribesmen. (The Muslim world as a whole presents numerous parallel examples to this). This assumption seems to be confirmed by the observations of Shahrani that the religious establishment in Badakhshan, unlike the areas to the south of the Hindu Kush, did not gain significant political power during the nineteenth century – 'probably because the area was not under a direct threat of Western colonial penetration, and hence did not need a jihad' (Shahrani 1984: 149-150).

Religious Minorities

Although the majority of the Afghan population were Sunnis, there was a sizeable Shi'a minority inside the borders of the Afghan state, mainly composed of Imami Shi'as consisting of the Hazara population of the central highlands and the influential Qizilbash of Kabul, Herat and Kandahar, plus some Tajik Ismaili Shi'as near Doshi and in Badakhshan.³⁵

In principle, the Shi'a faith is more unified and hierarchical than Sunnism. Religious dignitaries among the Shi'as enjoyed extremely high prestige and influence because they either claimed descent from the Prophet (were *sādād*)³⁶ and/or because of their reputation for learning or pilgrimage to holy shrines, especially the Shi'a shrines of Mashhad, Nejad and Kerbala. Jafri (1976) relates the historical origins and conceptual foundation of the 'Ali supporters' (i.e. the Shi'as) to the fact that in traditional Arab society the idea that 'noble qualities were inherent in certain stocks' was quite common. Moral qualities were thus seen as being genetically transmitted, the best virtues of an individual being only those which were handed down to him from his noble ancestors. The concept of 'noble birth' found its expression in *Imām* Hussain's letters to the Shi'as of Basra:

God has chosen Muhammad from among his people, graced him with His Prophethood and selected him for His message.

After he admonished the people and conveyed His message to them God took him back unto Himself. We, being his family (*ahl*), his close associates endowed with the quality of guardianship (*awliya*), his trustees and vice regent (*awsiya*), and his heir and legatee (*warith*), are the most deserving among all the people to take his place... (quoted from Jafri 1976: 179-180).

Owing to their 'noble birth', the *sādād* families were in receipt of religious taxes (*khums*, literally 'one fifth' of property), were considered the most prominent religious authorities and were seen as legitimate political leaders in times of crisis.

The social and political significance of the *sādād* in Imami Hazara society was so great that Kopecky (1982) goes as far as to say that it is not the Hazaras who integrate the *sādād* population but rather the *sādād* who manage to unite continually contending and divisive kin groups and tribes of the Hazara, and other Imami groups, into a political unit. However, the greater degree of hierarchization of the Hazara society, where local clan chiefs and religious leaders of *sayyid* descent exercised much more power than in the more egalitarian Pashtun society, apparently did not mean a greater degree of internal unity. The clans and lineages were not welded into a unified tribal organization, and followers of the Sunni, Imami and Ismaili faiths could all be found within the one clan. Hence Hazara society was traditionally seen as internally conflict-ridden.³⁷

The Hazaras lived in Hazarajat, an area of central Afghanistan which, in spite of being within the borders of the Durrani empire, had remained very isolated and in practice independent of the central government. However, since the formation of the Durrani empire, the Hazaras had been subject to encroachment of their territory by Pashtun groups which gradually forced them away from some of the most fertile lands and into the central highlands.³⁸ They had also been the target of continual attempts to subject them to the central government. Many Hazaras could also be found outside their home area; Elphinstone (1839/1972, II: 213) informs of many Hazara labour migrants doing menial jobs.

The Qizilbash, on the other hand, had always been close to the centre of power. They were originally Persians, acting as mercenaries in the Safavid army, and came to Afghanistan as mercenaries in Ahmad *Shāh* Durrani's army, and later on also formed the personal bodyguard of his successor Timur *Shāh*. Being external to the Afghan tribal system and as a minority not hatching any power plots themselves but depending on the powers that be, they could normally

be counted on as a loyal force for the existing ruler, and consequently came to occupy many trusted positions. The Qizilbash was an almost entirely urban population settled in a few major cities where they had more or less formed their own quarters (*mahālla*).

In the Muslim world in general, the followers of Shi'a Islam remained *doctrinally* in potential opposition to the Sunni majority and to the established authority, and the Shi'as' position as a persecuted minority led to the religious acceptance of *taqiyya* (dissimulation) in times of religious persecution. The Sunni majority in Afghanistan, who at least at the beginning of the last century were praised by travellers as non-bigoted towards people of different faiths, considered 'a Sheeah as more an infidel than a Hindoo and [Sunni Afghans] have a greater aversion to the Persians for their religion than for all the injuries the country has suffered at their hands' (Elphinstone 1939/1972, I: 262). With this background, it is hardly surprising that it was the policy of the rulers of Kabul to avoid an alliance between the politically and economically influential Qizilbash community and the Hazaras, since this was seen as a threat to the state.

However, the Qizilbash and the Hazaras had little in common except for their faith, which rendered both of them liable to persecution from the Sunni majority. Edwards (1986b) stresses that even in their practice of Shi'ism, Qizilbash and Hazaras displayed great differences. Given their social position and high literacy, the Qizilbash retained contact with the scriptural tradition, with the centres of Shi'ism and even counted a number of *ulamā* among their own ranks who were able to produce treatises on religious subjects. The Hazaras, on the other hand, being generally poor and geographically isolated, practised a Shi'ism with little connection to the scriptural tradition, but more centred on the personal devotion to *Ḥazrat* Ali, strong veneration of shrines, and a great reverence for *sādād* as bearers of *barakat*. In other words, although the Hazaras, like the Qizilbash, did venture on pilgrimage to the holy shrines of Mashhad, Nejad and Kerbala, the Hazaras were more likely to seek the blessing than the advice of the *mujtahid* (legal expert) (Edwards 1986b: 204). Apparently there were no *mujtahids* in Afghanistan – they were only to be found in Persia and the Hijaz.³⁹

In the case of the Ismaili community (most numerous in Badakhshan), they seem to have been little equipped with such religious establishments as mosques and *madrasas*. However, they had important religious dignitaries, claiming either *sayyid* or *khwāja* descent, who, as among the Imamis formed endogamous groups. Each of these dignitaries (locally called *shāh*) was represented by a

khalīfa (representative/deputy) who officiated in ritual and collected the *ʿushr* (an annual tithe on all income to be paid to the *pīr*). The *pīr* had enormous moral authority and economic power, and also acted as mediator of political conflicts in the Ismaili community. In principle, the authority of the supreme Ismaili world leader, Aga Khan, was acknowledged (Shahrani 1984: 150).

Summary

In the second half of the nineteenth century Afghanistan was thus a state subject to continued foreign pressure, intervention and aggression, resulting in two Anglo-Afghan Wars and loss of territory. Internally, the endemic power struggles inside the royal lineage weakened the central power further and the rulers, with little military power of their own, had to mobilize the active support of the tribes and other sections of the population both in the struggle with rival claimants to the throne and in order to resist the foreign aggression. With the structure of the Afghan state still being that of a tribal confederacy, the consequence was increasing power and influence for tribal leaders and big landowners on the one side – and for religious leaders on the other side.

British travellers in the last century in general reported upon the Afghans as devout Muslims and, at least before the Anglo-Afghan Wars, also as tolerant towards persons of other faiths. Until the First Anglo-Afghan War the attitude towards Europe was not an antagonistic one. Although the country's educational establishment was governed by rigid scholasticism and formalism, there seems to have been no official antagonism, religious or secular, to Europeans (see Elphinstone 1839/1972). However, the encounter with the Christian imperialist powers left a decisive mark on the ideological climate in Afghanistan. After the first Anglo-Afghan War (1839-42), when an upsurge of religious and national anti-British feeling ended the rule of *Shāh* Shuja, the attitude of the Afghans changed dramatically. All Europeans were mistrusted; the English, and later the Russians, were looked on not only as infidels but as enemies who threatened Islam and Afghan independence. The sporadic conflicts between the frontier tribes and the British authorities in India, and the general political conditions following the war, sustained this attitude (Gregorian 1969: 118-123). Both the *amīr* and the British played on the frontier tribes in their power game – for the frontier tribes it was a natural thing to appeal to the Afghan *amīr* for support against the

British and they often got the support even if the *amīr* had to do it in a covert way in order not to antagonize the British.

In view of the above situation, since neither the Afghan ruler nor the central power as such enjoyed general legitimacy in this very heterogeneous society, Islam appeared as the basic unifying force and means of mobilization vis-à-vis the population. Thus, both in internal power struggles and in mobilization against foreign aggression, appeals were made to the concept of *jihād*, which put the believer against the infidel and implied a religious duty (*farz*) which carried a blessing in itself either as *ghāzī* (warrior against the infidels) or as *shahīd* (martyr). As religious leaders were the keyholders of religious authority, their political influence naturally increased in this situation where their blessing and sanctioning of struggle as *jihād* was in constant demand.

While the political application of Islam on the one hand contributed greatly to the maintenance of Afghan independence, on the other hand the religious character of the struggle and of the leadership (most often a combination of religious and tribal leaders) promoted conservatism, Afghan xenophobia and cultural isolationism. Many of the religious leaders in general resisted the introduction and adoption of major socio-economic and cultural innovations, despising them as alien to the spirit and tenets of Islam and Afghan traditions. Most of them identified such innovations with the Christian enemy, so the rejection of European imperialism included rejection of European civilization as such (Gregorian 1969: 126-127).

Notes

- 1 See for example A. Arunova (1981).
- 2 *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 1985, vol.13: 35-37.
- 3 The British mission negotiating the treaty with the Afghan *Shāh* Shuja ul-Mulk in Peshawar was headed by Mountstuart Elphinstone. The treaty obliged Afghanistan to support Britain in the event that Iran and France attacked the possessions of the British East India Company. The treaty proved short-lived as Shuja ul-Mulk was soon overthrown. However, the experiences formed the background for Elphinstone's classic work *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul* (1839), which ever since has been considered one of the most authoritative works on Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier.
- 4 'A paper written by Sir Henry Rawlinson in July 1868, at first rejected, would, ten years later, become the cornerstone for the British 'Forward Policy' in Asia. The main points of the paper were: occupy Quetta; gain control of the Afghan area by subsidizing the Amir in Kabul; establish a permanent British Mission in Kabul to keep the Russians out' (Ghose 1960: 10).

- 5 See also Hager (1983) for further discussion of Prince Gorchakov's memorandum. For a discussion of the ideological justification of the Russian imperial policy, see Malozemoff (1958: Ch. 3).
- 6 See text in Habberton (1937: App. I).
- 7 For the text of the Treaty of Gandamak, see Hamilton (*op.cit.*).
- 8 See text of protocols in Habberton (1937: App. II, III).
- 9 Afghanistan was forced to rescind any claims to Swat, Bajaur, Chitral, a greater part of Waziristan, Davar and Chageh. The Durand Line cut across the lands of Mohmands, Afridis, Shinwaris, Yusufzais, Kakars, Waziris, etc., which areas were added to the domains of British India. However, the Durand Line was never recognized as a legitimate border by Afghanistan (nor by the Frontier tribes) and has been an issue of territorial dispute ever since.
- 10 Studies of the tribal structure among Aymaq, Hazara, Uzbek, etc. have received little attention, and in general it can be said that most studies in Afghanistan have focused on the Pashtuns. For studies of the Pashtun tribes, see also Barth (1959, 1969), Ahmed (1976, 1980, 1982, 1984), Anderson (1983, 1984), Glatzer (1977).
- 11 For a comprehensive discussion of the tribe-state relationship with reference to Afghanistan and Iran, see the contributions in R. Tapper 1983.
- 12 *Dastārkhwān* is a the table-cloth on which food is served.
- 13 Relevant for the discussion of *khānship* and leadership in general is also the concept of 'symbolic capital'. See, for example, Bourdieu (1977).
- 14 Bellew noted the general interest of the Afghan population in the ever-varying alliances and conflicts over power and influence and concluded that the general public had a greater knowledge of as well as influence on the government than most foreigners would expect.
- 15 See Poullada (1973:19) for what he calls 'the politics of tribal power' with its five basic conflict types in society.
- 16 Aslanov (1969) and Jäkel (1972) refer the development of 'feudal-like' structures to the inclusion/conquest of land in non-Pashtun areas.
- 17 R. Tapper (1983: 43-44) gives what he sees as the three main socio-political forms among the Pashtun tribes during the nineteenth century: (1) Egalitarian, communal forms were typical among North-West Frontier groups such as Afridis, Mohmands, Wazirs, etc. Economically they were characterized by marginal agriculture and pastoralism producing little surplus. (2) Groups showing greater social stratification, usually with a leisured class of martial Pashtuns owning the land and dependent groups working it. The typical example is here the Yusufzai of Swat, inhabiting better watered valleys where agriculture produced a large surplus. (3) An intermediate form found in areas that were more accessible to cities and rulers, and where agriculture was reasonably productive. Here the state produced a feudalistic form of stratification, involving a chiefly class with limited powers, a broad class of tribespeople, and a sizeable substratum of dependants. Many Durrani groups were of this type.
- 18 Anderson (1984: 274) explains this with reference to the Pashtuns' alleged history of conversion to Islam. According to this, the Pashtuns' common ancestor, Qais bin Rashid, should have been converted to Islam by the Prophet himself, and the patrilineal descent from him thus places Islam as a defining factor in Pashtun identity alongside *Pashtunwālī*.
- 19 For a discussion of *Pashtunwālī* and its relationship to the wider social

- environment, see for example Barth: 'Pathan Identity and Its Maintenance' in Barth (1969).
- 20 In the Hanafi school dominant in Afghanistan, there were four sources of law: Qur'ān, *sunna* (tradition of the Prophet), *qiyās* (analogy), and *ijmā* (consensus). Only the *ulamā* were authorized to handle questions of *qiyās* and, although *ijmā* in principle refers to the consensus of the *umma*, the *ulamā* were the interpreters of that consensus.
 - 21 In 18 out of the 27 provinces of the country, a *hākim* collected revenue and commanded the army while a *sardār* (royal leader) commanded the regular troops, preserved public order and enforced the authority of the *hākim* and *qāzī*. The remaining nine provinces, predominantly Pashtun, were governed entirely by a Durrani *sardār* (Elphinstone 1839/1972, II: 255-257).
 - 22 According to Elphinstone 1839/1972, II: 262. However, Kakar (1979: 58) ascribes a much inferior position to *dārughā* as mere assistants to the community elders.
 - 23 Elphinstone (1839/1972, II: 258) reports that about half the country's revenue was assigned as *jāgīr* and that the rest was allotted to maintain mullahs, religious officers, or given in charity to *darwishes* and *sayyids*. Ghani (1977:42) writes that by 1879 most of the inhabitants paid revenue, although the system of taxation varied from region to region and between ethnic groups.
 - 24 For a comprehensive discussion of this problematic, and its possible effects on the economic development of the Muslim countries, see Rodinson (1974).
 - 25 For. Dept. Front. B. Aug. 1900, Nos. 1-19.
 - 26 It was thus reported that the very important Mullah Powindah had issued a proclamation that Mahsud mullahs should not perform the burial ceremony of the *maliks* (presumably headmen appointed by the British as part of the indirect rule in the tribal areas) or others in receipt of allowances from the British government. Mullah Powindah was successful in thus excommunicating the collaborators from the *umma*, and the *maliks* consequently complained that the population was against them, and urged the British to take over their land (For. Dep. Sec. F., Oct. 1896, Nos. 382-439).
 - 27 Mullah Nasruddin is known as Nasreddin Hoca in Turkey, as Juhā in the Arab world and as Mushfiqī in Central Asia (*Encyclopaedia Britannica*, vol. 22, 1985: 58).
 - 28 In recognition of these fundamental internal differences among religious personnel, Ahmed (1976) argues for a division of mankind into: (1) the worldly - *ahl-dunya* (*khāns* etc.), (2) the religious - *ahl-dīn* (*sadaq*, mullahs etc.), and (3) the 'special ones' - *ahl-khususiyyat* (Sufis and mystics), whose spiritual authority is based on mystical association and thus beyond more worldly means of control.
 - 29 Regarding *madrassa*, see for example Eickelman (1978), Rosenthal (1947), Adeleye (1983), Anees & Athar (1978), and Godard (1951).
 - 30 For a discussion of the methods and pedagogical principles of the *madrassa* as well as its historical decline, in the case of Iran, see Ohadi (1987).
 - 31 The tomb of *Khawāja* Mu'in ud-Din Chishti in Ajmer has become one of the major *zīyārats* of North India, attracting thousands of pilgrims from all over India (including Hindus who also believe in the *barakat* of the *zīyārat*).
 - 32 For details of the life of Najm ud-Din *Akhundzada*, later to be known as the Hadda-i *Ṣāhib*, see Edwards (1986a).

- 33 Authority in the Sufi *tariqat* is based on spiritual descent. The *silsila* denotes the line of spiritual succession (which may also be genealogical) in a Sufi order, traced either to some notable religious leader or to the four rightly-guided caliphs or to the Prophet himself. The Mujaddidis and the Gailanis in Afghanistan are examples of combined spiritual and genealogical descent.
- 34 Edwards (1986a:287) relates how the Mujaddidis see themselves as having been assigned the role as 'controllers' of the Afghan government and 'explaining' it with a family legend in which their advice and blessing resulted in the victory of the Afghans in the battle of Panipat (1761), from which time, the family has stayed in close contact with the seat of power in Afghanistan.
- 35 Imamis, also called Ithnā 'Ashariyah, believe in a succession of twelve *imāms*, leaders of the faith after Muhammad, beginning with Ali ibn Ali Talib, fourth caliph and the Prophet's son-in-law. For a presentation of the Imami faith, see Jafri (1976) and Momen (1985). The Ismaili sect, on the other hand, only recognizes the first six *imāms* and deviate from the Imamis regarding the seventh *imām*.
- 36 'In the Imami (Shi'a) theological set-up the Imam is God's deputy on earth and a part of his divine being. From this derives the dogmatic principle of the *isma*, which means that those belonging to the family of the Prophet are believed to be free from error and sin. The divine inspiration passes on to the first born child of each generation or to the eldest son whose mother, too, is of holy descent. The *Sayyid* is – in continuing line – mediator between the human being and the Imam, or God' (Kopecky 1982:90).
- 37 Ferrier (1857: 220-221) mentions the conflicts and divisions among the Hazaras.
- 38 Canfield (1973: 95-107) gives a brief summary of the pressures exerted on the Hazara areas by the Kabul rulers and Pashtun groups during the last couple of centuries.
- 39 One British source does, however, refer to a Mullah Yusuf Ali, Qizilbash, as *mujtahid* (For. Dept., Sec. F, Pros. Oct. 1891, Nos. 368-404).

CHAPTER 3

From Tribal State to Absolute Monarchy (1880-1901)

When in 1880, following the Second Anglo-Afghan War and death of *Amir* Sher Ali (see Chapter 2), Abdur Rahman *Khān* succeeded in winning the Afghan throne over his two cousins, *Sardār* Yaqub and *Sardār* Ishaq, the task before him was (in his own words):

...to put in order all those hundreds of petty chiefs, plunderers, robbers, and cut-throats... This necessitated breaking down the feudal and tribal system and substituting one grand community under one law and one ruler. (Quoted from Wilber 1962:19)

The unification and centralization of Afghanistan, which *Amir* Abdur Rahman had set as his goal, was carried out through administrative and economic measures supported by a considerable strengthening of the executive power, i.e. army and police forces,¹ and a policy which ranged from 'divide and rule' to the application of brute force. The authority of the Afghan state was extended into hitherto independent regions (like Kafiristan and Hazarajat) and taxation and rigid administration were imposed upon the rest of the country.

Although the ruthless execution of this policy brought about more than forty internal disturbances during the reign of the 'Iron *Amir*', by the end of *Amir* Abdur Rahman's rule the power structure of Afghanistan was changed for good. The country as



Figure 7: Abdur Rahman, *Amir*
1880-1901

yet could hardly be called a unified, centralized state but the power of the tribes had been partly broken and the state was established as a centre of authority and power, independent of the tribes and the tribal chiefs.

The reign of *Amīr* Abdur Rahman will here be evaluated against the background of his determination to break the structural limitations of the 'tribal state' and create a 'modern' state apparatus in Afghanistan, a purpose in which he largely succeeded. This policy involved breaking the independence of the traditional power groups in society, the royal lineage, the tribal leaders and the religious establishment, and to turn them into groups whose basic interests, economically and politically, were merged with those of the state. This was done through subduing these groups with actual or threatened force and by undermining their economic basis, and consequently securing their allegiance to the state through allowances and favours, so that their position of power and authority was derived from and dependent upon the state.

The socio-economic structure of Afghan society as a whole did not change during the reign of *Amīr* Abdur Rahman; his policies were aimed only at restructuring power relations between the ruling groups of society and the state. However, for such an enterprise to succeed and not to be entirely dependent upon the use of physical force (i.e. the army), the legitimacy of power vis-à-vis the total population was essential. Consequently, the *Amīr's* military, administrative and economic reforms – aimed at building up a modern centralized state that was independent of tribal power – were paralleled by his attempts to establish a new ideological foundation for the state that was equally independent of the tribes. To base the legitimacy of this rudimentary modern-type state upon Islam was the most obvious, if not the only choice open for the *Amīr*. Islam was the only common denominator in the very heterogeneous society, forming as it did the primary cultural heritage among all groups of society, with a strong popular tradition whose ultimate authority could not be challenged. An additional benefit was that the (Sunni) Islamic tradition also contained the possibility of sanctioning an absolute monarchy.

Ideology of the State

According to the 'tribal state' notions of the legitimacy of power prevalent in Afghanistan, the *Amīr* was no more than a superior chieftain. His legitimacy of power, though ultimately deriving from

Allah, was mediated through the tribes as embodied in the institution of *jirga*, symbolizing communal authority and the equality of men. Both of these notions were contrary to the concept of absolute monarchy, which was *Amir* Abdur Rahman's ambition.

However, in the constant balance of power between the tribes and the rulers, the latter increasingly had attempted to claim legitimacy on the basis of an Islamic model, i.e. appealing to a source of legitimacy external to the tribal system, resulting in a dichotomy in the legitimation of power. *Amir* Dost Mohammad had, for example, declared himself as *Amir al-Mu'minin* (Commander of the Faithful) and *Amir* Sher Ali had claimed divine sanction of his rule. During the reign of *Amir* Abdur Rahman, these isolated efforts were turned into a full-scale ideological campaign rendering a confrontation between the tribal and the Islamic models of legitimacy unavoidable, not only at the level of ideological disputes but also in the field of practical politics.

From the very beginning *Amir* Abdur Rahman ascribed divine sanction as well as divine purpose to his rule:

As God wished to relieve Afghanistan from foreign aggression and internal disturbances, He honoured this, His humble servant, by placing him in this responsible position and He caused him to become absorbed in thoughts of the welfare of the nation and inspired him to be devoted to the progress of this people... for the welfare and true faith of the Holy Prophet Mahomed... (Khan, S.M. 1900/1980, II: 80)

In fact, *Amir* Abdur Rahman even claimed to be God-sent as an answer to the prayers of the Afghans, to deliver the nation from the distress following the Second Anglo-Afghan War in 1879 (Risala-i-Muwa'izza 1894, Appendix V: 1).²


In the 'tribal state' model, authority as emanating from Allah was transferred to the *Amir* with the tribes in the form of the institution of *jirga* as intermediary, thus ensuring that the *amir* should be no more than 'the first among equals' (of the Pashtuns). In the 'classic Islamic' model, on the other hand, the *Amir*, in accordance with the so-called 'Pious Sultan' theory (see Chapter 1), claimed divine sanction of his rule. This model did not in principle allow for any popular representation, but depended upon a 'concordat' between the ruler and the *ulamā* who were the chief intermediaries of divine sanction.

Amir Abdur Rahman did, however, make some concessions to popular representation, or maybe rather to the realities of power politics, in forming a constitutional assembly with members from the three powerful groups: the royal lineage (the *sardārs*), *khwānīn-i mulki* (*khāns* and landed proprietors) and mullahs. The selection of members

was subject to the *Amīr*'s approval and the assembly had neither executive nor legislative power. The *Amīr* also established a selected executive body (*khalwat*) as a kind of cabinet but it was equally powerless; its only function was to execute the will of the *Amīr* (Gregorian 1969: 134).

While the *Amīr* tried to bypass the 'tribal state' model as a source of legitimacy of his rule and acted like an absolute monarch in his policies, he did not directly deny the people's right to choose their ruler (the '*jirga* principle'): '... the people have full authority to choose the king, and kings who have been forced upon the people against their wish have lost not only the kingdom but their heads as well' (Khan, S.M. 1900/1980, II:2). The *Amīr* also stressed that his actions against the tribes were not directed by personal interests but that, when the commands of God and the Prophet were infringed, he was forced to act since he, entrusted with the *amīr*ship by God, would be answerable at the Day of Judgement (For.Pol.Sec. F, March 1888, Nos. 81-88). He also insisted that only divine guidance could lead the people to choose a true and legitimate ruler. The strength, the authority, and the legitimacy of the monarch emanated from God alone. Hence at the ideological level, the *Amīr* tried to interpelate this basic element from the tribal discourse on power into the Islamic discourse and thereby neutralize its antagonistic potential.

Figure 8: Dichtomy in the legitimation of the transmission of power between the 'classic Islamic model' and the 'tribal state model'



The model of the legitimation of the transmission of power in traditional Muslim societies is based on Mozaffari (1987), and it is here adapted to the peculiar Afghan situation during the last century.

Islamization of the Legal System

A necessary component of the *Amīr*'s endeavour to claim legitimacy on the basis of Islam was his attempt at an 'Islamization' of the legal system which would give him credibility, or at least disarm his opponents, as well serving as a means of unification and standardization of the diverse legal practices.

Traditionally, the *qāzīs* functioned only in the cities while in the countryside, where the government had little or no power, justice was administered by anyone who was known to be well-versed in Islamic law. Disputes were referred to local mullahs who were paid small fees for their settlement of cases and, even in the cities, few *qāzīs* had salaries from the treasury. In addition, most cases of acknowledged crime were settled by *jirgas* and the like without the intervention of *qāzī* or other legal authority. Taken as a whole, disputes were settled mainly in accordance with customary law (*rawaj*) rather than by Islamic Law (Kakar 1979: 50).

Amīr Abdur Rahman set out to enforce a unified legal system upon the country as a whole in which all laws should be in accordance with the Sharī'a whose interpretation was the monopoly of the *qāzī*, thereby eliminating the importance of *rawaj* and *Pashtunwāli* in legal matters. The increased power and influence of the *ulamā* thus took place at the expense of local autonomy and tribal independence which were curtailed. In addition, it was decreed that nobody but the government-appointed (and salaried) *qāzīs* and *muftīs* was to settle legal cases, so the increased powers of the *ulamā* were harnessed by the state, the institutional strength of which was greatly increased. While the power of the *qāzīs* was much enhanced,³ they were not allowed to exercise their own judgement and had to act in accordance with classic authorities on Islam. If a governor or a *qāzī* was presented with a case not specified in the codes, they were to refer the case to the *Amīr* for instruction (Ghani 1977: 61).

While the 'Islamization' of the legal system increased the power of the *ulamā* vis-à-vis the population, this power was derived from the state: the *Amīr* assumed the dual role of leader and interpreter of Islam, arguing that as a ruler, he, for the sake of the nation and the faith, had the right to define how Islamic Laws were to be applied. Moreover, by reserving the right to appoint judges, by ensuring the participation of secular authorities (the district governors in the district courts) in the judicial process, and by preserving jurisdiction over cases punishable by death, the *Amīr* thus asserted the monarchy's supremacy and pre-eminent right in the dispensation of justice.

That the 'Islamization' of the legal system primarily served the purpose of expanding the control of the state appears from the fact that the *Amīr* bypassed his own legal system if and when it suited his or the state's interests.⁴ When failing to influence the judgements of the *Khān-i ʿulūm* (Chief Justice), the *Amīr* decided that only legal and civil cases were to be referred to the Shariʿa courts, which thus minimized the jurisdiction of the *Khān-i ʿulūm* considerably (Kakar 1979: 35-36). Instead, he reserved for the ruler the right to settle cases of criminal and political nature, defining what was to be considered an offence and what an appropriate punishment. The background for this was the Islamic concept of *taʿzīr* (deterrence) the purpose of which was to deter others from similar conduct. However, he frequently exceeded the proscribed (Hanafi) limits of punishment by applying the death sentence. Here the *Amīr* actually followed the Maliki law school's principle of punishment requiring that the punishment should fit the nature of the crime and the character of the offender, including the death penalty in certain 'suitable cases' (Kakar 1979:167).

The *Amīr's* attempts to harness Islamic doctrines and ideals to support the state and legitimize his own rule were applied to a variety of concepts which he, in the position of 'Interpreter of Islam', dealt with in various religious treatises which he either wrote himself or had published. (A selected list of these titles is found in the Appendix). From many sayings of the Prophet and quotations from the Qurʾān, an elaborate doctrine was constructed, the essence of which was that the kings of religion were the vicars of the Prophet, the shadow of God on earth and the shield against unbelief (*kufr*) and rebellion.⁵ It was stated that Allah had ordained that the safeguard of religion and of the honour of the people of Islam depended on the organization of the kingdom (Risala-i-Muwaʿizza 1894: Appendix V).

Absolute monarchy could find religious legitimation by such means but this did not preclude dynastic rivalry from the *Amīr's* two cousins, *Sardār* Ayub (son of *Amīr* Sher Ali) and *Sardār* Mohammad Ishaq (son of *Amīr* Mohammad Azam *Khān*), who, also being sons of former *Amīrs*, had equally legitimate claims to the throne and enjoyed considerable popular support. Therefore, Abdur Rahman also had to apply more mundane means to consolidate the royal lineage or rather secure the perpetuation of the lineage's hegemony under the overlordship of *his* house (Ghani 1977:119), i.e. by providing the royal lineage with a material stake in the perpetuation of his rule.

Because of their kinship and solidarity to the royal family, His Majesty has chosen the members of the Mohammadzai lineage

to be superior to the Ghilzai and Durrani tribes and that they should be more prosperous. Therefore, it is decided that, in order that their life be more comfortable than that of other people, each man should receive a yearly salary of four hundred rupees and each woman three hundred, so that the foundation of the State and this dynasty be stable. (Mohammad 1914-15, quoted from Ghani 1977: 122)

Facing some forty uprisings during his reign, Abdur Rahman acquired a rather realistic conception of how the population looked upon his rule. Obedience to the ruler, no matter what his personal qualities, was made a religious duty by numerous *sūras* and traditions of the Prophet (Takwim-ud-Din 1888, Appendix IV: 6), viz:

Whoever obeys me, obeys God; whoever disobeys me, disobeys God; and whoever obeys his Amir, obeys me; and whoever disobeys his Amir, disobeys me; ...

And further: 'Hear and obey the person in authority over you, even if he be an Abyssinian slave, with the head of the size of a currant'. For this reason, the religious pamphlets also quoted that the Prophet had advised people enquiring about what to do if rulers did not grant people their due, thus: 'Hear and obey them; they have to be responsible for what they have been charged with, and you have to be responsible for what it is your duty to do'. And "Whoever should see anything which he does not like or approve on the part of his Amir, must patiently endure it..." (Takwim-ud-Din 1888, Appendix IV:6).

While the stress on authority and social order was well in line with the mainstream of Sunni political doctrine, i.e. with the 'Pious Sultan' theory, it was not in accordance with the principles of *jirga* and the values embodied in *Pashtunwāli*. However, Abdur Rahman was also trying to convince people and make them share his vision of an Islamic order in Afghanistan and, in *Risala-i-Muwa'izza* (1894), he thus presented the major parts of his political programme and reform policy, explaining how it had served the purpose of establishing a righteous and just society.

These state-controlled religious doctrines not only set out the general duties of the believers but were in many cases very specific and closely related to the actual situation in Afghanistan. The most significant Islamic virtues were said to be: giving *zakāt* (the obligatory alms tax), taking part in *jihād* service at the borders of the Islamic state and obedience to the ruler.

The primary role of the ruler was to protect the religion and to make *jihād* with the enemies of Islam. But only when the kingdom of the

people of Islam was organized did war and peace with the infidels become possible, for a kingdom without a king was said to be open to invasion and destruction. Hence, also for the defence of the nation (*millat*) and the faith (*din*), should the Afghans pay obedience to the *Amir*. God would bless those respecting the ruler and cause misery to those harbouring open or secret contempt for him. The subjects must help their king to strengthen the Islamic community, and must oppose all those fomenting dissention or rising in rebellion against the authority of the monarch .

Application of the Doctrine of *Jihād*

The religious obligation which was most emphatically put forth in the official doctrines was that of *jihād*, and, to fulfil this obligation, Muslims must join the army of Islam. It was stressed that *jihād* or *ghāzā* (raid against infidels) could not be fought except under the orders and instructions of the ruler in Islam:

True Muslims must understand that Ghaza means to fight a defensive war in the case of any nation trying to take their country or stop their religion, and no Ghaza (religious war) can be fought except under the orders and instructions of the ruler of the country. (Khan, S.M. 1900/1980, II:51)

And when the sovereign declared *jihād*, it was incumbent (*farz ʿayn*) on all able-bodied Muslims to defend the frontiers and the land of Islam or to support the *ghāzīs* with property (Kakar 1979: 177). The Prophet's command makes it obligatory for one out of every two men of a tribe to join the army but, it was pointed out, because of the leniency of the Afghan *Amir*, only one out of every twenty men had to report for service.⁶ In this way, the principle of *jihād* became directly linked with the system of regular, general conscription to the army, which no ruler before Abdur Rahman had been able to enforce upon the tribesmen.⁷ To strengthen the morale of the soldiers and the spirit of *jihād* among them, each regiment had a mullah who recited passages from the *Najiyya* and the *Hidayat al-Shaj'an*, booklets especially prepared for this purpose (Kakar 1979: 99).

Amir Abdur Rahman's notion of *jihād* was far from the defensive *jihād* doctrines which originated in India during the nineteenth century, only permitting *jihād* outside Islamic territory when the peaceful propagation of Islam was being hindered or when Muslims living among unbelievers were oppressed. This tradition, of which

Sayyid Ahmad Khan was one of the first proponents, thus implied a separation between the religious and political spheres (see Chapter 1). *Amīr* Abdur Rahman's ideas on *jihād* were much closer to those of *Sayyid* Jamal ud-Din al-Afghani (see Keddie 1968, 1972) and current in the Middle East at the time, particularly in the works of Muhammad 'Abduh and Rashid Rida.⁸ They asserted that the *jihād* duty also applied in case foreign aggressors invaded Islamic territory for political and economic reasons, i.e. the doctrine of *jihād* could be invoked in order to resist colonial conquest, which was exactly *Amīr* Abdur Rahman's aim:

Jihad is considered by certain Imams in their works of "Fika" as a "Farz-ul-Kifaya", i.e., if only a portion of the Moslem community undertakes Jihad, the others of the same community become exempt from it. But this stands true only when the infidels have not attacked the country of Mussulmans. But now, as it is reported that some of the countries of Mussulmans are being occupied and appropriated by infidels, who are seizing the property and families of the Mussulmans, Jihad has become an incumbent duty of every Moslem in accordance with what is enjoined and ordered in the Koran... (Takwim-ud-Din 1888, Appendix IV: 2)

However, the *Amīr* was hardly influenced by the liberal modernist reformism which formed the basis of al-Afghani's and in particular 'Abduh's and Rida's thinking. Moreover, some of the formulations in the *Amīr*'s religious treatises may even raise doubt as to whether he referred to an older tradition, so that the question was not even about defensive *jihād*:

... as the Great God had intended that the custom of making Jihad (religious war) should be introduced in this true faith (Islam) he therefore sent to the faithful the happy news... that God will grant the Muhammadans horses, troops and prowess to make war on the enemy so that they may be able to revenge themselves properly upon the enemies of God and to scatter them and seize their dominions as well as their riches. (Targhib-i-Ila-ul-Jehad 1887, Appendix III:6)

The *Amīr*'s concentration on the issue of *jihād*, his many proclamations etc. attracted considerable concern and attention from the British who invariably were given to speculations about whether a *jihād* mobilization was aimed at the Russians, the British or both and whether it should be seen as the *Amīr*'s internal political attempt to placate the religious circles or as 'only an Oriental method of mobilization'.⁹

The *Amīr*'s utilitarian application of *jihād* to provide the legitimation of absolute monarchy and a number of economic and political measures, ranging from imposition of taxes, conscription to the army to unifying the nation against foreign aggression, may be said to be fully within the tradition of al-Afghani. There were no aspects of the greater *jihād* left but the focus on *jihād*, whereby the *Amīr* defined Afghanistan as a 'frontline state', served to sacralize the whole juridico-economic structure of the state, making it part of a divine scheme, the order of which could not be challenged.

When it came to the arguments addressed to the individual to exhort him to fulfil his religious duty as a *ghāzī*, he was to be blessed in this world and the next:

God hath promised Ghazis three benefits: two being in this world, namely safety and booty, and one in the next world, i.e. admission to paradise. (Takwim-ud-Din 1888, Appendix IV:3)

As for the *shahīd*, the blessings from dying in *jihād* are so great that there is 'a difference of only one step between the prophets and the martyrs'. Among other favours, such as being forgiven all his sins, the corpse of the *shahīd* will not be 'destroyed by any soil or earth', he will go straight to Paradise, where he will have a magnificent coronet of rubies and be married to seventy-two *hurīs* (fairies) – and, finally, he will be able to intercede for seventy of the members of his family on the Day of Judgement (Takwim-ud-Din 1888: Appendix IV). While it no doubt can be argued that this text should be read allegorically in order to understand its esoteric content, there is hardly any doubt either that, for the vast majority of Afghans at the turn of the century, it contained the plain promise of reward for obeying religious injunctions.

But when dealing with the abstainer from *ghāzā*, the arguments moved from religious idioms, threatening him with God's punishment, to disdainful dismissal according to the male ethos of the patriarchal society: 'You are not possessed of the essential qualities of a man; better that you stay inside the house like women', invoking the notions of honour and shame. Another example of this is a proclamation by the *Amīr* to the people of Afghanistan to wake up in view of the threat which the infidel powers (Russia and Britain) constituted to the independence of the country:

Alas! Alas! you do not feel shame because you have borne too great shame already. Alas! the name of Afghan should not have been given you by the giver of names, as you do not deserve it...

They will not be satisfied with the taking of the country of Afghanistan but will introduce their customs which are disgraceful in the extreme; for instance husbands have no power to kill their wives for misconduct – a condition of things hated in Afghanistan – and other evils besides that mentioned above, too numerous to speak or write about...

...I will soon invite the elders and influential men of Afghanistan and take their opinions on these very matters...¹⁰

The *Amīr*'s skills in the practical politics of divide-and-rule was thus equally matched by his understanding of the ideological struggle. While achieving hegemony of the Islamic discourse was a long-range project for the *Amīr*, political expediency forced him to take recourse to the 'tribal discourse' in the immediate mobilization of people, i.e. by appealing to tribal values, addressing the individuals as tribesmen, appealing to their code of honour etc. (To what extent such a manipulation of interpellations was a product of conscious choice on the part of the *Amīr* cannot be determined, and it may equally well reflect the fact that the *Amīr* himself was as much a tribesman as an Islamic reformer!)

In the view of the *Amīr*, the harsh policies and persecution of political opponents were means fully legitimized by the lofty goal which was the creation of unity in the nation: 'Do not ye know what blessings the true faith of Islam has awarded to you; uniting your scattered tribes and communities into one brotherhood?' (Khan, S.M. 1900/1980, II: 205). *Amīr* Abdur Rahman's cruelty was legendary and Frank A. Martin, who for eight years served as engineer-in-chief successively under the *Amīrs* Abdur Rahman and Habibullah, has in his book (1907) devoted full two chapters (IX and X) to a painful description of the Afghan prisons and the treatment of prisoners as well as the methods of torture and execution in use during Abdur Rahman's reign. Reading those, one can well appreciate the characterization by the Hadda Mullah, Najm al-Din, of *Amīr* Abdur Rahman as 'one of the most oppressive rulers who was hated by the people of Afghanistan' (quoted from Kakar 1979:156).

Subjugation of the *ʿUlamā*

The *Amīr* could establish the religious legitimacy of his rule and impose Islamic ideological concepts upon the tribes and population in general only with the cooperation of the religious leaders, as the 'Islamic model' presupposed the *ʿulamā* as mediators of the religious

sanction, apart from their key role in socializing the individual into the membership of the *umma*.

For *Amīr* Abdur Rahman to be able to enforce his programmes of religious-ideological standardization upon the religious leaders he first had to break their economic independence – or at least ensure that their economic interests converged with that of the state. This was in accordance with the policy followed vis-à-vis the tribal chiefs.¹¹

The *Amīr*'s opinion on the religious establishment of the country was in general disrespectful (and may to some extent serve as an illustration of the previously-mentioned latent conflict between *Pashtunwāli* and *sharīʿat* (see Chapter 2), as the *Amīr*'s views had some foundation in the population), and the measures he took were often harsh and drastic, as he himself admitted:

Many of these priests taught as Islamic religion strange doctrines which were never in the teaching of Mohamed, yet which have been the cause of the downfall of all Islamic nations in every country. They taught that people were never to do any work, but only to live on the property of others, and to fight against each other. Of course it is natural that every one of these self-made kings should have levied separate taxes on their subjects: so the first thing I had to do was to put an end to these numberless robbers, thieves, false prophets, and trumpery kings. I must confess that it was not a very easy task, and it took fifteen years of fighting before they finally submitted to my rule or left the country, either by being exiled or by departing into the next world. (Khan, S.M 1900 [1980], vol. I: 218)

The effect of the *Amīr*'s legal, educational and economic reforms is not easily evaluated as it is impossible to find out to what extent his *farmāns* (edicts) were actually enforced. He did however manage to cut some of the independent sources of income for the clergy such as *ṣadaqa* and *zakāt* (voluntary and obligatory alms, respectively), subject others to taxation and nationalize all *awqāf* (religious endowments), the proceeds of which were allotted to the upkeep of the mosques. Hereby, the religious leaders were forced into a greater dependency upon the allowances (*wazīfa*) from the state. In cases involving grants of land, beneficiaries were forbidden to sell such land and the state asserted its claim to re-occupy it whenever it saw fit. An example of this was the allowances granted to the descendants of the Naqshbandi *pīr*, Sufi Islam, Mirza Mohammad Omar of Karrukh, Herat (Mohammad 1912, Vol. III: 1207). Furthermore, the traditional exemption of dignitaries from taxation on private landholdings was revoked and their land made subject to assessment.

The argumentation for the gradual expropriation of religious sources of income took place partly with reference to the state having assumed responsibility for the upkeep of religious leaders and partly with reference to the sacralization of the state. It was reported that the *Amīr* had issued orders that, as the mullahs were paid by the state, it was entitled to enjoy the rights which they had hitherto maintained.¹² For example, *ṣadaqa ul-fitr* is charity in the shape of money or corn which according to old usage was given to the mullahs on the termination of the Ramadan (the month of Fasting) but in future it should be paid to the state. Moreover, the order should also have retrospective effect to the last seven years. It was also ordered that the payers should not be compelled to pay the *ṣadaqa ul-fitr* provided they could produce the receipts of the payees, in which case the payees would have to make them over to the state – otherwise the people would have to pay it. Of course the burden of proof would fall upon the people because it was not a state tax but a charity and consequently no one used to make receipt for it.¹³ *Zakāt* was equally to fall to the state.

As collector of revenue, the *Amīr* considered himself to be the *nāʾib* (viceroys) of the Prophet since the revenue was a part of the *bayt ul-mal* (public property) and was to be spent on the protection of frontiers of the country and the honour of the religion and faith. Consequently, any negligence in the payment of revenue was tantamount to disobedience to the commands of God and it was his duty as the ruler of Islam to ensure that this did not happen. Similarly, the *Amīr* explained the increases in land revenue as the commands of God. In one of his pamphlets, the *Amīr* also used the Ottoman state as a practical example of how Believers should endeavour to support the Muslim ruler and state through voluntarily accepting new taxes, etc. (*Sarishta Islamiya Rum*, see App. I). However, the British report that this attempt to utilize Turkish successes in tax collection misfired among the Afghans, who realized that the Turks were paying ten percent income-tax in addition to revenue collection which made them wary about the *Amīr's* future plans in this field.¹⁴

In 1885 he declared that most of the religious leaders in receipt of state grants for their alleged descent from the Prophet or for their reputation for learning had no real religious knowledge. Therefore an examination of each one's credentials was necessary to determine who actually deserved such grants. Hence, in the Kabul Newsletter to the Government of India, No. 34, dated Jalalabad 4 May 1883, the following was reported:

On the above-mentioned date [2 May 1883] the Amir issued the following edict – "Every Mullah who passed a certain test

should receive a royal diploma and wear a white turban, but a Mullah who has not read up to the above-mentioned standard shall wear a coloured turban, and every Mullah whose whereabouts, nationality and parentage are not known shall be expelled from the country, so that no stranger may come and foment disturbances".¹⁵

The next step was the introduction of the examining commissions under Mullah Khosa, the activities of which were further stressed after Mullah Abdul Karim Andar's involvement in the Ghilzai Rebellion in 1886-88.¹⁶ The examination commissions were sent to several provinces, and mullahs were summoned to Kabul from time to time. In Kandahar, most of the mullahs did not appear before the commission to be tested, and consequently their allowances were drastically reduced. Similarly, most Herat mullahs did not respond to the summons and lost their allowances for a while.

These policies not only existed on paper, but were in fact also put into practice. The British newswriter at Kandahar thus reports on 11 February 1887:

The case of stipends to the Ulema, Syads, and Sheikhs of Kandahar, which were stopped was pending until recently; but a list has now been received from the Amir, who has sanctioned only small amounts in favour of a few Mullahs and Syads, and has disallowed and confiscated most of them. Formerly a sum of nearly one lakh and forty thousand Kandahari rupees was spent annually on this account, while now only twenty-four thousand Kandahari rupees have been allowed. An order has, moreover, been received to recover from the stipend-holders the amount they have drawn during the last five years. This it is impossible for the stipendholders to pay, and in case they refuse they are summoned to appear before the Amir at Kabul.¹⁷

And in the newsletter of 22 February, the newswriter reports (*ibid.*) that:

... competent Examiners had been sent from Kabul to test the abilities of the Ulema and other stipend holders in Kandahar, and they reported on their return that a certain number of men had appeared to the examination, and a few had passed in the first class, a greater number in the medium class, and the greater portion in the lowest class only. Stipends have been given them according to their merits, as arranged by the Examiners. Notice is now given, at the suggestion of the Examiners (Ulema Mumtahn), that any other member of the Ulema in Kandahar desiring to hold a stipend should proceed

to Kabul and pass the examination, and an allowance will be given him according to the grade in which he may pass.

This cutting into the economic resources of the clergy was not principally aimed at increasing state revenue but rather at creating and consolidating their economic dependency upon the state which could be used to exert political-ideological pressure on even the most prominent mullahs. The return of privileges was made dependent on complete adherence to official religious policy, on non-participation in mystic orders and on recruitment of followers.

Amīr Abdur Rahman did not promote any 'peculiar' Islamic doctrines. On the contrary, his committee set up for examining the mullahs' qualifications, under the chairmanship of Mullah Khosa of Laghman, promoted only orthodox Sunni Islam (Hanafi), based on the authority of the Qur'ān, the *hadīth* and the traditions of famous scholars. The resistance of the *ʿulamā* to these commissions was thus not based on dogma but on the disgrace of having to be examined and the insult to their dignity of having to 'earn' the *wazīfa* by passing a test.

Ultimately, however, even the most prominent religious dignitaries from Herat did submit to be checked by the Examination Commission, and even people as prominent as *Mīr* Murtaza *Khān* of Gazargah and Mirza Mohammad Omar *Khān* of Karrukh went to Kabul to present themselves before the Commission consisting of (the comparatively insignificant) Mullah Said Mohammad *Khān*, Mullah Dad Mohammad *Khān*, Mullah Abdullah and Mullah Qutbuddin *Khān* who were assigned by the *Amīr*. After the examination, the *Amīr* restored the stipends of these most prominent religious leaders of Afghanistan and presented them with *khilats* (robes of honour).¹⁸

Standardization of Faith

The legal Islamization in its form of *polity expansion* (Smith 1974), i.e. Islamization as a vehicle for expanding state control over legal matters, required loyal bureaucrats who were trained in religion. At the time, there was little uniformity in religious education, with the *ʿulamā* being trained not only in Afghanistan but to a large extent also in India, Bokhara and Tashkent. Furthermore, the *madrasas* were independent institutions which could not easily be made to serve the purpose of the state. The polity expansion in the legal field thus necessitated polity expansion also in the education field where the state took over responsibilities: *Amīr* Abdur Rahman opened a royal

madrassa in Kabul where two hundred students were primarily to be taught Islamic Law, all the expenses of lodging and education to be met by the state. The study of *jihād* was made a major subject in the curriculum in view of the importance that the *Amīr* attached to this concept. The aim was that these graduates from the royal *madrassa* should be appointed the *qāzīs* and *muftīs* of the future (Kakar 1979:161-163).

However, the policy of uniformity and control went further than that. A special committee, directly appointed by the *Amīr*, was entrusted with drafting the general handbooks of religion as well as producing pamphlets on various aspects of the faith. The *Amīr* himself carefully scrutinized the contents of each handbook or pamphlet and sometimes even chose the appropriate verses from the Qurʾān. Only then did he issue orders for publication. In fact, some of the most important of these works were written by the *Amīr* himself. The religious books and pamphlets published were distributed to the *ʿulamā* all over the country with specific instructions to be read daily in the mosques after prayers so that people would be well-acquainted with their content.¹⁹ By these means of *polity dominance* (Smith 1974), the state controlled not only the educational institutions but also the curriculum, thus exerting a wide influence over those who would occupy some of the most important positions in the country. The extent to which this policy succeeded is illustrated by the fact that one of the most important handbooks of this period, *Taqwīm ud-Dīn* (The Essence of Religion), was still in use in the 1970s (Ghani 1977:72-74).

That the *Amīr*'s educational efforts were geared more towards control than towards enlightenment became apparent on several occasions. In a *darbār* discussing the virtues and vices of the Afghans, the *Amīr* concluded his speech by adding 'that he did not mind about the ignorance of the nation so long as they remained loyal to their ruler and offered combined opposition to the external foe; he preferred barbarism to intelligence, as the former was more useful in war than the latter'.²⁰ And in another instance, in connection with an alchemy case (forged coins), the *Amīr* concluded with the following lesson:

It is a great fault of kings to allow every one without any restriction to study sciences and acquire knowledge, and to become a learned man and to confer upon him the privileges and rights of that distinguished class. Knowledge is a noble quality, and it must find its place in noble brains, because the dregs of society cannot be allowed to obtain education and commit mischief.²¹

As discussed above (Chapter 1), these autocratic views, so bluntly expressed by the *Amīr*, had a firm basis in the inherent elitist and eclectic nature of the 'Islamic discourse'. This attitude permeated the whole society and the nature of all apprenticeship, whether philosophic or artisan, with the *ustād* (master) being reluctant to 'reveal' *all* his knowledge ('the secret of the trade') to his apprentice (*shāgird*). Only the late-nineteenth-century modernist reformers ('Abduh, Sayyid Ahmad Khan, etc.) who propagated an Islamic philosophy of Enlightenment challenged these views on learning and knowledge – which, however, were to affect only the successors of *Amīr* Abdur Rahman.

Propagation of the official religious doctrines was carried out among the populace. Itinerant mullahs were appointed to teach the population the fundamentals of Islam, and by the authorization of the *muhtasibs* they had the right to prosecute those who failed to observe the basic commandments (Kakar 1979: 161-3). Because of the *Amīr*'s attempts to centralize and standardize the religious beliefs, the position of the *muhtasib* gained considerable importance. They not only looked after the religious and moral behaviour of the people, but also ensured that the local *imāms* performed their religious duties properly and, in the case of violation of regulations, they had the authority to imprison or whip people:

... if people will not listen to their [the *muhtasibs*'] advice, they administer a certain number of lashes, because a nation which is not religious becomes demoralised and falls into ruin and decay, and misbehavior makes people unhappy in this world and the next. (Khan, S.M. 1900 [1980], II: 103)

The *Amīr* also took to hanging posters at public places with instructions to the people such as this:

The public are hereby directed to be very careful in the performance of their religious ordinances. Muhtasibs are appointed in every part of the city to preach and give advice to the common people in religious matters. Any person found breaking the commandments shall be reported to the Kazi by the police, and the Kazi will have full power to inflict a severe punishment on the perpetrator of the crime. (For. & Pol. Dept. Oct. 1891, Nos. 1-34)

Whether this propagation had the intended effect upon the population or not, the measure may have served to separate the mullahs from their own communities for two reasons: first, the mullahs were sent

out by and supposed to act as agents of the central government, and, second, the 'upgrading' of *Sharī'a*, as compared to *rawaj* and *Pashtunwāli*, was a violation of the established mores of the local communities. In other words, with the mullahs becoming civil servants, the basis for a conflict between *sharī'at* on the one hand and *qaumwāli* and *tariqat* on the other (as indicated by Anderson 1984) appeared for the first time.


The establishment of *fiqh-i Hanafiyya* as the official creed of the country led to the active suppression of divergent religious practices, and the position of *jihād* as the central concept in the political ideology of the Afghan state was given a practical meaning in connection with the *Amīr's* campaigns against Hazarajat (1891-93) and Kafiristan (1895-6). Both areas had so far been outside the control of the Afghan state and were populated by ethnic groups of different religious persuasion, the Hazaras adhering to Shi'a Islam while the so-called 'Kāfirs' as the name indicates were non-Muslims. As is often the case, missionary zeal was, for the *Amīr*, a cover for colonial expansion. Defining the conquest of Kafiristan as a *jihād* was in this respect in accordance with the early Islamic tradition (but a deviation from the doctrine of defensive *jihād* – see Chapter 1), where any war against unbelievers were considered as *jihād* (Peters 1979).²² The campaign against the Shi'a Hazaras was in terms of religious dogmas a different matter. The independence of the central highlands of Hazarajat was clearly a problem for the *Amīr's* unification of Afghanistan, and at first he tried to exploit internal rivalries among the Hazaras and through a combination of co-option and coercion to impose the suzerainty of the state upon these areas. However, when that form of suppression ultimately brought about a unity among the Hazaras against the Afghan state, the *Amīr* declared *jihād* against Shi'as in general, recruiting volunteers in the rest of the country by promising loot and slaves in return (Kakar 1971).

In his attempts to suppress Shi'ism, the *Amīr* reportedly went so far as to spy upon suspected Shi'as in Kabul and order them with threats of violence to follow Sunni practices. On 12 Feb. 1895, a notice from the *Amīr* was read out in the principal mosque in Kabul before prayers that the people of the Hazara tribe, being Shi'as, should not be considered Muslims and should not be left alive, wherever they might be found.²³

Declaring *jihād* against the Shi'a minority was doctrinally unlawful, as the Shi'a areas of Hazarajat could neither be considered as *dār al-harb* (being inhabited and ruled by Muslims) nor was there any evidence that the Qizilbash were supporting the Hazaras in their

uprising and thus were seditious.²⁴ However, contrary to all dogmas the Shi'as were defined as non-believers, which 'legalized' the *jihād* and even opened up the possibility of taking the Hazara captives as slaves, an act to which it is unlawful to submit Muslims. Ultimately, it turned into an outright religious war when the *mujtahids* of Mashhad, in defence of the Afghan Shi'as, declared war against the Sunnis of Afghanistan, and the Persian *Shāh* requested the British to put pressure on the Afghan *Amīr* to stop the persecution of his Shi'a subjects (Kakar 1971:179).

Map 6: Conquest and revolt during the reign of Abdur Rahman



Despite internal revolt and external encroachments, Abdur Rahman expanded and consolidated his rule.

Hazarajat: The *Amīr* did not follow a uniform policy vis-à-vis the different Hazara tribes but used a combination of peaceful penetration and forceful subjugation. Altogether, the policy was comparatively successful and by 1886 most Hazara tribes paid both land revenue and cattle tax. However, when the Hazaras of Uruzgan rose in 1891, they were soon joined by all other groups of Hazaras (for details on the Hazara War, see Kakar (1971. Ch. 6).

Kafiristan: Kakar (1971: Ch. 7) informs that for a long time the *Amīr* had plans to pacify Kafiristan but that his immediate decision was triggered by the Russian occupation of Pamir and the British extending their control to Chitral, both regions close to Kafiristan. Overall, Kakar (*ibid*) describes the *Amīr*'s treatment of the *Kāfirs* as almost paternal compared with his treatment of other rebellious groups. After the conquest, this region was renamed Nuristan (Land of Light).

Evaluating the *Amīr*'s reasons for this policy, it seems clear that he was in no way guided by personal religious bigotry (although he exploited the bigotry of others) in his persecution of the Shi'as. He, in fact, was ready to deviate from orthodoxy and have anybody pronounced an infidel, provided it served his purpose.

The main religious practices that were suppressed, apart from the Shi'a doctrine, were the Sufi orders and the so-called Indian Wahhabis (see below). In spite of the fact that Sufism as practised in Afghanistan was not far removed from orthodoxy and many *pīrs* at the same time were *ʿālim* (see Chapter 2), the *Amīr* opposed the Sufi orders with reference to orthodoxy and cut the state allowances to *khānaqāhs*.²⁵ Apart from the fact that the esoteric learning of *tasawwuf* defied any state control and the *pīrs* were by far the most prominent *ʿulamā* at the time, the *Amīr* was probably also influenced by the fact that *Sardār* Mohammad Ishaq in Turkestan had received considerable support from the followers of the Sufi orders, *Sardār* Ishaq himself belonging to the Naqshbandiyya Order.

As far as the Indian Wahhabis were concerned, since the reign of Timur *Shāh* (1773-93) there had been a special office at the court responsible for combating this doctrine (Ghani 1978:282-83). What *Amīr* Abdur Rahman generally referred to as 'Wahhabis' at that time in fact was not the real Wahhabis (disciples of Mohammad b. Abd al-Wahhab of Najd) but the followers of *Sayyid* Ahmad Bareilly (the 'Indian Wahhabis') as well as the followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadian, i.e. the Ahmadiyyas (Kakar 1979: 138). The latter were easily denounced as *kāfirs* owing to their rejection of the notion of the Seal of Prophecy. The public campaigns against the 'Indian Wahhabis', through public posters, persecution etc., could take the following form, as in this Proclamation against Wahhabis in Kandahar accusing them of:

- a) denying any connection between Creator and created
- b) claiming that neither the Prophet, his Companions nor *Imāms* can intercede at the Day of Judgment
- c) only recognizing the taxes in force in the days of the Prophet – not any imposed by the first four *khalīfas*
- d) considering swearing by the Prophet and the four *khalīfas* as impious
- e) condemning decoration of graveyards, shrines and headstones as idolatry, and having despoiled the holy shrines of Najaf and Kerbala
- f) considering circumcision as heresy

A proclamation of this kind seems to be aimed at inciting religious sentiments rather than constituting an orthodox denunciation of Wahhabism. The *Amīr*'s repression of the 'Indian Wahhabis' was probably motivated by the Wahhabis' politico-religious attacks on existing Muslim rulers rather than by purely theological considerations, and their potentially disruptive influence in Frontier areas where they had a stronghold in Buner (see Chapter 4). The policy was further reinforced by the *Amīr* in his refusal to allow foreign mullahs to enter the country, and Afghans with foreign religious education were generally mistrusted (Kakar 1979, Ghani 1978).

Relationship between the *ʿulamā* and the State

In his relationship to the *ʿulamā*, *Amīr* Abdur Rahman was caught in a paradox: curtailment of the power and influence of religious leaders was necessary for by-passing the 'Tribal state' and the establishment of the centralized state and absolute monarchy, while its claim on legitimacy and whole mode of functioning depended upon the strengthening of Islam's and the *ʿulamā*'s position in society. His policies vis-à-vis the *ʿulamā* were thus guided by three principles, as described above: curtailing the doctrinal and economic independence of the *ʿulamā*; Islamization of the state; and co-option of the *ʿulamā* into the state apparatus.

By 1880, after two Anglo-Afghan wars (in 1842 and 1879), the Afghan *ʿulamā* and population had become strongly anti-British and any reference to British connections was enough to denounce a person as a '*kāfir*'. It thus appears that initial resistance to Abdur Rahman as *Amīr* by the *ʿulamā* – including the most prominent religious leaders, Mullah *Mushk-i Alam* and the Hadda-i *Ṣāhib* (see below) – was rooted in suspicion of him acquiring power with the tacit understanding and approval of the British. On this basis the *ʿulamā* of Kandahar supported *Sardār* Ayub's claim to the throne by issuing a *fatwā* denouncing Abdur Rahman as a 'nominee of the British' and urging the people to rise against him in a *jihād*. After defeating *Sardār* Ayub, *Amīr* Abdur Rahman ordered that two prominent religious dignitaries, Mullah Abdul Rahim and Mullah Abdul Ahmad *Akhundzada*, who had signed the *fatwā* in support of *Sardār* Ayub, were to be executed.²⁶

After seizing power, *Amīr* Abdur Rahman's strained relations with the religious leaders continued. Although religious leaders gave religious sanction to a number of uprisings against *Amīr* Abdur

Rahman, there was little if any dispute of religious principles involved in his struggle with the clergy. The point was that, since the *Amīr* was outwardly pursuing an 'Islamization policy' within all sectors of society, the religious leaders could hardly object. However, his policies still alienated a large section of religious leaders: first, because by 'Islamizing' the state he subjected them to state control and curtailed their traditional privileges; and second, because his centralizing policy also alienated large sections of the population (tribal leaders and groups, etc.) on whom the religious leaders depended and thus with whom they shared interests.

Clerical Support for Rebellion

Consequently, in most of the uprisings, local or regional, religious dignitaries played an important role as they gave religious sanction to the rebellion by declaring that the *Amīr* was violating the interests of Islam or was an outright *kāfir* which consequently made *jihād* against him lawful. In several instances the leadership of a rebellion consisted of a combination of tribal and religious leaders; both were needed – the tribal leaders to command manpower and the religious leaders to recruit, mobilize and sanction the uprising. A case in point is the Ghilzai Rebellion (1881-82, 1886-88), where first Mullah *Mushk-i Alam* and, after his death, his son Mullah Abdul Karim Andar took a leading role.

The main complaint which could be lodged against the *Amīr* by the religious leaders was his harsh treatment of his subjects and his supposed over-friendliness with the British – two points which could be used to sanction *jihād* and justify rebellion against him. An example of this can be seen once again in the Ghilzai Rebellion in 1886, when the *Amīr* tried to enlist the mullahs' support. Five hundred mullahs from Ningarhar, Laghman and the neighbourhood of Kabul met to discuss the matter and Mullah Khosa of Laghman drafted a *fatwā* sanctioning *jihād* against the Ghilzai. The great majority of mullahs, however, told the *Amīr* that 'he had killed all the chiefs who could help him, that he could expect nothing from them [i.e. the religious leaders] except prayers, and that he was justified in fighting those only who were the most dangerous to Islam'.²⁷ The mullahs, then, did not deny the *Amīr*'s right, well established within Sunni tradition, to declare *jihād* against rebels and seditious elements but differed with him as to who should be classified as such and thus be objects of a declaration of *jihād*.

Although the mullahs formed a distinct social group, they in no way constituted a homogeneous group. Their educational background differed widely and so did their economic situation and their relationship to the local population, with whom they were more closely associated than with each other. The clergy's response to *Amīr* Abdur Rahman was consequently not unanimous.

When fighting for the Afghan throne, Abdur Rahman had managed to get religious support for his campaign: in Maidan he thus secured the allegiance of four hundred mullahs and a *fatwā* to denounce *Sardār* Ayub as a 'rebel' (Kakar 1971: 76-79). And while Mullah Khalil Mohmand²⁸ urged submission to the *Amīr*, the Hadda-i *Šāhib* encouraged the Safis of Kunar to resist him. Equally so, in connection with the Ghilzai Rebellion in 1886, Mullah Khalil refused a request from Mullah Abdul Karim (the son of Mullah *Mushk-i Alam*) to raise levies among the Mohmand, Utman Khel and Bajaur territories to support the uprising.²⁹ As a recognition for his unwavering loyalty, Mullah Khalil's annual allowance from the *Amīr* was increased from 2,500 to 4,000 rupees.³⁰

Throughout his reign, *Amīr* Abdur Rahman managed to get religious leaders to help him formulate and carry out policies which the majority of the religious establishment opposed, including some of the most venerated and learned mullahs of the time. Since the opposition to the *Amīr* was not based upon strictly religious matters, the response of the respective mullahs was in most cases dependent upon the treatment of and reaction among the population from which their followers came.

By imposing Islam as the ultimate authority in all matters, promoting orthodox Sunni Islam and stressing the concept of *jihād* so strongly, the *Amīr* was actually promoting the interests of the 'ulamā of the country, since the influence and authority of *qāzīs*, *muftīs* and others was increased. The cause of conflict was not the ideological content of the *Amīr*'s policy, but his attempts to transfer the alliance and dependency of the religious dignitaries from the tribes to the state. On the one hand this would curtail the independence of the clergy but, on the other hand, it would increase their authority and sphere of influence in the population. Earlier the mullahs had to accept the coexistence and often predominance of *Pashtunwāli* and *rawaj* over Islam, while the policy of the *Amīr* clearly stressed the ultimate authority of Islam. In this sense, the *Amīr* was more orthodox and radical in his policy than the majority of 'ulamā would have dared to be, and rejected the advice of leading 'ulamā to show leniency. The background of this more mild and 'flexible' attitude on the part of the

traditional *‘ulamā* should no doubt be found in their close association with the people, i.e. their alliance with and dependency upon, for example, the tribal population.

While sufficient information is lacking, it seems reasonable to argue that those religious leaders opposing *Amīr* Abdur Rahman were first and foremost *pīrs*, in close connection with particularly the tribal population and enjoying a solid economic independence of the state due to their numerous supporters, while the *Amīr*'s supporters were to be found among the *fuqahā*, religious scholars prominent because of their learning, not because of any personal or inherited *barakat*. The outline here may be of an emerging conflict between *tariqat* and *sharī‘at*, although at first the decisive factor may have been that, for the individual *‘ālim* without any supportive *tariqat* network, the *Amīr*'s offer of generous *wazīfa* and increased (though controlled) influence was compelling, while for the *pīr*, there was no such advantage, particularly in view of his followers' response to the *Amīr*.

For the *Amīr*, the support of precisely these independent religious leaders was essential because of their immense influence and authority within the population. Even if the *fuqahā* would sanction the *Amīr* and his rule according to religious dogmas, this did not automatically ensure the legitimacy of his rule vis-à-vis the population, among whom the 'Islamic model of legitimacy' did not enjoy unanimous support anyway. Only the support of prominent religious leaders could overcome this problem, and for that reason the *Amīr* throughout his reign tried to co-opt or at least pacify these religious dignitaries. An illustration of this is the *Amīr*'s turbulent relations with the two leading east Afghan religious leaders, the Hadda-i *Šāhib* and Mullah *Mushk-i Alam*.

Hadda-i Šāhib

Najm al-Din *Akhundzada*, later known as the Hadda Mullah in British sources or by Afghans as the Hadda-i *Šāhib*, was born in the early nineteenth century in Ghazni district. He studied under the famous *Ākhund* of Swat, whose most distinguished disciple he became. After being initiated into the four *tariqats* of Naqshbandiyya, Qadiriyya, Chishtiyya and Suhrewardiyya, he returned to Afghanistan where he established a religious centre at Hadda in Ningarhar province. From here his fame spread all over the Frontier. (For fuller details, see Edwards 1986a). Due to his learning and piety, he was the most influential *pīr* in eastern Afghanistan where he was reputed to have

had more than a hundred thousand followers. Being initiated as *khalīfa* of the *Ākhund* of Swat, he established his own network of deputies (*khalīfas*), several of whom were members of established hereditary religious families.³¹ The Hadda-i *Ṣāhib* himself, reputed for his power in performing miracles, had the lifestyle of a *faqīr* although he had set up what at that time was one of Afghanistan's most prominent religious centres which also, owing to its location outside the tribal setting and at the fringe of Afghan government authority, became a most important meeting place for both religious and tribal leaders in the years to come (see Edwards' discussion of 'liminality' [1986a]).

Amīr Abdur Rahman at first mistrusted the Hadda-i *Ṣāhib* for his great influence and – no doubt also because in 1880 he had encouraged the Safis of Kunar to resist the *amīr*ship of Abdur Rahman – the *Amīr* tried to obtain a *fatwā* declaring the Hadda Mullah as a Wahhabi.³² Failing in this, the *Amīr* tried to win him over, asking him to try to persuade the Shinwaris as well as Ghilzais to desist from fighting. But the Hadda-i *Ṣāhib* wanted to get guarantees that the *Amīr* would show leniency towards the tribesmen. The *Amīr* rejected this demand and instead arranged to have the Hadda-i *Ṣāhib* killed. However, the latter discovered the plot and managed to escape and settled in eastern Afghanistan beyond the reach of the *Amīr*. From here, the Hadda-i *Ṣāhib* continued to denounce the *Amīr* as an infidel for his cruelty and damage to Islam, caused by his contact with the British and other Europeans. In spite of this, the *Amīr* did not give up the idea of winning over such an important religious leader (notwithstanding the official policy of condemning Sufism) and he continued to try to persuade the Hadda-i *Ṣāhib* to come to Kabul 'to promulgate the Mohammadan Law afresh'. In a letter of invitation to him, the *Amīr* stated: 'I consider the presence in my Durbar of men like you, who are perfect in devotion and religion, as a means of success and guidance for eternity'. However, the Hadda-i *Ṣāhib* resisted the offer and stayed in Mohmand country, out of reach of the Afghan *Amīr*, where he turned his attention away from Afghanistan and concentrated on fighting the 'real' infidels, i.e. the British. He was thus a moving force behind many of the anti-British disturbances in 1897 (see Edwards 1986a, Warburton 1900 and Hamilton 1906).

Mullah Mushk-i Alam

While the Hadda-i *Ṣāhib* did not nurture any personal political ambitions but was concerned with the defence of the Faith, both

Mullah *Mushk-i Alam* and his sons were prepared to engage in a debate with the *Amīr* in exchange for gaining political influence. Din Mohammad, later to be known as Mullah *Mushk-i Alam*, was born around 1790. He was given the honorific title of *Mushk-i Alam*, meaning 'the Scent of the World', on account of his proficiency in religious matters. While his influence in eastern Afghanistan in general was great, it was particularly so among the Ghilzais.³³

By the time *Amīr* Abdur Rahman assumed power, Mullah *Mushk-i Alam* was already an infirm old man of around ninety years of age. He had, as mentioned initially, been against Abdur Rahman's candidacy as *Amīr* and in view of his great influence in Afghanistan the British had approached him to try to prevent Abdur Rahman from succeeding in gathering strength for a *jihād* against the other competitors for the throne. Although the British wanted Abdur Rahman on the throne, they wanted him to succeed without *jihād*. However, the approach failed, as Mullah *Mushk-i Alam* in his answer to the Chief Political Officer, Mr. Lepel Griffin, tried to play out his own 'candidate' for the Afghan throne:

All Mussulmans of Afghanistan have selected me as 'Imam-ul-Mujahidin-i-walMuslimin' (leader of the religious warriors and the Mussalman), and no one acts contrary to what I say. The friendship between the British Government and the *Amīr* of Afghanistan should be made on the security of the people of Afghanistan, so that the ruler of this country be a friend of the friends, and enemy of the enemies of the British Government.

I cannot be security for any other person than Sirdar Muhammad Musa Khan [son of Yaqub *Khān*] because this Sirdar is a young boy and cannot do anything contrary to my advice. To carry on the state of affairs, well-wishing and sincere Wazirs will be appointed, and I will also pay attention to this.³⁴

Ultimately, 'in the interests of the country', Mullah *Mushk-i Alam* had to accept the inevitable, and he wrote to the British from Maidan, saying 'that he and all those assembled [many principal chiefs] were ready to accept as *Amir* whomever the British Government might select (R/12/194, p. 78).³⁵

Apparently, Mullah *Mushk-i Alam* managed to utilize his initial reluctant acknowledgement of Abdur Rahman as leverage to obtain a momentary political influence. Kakar (1971:66) reports that Mullah *Mushk-i Alam*'s son, Mullah Abdul Karim, was appointed as *Khān-i-ulūm* (Chief Justice) in 1880 by Abdur Rahman, possibly in a deal struck with the Ghilzai elders concerning the withdrawal of British

troops via Kandahar. On that account the Ghilzai elder, Ismat Allah, was appointed as Prime Minister for a short period.

However, the relationship between Mullah *Mushk-i Alam* and *Amīr* Abdur Rahman soon went sour during the Shinwari uprising (1882-1892). Of all the Afghan tribes, the Shinwaris refused to accept the *Amīr's* authority for the longest period. As guardians of the Khyber pass, the Shinwaris took responsibility for keeping the road open and safe in return for levying a toll. When *Amīr* Abdur Rahman denied the Shinwaris their traditional right to levy this road toll, conflict ensued (Kakar 1971: 93-101). In connection with this uprising, the *Amīr* made overtures for assistance from Mullah *Mushk-i Alam* but got the reply that, since the *Amīr* had proved untrustworthy, the Mullah would do him 'all the mischief in my power',³⁶ upon which Mullah *Mushk-i Alam* and his son Abdul Karim lent support to the Ghilzai Rebellion.

Mullah *Mushk-i Alam* died in the middle of this rebellion, on 17 February 1886. The British newswriter in Herat reported that in revenge for Mullah Abdul Karim's leadership in the Ghilzai rebellion, the *Amīr* ordered the tomb of Mullah *Mushk-i Alam* to be opened and his bones burnt as a warning to others.³⁷ By the sacrilege (of opening Mullah *Mushk-i Alam's* grave), not only did *Amīr* Abdur Rahman take symbolic revenge over him by this display of disrespect but also a very real revenge because, according to existing beliefs, the burning of the Mullah's bones meant that he would not be able to rise on the Day of Judgement and face the Lord, i.e. his soul was forever condemned to Hell.

At this stage *Amīr* Abdur Rahman saw Mullah *Mushk-i Alam* and his sons as some of his worst enemies but in the 1890s, when the *Amīr* increased his efforts at co-opting the most prominent religious leaders, a change of attitude to the sons of Mullah *Mushk-i Alam* became apparent. The youngest son, Abdul Rahman, who had taken refuge in Indian Baluchistan, where the family was in receipt of an allowance of 120 rupees per month from the British Indian government, was approached by the *Amīr* who invited him to return to Afghanistan with promises of an increased allowance.³⁸ (This changed attitude may have been caused by the *Amīr's* wish to get Abdul Rahman's assistance in connection with the Hazara War.) Before returning, the family of *Mushk-i Alam* demanded a written guarantee, on *sūra* Yasin (XXII:36) of the Qur'ān, that the *Amīr* would not violate their safety on return.³⁹ Presumably the *Amīr* agreed, as it is later reported that Mullah Abdul Rahman on his visit to the *Amīr* received 700 rupees and was promised that on the following *Nawroz* (New Year), a fixed allowance would be settled.⁴⁰

Mobilization Against the Infidel

A common feature among virtually all the religious leaders in Afghanistan at the time was their strongly anti-British attitude, brought about by the British expansion in North-West Frontier Province and Afghanistan's two wars with British India. As with the Muslims of British India, the feeling of 'Islam in Danger' was strong – a subject also fully utilized by the *Amīr* in his appeal to obedience and loyalty among the population. However, at the beginning of his reign *Amīr* Abdur Rahman was not yet ready to let his appeals manifest themselves in concrete action. It was reported that Mullah Khalil with two hundred mullahs from Laghman, Kohband, Kunar and Jalalabad together with some Mohmand *khāns* made the following petition to the *Amīr*: that those who were partisans of the British be banned from the country; the *khāns* who remained anti-British be rewarded with governorships; permission be granted to Mullah Khalil to fight *Sayyid* Mahmud, *Badshāh* of Kunar who was considered to be a Wahhabi; and a *sanad* (warrant) be issued empowering Khalil to punish people who violated Shari'a and served the British.⁴¹ To this the *Amīr* replied that it was against Shari'a to fall out with the British without any manifest reason and that Khalil's words would merely bring the British back into Afghanistan (*ibid*).

Jihād was a key concept in the ideological discourse of the centralized state, and it was precisely the external *jihāds* against 'infidels' which secured for the *Amīr* the unanimous support of all (Sunni) *fuqahā* and *pīrs* alike and thus served to consolidate his power. The conquest of Kafiristan was particularly popular among the *ʿulamā* who had already initiated conversion activities in the area. Around 1886 the *Amīr* had lent his official blessing to the *jihād* movement of Mullah Khalil and the *Khān* of Asmar and by 1890 the Hadda Mullah allowed his followers to join the conversion activities (Kakar 1971: 188). Following the conquest of Kafiristan in 1896, the elders and the *ʿulamā* conferred on *Amīr* Abdur Rahman the title of *ghāzī* and of *Zia al-Millat-i wa al-Dīn* (the Light of the Nation and Religion). These internal developments, as well as the Russian seizure of Panjdeh (1885) and later overtures about Wakhan, thus ultimately caused the clergy to rally round the *Amīr* in the defence of Islam and the nation against the infidels.⁴² Finally, the *Amīr* managed to obtain a *fatwā* to the effect that whoever made excuses to avoid serving the king of Islam (i.e. the *Amīr*) was, according to Muslim law, an infidel (Kakar 1979: 155-156). Thus the ideological discourse in support of the centralized state and the absolute monarchy had been accepted.

Summary

The ultimate aim of *Amīr* Abdur Rahman's policies was the consolidation and centralization of the Afghan state – in other words the transformation of the Afghan state from a 'tribal state' to a centralized 'modern' state. Accomplishing such a transformation involved: first, the creation of an administrative infrastructure of the state, staffed by civil servants employed and salaried by the state; second, the establishment of a standing military force loyal to the state as a counterweight to the tribal levies; and, third, securing the economic basis of the new institutions of the state through increased taxation.

A precondition for the success of the above policy was the breaking of the independence of the traditional power groups in society – the royal lineage, the tribal leaders and the religious establishment – and turning them into groups whose basic interests, economically and politically, merged with those of the state. Since the above measures all aimed at strengthening the state vis-à-vis these traditional power groups, and particularly vis-à-vis the tribes, who since the formation of the Durrani kingdom had formed the military and political backbone of the state, the inevitable result was a series of confrontations between the central government and different tribal forces. However, for the centralization of the state to succeed and not to be entirely dependent upon the use of physical force, it was essential for the *Amīr* also to achieve legitimacy of power vis-à-vis the population at large. Consequently, the administrative, military and economic reforms were paralleled by attempts to establish a new ideological foundation for the state and the ruler, to replace the 'tribal state' model.

Altogether, *Amīr* Abdur Rahman's policies in building up a centralized state can be characterized as being *polity expanding* in nature, i.e. generally aiming to extend and expand state control to new sectors of public life – in the administrative, legal, military, economic and other fields – and thereby restricting the independence of the tribes. Polity expansion in the legal field by necessity meant 'Islamization' of the existing legal system in which *Pashtunwāli* and *rawaj* represented decentralized and local customs versus the regularized and 'specialist-controlled' Shari'a. This polity expansion in the legal field required a similar polity expansion in the educational field in order to ensure the supply of adequately trained personnel to manage the legal system. Polity expansion in the field of education was also an important component in the *Amīr's* attempt to achieve ideological hegemony for *his* version of Islam, i.e. for polity expansion in the ideological field.

Since the religious establishment as a group controlled all education, claimed a monopoly on the interpretation of Islam and thus were key figures in the legal system, it was obvious that the *Amīr*'s policy could not succeed without subjecting this group to state control. It was also inevitable that Islam as such should gain an even stronger position in society than it had hitherto enjoyed, since it was being utilized as the state-supporting ideology. In establishing the hegemony of the state-sanctioned interpretations of Islam, the whole educational system was organized expressly for this purpose, as were the legal, executive and legislative powers. The religious beliefs and practices were controlled and standardized to comply with the 'State Church' of Hanafi Sunni Islam.

The religious content or elements in the ideological discourse sanctioning the centralizing policy of the *Amīr* was the ultimate authority of the Qur'ān, the *hadith*, the tradition of famous Muslim scholars and orthodox Sunni jurisprudence in general. However, the discourse into which these concepts were integrated was determined by the secular, political goals of the central state, and not by any religious goals. The comparative success of the *Amīr*'s political use of Islam was due to several factors. In the internal Afghan situation the precondition for establishing ideological hegemony was the interpellation of concepts from the strongest cultural heritage, i.e. Islam. And, by applying orthodox Sunni doctrine in the religious policy, no challenge of religious interpretations by the clergy was possible. In external policy Afghanistan's location as a buffer state between the two Christian powers strongly favoured the *Amīr*'s extensive use of the concept of *jihād* and all other concepts which could be related to the defence of the faith.

For the relationship between the state and the people, this change in the ideological paradigm meant that the people in the official discourse were addressed and interpellated as subjects-cum-believers rather than as tribesmen. However, *Amīr* Abdur Rahman was more a statesman than an ideologue and, when it suited the interests of the state, he still did not hesitate to appeal to the tribal identity of people in a 'divide-and-rule' strategy.

By the end of his rule, *Amīr* Abdur Rahman's policies had succeeded to the extent that the tribes were more or less pacified, the religious leaders to a considerable extent co-opted by the state, and the ideological discourse in support of the centralized state and the absolute monarchy dominant. The foundation of the 'modern' centralized state apparatus in Afghanistan also survived the death of

the 'Iron *Amīr*' in 1901 and did not disintegrate in succession struggles, as had been the normal trend during the nineteenth century.

Notes

- 1 The army alone, according to the *Amīr*, absorbed about 78% of the total income of the state (Kakar 1979:230). *Amīr* Sher Ali had already reduced the *sardārs'* power by creating a standing army of about 56,000, converted into regular troops and paid in cash. The army was mainly recruited among the Ghilzai, and Pashto became the language of the army (Kakar 1971: 4). It still is today.
- 2 In his autobiography *Amīr* Abdur Rahman claims that the Prophet and the Four Companions had appeared to him in a revelation, choosing him as a future *amīr* (Khan, S.M. 1900/1980, Vol. II: 232), and that God helped him to learn to read and write overnight (Vol. I: 37-39). Lord Curzon, who spent several months as guest of the *Amīr*, also states that the *Amīr* 'was convinced that he possessed supernatural gifts' (Curzon 1923: 50).
- 3 For a specification of the authority of the *qāzī*, see Ghani (1977: 52-54).
- 4 It is thus reported (For. Dept. Sec. F, May 1891, Nos. 155-173) that the *Amīr* ordered the *Khān-i Mullah Khān* to make up a list of deceased persons with the object that, of the effects of a deceased person, one third should fall to the government and two thirds to the heirs. If the heir was under age, the two-thirds share would be handed over to the *Khān-i 'ulum*. The *Khān-i Mullah Khān* was reluctant to carry out the order, apparently in view of the popular uproar it would create (quite apart from the fact that no legal sanctions for such a measure could be found in Islamic Law). However, the *Amīr* used dismissal and punitive fines to deal with such opposition (*ibid*: Kabul Newsletter, 18. March 1891).
- 5 Targhib-i-Ila-ul-Jehad 1887 (Appendix I:1), Khan, S.M. 1900/1980, II: 2, 15, 50 198, 200).
- 6 Targhib-i-Ila-ul-Jehad 1887 (Appendix III: 7).
- 7 For an account of the development of the Afghan army, see Kakar (1979: Ch. V).
- 8 Mohammad 'Abduh (1849-1905), religious scholar, jurist, and liberal reformer, who led the late nineteenth century movement in Egypt and other Muslim countries to revitalize Islamic teachings and institutions in the modern world. He was strongly influenced by al-Afghani's revolutionary pan-Islamism. Rashid Rida (1865-1935), Syrian scholar profoundly influenced by the writings of al-Afghani and 'Abduh.
- 9 Letter from Durand, C.S.I. to Colonel Bradford, 10.06.1887 (For. Dept. Sec. F, July 1887, Nos. 155-169).
- 10 For. Dep. Sec. F, July 1887, Nos. 155-169/ Appendix.
- 11 In general, the *Amīr's* economic policy was basically a matter of imposing and, in particular, collecting new taxes. Even the lands of tribal chiefs became subject to taxation and their right to levy duties on caravans was removed. In this way the independent economic power of the tribal chiefs was partially curtailed, while simultaneously encouraging economic dependence on the state via a system of allowances (Ghani 1977: 102-104).
- 12 For. & Pol. Dep. Sec. F, April 1892, Nos. 107-126.

- 13 *ibid*: Diary of the British agent, Kabul, 6-9 Feb. 1892.
- 14 For. Dept. Sec. F, July 1887, Nos. 155-169.
- 15 For. Dept. Sec. E, May 1893, Nos. 314-316).
- 16 The Ghilzai Rebellion was essentially an uprising of landowners in opposition to the new taxation (*zakāt* to be paid to the government, house tax, birth tax, marriage tax and succession tax) and increased revenue imposed by the *Amīr* in an attempt to curtail their power (see Kakar 1971: Ch. 4).
- 17 For. Dept. Sec. F, Prosc. July 1887, Nos. 571-710.
- 18 Seraj-ul-Tawarikh, III: 516, For. Dept. Sec. F, April 1887, Nos. 399-495.
- 19 For. Dept. Sec. F, July 1887, Nos. 571-710.
- 20 For. Pol. Dept. Sec. F, Prosc. May 1890, Nos. 44-45.
- 21 For. & Pol. Dept. Sec. F, Jan. 1893, Nos. 511-539.
- 22 See Kakar (1971). For a study of Kafiristan before the Afghan conquest, see Robertson: *The Kafirs of the Hindu Kush*, London 1900.
- 23 For. Dept. Sec. F, June 1895, Nos. 767-786 - for cases of forced conversion of Kabul Shi'as, see For. Dept. Sec. F, Aug. 1896, Nos. 1-14. A modern parallel to this persecution and encouragement to genocide of the Hazaras was Abdullah Amin's public speech in Aibak, Samangan Province, in Autumn 1979, to the same effect: '*tokhm-i Hazara dar Afghānistān na-memānad*' (i.e. 'the seeds of Hazaras shall not be left in Afghanistan').
- 24 The Qizilbash had been close to the seat of power since their arrival in Afghanistan during the Safavid period but, according to Kakar (1971:178), had fallen out with *Amīr* Abdur Rahman firstly because of their support of the British in the Anglo-Afghan Wars and secondly for having supported the late *Amīr* Sher Ali. The *Amīr* now took revenge on them, labelling them 'enemies of Afghanistan' and appealed to the anti-Shi'a feelings of the population. He also accused the Qizilbash, as well as the *mujtahid* of Mashhad, of being instigators of the Hazara War (Kakar 1979: 158-159).
- 25 An exception was the descendants of Abdul Kasim, also called Sufi Islam (*Shaykh ul-Islām*) of Karrukh of Herat, one of the most influential religious centres of that province. The *Amīr's* respect for him, and hence for his descendants, was based on Sufi Islam having sacrificed his life in declaring *jihād* against the Persians for their attack on Herat in 1837 (Kakar 1979: 152).
- 26 For. Dept. Sec. F., July 1887, Nos. 283-294.
- 27 For. Dept. Sec. F., July 1887, Nos. 283-294.
- 28 Warburton (1900:218) describes Mullah Khalil as 'a regular firebrand of the Afghan war of 1878-80' pensioned with Rs 5,000 from the Afghan army. He was stirring up the Mohmands to resist the British Kabul-River Survey, 1890-91. See also For. Dep. Front. A, Pros. Sept. 1892, Nos. 1-8.
- 29 For. Dept. Sec. F., Jan. 1887, Nos. 119-198.
- 30 For. Dept. Sec. F., Sept. 1889, Nos. 301-302, Jan. 1887, Nos. 119-198.
- 31 'The *khalifas* of Hadda-i Sahib included two *hazrats* (Hazrat Sahib-i Char Bagh, Hazrat Sahib-i Butkhak), at least three *sayyids* (Shaykh Pacha Sahib-i Salampur, Pacha Sahib-i Tigari, Kajuri Mulla Sahib), and at least one descendent of an *akhund* (Sufi Sahib-i Batikot)' (Edwards 1986a: 298, note 34).
- 32 For. Dept. Sec. F., Feb. 1888, Nos. 505-584.
- 33 For. Dept. Sec. Supp., Feb. 1880, Nos. 325-330.

- 34 For. Dept. Sec. Supp. July 1880, Nos. 256-280. See also L/P&S/18 A: 43-47.
- 35 That Abdur Rahman at this stage also had to acknowledge the decisive influence of the British in internal Afghan affairs is demonstrated by his letter to Sir Lepel Griffin (20 June 1880): '...you propose to hold a public Darbar (...), and to notify to the Sardars and Chiefs of Kabul that the British Government has been graciously pleased to accept this creature of God as Amir of Afghanistan. I in return accept from you and from the Viceroy of India the Amirship of Afghanistan' (R/12/194, p. 239).
- 36 For. Dept. Sec. E, Prosc. Jan. 1884, Nos. 214-217.
- 37 For. Dept., Sec. F. April 1887, Nos. 399-495.
- 38 For. Dept. Front. B, Oct. 1892, No. 52.
- 39 For. Dept. Sec. F., Dec. 1892, No. 28-45.
- 40 For. Dept. Sec. F., May 1893, Nos. 37-80.
- 41 For. Dept. Sec. Supp., Prosc. Nov. 1880, Nos. 107-113.
- 42 The 'defence of Islam' even brought about a convergence of interests between the Hadda Mullah and the *Amīr*. The Hadda Mullah thus informed the *Sipāhī Sālār* ('army leader', General-in-Chief) about some tribesmen being inclined towards the British and suggesting, that the *Amīr* may send for some of their elders and give them *lungīs* to retain their loyalty (Peshawar Confid. Diaries, For. Dept. Sec. F, May 1897, Nos. 41-57). *Lungīs* (turbans) were commonly used by the rulers of Afghanistan as presents to tribal elders and others who came to pay their respect and who were not prominent enough to command more auspicious gifts.

CHAPTER 4

PAN-ISLAMISM AND ANTI-COLONIALISM (1901-1919)

Few Afghan rulers before *Amīr* Abdur Rahman had managed to die a natural death while still being in power – and after him no ruler has managed to do so. This fact illustrates not only that Abdur Rahman ruled the country with great political skill but also that he did it with so much repression that all opposition from the traditional power groups in the country over the years was rendered harmless. By the time of his death even the usual struggles over succession did not occur, and his son Habibullah could take over the throne without opposition. One of the reasons for this was no doubt because *Amīr* Abdur Rahman had already secured allegiance to his son's succession by arranging matrimonial alliances for Habibullah with leading families of the royal lineage (such as the Loynab and the Yahya Khel), as well as marrying him to a daughter of Sa'addin, the *Khān-i 'Ulūm* (Chief *Qāzi*).¹

To a large extent, the eighteen years (1901-1919) of *Amīr* Habibullah's reign saw a continuation of the policies of Abdur Rahman, in particular regarding foreign relations.² However, *Amīr* Habibullah gave the absolute monarchy a more human face and gained some initial popularity by reducing the most barbarous methods of punishment (like abolishing the *chāh siāh*, i.e. the black well) and allowing the return of the families whom *Amīr* Abdur Rahman had banished from the country, such as the Tarzis, the Musahiban and the Charkhis.



Figure 9: Habibullah, *Amīr* 1901-19

The comparatively peaceful internal situation during *Amīr* Habibullah's reign can no doubt be seen as the effects of *Amīr* Abdur Rahman's very repressive policies; Habibullah was, so to speak, reaping the benefits of his father's military campaigns over twenty years against rebellious groups and tribes. This does not mean that political life in Afghanistan was at a standstill in this period; on the contrary. While *Amīr* Abdur Rahman had singularly defined the ends and means of Afghan policy, many new ideas were now brewing up within the ruling elite, among whom the consolidation of the central state had brought about the formation of a civilian and military bureaucracy, in whose interests it was to develop the state apparatus and its functions further. This group in particular objected to the xenophobia and isolationism which had been cemented during the last couple of decades and which was seen as an inhibition to the development of the state and society. *Amīr* Habibullah himself was somewhat influenced by these ideas and initiated some reforms with the aim of putting Afghanistan on a par with the rest of the world. In this sense, *Amīr* Habibullah's reign can be seen as an interlude between two eras of Afghanistan's history: in many ways it was a continuation of the past, but it was also a period of realignments where new ideas were developing and taking root, thus signalling what was in stock for the future.

In addition, the developments abroad, particularly in the Middle East, in British India, as well as the Balkan War and the First World War, had greater effects than ever before on the political thinking in Afghanistan, both among groups that could be labelled as 'modernists' and among 'traditionalists'.

The Policies of *Amīr* Habibullah

Since *Amīr* Abdur Rahman had dealt so effectively with the traditional power groups in the country that they no longer formed an immediate threat to the monarch, *Amīr* Habibullah could afford to give some concessions to these groups in an attempt to broaden his power base and rely less on the use of force. He relaxed the much-resisted system of compulsory military recruitment, established a State Council to handle tribal affairs, giving consideration to the will and interests of the tribal leaders, and introduced a system whereby tribal representatives could participate in the adjudication of tribal cases by provincial authorities (Gregorian 1969:181). However, these concessions did not change the basic structure of the state, based as it

was upon the absolute monarchy, and Habibullah retained all the prerogatives of the late *Amīr*.

In an assembly held in September 1902, one year after Habibullah's ascent to the throne, 'military and civil officers, Sayids, learned men of religion, and Khans...with the representatives of tribes from various districts'...pledged their loyalty to *Amīr* Habibullah, regarding him after the Almighty God and the true Prophet as having claims upon them, and swore to obey his orders and comply with his wishes under the commandment and wishes of God, and carry out his prohibitive orders, as the prohibitions enjoined by him were the prohibitions of God.³ Thus *Amīr* Abdur Rahman's efforts to give the *amīr*ship religious legitimation had succeeded.

It appears that the religious leaders managed to improve their situation considerably – more than the tribal leaders – during *Amīr* Habibullah's reign. They did not regain their independence from the state but, in a continuation of *Amīr* Abdur Rahman's successful attempt at co-opting the *ʿulamā* into the state apparatus, their influence was now institutionalized through the formation of the Mizan al-Tahqiqat Sharīʿat. This was a board of some seven to eight *ʿulamā* whose function it was to ensure that the official policy was in accordance with Islam, as well as produce books on *fiqh* and interpretations of the Qurʾān and *hadīth*. While Abdur Rahman had used a small group of three to four *ʿulamā* for the same purpose, it is significant that these functions became institutionalized under *Amīr* Habibullah. This can be seen as a continuation of *Amīr* Abdur Rahman's polity-dominance Islamization, where an increasing number of previously independent religious functions were incorporated into and dominated by the political domain.

The Mizan al-Tahqiqat was headed by the *Qāzī al-Quzāt*, *Hājji* Abdur Razzaq, who had received his education at Deoband and studied *hadīth* under the famous *Ḥāzrat Mawlānā* Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, one of the founders of *Dār-ul 'Ulum Deoband*. Among other prominent *ʿulamā* of the board was Mullah Abdul Majid and Mullah Ghulam Naqshband (*Hājji Bāshi*).⁴ *Hājji* Abdur Razzaq had been the tutor of *Amīr* Habibullah and exerted a very strong influence at court, where he continued to be the spiritual mentor of the *Amīr*'s younger brother, *Sardār* Nasrullah. *Sardār* Nasrullah held the title of *Nāʾib al-Sultanat* (viceroy), which included most of the functions of a Minister of the Interior; in particular, the relations to the border tribesmen and religious leaders on either side of the border fell under his control. He was known as strongly anti-British, conservative and religious, being a *hāfīz* himself (i.e. having learned the Qurʾān by heart).

The new cordial relationship between the monarchy and the religious establishment appeared immediately after *Amīr* Habibullah's takeover. For the *Nawruz* celebration in 1902, he invited the Hadda-i *Ṣāhib* to come to Kabul and increased his sacerdotal powers by placing a large section of the Frontier within his religious jurisdiction and ordering a new mosque to be built for him.

Both *Amīr* Habibullah and *Sardār* Nasrullah also seem to have paid special respect to the *Naqīb* of Baghdad (*Sayyid* Abdul Rahman); when *Sayyid* Hassan *Effendi*, brother of the *Naqīb*, was granted an interview in 1904, the *Amīr* invited him to settle in Kabul, and reportedly the *Amīr* even contemplated giving one of his daughters in marriage to *Sayyid* Hassan *Effendi*. After the latter settled in Kabul, he was graced with a guard of honour – a battalion of infantry – when departing for winter residence in Jalalabad. He was also granted a monthly allowance of 1,000 rupees plus some land.⁵

While the *Naqīb Ṣāhib* was known to be pro-British, *Amīr* Habibullah also invited other leading dignitaries from the Frontier disturbances in 1897, such as the 'notorious Mullah Powindah from Waziristan, the troublesome fire-eater Mullah *Sayyid* Akbar [*Akhundzada* (Aka Khel Afridi)] from Tirah and the Safi Mullah' (Hamilton 1906:442).⁶ All this was much to the displeasure of the British who feared new troubles at the Frontier, particularly since the new *Amīr* also took an interest in the Afridi tribesmen, south of the Khyber, whose hostility to the British government made them a constant cause of trouble.

These cordial overtures to the religious dignitaries were soon reciprocated. In November 1902, the Hadda-i *Ṣāhib* wrote to invite *Amīr* Habibullah to hold a special *darbār* in order to receive from the hands of the mullahs the title *Sirajul-Millat wa ud-Dīn* (The Light of the Nation and the Faith).⁷ The attitude of the contemporary British Indian government to all this is contained in Hamilton's remarks: 'In view of this it was generally felt that the happiest augury for the peace of the Indo-Afghan border, at the end of 1902, was the death of the Hadda Mullah on December 23, when the Afghan government devoted a sum of Rs 30,000 towards the funeral obsequies of their sainted protégé' (Hamilton 1906:448).

In spite of *Amīr* Habibullah's positive attitude to the religious establishment he still ran into conflict after his official visit to British India in 1907.⁸ The visit was a great success and the *Amīr* was so impressed with what he had seen that he decided that Afghanistan needed reforms and development. However, another consequence of the India trip was that the *Amīr* got himself initiated into the fraternity of Freemasons. This caused religious elements in Afghanistan,

especially from Laghman, to accuse the *Amīr* of secretly having embraced Christianity and being willing to hand over his country. The agitation subsided only when, upon his return, the *Amīr* had four mullahs hanged (Adamec 1967:66). This agitation took place in spite of all the cautiousness of the *Amīr*. During his trip, *Amīr* Habibullah sent orders to *Sardār* Nasrullah to summon all the leading mullahs to a *darbār* and instruct them to ensure that all men in their *mahallas* (neighbourhoods) say morning and evening prayers in the *mahalla* mosque, and anybody leaving the *mahalla* should report to the mullah. In addition, the mullahs had authority to beat to death anyone disobeying these orders – and should teach the principles of Islam to all children.⁹

While *Amīr* Habibullah's trip to India had opened his eyes to the need for technological development in Afghanistan (through employment of foreign technicians and experts, for road construction and, perhaps, a railway),¹⁰ he had already taken steps to improve the educational system of the country. In 1903, as a first step, the *Amīr* had issued orders to all the mosques in Kabul to collect the children playing around the streets and give them an education. The headmen of different quarters were to report who could not afford to educate their children and the *Amīr* would arrange for it. This system was intended to be applied all over the country.¹¹

These noble and revolutionary thoughts were naturally not carried out on a national scale but significant steps were taken towards the establishment of a secular school system. In 1904, the Habibiya College, the first secondary school (for boys only) was started. In connection with the opening of this college, the *Amīr* made a proclamation on general education, centred around a four-year curriculum, covering religious instruction, Persian, arithmetic and geography. Education was to be obligatory for all citizens.¹² A military college, Harabiya, was also opened; this was under the administration of Turkish officers, while the administration of Habibiya was in Indian hands.

Hitherto, education had been entirely within the religious domain (see Chapter 2) in spite of *Amīr* Abdur Rahman's attempts to control its content. But now, by these reforms, education became directly subject to the polity-expansion of the state through the foundation of a governmental school system. While the emphasis was still on the traditional, religious education, 'secular' subjects were also introduced in these government institutions, while the traditional religious school system was left unchanged. *Amīr* Habibullah, who thus became the founder of the modern educational system of Afghanistan, was a

great supporter of 'western' education – but religious education should remain the foundation upon which all other education should rest.¹³

A characteristic formulation is the speech which the *Amīr* made on his India trip where he was invited to lay the foundation stone of the Islamic College at Lahore:

O my Muslim brethren, endeavour to acquire knowledge, so that you may not wear the clothes of the ignorant. It is your duty to acquire knowledge. After your children have thoroughly acquainted themselves with the principles and laws of the faith of Muhammad, turn their attention towards the acquirement of the new sciences, as unless you acquire Western knowledge, you will remain without bread. (Quoted from Gregorian 1969:187)

In other words, acquisition of knowledge was seen as a religious injunction, strengthening the believers against the infidels. These ideas, drastically different from those of *Amīr* Abdur Rahman for whom knowledge was something which was exclusively for noble minds, were clearly affected by the teachings of such Islamic modernists as Jamal ud-Din al-Afghani, *Sayyid* Ahmad Khan and most strongly represented at the Afghan court by the prominent writer and journalist Mahmud Tarzi.

Tarzi had returned to Afghanistan in 1904 from Damascus, where his family had had to go into exile during *Amīr* Abdur Rahman's reign. There, Tarzi had become familiar with European philosophy as well as with reformist and pan-Islamic ideas together with the Ottoman nationalist movement. During the first years of his rule, *Amīr* Habibullah was very responsive to Tarzi's arguments about the importance of modernization in the fields of education, communication and economy.

The *Amīr* also formed an organization, Dar al-Ta'arif, for the publication of the much needed educational material. Most of the teachers were Indians, either educated in Lahore or at the modernist Muslim College at Aligarh. Hence the effects in Afghanistan of events and ideas developed among the Muslims of British India came to be even stronger than before. Earlier, the influence from British India had been more from the orthodox theological school at Deoband where some Afghans had also received their education.

Amīr Habibullah's responsiveness to modernist ideas was also illustrated by the fact that in 1911 he gave support and encouragement to Mahmud Tarzi's publication of the Farsi-language bi-weekly *Siraj*

al-Akhbar (Torch of News). Apart from bringing news, the paper attempted to define both the nature and ultimate aims of Afghan nationalism and to formulate its theoretical basis in order to direct and justify the projected socio-economic transformation of the country (Gregorian 1967:347). Within a decade, *Siraj al-Akhbar* and Tarzi's ideas exerted a huge influence on the modernist section of the Afghan bourgeoisie but, by 1918, Tarzi's militant pan-Islamic and anti-British attitude had become too much of an embarrassment to the *Amīr*, and the paper was closed down.

Although only a section of the ruling group was committed to the *Amīr's* cautious reform policy, the main political issue which divided this group was going to be Afghanistan's relationship to Great Britain. And it was an issue which created unorthodox alliances.

Political Groupings around the Court

Political developments in the world at large had significant effects on the internal Afghan scene. As illustrated above, *Amīr* Abdur Rahman had made extensive use of Islam to unite the heterogeneous population against aggression from its Christian neighbours. This feeling of 'Islam in danger' became further stressed by the gradual dismemberment of the Ottoman empire, since now the Caliphate itself was in danger. While Abdur Rahman had mainly tied Islam and state together, this apparent onslaught of Christian, European imperialism against Islam called for a pan-Islamic solidarity. These sentiments grew very strong among the Muslims of British India and also had a great influence in Afghanistan.

However, a British-engineered counter-offensive was also launched. Lord Curzon (Viceroy of India, 1898-1905), with the help of the (British) Principal of the (loyalist) Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh, sent a deputation of Aligarh staff to Afghanistan to persuade the 'noble class' to send their sons to Aligarh (Muhammad 1981). Some results may have come out of this charm offensive, but not enough to affect the politico-cultural atmosphere in Afghanistan and, in view of the international and domestic political development, even Aligarh ultimately turned anti-British under the influence of the two Ali brothers (Mohammad Ali and Shaukat Ali) who were former Aligarh students (*ibid*:106) and later became leaders of the anti-British Khilafat Movement (see Chapter 5). Turkey's entry into the First World War and the Caliph's call for a *jihād* against the Allies added even more fervour to the pan-Islamic and anti-British feelings.

Pan-Islam, the concept of Muslim solidarity, made it possible for the most orthodox traditionalists and the recently developed 'modernist' group to join together politically for the defence of the fatherland and the faith. *Amīr* Habibullah was thus subject to considerable political pressure to abandon the treaty with the British and enter the war in religious solidarity with the Turks – and to gain full Afghan independence at the same time, i.e. nullification of the treaty of Gandamak according to which Afghanistan's foreign policy was under British control. Even a German mission, the Niedermayer Mission (see Adamec (1967) and Vogel (1976)) came to Kabul to secure Afghan cooperation against the British, accompanied by some Indian revolutionaries who envisaged *Amīr* Habibullah as a liberator of the Indian Muslims. But all efforts were in vain. *Amīr* Habibullah maintained the neutrality of Afghanistan – and this controversial position may have sealed his fate as he was assassinated in 1919 on a hunting trip in Laghman.

The war issue divided the court and ruling circles into two opposing groups:

- a pro-British group (or to put it differently, a group wanting to maintain Afghan neutrality in the war) consisting of the *Amīr*, Abdul Quddus Khan (Chief Minister), the very active Bibi Halima (widow of *Amīr* Abdur Rahman and grand-daughter of *Amīr* Dost Mohammad) and many merchants trading with India.
- the so-called 'War Party' consisting of firstly 'traditionalists' led by *Sardār* Nasrullah, *Qāzī al-Quzāt*, *Hājji* Abdur Razzaq and supported by most of the religious and tribal leaders, and secondly 'modernists' led by Mahmud Tarzi and *Sardār* Amanullah and (possibly) supported by general Nadir *Khān*.¹⁴

The two groups of the 'War Party' did not have much more in common than pan-Islamism and being anti-British. While the traditionalist group was by far the most representative of the Afghan population, the smaller 'modernist' group, owing to the personality of Mahmud Tarzi, had exerted considerable influence at court, for example on *Amīr* Habibullah's educational programmes. The mouthpiece of this group was the newspaper, *Siraj al-Akhbar*. The strongly anti-British and pan-Islamic views of the newspaper (also crossing Shi'a-Sunni divisions) went far beyond official Afghan policy. Accordingly, the British kept a rather close watch on *Siraj al-Akhbar*, having significant articles translated and submitted for closer scrutiny.¹⁵

For example, *Siraj al-Akhbar* wrote on the atrocities committed by the Balkan states. The lesson drawn was how the Christian powers had devoured and taken over one Muslim country after the other (such as Egypt, Turkestan and India) while Persia, Arabia and Turkey remained threatened. *Siraj al-Akhbar* also managed to become a newspaper recognized in the Muslim world beyond Afghanistan. (Since the modernist views of these writings are so closely connected with the policies of the Amanullah era in Afghan politics, they will be dealt with separately.)

Within the modernist camp, there were also some movements pressing for the establishment of a constitutional monarchy (*mashruṭiyya*), which even enjoyed the support of some members of the *ʿulamā*, as well as of some tribal leaders, but these movements were simply repressed by the government.¹⁶

As mentioned above, there were very few tribal uprisings during *Amīr* Habibullah's reign and, in the few that there were, the religious leaders assisted in re-establishing peace, i.e. the religious leaders had now joined the state in opposition to the tribes, as in the case of a rebellion of Mangal and Ahmadzai in 1912, which the Lala *Pīr* and Mullah Mohammad *Sayyid Akhundzada* of Musai, Logar, helped the government to suppress (Adamec 1975:181).

In a way this can be seen as a continuation of the settlement reached in the 1890s between *Amīr* Abdur Rahman and the religious leaders following his campaigns against Kafiristan and Hazarajat. Here, at the beginning of the twentieth century, it was also the external enemy which led these leaders to urge believers to rally around the King of Islam in order to resist the infidels. As such, less attention was paid to domestic matters and *Sardār* Nasrullah made sure, covertly, that enough resources were channelled to maintain the external activities of the religious leaders.

Pan-Islamism and Anti-Colonialism

In all political quarters in Afghanistan, foreign political considerations generally weighed more heavily than domestic issues during these years, and this situation was mainly brought about by a revived and aggressive British 'forward policy'. The British pushed outposts into tribal territories from Chitral to Baluchistan, recruited and trained local levies, paid high subsidies to some tribes, fought others and built railway lines to Dargai, Thal and Jamrud at the Khyber. The local response was not lacking and took the form of tribal raids on these

outward symbols of the Empire. In 1897 there was a general Frontier uprising which took no less than 35,000 troops to put down. As a result, the new North-West Frontier Province was established with a Chief Commissioner directly under the Viceroy, and by instituting a system of regular payments to Frontier tribes, border conflicts were reduced. However, during the following decades British troops continued to fight against Mahsuds, Waziris and Zakka Khel Afridis; thus in 1907, 56 raids were recorded in the Settled Districts of the North-West Frontier, 99 in 1908 and 159 in 1909 (Davies 1932).¹⁷

The Frontier tribes, and particularly the religious leaders of these areas, pressurized the *Amīr* to lend support to their resistance. Habibullah's reaction towards this popular sentiment for *jihād*, which was also strongly felt inside Afghanistan, was that he would neither support nor encourage participation but, on the other hand, would not stop any of his subjects from participating – and many religious leaders went with numerous troops: the *Hazrat Sāhib* of Butkhāk¹⁸ went with 1,500 *ghāzīs*, Sufi *Sāhib* of Batikot also went with another 1,500; *Sāhibzada* of Musai took 1,200; while *Mīr Sāhib Jan Bādshāh* of Islampur, Mullah *Sāhib* of Tagab, Mullah *Akhundzada* of Karabagh, Mullah *Akhundzada* of Dudzai and Mullah *Akhundzada* of Langar also joined with troops. They went to attack the old Sikh fort at Shabkadr, where the British had put up a border police post, and Mullah Qayyum of Nazian led an attack on Landi Kotal. At the same time, the Babra Mullah tried to mobilize people against the British Mohmand expedition. Before joining the *jihād* many of these religious leaders went to see the *Amīr* and, while they had to make do with his silent approval, they obtained money and weapons from *Sardār Nasrullah*.¹⁹

There might have existed a tacit understanding at least initially between the *Amīr* and *Sardār Nasrullah* on the issue of anti-British activities, since the *Sardār* throughout these years covertly channelled resources to the external activities of the religious leaders. The *Amīr* apparently at no time attempted to restrict the activities of the *Sardār* (or of the religious leaders) as long as Afghanistan officially was able to maintain its neutrality – and the *Sardār* and the religious leaders, for their part, only attempted to pressurize the *Amīr* and never sought an outright confrontation with him on these issues. The anti-British activities were thus singularly dealt with by *Sardār Nasrullah*. It is thus interesting that while the *Hājji* of Turangzai and the Indian *mujāhidīn* were among the foremost anti-British forces at the time, secretly supported by Nasrullah, they were also engaged in securing allegiance among the Frontier tribes for the Afghan *Amīr*.²⁰ The Indian

revolutionary, *Mawlānā* Obaidullah Sindhi stayed in Kabul during the World War I and was a keen observer of political developments there. He hinted that the British, knowing well that *Amīr* Habibullah was their only guarantee of Afghan neutrality, even financed his endeavours to secure allegiance from the tribes in *Yāghīstān*,²¹ thus keeping them from declaring *jihād* on their own; the *Hājji* of Turangzai and the *mujāhidīn* were used by *Sardār* Nasrullah to distribute these British funds (Sindhi, quoted in Shaikh 1986:64-65).

The Balkan War and the peril of the Ottoman empire, which in this context was identified with the Caliphate (Sultan Abdul Hamid nominally being Caliph of the Muslim World), increased pressure on *Amīr* Habibullah from the most prominent religious leaders of the



Figure 10: Obaidullah Sindhi

country to declare *jihād* against the British. Thus the Pacha *Sāhib*, a relative of the prominent *Mīr Sayyid* Jan *Bādshāh* of Kunar,²² in an address to the *Amīr* held the British responsible for the Balkan War which therefore should be considered as a religious war (requiring *jihād*). But the only response elicited from the *Amīr* by these overtures was that, if *Bādshāh Sāhib* had not been a *sayyid*, the *Amīr* would have had him killed for such talk.²³

In this situation, it seems that *Sardār* Nasrullah involved himself even more directly in supporting the trans-border *jihād* activities, and it was also reported that he had opened a subscription list in aid of the Turkish War Fund,

singling out various Indian chiefs as examples of generosity.²⁴

Amīr Habibullah thus maintained Afghanistan's neutrality in spite of strong opposition even at court, where a person as prominent as the *Qāzī al-Quzāt* confided to the British political agent after a *darbār* that he personally considered the war with Turkey an entirely religious war 'on the authority of belief in the Sultan of Turkey as the unanimously accepted Khilafat ul-Muslimin over the Muslim world in the past and the present'; and the only thing keeping the *Qāzī al-Quzāt* from having declared *jihād* long ago was the *Amīr*'s decision to

maintain neutrality. The *Qāzī al-Quzāt* enjoyed a position of high esteem not only in court circles but also among the general public.²⁵ Hereby is thus reflected the fact that, although the purpose of the *Mizān al-Taḥqīqāt* – headed by the *Qāzī al-Quzāt*, *Hājji* Abdur Razzaq – was to ensure that government policy conformed with Sharīʿa, it was still a state organ which could be forced to endorse official policy, i.e. giving religious sanction to the policies of the *Amīr* much in the same manner as under *Amīr* Abdur Rahman.

But the pressure on the *Amīr* was to grow even further, when Enver Pasha, the Young Turk Minister of War, sent a letter containing the following points:

- the Sultan of Turkey had declared *jihād*, which should be obeyed by all Muslims (since the Sultan was *Khalīfa al-Muslimīn*). Muslims in India and Persia were following the proclamation but what was the case of Afghanistan?
- would Afghanistan allow Turkish troops to pass through the country?
- he suggested that Afghan-British diplomatic relations be terminated; and
- that Afghan mullahs not be prevented from joining *jihād*.²⁶

Even this could not move *Amīr* Habibullah from his policy of neutrality, as shown by what he is reported to have answered:

- it was too early to give up Afghan neutrality;
- no attempts would be made to stop Turkish army passing *outside* Afghan territory but there would be no Afghan help in terms of provisions;
- it was not desirable for Afghanistan to break off diplomatic relations with British India; and
- mullahs could do what they liked *outside* Afghan territory – they were neither forbidden nor encouraged to engage in hostilities.²⁷

Kabul at the time was the meeting place for all sorts of delegations, an important one being the Turco-German von Hentig/Niedermayer Mission, with Kazim Bey as representative of the Ottoman Turks, in which the Indian revolutionaries Raja Mahendra Pratap and *Mawlānā* Barkatullah also took part.²⁸ They were later to join in cooperation with *Mawlānā* Obaidullah Sindhi, representing the *Shaykh al-Hind*, in setting up a Provisional Government of India in Kabul, and sending missions to Tashkent, Samarkand, Constantinople and Berlin to enlist

support. There is evidence that *Sardār* Nasrullah and the *Qāzī al-Quzāt*, *Hājji* Abdur Razzaq, were in favour of sending the mission to Tashkent and Samarkand.²⁹

The Turco-German Mission visited Kabul in September 1915 to plead support for the Turkish cause. In view of this, the *Amīr* called a *jirga* consisting of 'Ulemas, Mashaikhs and the dignitaries of the State' to review the issue of Afghan neutrality. There was almost unanimous support for declaring *jihād* on the British but, when consulted, the *Ḥāzrat Sāhib* of Chaharbagh advised the *Amīr* to remain neutral until the best opportunity occurred or such circumstances as would render Afghan intervention in the war absolutely necessary, while in the meantime preparing for this eventuality.³⁰ In addition, the *Amīr* had the *Khān-i 'Ulum* (his father-in-law), Sa'addin *Khān*, to produce a pamphlet endorsing the view (in the tradition of *Amīr* Abdur Rahman) that disobedience to the *Amīr* equalled disobedience to Islam.³¹ Tension and dissatisfaction at the court grew, bringing the modernists and traditionalist in the 'War Party' closer together in opposition to the *Amīr*. While having managed to maintain Afghan neutrality, *Amīr* Habibullah made a number of gestures at the domestic front to indicate his sympathy with the anti-British front, instructing mullahs:

... to inform the people of the arrival and the objects of the Turkish Mission and to warn them to prepare themselves to await the proper time for lawful ghaza and to disregard the hasty and ill-advised calls to arms which are now being made.³²

Whether the *Amīr* really contemplated breaking the Afghan neutrality is doubtful. Yet he managed to get the Turco-German Mission to agree to a treaty under which the Germans were to give Afghanistan 100,000 rifles, 300 cannon and 20 million pounds in gold. In return, the *Amīr* merely hinted that he would attack India – but only after victorious German and Turk armies entered Afghanistan to lead the assault (Adamec 1967: 94).

The British naturally kept a close watch on the developments in Afghanistan. Aware of this, *Amīr* Habibullah turned to the British indicating that, in view of all the above pressures, his neutrality ought to be rewarded with the British relinquishing their control of Afghanistan's foreign affairs. This did not happen, but the British did increase his subsidy in 1915 in order to strengthen him and as a reward for maintaining Afghan neutrality (Shaikh 1986: 49).

Summary

In comparison to the preceding decades, the reign of *Amīr* Habibullah was characterized by internal peace and thus an unusual degree of consensus regarding the legitimacy of power and of the ruler. Several factors contributed to this but most important was that, during the reign of *Amīr* Abdur Rahman, the power of the tribes and religious establishment had been curtailed. This was followed up by their cooption into the state (i.e. in a combined 'stick-and-carrot' policy) with the end result being the establishment of a new *modus vivendi* between state, tribes and clergy, from which *Amīr* Habibullah benefited. Furthermore, the domestic policies during these two decades were basically a continuation and consolidation of the reforms initiated by *Amīr* Abdur Rahman.

While the internal political situation thus was one of comparative peace, foreign political issues were dominating the internal Afghan debate and left many traces in the political as well as the intellectual life of the period. The buffer state position of Afghanistan, which had been cemented during the last decades of the nineteenth century through the British-Russian protocols and border commissions, and reflected in *Amīr* Abdur Rahman's political discourse centered around *jihād*, had at first produced xenophobia and isolationism in Afghanistan. By the turn of the century, however, the situation seemed to change and the imperial pressures on Afghanistan were increasingly perceived in an international (i.e. pan-Islamic) perspective which linked up intellectual and political thinking in Afghanistan with the rest of the Muslim world.

At least two factors contributed significantly to this development. First was the return of exiled families to Afghanistan, most notably the Tarzi family, who became the most important inspirator for the newly-founded bureaucracy and for the court in general. Returning from the Ottoman empire, Mahmud Tarzi, through the newspaper *Siraj al-Akhbar*, introduced the political thinking of the Young Turks, *Sayyid* Ahmad Khan and al-Afghani to the Afghans as well as kept them informed about events in the world in the political, scientific and cultural field. The 'Turkish connection' of the Tarzis also paved the way for Afghan-Turkish cooperation, at first within the military college, Harabiya. The second factor was the connection to India, where a number of Afghan religious leaders had traditionally been educated. With *Dār ul-'Ulūm Deoband* assuming a leading position, particularly under the dynamic leadership of *Shaykh al-Hind*, *Mawlānā* Mahmud al-Hassan, the radical ideas among the Indian Muslims

were transmitted directly to Afghanistan. Here, a significant number of religious leaders in the Eastern provinces and along the Frontier were mobilized in a *jihād* movement on the basis of a (maraboutic) Sufi network, developed around the *Ākhund* of Swat and his foremost *khalīfa*, the Hadda-i *Sāhib*, and 'Indian Wahhabism' in the formulations of Shah Waliullah and *Sayyid Ahmad Bareilly*.³³

During the first two decades of this century, two political movements were thus in force in Afghanistan: a nationalist, constitutional and anti-colonial movement, mainly centring around the newly founded bureaucracy and getting inspiration from Muslim modernizers of the nineteenth century as well as from the West, and the east Afghan *tariqat* orders turning into a militant, anti-colonial movement. The international political juncture at the time, i.e. most notably the dismemberment of the last great Muslim empire (the Ottoman state) and the growing anti-colonial movement in British India, for a while turned *jihād* into the meeting point for these two movements, i.e. of the old *ruḥāniān* (most notably the *pīrs*) and the new *rawshanfikrān* (the small, up-coming urban intelligentsia).

The religio-political conceptualization of the international situation and the focus on *jihād* had been predominant in Muslim thought since the middle of nineteenth century (it was thus not only the Frontier which experienced militant religious mass movements during these years) and, furthermore, the preceding two decades of official Afghan 'Islamization' had prepared the ground. The identities of *ghāzī* and *mujāhid* for a while bridged tribal particularism and religious leadership seems to have overshadowed by far any tribal leadership in the mobilization and uprisings along the Frontier during 1897-1917. This situation was in support of the official ideological discourse of the Afghan state, i.e. the *Amīr* being *not* a 'primus inter pares' but 'King of Islam' and 'Defender of the True Faith' and sanctioned by God. However, the dilemma of this situation also became apparent when political expediency and international agreements barred the *Amīr* from acting as 'Defender of the True Faith' – which ultimately could raise doubts about the divine sanction of his rule.

Notes

- 1 Hamilton (1906: 436), Khan. S.M. (1900/1980, II:11). For a list of *Amīr Habibullah's* wives and 'consorts', see Adamec (1975). For a discussion of the alliance aspects of marriages among different groups in Afghanistan, see a series of articles in FOLK, vol. 24, 1982. Olesen (*ibid*) also discusses the significance of extra-marital relations in this context.

- 2 'Foreign relations' were basically the relationship to Britain which, since the Second Anglo-Afghan War, had control over Afghan foreign policy. Like his father, *Amīr* Habibullah honoured the treaty with the British but also did not give an inch more than needed. The British had hoped for more cordial relations with Afghanistan after Abdur Rahman's death, but were disappointed in that (see for example Adamec 1967, Hamilton 1906).
- 3 For. Dept. Pros. 50-52, Feb. 1903
- 4 *Ustād* Khalilullah Khalili, personal communication, Peshawar, November 1986. See also Muhammad Hajjan Shaikh (1986:41).
- 5 For. Dept. Frontier B, Feb. 1907, Nos. 142-175, L/P&S/10/201, 1913, Diary Br. Pol. Agent, Kabul, No. 136, 13.09.1913, For. Pol. Dept. Sec. F., Oct. 1907, Nos. 152-159.
- 6 Mullah Powindah was a Marobi Shabi Khel Alizai Mahsud. His preaching of *jihād* brought about the attack on the Wana camp in 1894. Mullah Powindah was heavily involved in tribal politics and, in relation to the British payment of allowances to the Mahsuds, managed to out-manoeuvre the maliks so that in a *jirga* he was elected as tribal representative vis-à-vis the British. The British tried to buy off the Mahsud from supporting Mullah Powindah, and to give him a land grant to discredit him in front of the tribe, but failed. In 1913, it was reported that Mullah Powindah was in receipt of an allowance from *Amīr* Habibullah, and stayed in contact with *Sardār* Nasrullah. Throughout his career, it seems that he had used Kabul as a safe refuge in his struggles with the British (For. Pol. Dep. Sec. F, Prosc. Oct. 1907, No. 13-111, For. Pol. Dep. Sec. Front., Aug. 1913, Nos. 8-12). Hamidullah Khan, *Akhundzada* Safi (also known as Mullah *Sāhib* of Tagab or as *Bādshāh Sāhib* of Tagab), was a *khalifa* of the Hadda-i *Sāhib* and influential in Ningarhar and Laghman. He took a leading role in the Frontier disturbances in 1889 (Adamec 1975: 158).
- 7 For. Dept. Feb. 1903, Nos. 50-52.
- 8 For the details of the programme, see For. Dept. Sec. F., May 1907, No. 98.
- 9 For. Pol. Dept. Frontier B, April 1907, Nos. 191-231.
- 10 See also For. Dept. Sec. F., Feb. 1907, Nos. 1-56.
- 11 For. Dept. Frontier B, August 1903, Nos. 386-420.
- 12 For. Pol. Dept. Frontier B, Prosc. Jan 1908, Nos. 189-216.
- 13 Proclamation on religious education/knowledge issued by *Sardār* Nasrullah in 1907 (For. & Pol. Dept., Frontier B, Jan 1908, Nos. 189-216).
- 14 The position of Nadir *Khān* and his brothers ('the Musahibans') is not entirely clear. It is reported that later on they were in favour of Afghan neutrality but, fearing suspicion of being pro-British after having spent so many years in exile in India, they chose to formulate their position as being that of following the *Amīr's* decision (L/P&S/10/202, Kabul Diary, 7. Feb. 1916).
- 15 For. Pol. Dept., Secret War, March 1917, Nos. 540-550.
- 16 Mr. Gulab Ningarhari, personal communication, Peshawar, November 1986.
- 17 There are a number of published British records on the political and military situation on the Frontier at the time - see for example Warburton (1900/1975) and Howell (1931/1979).
- 18 Abdul Shukur, known as *Hazrat Sāhib* Butkhāk. His family, who were descendants of *Shaykh* Ahmad Sirhindi, originally came from Bokhara and settled in Afghanistan at the time of *Amīr* Dost Mohammad and had family

connections with the royal family at that time. The *Hājji Sāhib* of Turangzai was his *khalifa* as was Payenda Mohammad, known as the *Ustād Sāhib* Hadda.

- 19 For. Dept. Frontier B, July 1908, Nos. 289-325, L/MIL/17/13/23, Secret April-May 1908.
 - 20 *Hājji* Fazl Wahid of Turangzai, born 1856 at Turangzai, a border village of Peshawar. He was either himself a *khalifa* of the Hadda-i *Sāhib* or a *khalifa* of the *Hazrat* Abdul Shukur of Butkhāk, who was one of the most prominent of the Hadda-i *Sāhib's* *khalifas*. The *Hājji Sāhib* built a mosque and a hostel for his disciples in Turangzai, and founded a large number of religious schools at the Frontier, the most prominent being the *Dār al-'Ulum* of Gaddar at Surabi, Mardan, and the Ghazi *Madrasa* at Saida Shah, Bajaur, established with the support of the Babra Mullah *Sāhib* (M.F. Khan 1977: 330-331). In 1908, he was arrested by the British for seditious preaching. He was a very influential man among the followers of the late Hadda-i *Sāhib* and in most of the villages in Peshawar district.
- The Indian *mujāhidīn* were a militant strain of Indian Wahhabism aiming at the defence and purification of Islam in India. Although suppressed after the Indian Mutiny, these 'Hindustani fanatics' revived about the turn of the century and remained implacable enemies of the British. Their stronghold in Buner attracted many recruits from northern India, mainly students moved by hostility to British rule (L/P&S/10/633, p. 69).
- 21 The term *yāghistān* here refers to the tribal areas outside Afghan and British control.
 - 22 He was a *khalifa* of the Hadda-i *Sāhib*, and on the latter's death he succeeded him at Hadda.
 - 23 L/P&S/10/200, Diary of British Agent, Kabul, No. 110, 15.02.1913.
 - 24 NWFP Diary No. 45, 9.11.1912.
 - 25 L/P&S/10/202, Kabul Diary, 07.07.1915.
 - 26 L/P&S/10/202, Kabul Diary, 30.09.1915.
 - 27 There exist various versions and speculations about the *Amīr's* position regarding the war issue. Adamec (1967: 83) thus writes that *Amīr* Habibullah wrote a letter to Enver Pasha, asking if he should attack British India or Tsarist Central Asia in support of the Ottoman cause.
 - 28 Raja Mahendra Partap came from an old (Hindu) ruling family of Aligarh district, and he had studied at the Muslim Anglo-Oriental College of Aligarh, where he became imbued with the idea of a Hindu-Muslim union. He came with the Turco-German Mission to Kabul in 1915, carrying *jihād fatwās* and letters from the Ottoman Sultan and from the German Kaiser for the *Amīr* of Afghanistan (L/P&S/10/633, p. 474).
 - 29 L/P&S/10/633, p. 450.
 - 30 The *Hazrat Sāhib* of Chaharbagh, Mohammad Saeed Jan, *Zia ul-Masum*, living in Chaharbagh of Surkhrud in Ningarhar Province. He was a descendant of *Shaykh* Ahmad Sirhindi, *Mujaddid-i Alf-i Thani*, and thus related to the *Hazrat Sāhib* of Shor Bazaar, Kabul and a cousin of Abdul Shukur, *Hazrat* of Butkhāk, who also was a *Mujaddidi*. The royal family held him in great respect.
 - 31 Ansari's letter to *Mawlānā* al-Hassan, L/P&S/10/633, p. 17-18.
 - 32 L/P&S/10/202, 46/1912, Pt. 3, Kabul Diary, 30.11.1915.
 - 33 This so-called Silk Letter conspiracy is briefly described in Chapter 5 and is discussed in detail in Olesen (1988a and 1991).

A New Ideological Paradigm: The Reform Policy of King Amanullah (1919-29)

With the assassination of *Amīr* Habibullah during a hunting trip to Laghman in 1919, the stage was set for the proponents of the so-called War Party, whose main representatives at court were the *Amīr*'s brother and son, *Sardār* Nasrullah and *Sardār* Amanullah. The opposition to *Amīr* Habibullah's neutralist policies during World War I had brought about a *rapprochement* between the traditionalists and the modernists, and although *Sardār* Nasrullah was the main representative of the clergy's interests, *Sardār* Amanullah also enjoyed widespread respect and support in religious circles, as he was recognized as a strong pan-Islamist and nationalist and had, in his administrative work as governor of Kabul, gained a reputation for personal honesty and integrity.¹

However, with *Amīr* Habibullah removed, a short power struggle took place between the traditionalist forces, who hurriedly proclaimed the late *Amīr*'s brother, *Sardār* Nasrullah, as *amīr*, and the modernists who supported *Sardār* Amanullah's claim to the throne. Nasrullah had gone along on the *Amīr*'s hunting trip to Laghman, and



Figure 11: Amanullah, King 1919-29

immediately gained the support of the leading religious leaders of eastern Afghanistan, with whom, over the years, he had retained close contact. The mullahs declared that, as *Amīr* Habibullah had died as a *shahīd* (martyr), he should according to custom be buried at once in the clothes he was wearing and without elaborate ceremonies – and that as a martyred king he could only be buried by his successor. Consequently, *Sardār* Nasrullah was immediately crowned. The corona-

tion took place in Jalalabad with the *dastārbandī* ceremony² being performed by a few mullahs, among whom were the *Naqīb Ṣāhib* of Baghdad,³ the *Bādshāh Ṣāhib* of Islampur and the son of the *Ḥazrat Ṣāhib* of Chaharbagh.

While this was going on in Jalalabad, *Sardār* Amanullah had himself declared as king in Kabul. He enjoyed the unanimous support of the 'modernists' (i.e. the urban intelligentsia); his powerful mother's background in an influential Barakzai family secured him a certain tribal support; he was popular with the army, particularly since his first move was to declare a pay rise for regulars and officers; he was acceptable to the religious leaders as a pan-Islamist and nationalist; and, finally, he was not tainted by having participated in the hunting trip where the assassination took place. Moreover, by being in Kabul, as governor he controlled the Kabul garrison, arsenal and treasury.⁴

Sardār Nasrullah announced his abdication in order to avoid bloodshed and submitted to Amanullah, although General Nadir *Khān*, Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, and *Mīr Sayyid* Jan *Bādshāh* of Islampur tried to convince him otherwise. The *Bādshāh Ṣāhib* reportedly promised to bring in a force of 50,000 tribesmen in support of *Sardār* Nasrullah, but the offer was rejected.⁵ The *Qāzī al-Quzāt*, Abdur Razzaq, on Nasrullah's submission, reportedly went off to join the *Hājjī* of Turangzai in Mohmand country, but like the rest of Nasrullah's party soon submitted to King Amanullah (Adamec 1975:107). On 27 February 1919, Amanullah was formally crowned by Mullah Hamidullah of Tagab, who declared that *Sardār* Inayatullah – though as eldest son the official successor to the throne – had forfeited his claim by first recognizing *Sardār* Nasrullah (*ibid*:118).

One of Amanullah's first moves when assuming power was to immobilize all other contenders to the throne: his uncle *Sardār* Nasrullah (who apparently died in prison), his elder brother *Sardār* Inayatullah (who had lost much popularity after the *jirga* in 1915 where he supported *Amīr* Habibullah's neutralist policy) and many members of the Musahiban family, including Nadir *Khān*. They were imprisoned pending the investigation of the assassination. However, with Amanullah well-entrenched in power, they were released as innocent and no culprit was ever found.⁶

The short power struggle was an indication of the serious internal differences both at court and among the state-supporting groups. The unity among the so-called 'War Party' had been due to the foreign political issues that had been dominant over the preceding two decades. This unity broke down when after the initial phase King Amanullah devoted his attention to fulfilling the (domestic) reformist

ambitions of the modernist Young Afghans, his principal supporters. The dominant theme during the ten years of King Amanullah's rule thus became the legal, educational and cultural efforts to win credence in the population for a new ideological paradigm for the Afghan state and society. The resulting antagonism of existing ideas and interests led to an outright struggle, not only at the ideological level but also at political and military levels.

Pan-Islamism

In his first proclamation, Amanullah promised to gain the 'total independence of Afghanistan' (i.e. the right to pursue an independent foreign policy) – probably the only goal which could rally the unanimous support from traditionalists and modern nationalists alike. However, as far as the actual background of the Third Anglo-Afghan War was concerned, British, Russian and Afghan writers present rather differing views. Sykes (1940: 150) thus claims that the arrest of *Sardār* Nasrullah and the Musahiban family alienated both mullahs and the army to such an extent that the *khutba* – the sermon or oration delivered on Fridays at the time of the midday prayer, in which the name of the ruler is customarily mentioned – was not read in Amanullah's name in Kandahar, and that proclamation of *jihād* against the British was the only measure to unite the nation. British Intelligence reports also tell that Amanullah decided for *jihād* against the British in response to reports on the deteriorating situation of Muslims in India (i.e. in Lahore, Delhi and last but not least the Jallianwalla Bagh massacre in Amritsar, 15th April 1919).⁷

No matter which immediate opportunity King Amanullah seized, it is obvious – given his political position hitherto and the expectations of the population – that he had to obtain full independence for Afghanistan. *Mawlānā* Obaidullah Sindhi, who had a meeting with Amanullah shortly after he seized power, reported that Amanullah with a smile stated: 'I am still the same person', thereby referring to their previous meeting, where Sindhi had obtained the *Sardār's* support for the scheme of *Shaykh al-Hind*. (This scheme, known as the 'Silk Letter Conspiracy', was hatched in 1915 and sought to bring Afghanistan into the war against the British. Its aim was to ensure full Afghan independence and the liberation of India from colonial rule. At one point, it was even mooted that *Sardār* Amanullah be placed on the throne in Delhi).⁸ And in his condolence address on the death of *Mawlānā* Mahmud al-Hassan, Amanullah said: 'Maulana Mahmud

Hassan initiated a mission which I am going to complete' (Shaikh 1986:82-83).

The *jihād* proclamation took place in the Hadda mosque and, with the 'King of Islam' declaring *jihād*, all the *pīrs* of the Frontier – who had waited for this situation for years – could finally mobilize their followers. *Mīr Ṣāhib Jan Bādshāh* and the Chaknaur Mullah went to the Mohmands and fought the British with a *lashkar* at Dakka. The *Hazrat Ṣāhib* of Butkhāk was active in the Mangal country and in command of all the Ghilzai and local Alijari *lashkars* on the Kharlachi front, where the Bajauris were led by the Babra Mullah *Ṣāhib*. Other religious leaders went to Tirah to raise the Afridis, while the *Hazrat* of Shor Bazaar and the *Hājjī* of Turangzai gave their support on other sections of the front. (See also Stewart 1973: Ch. 5 for a more vivid and emotional account than official reports provide).

What followed is reminiscent of the Silk Letter Conspiracy: after negotiations with King Amanullah, *Mawlānā* Obaidullah Sindhi issued a proclamation in Urdu and English, informing his Indian compatriots that the Indian Government-in-exile had managed to get outside support (no name mentioned) for the liberation of India, and urging the local population to assist the liberating army invading India (Shaikh 1986:87-88).

With what the Afghans considered as a victory, the Third Anglo-Afghan War ended and Afghanistan won complete independence. The young king's popularity was greatly enhanced. Not only in Afghanistan but also elsewhere in the Muslim world, he was looked upon as a great Muslim leader. The war produced yet another hero, General Nadir *Khān* of the Musahiban family, who won the Afghans their only military success of the war by capturing the fortress of Thal.

However, the victory had one drawback: as its military forces could not have sustained prolonged warfare, Afghanistan had to recognize the Durand line of 1893, which has remained a thorn in the flesh of many Afghan (i.e. Pashtun) nationalists ever since. At the time, the acceptance of the Durand line was a blow for the tribes across the border among whom the *Hazrat* of Shor Bazaar had many followers. This was, perhaps, the first sign of disillusionment with the young king (Poullada 1973: 126-128).

Disillusionment also existed in another quarter. The comparative military failure of the Afghan army, and the truce with Britain which secured Afghan independence but without mentioning India by name, was a great disappointment for the Indian exiles in Kabul:

Afghanistan, true to her old traditions once again left her war allies (the Indian Muslims) to their fate. The result was obvious. After the Anglo-Afghan War the British multiplied their cruelties upon the people of India especially upon the Muslims. (Zafar Hasan, quoted in Shaikh 1986: 95)

The bitterness of the Indian exiles was somewhat unjustified as the Muslims of British India did enjoy Afghan support in the subsequent Khilafat movement which called for self-determination for the Muslim British subjects as well as for the preservation of the Ottoman empire.⁹ In the summer of 1920, the idea developed that Muslims might escape the 'infidel' rule of the British by emigrating to the Muslim kingdom of Afghanistan where they were told that fertile lands were waiting for them. This *hijra* (exodus) – propagated by local clerics and supported by a *fatwā* issued by *Mawlānā* Abdul Bari and *Mawlānā* Abu'l Kalam Azad – caught the imagination of the poor peasantry particularly in the NWFP and in parts of Sind. In their thousands they started moving north-west in almost paradisiac hope (Smith 1946: Ch. II). The *hijra* from India took place between May and August 1920. On 9 August 1920 Amanullah, through a *farmān*, stopped the flow of *muhājirūn* into Afghanistan at the request of the Indian Emigration Committee in Kabul, which realized that Afghanistan could not possibly provide for this sudden influx of people.¹⁰ The Khilafat movement in India thus culminated in the final denunciation of the 'infidel' rule and the exodus of some 18,000 Muslims seeking refuge in Afghanistan where Amanullah initially welcomed them. Incidentally, the most famous *muhājirūn* were the brothers-in-law of the *Hājji* of Turangzai, Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Dr. Khan Sahib Khan, who were to become leaders of the Khoda-i Khitmagaran in NWFP. In 1921, they returned to India but retained a deep sympathy for King Amanullah (Gregorian 1969: 323-326).

The Afghan pan-Islamic commitment and, in particular, concern about the Indian Muslims and their particular situation in a Hindu-dominated society at this time went so far as to imitate the Khilafat movement in its attempt to form a Hindu-Muslim alliance against the British. It is reported that spiritual heads of different places in Afghanistan issued a proclamation to abstain from cow slaughter and instead slaughter goats in consideration of Hindu feelings. This was supported by the order from Amanullah that goat slaughter was preferable to cow slaughter.¹¹

Through the Third Anglo-Afghan War, King Amanullah had established his position in the Muslim world as an anti-imperialist ruler and, during the first years of his reign, he continued to pursue

a militant pan-Islamic policy. He verbally supported the Caliphate against the European threats and materially he helped the *Amīr* of Bokhara and the *Basmachis* of Turkestan against Bolshevik forces. As in the case of the trans-border tribes in the east, religious leaders along the northern frontier were instrumental in sounding out the popularity of Afghan rulers across the border. It is thus reported that both the *Mīr* of Gazargāh and the *Ḥāẓrat* of Karrukh had returned from Chihel Dukhtaran via Panjdeh and reported that Turkomans in Panjdeh, which after 1886 was under Russian rule, had expressed a wish to be under Afghan rule.¹²

This pan-Islamism not only enhanced the King's prestige in the Muslim world but also paid off at home, where even the most traditionalist religious leaders supported him on the basis of his being pan-Islamist and anti-British. However, it requires a strong country and a strong leader to alienate two powerful neighbours at the same time, and neither Afghanistan nor Amanullah could afford that. Yet another problem was that, by achieving Afghan independence, Amanullah had renounced the British subsidies which had given both *Amīr* Abdur Rahman and Habibullah a certain measure of independence and leverage vis-à-vis the tribes. So eventually, King Amanullah had to tone down his foreign policy and turn to the domestic situation which, after two decades of foreign political dominance, came to the fore.

Ideology of the Young Afghan Movement

As a young prince, Amanullah (and his brother Inayatullah) had been part of the small group of educated modernists around the court, the so-called Young Afghans or *Mashrutiya* (Constitutional) group, the leading figure of which was the prominent journalist and writer, Mahmud Tarzi. While *Amīr* Habibullah had been sympathetic to Tarzi's ideas, his influence now became far greater. As father-in-law of both Amanullah and Inayatullah, and principal adviser to King Amanullah as well as being his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tarzi was now to see his visions transformed into the practical reform policy during the 1920s.

The general philosophical background and justification for the practical reform policy by King Amanullah in the 1920s can be found in the issues of *Siraj al-Akhbar* from 1911-1918.¹³ Tarzi, like al-Afghani, stressed that the survival of Islam and of the Muslim nations was contingent upon a return to the true spirit and character of Islam, free

from the corrupting influence of despotic rulers and ignorant *‘ulamā* which, together with the widening gulf between secular interests and the ethical standards of Islam, had caused the downfall of all Muslim nations.

In order to face up to the threat from Europe, according to Tarzi it was not enough for Afghanistan (or any other Muslim nation) to aim for equal military might. The European superiority of power was due to the achievements within the economic, scientific, technological and cultural spheres. Afghanistan and other Muslim nations could only reach an equal standing by reorganizing society, adopting the new technology and science, developing local industry, etc. In support of his argument, Tarzi published a number of articles on human achievements, such as scientific discoveries and inventions, and wrote about the benefits of electricity, chemistry, the telegraph, railways, aviation, etc. (Schinasi 1979).

Although Tarzi advocated copying the way Europe had developed, he did not want an uncritical imitation; his vision was of Muslim modernization and he referred to Japan as a successful Asian example of a country which had systematically copied the best in Europe but retained the refinements of its own creed, customs, morality and general way of life (Schinasi 1979: 163). As for his anti-imperialist stand, he explained how Europe – in spite of its affluence, civilization and economic domination – was now facing the problem of providing for a population too large for the available resources and hence had



Figure 12: Mahmud Tarzi

to expand at the expense of other continents, with resulting exploitation and barbarity.

Tarzi did not explain how the Muslim model of modernity should avoid this pitfall because his main task at the time was to prove to the Afghans that modern science was not contrary to Islam. First of all, modern European science was rooted in the highly developed, medieval (Arab) science, and European technology and science were a necessity for the progress of contemporary Islamic civilization.¹⁴

Knowledge and efforts to acquire knowledge through

education were not only compatible with the precepts of the *Qurʾān*; they formed an essential part of it.¹⁵ Since the distinguishing trait in which lies the inherent superiority of Man over Beast was his God-given Reason, by inference, the neglect of its cultivation and application was a great disservice to oneself, to one's community, to Islam and to God.¹⁶ This 'philosophy of Enlightenment', of which Tarzi was the foremost exponent in Afghanistan, replaced the learned (*ruhānī*) with the intellectual (*rawshanfikr*), whose ambition it is to enlighten the masses (*siraj* also means 'torch'). These ideas, already reflected in *Amīr* Habibullah's educational policy, were a break with the traditional elitist concept of knowledge only being suitable for 'noble' brains, as in the formulation of *Amīr* Abdur Rahman.

Yet another example of the progressive character of the uncorrupted Islam was, for Tarzi, the prominent role of women during the Abbasid Caliphate. At a time when all European men and women were illiterate and ignorant, Muslim women had occupied important positions as poets, artists and even held public offices. The present situation of Muslim (and particularly Afghan) women was accordingly the more deplorable. Tarzi and the Young Afghans were thus the first to champion the rights of women in Afghanistan, to recognize their abilities, and to acknowledge their right to education and monogamous marriage. Tarzi even explained the decline of Afghanistan since the time of Timur *Shāh* (1772-93) in terms of the bad habit of polygamy among the rulers, resulting in numerous male offspring all making equal claims to the throne and thus tearing the country to pieces in internal power struggles (Grevemeyer 1987: 150). Like his contemporary Muslim reformers and modernists, Tarzi's support of the women's cause was strongly linked to the argument that only enlightened and educated women could be good wives and mothers, bringing up the children in whose hands the future rests. Even a radical reformer like Kemal Atatürk of Turkey basically argued along these lines when granting women legal equality with men.

While *Amīr* Abdur Rahman had utilized Islam to legitimize the absolute monarchy, Tarzi used Islam to underpin the monarchy and the nation-state. *Amīr* Abdur Rahman had focused on judicial concepts and dogmas in Islam while Tarzi argued on the basis of the faith and ethics of Islam. Since it was by the grace and will of God that the Afghans had accepted Islam, Afghanistan was consequently a God-given country and hence love for the fatherland (*watan*) was directly ordained. Although all Muslims belong to *umma*, this consists of many political units, of Fatherlands, where people constitute themselves in nations (*millat*). Thereby pan-Islamism and nationalism

did not contradict each other. If the fatherland be equated with a Being, then the nation is its flesh and bones and the King its soul. Therefore, it was a religious duty for any Muslim to serve not only his fatherland and his nation but also his government and monarch: for a 'Fatherland without a Nation, a Nation without a Fatherland, both without Government, and Government without a King, would resemble inorganic substance or a car without an engine'.¹⁷

Logically it followed that love of the fatherland and modernization became identified with each other. Above, it was illustrated how patriotism was seen as a religious duty, and since modernization and progress were indispensable for the defence of the fatherland, it follows that it was the duty of all faithful patriots to promote learning. Divinely-ordained principles of law and other precepts of Islam, as well as the causes of freedom and progress, necessitated national unity. Since the enemies of Islam benefit from chaos and disunity, it was the supreme task of all Afghans to support the monarchy that aimed at unification through centralization and to secure progress thorough modernization.¹⁸ This argument is clearly reminiscent of *Amir* Abdur Rahman's argument for obedience to the ruler and the necessity for having a strong military force and for levying taxes.

Tarzi's and the Young Afghans' vision of a reformed and modernized Afghan society was to be achieved through the combined efforts of an enlightened religious leadership, the intelligentsia and the ruling elite. However, no religious leaders in Afghanistan had so far been ready to take on this grand task and Tarzi and his followers thus appeared as the first laymen in Afghanistan to publicly interpret the Holy Scriptures in ways directly opposed to the thinking of much of the religious establishment, which considered all 'modernization' heresy.¹⁹ Thus the stage was set for a confrontation between the new ideas of the *rawshanfikrān* and those of the *ruhānīān*.

The task which Tarzi had set himself regarding culture and education in Afghanistan was comparable to that of the founder of modern Islam in India, Sir *Sayyid* Ahmad Khan (1817-1898), who also devoted his life to removing Muslim prejudice against Western civilization and change; similar ideas of 'modern Islam' could also be found within Young Turkish thought. But whereas Sir *Sayyid* Ahmad Khan was motivated by the wish to effect a *rapprochement* between the Indian Muslims and the British Raj, to turn the Muslims into loyal subjects and to reveal them as such to the British, Tarzi saw modernization as the only means whereby Muslims would be able to resist the British. Hence, in political outlook, Tarzi was much more influenced by the pan-Islamism of al-Afghani and of the Young Turk

movement.²⁰ When the modernization policy under King Amanullah started, it was thus no coincidence that Turkey was seen as the ideal of modernization among Muslim countries, and experts and advisers in many fields were brought to Afghanistan from Turkey rather than from India as earlier.

The composite nature of the Afghan modernists, combining views of modernist Islam with plainly secularist political aims, penetrated the actual reform policy. King Amanullah's initial reform zeal during the period 1922-25, when most of the reforms were promulgated, was later moderated as a result of the Khost Rebellion in 1922-24. However, after the King's grand Europe tour of 1928 he embarked upon new reforms with a stronger secularist tinge than ever before. Only when it was too late and he had already alienated all important religious leaders of the country did he attempt to reach a compromise with these influential people in order to avoid the ensuing disaster.

The emphasis of the initial reforms was on the formulation of a legal, judicial and administrative framework for the state.²¹ Afghanistan's first constitution was promulgated in 1923, and a number of special laws and regulations were issued in the period 1919-23 concerning the organization of the central government, the provincial and local administration as well as a general law for the courts.

These laws and regulations thus contained the basic framework of what King Amanullah and his modernist supporters envisaged the modern Afghan nation-state to be. Hence these laws formalized the ideological break with the past, the departure from the autocratic but still tribally-based monarchy of *Amīr* Abdur Rahman and *Amīr* Habibullah, and signalled Afghanistan's entry into the political thinking of the twentieth century.

The reform policy also reflected the dilemma between Tarzi's and the Young Afghans' double heritage – the vision of an Islamic model of modernization and the admiration of the Young Turks' practical efforts to turn a Muslim empire into a modern nation-state.

The Constitutional Monarchy

Article 4 of the 1923 Constitution of Afghanistan (*Nizāmnāma-i Asasi-e Daulat-e 'Aliyah-e Afghanistan*) stated:

In view of the extraordinary services rendered to the cause of progress and independence of the Afghan nation by His

Majesty the King, the noble nation of Afghanistan pledges itself to the royal succession of his line on the principle of male inheritance through selection to be made by His Majesty and by the people of Afghanistan.

These formulations broke with the Islamic concept that legitimate authority rests on the notion of Divine Will rather than on popular sovereignty. In these formulations, the influence of secularism in the mode of the Young Turks was thus dominant. However, some concessions were granted to Islam, as Article 4 continued:


His Majesty the King on ascending the throne will pledge to the nobles and to the people that he will rule in accordance with the principles enunciated in the Shari'a and in this Constitution and that he will protect the independence of the country and remain faithful to his nation.

Consequently, although the nation was the source of legitimacy of power, it was as yet impossible to establish the legality of the state and ruler independently of Islam. However, this half-hearted attempt to give an Islamic flavour to the question of legitimacy did not have much in common with Tarzi's vigorous efforts to show the inherent unity of the concepts of *watan* and *millat* with the precepts of Islam, as presented in his writings in *Siraj al-Akhbar*. Legitimacy emanated from the nation and some sort of popular sovereignty, while the obligation to adhere to Shari'a should serve the purpose of dissipating the fear of those (the vast majority of the population), for whom the concept of nation had little or no meaning. In fact, according to Article 69, in cases of conflict the Constitution had precedence over Shari'a.

Altogether, King Amanullah's 'model' for the legitimation of power can be seen as a continuation of *Amir* Abdur Rahman's attempt to surpass the 'tribal state model'. Where *Amir* Abdur Rahman put forward the religious legitimation of power as an alternative (utilizing the only all-embracing ideology of society) to the predominant 'tribal state model', King Amanullah tried to surpass even the 'Islamic model', since his goal was not only centralization and unification, but much more so, modernization and development along European lines. And in spite of Tarzi's rhetoric, the religious establishment was expected to be only a reluctant ally in this process. The *Nizāmnāma* was, by its provisions for legislation, designed to lead to the development of secular law-making and gradually provide for the separation of secular from canonical jurisprudence (Schwager 1932: 110). The concessions to Islam in the Constitution were made to keep the *ʿulamā* at peace while state and society were transformed.

Islam and the nation as sources of legitimacy were thus not integrated within the Constitution and instead the model of the legitimate transmission of power became dualistic (i.e. there were two separate sources of legitimacy):

Figure 13: Duality in the legitimation of the transmission of power in the 1923 Constitution



Embarking upon his truly revolutionary reform policy, King Amanullah thus tried to create a balance between actual secular nationalism as seen in Turkey and liberal Islamic modernization in the *Sayyid Ahmad Khan* form. The Constitution was to a very large extent inspired by the Turkish example and formulated with the help of Turkish advisers like the ‘Young Turk’ Badri Bey, but the Afghans kept religious legitimation in the Constitution in spite of the ensuing lack of clarity and inconsistency in the formulations.

The problem of secular versus religious law was handled in Article 21, stating that ‘all cases will be decided in accordance with the principles of Shari’a and of general civil and criminal laws’. The lack of specificity regarding authority of secular versus religious law and the inherent challenge of the *ʿulamā* were covered up by public declarations that the *Nizāmnāma* and all legal codes were designed so as to be compatible with Shari’a (Poullada 1973: 96). However, the concessions to Islam in the Constitution were in fact not binding at all – Article 72 states the following: ‘In the process of legislation the actual living conditions of the people, the exigencies of the time and particularly the requirements of the laws of Shari’a, will be given

careful consideration'. Instead, the support of liberal *'ulamā* was enlisted. They gave their approval to the new legislation by issuing *fatwā* to the effect that the legislation was not contrary to Sharī'a and hence was to be followed as valid law.

The notion of nation-state based on popular sovereignty, in one or the other form, implies that citizens enjoy basic civil liberties and formal equality before the law – at least in principle. These ideas were embodied in the Constitution, Article 16: 'All subjects of Afghanistan have equal rights and duties to the country in accordance with Sharī'a and the laws of the State'. This was something new in the tribal kingdom where the Pashtuns had controlled the military and political power since the time of the Durrani empire and received privileges accordingly, while the other half of the population had had the status of subject peoples.²² General civil rights were granted (Articles 8-24), slavery, forced labour (*bigār*) and torture abolished, freedom of the press ensured (Article 11) and the right to free education provided. In short, Afghan citizens were granted rights like those in liberal Western constitutions. National identity as Afghans was to be achieved through safeguarding the rights of equal citizenship for all. King Amanullah even embarked upon the process of emancipating women to become equal citizens and, although Islam was the official religion, citizens of other religions were to enjoy equal rights and liberty of faith (Article 8).

In the bourgeois nation-state, individuals are integrated in society, as citizens, through a socialization process involving a vast network of institutional channels, most of which are under state control. These integrative mechanisms are qualitatively different from the mechanisms of social integration existing in Afghan society, as well as the general concepts thereof within Islam. The emphasis in Islam is on the importance of a community of believers (*umma*) which is both a religious and a political community and which provides the individual with his basic identity. Consequently, believers and non-believers are separate and, although they can live in one society, their rights and duties differ and they are addressed separately. In the formulations of Therborn (1980), one may say that the inclusive-historical interpellative qualities of Islam in constituting human subjectivity (see Chapter 1), centered around the believer and the *umma* was now being challenged by the concepts of citizen and civil society.

The concept of citizen also ran counter to the tribal pattern of Afghan society in which subjectivity, first and foremost, was constituted inclusively by membership and socialization within a certain segment of the society, such as the family, the tribe, the local community or the ethnic group. The central power had not been concerned with the

integration of these various groups. On the contrary, rulers had often maintained power through a skilful divide-and-rule strategy vis-à-vis the different tribes and religious and ethnic groups so that segregation was maintained. The ruler related to communities (tribal, religious or local) rather than to individuals in matters of conscription, taxation, legal matters, political alliances, etc.²³

Hence the notion of the individual citizen which was introduced in Afghan society by the Constitution of 1923 was not met with much appreciation, as it superseded existing ideas of the organization of society. Amendments to the Constitution, passed by a Loya Jirga in 1924 during the Khost Rebellion, dented the ideal of equality in citizenship. The provision was added that, in spite of freedom of faith, Hindus and Jews should pay the special tax (*jizya*) for infidels and wear distinctive clothing. And the Hanafi religious rite was made official, which indirectly set aside the Shi'a community in the country (Poullada 1973:98). While the *'ulamā* argued for reference to Hanafi *madhhab* (school of law) as protection against Qadianism etc., Amanullah objected that this would undermine national unity and antagonize the Shi'a community. However, the *'ulamā* succeeded in their demand.²⁴ The introduction of these amendments were clear products of the pressure exerted by orthodox Muslim forces as they were directly contrary to the spirit of the Constitution and to the aims of the King and his mentor, Mahmud Tarzi, who had repeatedly argued in *Siraj al-Akhbar* for a solution to the differences between Sunnis and Shi'as.

The drive for creating a nation of citizens took place, not only on paper but also in practice, with little appreciation by the people. The King curtailed the fringe benefits of the tribal leaders, determining that remuneration had to be based on work of value to the nation. The conflicting conceptions of community versus ruler or individual versus state was obvious: the loyalty of the tribal chiefs depended upon their privileged position and they in turn bound their families and clans and tribes in a web of loyalty dependent upon the distribution of largess. To ask them to prove themselves useful to the nation in addition to their service as power brokers was an imposition that violated the terms of Pashtun tribal relationships (Poullada 1973:108).

The result was even worse when Amanullah launched his anti-corruption campaign, applying Western standards of probity to the intricate system of payment and support through which power was transmitted in Afghan society. Traditional Afghan society certainly did recognize that corruption took place and that it was to be condemned, but what Amanullah disregarded was the accepted and

well-established system of favours and counter favours, obligations towards kinsmen etc. which was fully integrated in the functioning of the state but obviously violated any generalized rule for permissible and non-permissible activity. Consequently, when the King let his own mother's step-father – one of the top Barakzai tribal *sardārs* – be jailed, he was not praised for proving that everybody was equal before the law; on the contrary, he was condemned for gravely violating kinship obligations (Poullada 1973:109) – an act which in the tribal society was most damaging to the honour (*ghayrat*) of any decent man.

Grevemeyer (1987) adds another, interesting dimension to the discussion of corruption in Afghanistan. He points out, that exactly the consolidation of administrative 'middlemen' (*maliks* and others) and the establishment of bureaucratic cadres, which resulted from King Amanullah's administrative reforms, formed the breeding ground for excessive corruption. Although the new Penal Code (*Nizāmnāma-ye jezā-ye 'omumi*, 1924) specifically dealt with corrupt practices, it had apparently had no effect whatsoever. The reasons were to be sought in the principles of recruitment (loyalty and background before qualifications) of the bureaucratic cadres, low salary, lack of control and lack of understanding of the legal reforms – all of which together resulted in nepotism, clientage and corruption (Grevemeyer 1987:79-81.²⁵

The tripartite division of power was attempted, though not fully realized, in the Constitution. The cabinet would be selected and appointed by the King (Article 28) and should each year report to a High Assembly (*Darbār-e A'la*) composed of the high government officials, the elders of the people, the nobles and others selected specially by the King (i.e. a kind of Upper House based upon a moderated *jirga* principle). The legislative power was rooted in the King, the Council of Ministers and the State Council. The State Council consisted of equal numbers of appointed and elected members and had an advisory capacity vis-à-vis the cabinet – according to the Constitution the popular influence on legislation should be channelled through this council.

As can be seen from the above, the Constitution did not contain any admission of the existence of tribal structures in the country, and tribal approval of the ruler and his policies did *not* in principle form a part of the legitimation of power. However, like Abdur Rahman, King Amanullah had to realize that ideal formulations were one thing and realities of power something else – while the institution of Loya Jirga was not mentioned in the Constitution, King Amanullah, on the

recommendation of his religious advisers, still summoned it for confirmation of his policies in 1924, during the Khost Rebellion (Poullada 1973: 122). Hence, the Loya Jirga still had an important de facto function (albeit extra-constitutional) in representing the population and influencing legislation (Moltman 1982: 29). This can be seen as a de facto concession from King Amanullah to the tribal structure of society. The Loya Jirga summoned in 1928 was likewise an attempt from the King to mobilize popular support for his large-scale reform measures following the European tour – but to no avail.

The independence of the judicial power was ensured by Article 53 in the Constitution, all trials were in principle public (Article 50) and every person appearing before a court of justice could use any legitimate means to ensure protection of his rights (Article 51). The Constitution was revolutionary in the Afghan context not only by the granting of civil rights to all citizens and by regulating the functioning of the power apparatus setting forth the principle of cabinet responsibility (Article 6), but also in enumerating the powers of the King, making them subject to existing law (Article 7) – a radical departure from the personal, and sometimes tyrannical, rule customary in Afghanistan (Poullada 1973: 96).

Islamic Modernism or Secularization?

As pointed out above, King Amanullah's modernization policy was caught in a dilemma between Tarzi's philosophy of an Islamic model of modernization and the practical example of secular modernization of the Young Turks. While secular modernization in the new Turkish Republic clearly meant Westernization of the state and society, it was less clear whether Tarzi's vision of modernity was secular or Islamic. While a staunch anti-imperialist, Tarzi's concept of modernity was implicitly a reproduction of the course of modernization which Western societies had followed: industrialization through capitalist development with whatever social consequences that had brought about. Hence, Amanullah and the Young Afghans were left with the drive to acquire all the signs of modernity which Western society displayed, and the conviction that Islam as practised in Afghan society at the time formed an obstacle to reaching that goal.

King Amanullah's reform policy became the subject of much political controversy as it was considered anti-Islamic, i.e. an attempt to secularize the Afghan state and society. The extent to which the reforms actually did constitute a Secularization process, comparable

to its contemporary Turkish counterpart and source of inspiration, will be discussed below. The formulation of the Afghan constitution – defining the state and the rights and duties of the citizens independently of Islam – formed the basis of the rest of the reforms but the duality of the Young Afghans, and their numerical weakness as compared to their Turkish counterparts, meant that they did not take the outright anti-Islamic stand of the latter. However, the two ‘modernization’ attempts still had so much in common in terms of ideological confrontations (particularly Amanullah’s last reform phase after his grand tour of Europe) that contrasting the policies and attitudes towards Islam of the Amanullah’s regime with that of its Turkish counterpart gives an interesting perspective. For this purpose, we shall evaluate the reforms according to the following concepts:²⁶

- *Institutional secularization*, i.e. changes in organizational arrangements designed to destroy the institutional strength of Islam.
- *Functional secularization*, i.e. changes in the functional specificity of religious and governmental institutions.
- *Legal secularization*, i.e. changes in the legal structure of society.
- *Symbolic secularization*, i.e. enforced changes in aspects of national culture or social life which had symbolic identification with Islam.

Institutional Secularization

In Afghanistan the policies of institutional secularization were very feeble, only amounting to passing the new Constitution in 1923, which, however, still contained references to Islam and still stated that Islam was the state religion and, after the amendments of 1924, even spelling out the adherence to the Hanafi code. Regarding the position of the monarch, according to the Constitution the King was no longer a ‘Pious Sultan’ (see Chapter 1) ruling on the basis of divine sanction; while the King was still bound to rule in accordance with Shari‘a, he was more of a constitutional monarch and a form of popular sovereignty was *formally* invoked though not practised, except in its tribal form (via Loya Jirga). The only other institutional measure of secularization in Afghanistan was the abolition of the office of *muhtasib*, and of the *pīr* and *murīd* system in the army (Poullada 1973:177).

However, the *muhtasib* was reintroduced with the amendments of 1924. In Turkey, on the other hand, this development started with the drastic measures of the abolition of the Caliphate, of the office of the *Şeyh-ül-Islam* (*Shaykh al-Islam*) and the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations (all on one day in 1924). Their abolition plus the 1921 and 1924 Constitutions, stating the principle of political authority derived its legitimacy from the concept of national sovereignty, were major steps towards the separation of 'church' and state (Toprak 1981:46).

As pointed out previously, since the reign of *Amir* Abdur Rahman, the policy in Afghanistan had in fact been the exact opposite of institutional secularization. What had taken place was the integration of religious institutions within the state bureaucracy and the consequent subordination of religious authority to the political. This process of *polity-dominance*, which took the outward form of 'Islamization', was primarily aimed at undermining the religious autonomy. It is interesting to note that the subjugation of religious institutions to state control initiated by *Amir* Abdur Rahman also had parallels in Republican Turkey. Toprak points out that state supervision of religious organizations and activities might be a necessary precondition for secularization in a Muslim society where politics have a theological significance (Toprak 1981:46). In Afghanistan in the nineteenth century, the situation was rather that 'Islamization' was a necessary tool for the development of the 'tribal state' into a centralized 'modern' state (see Chapter 3).

Functional Secularization

In both the Ottoman state and in Afghanistan the religious hierarchy had controlled the educational as well as the judicial processes. Functional secularization within these fields was therefore given high priority in both countries. With the exception of Habibiya College and the Royal Military College (Harabiya) where 'modern' secular subjects were included in the curriculum, the traditional Islamic system of education was still in force when King Amanullah assumed power. The educational policy, which probably constituted the reforms closest to King Amanullah's heart, took the form of a two-pronged attack on the religion-dominated education in the country. On the one hand, a number of schools giving secular education were started (high schools, vocational schools, girls' schools, etc.) and, on the other, students were sent to Europe for higher education. This form of

secularization can be termed as *polity expansion* (Smith 1974:8), in the sense of expanding the polity to perform educational functions which had previously been performed by religious institutions. This process had already been started under *Amīr* Habibullah, with the establishment of the Department of Education in 1913 and a Teachers' Training Centre in 1914 (Gregorian 1969: 186).²⁷

The educational policy also contained elements of *polity dominance*. In fact, this was a continuation of *Amīr* Abdur Rahman's policy of subjugating religious education to state control: schools for mullahs were established, educational standards for mullahs as prerequisites for officiating as religious teachers were proposed in 1928, and a school for *qāzīs* was also proposed in 1928 with the proviso that in the future only graduates from here could be appointed as *qāzīs* (Poullada 1973:77).

It is obvious that educational reforms would attract much attention in Afghanistan (as in Turkey). For any reforming or revolutionizing regime, the educational institutions form a key to disseminating the ideology of the ruling group. In these societies, where most of the socialization took place within the family and – where the press still played a very minor role in influencing public opinion – taking hold of the school system (apart from controlling religion) was almost the only available institution for educating and socializing individuals in the new 'creed' of nationalism. King Amanullah's aim with the educational reforms was particularly the cultivation of an enlightened intellectual class in Afghanistan, and for the provision of a group of able administrators for the monarchy (Shah 1982 :239).

Legal Secularization

Amīr Abdur Rahman had strived for a unification of the legal system on the basis of *Sharī'a*, the interpretation of which became the monopoly of the government-appointed *qāzī*. The result was a strengthening of the position of Islam and of the *qāzī*, while at the same time integrating that office into the state, i.e. a case of combined *polity dominance* and *expansion*.

These attempts were followed up under *Amīr* Habibullah with the publication of a voluminous commentary on religious law, providing guidelines for the courts.²⁸ King Amanullah further developed the codification of law, through the publication of the new Penal Code of 1924-25. The King had assured the religious leaders beforehand that all the laws to be promulgated would be based on *Sharī'a* and that the

Penal Code was simply a codification to make Sharī'a understandable and easy to apply (Poullada 1973:106). However, the long-term intentions of the judicial reforms were apparent in the first paragraph of the general penal code (*Nizāmnāma-ye Jezā-e 'Omumi*, 1924): the determination and execution of punishment belonged to the state and the function of *qāzī* was considerably curtailed. However, the clergy in the Loya Jirga of 1924 objected to these formulations and on the basis of the Hanafi code they forced the King to return the power of determination of punishment to the *qāzī* (Tabibi 1980:240-242).

Another indication of the long-term goal of functional secularization of the court system was the introduction of 'magistrates courts' (*Mahakem-e Alahieh*), composed of 'honourable and honest men', which would deal with civil and commercial cases. It was essential here that the religious hierarchy should not be represented in the magistrates courts.

In evaluating these initial steps towards a secularization of the court system, it should be borne in mind that in the Afghanistan of the 1920s there was not a single secularly trained lawyer to advise on the legal reforms and that the King had to rely on the assistance of liberal *'ulamā* who, at the same time, could guarantee that legislation was not contrary to Islam (Poullada 1973: 106).²⁹

In Turkey, the institutional and functional secularization of the Kemalist government was reinforced by a *legal secularization*, a new framework which eliminated the religious-sanctioned provisions of civil, commercial and criminal laws. A new set of secular codes was adopted in which not a trace of Islam was left since they, with only minor revisions, consisted of the Swiss Civil Code, the Italian Criminal Code and the German Commercial Code (Toprak 1981:52).

The case of Amanullah was here quite different: right from the beginning, he had to convince the *'ulamā* that all new reforms were compatible with Sharī'a, and whenever there could be doubt, the *'ulamā* forced him to make amendments. An example of this was the reintroduction of discrimination against non-Muslims (*dhimmīs*, i.e. Hindus and Jews) which Amanullah, in spite of his wish for religious freedom, had to accept in the Constitution. Modernization and reforms of existing laws could thus only take place within liberal interpretations of Islam. Legal secularization in the sense that Sharī'a should be substituted as the basis of the law was unthinkable. The reform strategy of following liberal interpretations of Sharī'a is in fact the course which has been followed in the majority of Muslim countries, the exceptions being Turkey, Albania and the Central Asian Soviet republics.³⁰

This aspect of the Amanullah reforms can be seen as an expression of Tarzi's vision of Islamic modernization as a return to 'original, uncorrupted Islam'. But no matter whether it was out of necessity or of design that Shari'a remained the basis of law, this did not really make the task of the reformers any easier. For example, in 1928 the King started a public campaign against the veil – the veil was not abolished by law and discarding it was to be a voluntary act (Poullada 1973: 82) – stressing that Islam does not prescribe the veiling of women. Equally, in 1923 the Law Concerning Engagements, Marriages and Circumcision (*Nizāmnāma-e 'Arusi, Nikah wa Khatnasuri*) assured Afghan women the right to marry only a man of their choice (*ibid*: 85), reduced dowry and brideprice and aimed at the protection of women's rights in marriage (all issues which even *Amīr* Abdur Rahman had tried to deal with). This was also a law which could be argued on the grounds of traditional Hanafi doctrine. The public resentment to these reforms was not so much rooted in orthodox Islam as in the fact that Shari'a was not the only legal base of traditional Afghan society – in many fields, tribal codes like *Pashtunwāli* and customary law (*rawaj*) were followed instead in spite of four decades of legal 'Islamization'. As such, even reforms strictly on the basis of Islamic law were for many Afghans far too liberal and constituted a clear violation of age-old customs and rights, i.e. problems reminiscent of those of *Amīr* Abdur Rahman in his 'Islamization' policies.

The above discussion shows that King Amanullah's reputation as a radical reformer in the style of Kemal Atatürk is somewhat exaggerated, considering the meagre achievements as far as institutional, functional and legal *secularization* is concerned.³¹ The King may have seen the reforms as just the first step in a much more thorough secularization which would take place. But in view of the actual results, the question is why or how the local population and contemporary observers alike came to see King Amanullah as a most rabid reformer, rejecting all local customs and mores in his zest for Westernization, when he, as demonstrated above, in many respects just continued policies which had been initiated by *Amīr* Abdur Rahman and *Amīr* Habibullah?

Symbolic Secularization

The explanation will no doubt be found in what Toprak calls the *symbolic secularization process*, which in both Turkey and Afghanistan became an important aspect of the reform policy. Amanullah and

Kemal Atatürk alike aimed for a cultural transformation of their societies, to be achieved through an induced transformation of dominant symbols in society. In Turkey, the language reform, the outlawing of the fez and also the abolition of the Caliphate can be seen as such measures towards transforming the connotations of a set of symbols from the sacred to the profane.

In Afghanistan, certain policies were aimed at such cultural transformation while others, like changing the holiday from Friday to Thursday, might only have been interpreted as such by the general public. The rejection of the veil and the *purdah* system was a blow at the outward signs of the inferior position of Afghan women – and the unveiled woman, represented in person by the Queen herself, was to denote the free and independent woman who, on an equal basis with men, would build the new Afghanistan.

Along the same lines was the dress reform requiring the adoption of Western dress in Kabul. Poullada (1973:81) explains that the intention was 'to lower the visibility of the self-conscious differences between ethnic and religious groups', i.e. abolishing the traditional dress with all its implications of diversified identification and substituting it with the uniform Western dress which would then symbolize the new shared *national* identity as Afghan citizens.³²

For the planner of such 'cultural engineering' there is one problem arising from the introduction of symbols which are not part of the historically transmitted pattern of symbolic forms shared and understood by all: they are particularly susceptible to other interpretations than those intended by the planners. While the Western dress for the King and his modernist supporters represented all the cherished goals of modernity, for the general public Western dress was seen as contempt for tradition if not outright identification with the infidels.³³

Yet another act of symbolically stressing the new identity of equal citizens in the nation-state was the abolition of rank and titles pertaining to the *sardārs*, *khāns* and *maliks*. This attempt at depriving the tribal aristocracy of the symbols of privilege did much to alienate the tribal chiefs from Amanullah, and so did the abolition of the tradition of sending food from the royal kitchens to favoured courtiers (Poullada 1973:107-108).

Mardin (1971) claims that the Turkish Revolution was primarily a revolution of values, that the Kemalist regime spent an extraordinary amount of energy on elaborating a national consciousness and considered the values of the *ancien régime* as a threat to its existence. King Amanullah of Afghanistan seemed to share this preoccupation.

From 1928 particularly, he regarded the influence of religion as an obstacle to progress. Although his ambition was the separation of mosque and state, he never became anti-Islamic in the way that the Kemalists did. First of all, Amanullah was a religious man himself, secondly the vision of Tarzi of a modernized Islam serving the nation-state still lingered on; and thirdly, the religious establishment in Afghanistan was less developed and institutionalized than it had been in the Ottoman empire, the seat of the Caliphate – i.e. it was not until the end that the King was faced with a unified block of religious leaders opposing him.

King Amanullah realized that, in order to lead Afghanistan into a dynamic national development with an emphasis on education, health and industrialization on a par with other nations in the world, it was necessary that the Afghan population came to share *his* vision of the future, i.e., that the ideological paradigm of the nation-state and civil society became predominant over existing parochial ideologies tied up with notions of tribe, ethnicity and religion. Although he realized the importance of achieving ideological hegemony and in this connection the need of, for example, creating a new educational system and symbols of the new culture and values, he greatly overestimated the force of the new ideas. In fact, papers like *Siraj al-Akhbar*, so important for the Young Afghans, and the government press presenting the background of the reform policy, only reached a small literate group in the cities, and the reformers ultimately had to acknowledge that the battle over the reform policy was formulated on quite different premises.

King Amanullah and the Traditional Power Groups

At the very beginning of his reign King Amanullah enjoyed the widespread support of religious leaders and the population at large. His clear pan-Islamic and anti-British policy ensured him the support of all the important *pīrs* of eastern Afghanistan, i.e. the followers of the late Hadda-i *Ṣāhib*, and he had close personal relations with the *Ḥaẓrat Ṣāhib* of Shor Bazaar, Fazl Mohammad, *Shams al-Mashayikh*, who together with his two brothers was to make the Mujaddidi family the most respected and influential religious family in Afghanistan in the years to come.

The first signs of the trouble in store for King Amanullah and his reform policy appeared in 1923 in Jalalabad at the annual celebrations (*jashn*) of Afghanistan's independence (after the Third Anglo-Afghan

War). Some eight hundred delegates from Afridi, Mohmand, Shinwari, Khugiani, Ghilzai and Ningarhar Wazir had been invited, along with such religious dignitaries as the *Hājji* of Turangzai, the Mullah *Sāhib* of Chaknaur, *Bādshāh Sāhib* of Islampur, Mullah *Sayyid* Akbar, Aka Khel and *Mīr* Jalal Sipah of Ningrosa. The King read the *Nizāmnāma* to the audience and informed them about his future policies. Upon this, the brother of the *Hazrat Sāhib* of Chaharbagh put forward the view that the *Nizāmnāma* appeared to be injurious to the progress of Islamic teaching, an objection which may have been aimed at the increasing amount of secular subjects to be taught as well as at the creation of a secular educational system, both undermining the existing religious monopoly over education. As far as the tribesmen were concerned, their worries seem at first to have been more mundane, the Afridis and Mohmands reportedly being dissatisfied that the allowances distributed to them were smaller than those of the late *Amīr*.³⁴

The deteriorating effect of the reform policy on the King's relationship with the traditional power groups was manifest in 1924 – first in the Khost Rebellion and later at the meeting of the Loya Jirga when the King had to submit to some amendments of the *Nizāmnāma*. Although the institution of Loya Jirga was not mentioned in the Constitution and could not be considered a legislative assembly, in view of the Khost Rebellion it met to give a de facto confirmation of the Constitution – already in force – and did so only after the King agreed to some amendments.

The official version of the Khost Rebellion, as presented to the public in the periodical *Ittihād-i Mashriqi* of 26 June 1924, explained that enemies of the religion and the nation had bribed such treacherous and wicked *‘ulamās* as Mullah Abdulla *Akundzada* Kharoti – also known as *Mullah-i Lang*, i.e. the Lame Mullah – and Mullah Abdul Rashid of Sahak to incite the population against the government. They had submitted an application for the abolition of the *Nizāmnāma-i Jezā* (Penal Law) through the *Hokumat-i A‘la of Samt-i Junubi* (Province of 'Junubi', i.e. 'the South') to the Interior Minister. The mullahs were then invited to come and discuss their petition in Kabul. However, they refused and went instead to the Mangal and Zadran tribes, inflaming them against the government. Upon this move, the government sent the Minister of Justice – *Sardār* Mohammad Ibrahim *Khān*, Barakzai, maternal uncle of King Amanullah – plus 'Hazrat Sahiban and certain Ulamas' to Gardez to settle the problem and 'to explain the instruction and orders of 'Shari'a Sharif' (Holy Shari'a) and to make them see the errors of their way', i.e. to explain the

compatibility of the new laws with Sharīʿa. The negotiations were in vain and the tribes started an attack on a company at Kotal-i Tirah. The rebellion spread and the Minister of War responded by having rebel positions bombarded. After this display of military might from the government, the elders and *maliks* from the rebelling tribes gradually came to present themselves 'to repent their wicked actions taking oath on the Al-Quran'.³⁵

The mullahs representing the government in the negotiations (the above 'Hazrat Sahiban') included the *Ṣāhibzada* of Musai and Mullah Abdul Ghafur. It is interesting to note here, that King Amanullah at this point of time could apparently still rely on the loyalty of most of the prominent *pīrs* in eastern Afghanistan, with whom his anti-British and pan-Islamic credit still held good. The King's relationship to the *Ḥazrat* of Shor Bazaar is less clear, since several reports at the time imply that from his Kabul residence the *Ḥazrat Ṣāhib* was the prime instigator of the rebellion, while other reports claimed that the *Ḥazrat Ṣāhib* was sent by the government to Gardez to negotiate with the rebels. However, most evidence points to the fact that King Amanullah kept his close contact to *Shams al-Mashayikh*,³⁶ and that the relationship to the Mujaddidis did not turn sour until *Nur al-Mashayikh* had succeeded him as *Ḥazrat* of Shor Bazaar.

The popular account of the negotiations between the government representative *Qāzī* Abdul Wasay (who himself had been involved in the formulation of the *Nizāmnāma*) and Mullah Abdullah tells that what separated the two parties involved were the following demands,³⁷ with which the government refused to comply. First, regarding the educational reforms, Mullah Abdullah demanded that only the limited number of boys who were likely to have to deal with foreigners should receive a modern (i.e. secular) education. Second, education for girls could only be accepted under the following provisos:

- they were taught only the Qurʿān
- they were not to be kept at school after reaching a marriageable age (this could be as low as nine years or at least by the start of puberty)
- the minimum age for their male teachers should be fixed at eighty years (*sic!*).

Third, the tribes also rejected the system of conscription to the army, the so-called *hasht nafari* system, whereby each 'eighth man' in a village or community was called on. The tribes instead suggested that in the event of war with a foreign power, the tribes would supply the

King with a voluntary unpaid force of 100,000 men. No men would be supplied in peacetime and military training was in any case not necessary for the Frontier tribes (*sic!*). To prove the last point, Mullah Abdullah challenged the Afghan regulars to a musketry contest; the mullah was known as a marksman of some note and nobody accepted his challenge (*ibid*). The *hasht nafari* system was not Amanullah's invention but had existed since the time of *Amīr* Abdur Rahman (Kakar 1979: 98, 112-113). However, Poullada (1973:115) observes that often recruits were 'the dregs or rejects of village and tribal life, selected, and at times paid for "volunteering", by the local elite'. Amanullah tried to introduce a lottery in *hasht nafari* as a fairer and more representative system of national service. On top of general tribal aversion to conscription, this move produced considerable resistance, since the control of recruitment thus escaped the tribal elite (*ibid*).

The Khost Rebellion dragged on for more than nine months, lasting until January 1925. Poullada argues (1973:121-123) that the rebellion was not a *religious* controversy, as the rebels claimed, but (as King Amanullah also claimed) a political and economic conflict, a struggle for power between reactionary religious leaders and the government and thereby a continuation of the struggle between 'church' and state as under *Amīr* Abdur Rahman. This point can be argued because, although the alliance between clergy and the tribes was reminiscent of the uprisings against *Amīr* Abdur Rahman, the present conflict was of another nature owing to its different ideological content.

While Abdur Rahman had increased the influence of Islam and the authority of the clergy, by subduing it to the centralized state, King Amanullah's long-term ambition, as reflected in the educational and legal reforms, was the separation of 'church' and state. The clergy's power was undercut through secular education, secular judges, etc., but these were also points to which doctrinal objections could well be raised.

The rejection of conscription by the tribes was a continuation of the conflicts between tribes and the state under Abdur Rahman. As far as the education of girls and the official attempts to discourage the wearing of veil for women were concerned, these might not literally or doctrinally be religious questions. But Amanullah first of all challenged the full authority of a man over his family and particularly his womenfolk. It was a violation of the religious notion of the sanctity of the family, as well as of one of the basic concepts of *Pashtunwāli*: the total sovereignty in actions and decisions of the individual, the family and the lineage.³⁸ The woman in Afghan society, and particularly so

among the Pashtuns, is a figure loaded with symbolic significance, embodying the *nang* (disgrace) and *nāmus* (reputation/chastity) of the whole kin group. In the puritanical Islam of the tribesmen, linked with the defensive sexism,³⁹ the reforms were seen as a challenge and threat to the honour of the tribesmen, and they had to reject them to avoid 'eating shame'.

Examples of popular propaganda against the form which Amanullah's modernization policy took is found in books like *Pand Nāma* and *Tabrik Nāma* (published in Lahore) by *Mawlawī Najaf Ali Khān* (who, according to Ghobar (1968), was a British agent). In *Tabrik Nāma*, the following poem⁴⁰ about the modernized women of the Amanullah regime appeared:

In the time of Amanullah Khan
 the girls were flirts
 They were going everywhere jumping like Tatar gazelles
 Their legs were showing above their socks
 Paris and London were no match for them
 They had washed their hands of shame, dishonour and holy
 honour
 and shamed the Nation by their flirting
 Most of them went to Europe by train
 Every Muslim who saw this warning sight
 became ashamed of this act of ignorance of
 the Afghan king
 and cried, biting their finger with sadness
 saying 'Oh'
 Wondering about the honour of the King of Islam
 The youngsters are continuously saying the word of Fatherland,
 because they don't pay any attention
 to Islam and faith⁴¹
 King Amanullah Khan was in the sleep of carelessness,
 unaware of the earth circling
 and of day and night
 he issued many decrees (of modernization),
 which you would think originated
 from God on the First Day
 "Paradise comes under the feet of mothers",⁴²
 and the one cursed by his mother [*cāq-i mādar*, i.e. Amanullah]
 came into disaster more and more.

Although the educational reforms and those related to the status of women would for a long while have no practical effect on the Khost tribesmen, they could agree with the religious leaders in objecting to them as violating deep-rooted customs, which were generally assumed to be sanctioned by Islam. And the conscription system to the army was enough of an offence from the central power to cause rebellion.

So there was ample basis for an alliance between religious and tribal leaders.

The Khost Rebellion displayed another significant fact, that Amanullah was initiating wide-ranging reforms without being able to rely on a strong army as *Amīr* Abdur Rahman had done – the army was weakened after reorganization and the war hero, General Commander Nadir *Khān*, refused to lead the army against the Khost tribesmen. The hollowness of the King's propagation of national integration and identity as opposed to tribal identity was in turn also exposed when the government had to declare *jihād* against the rebels and fall back on tribal levies from the Mohmand, Shinwaris, Waziris, Afridis and Hazaras. As these tribes had long-standing feuds with the Mangals, inter-tribal feuds were further rekindled by this policy (MacMunn 1929/1977: 175).

The Loya Jirga of 1924

Faced with what appeared to be the public rejection of the *Nizāmnāma*, the King hurriedly called a Loya Jirga to discuss and sanction the reforms.⁴³ About two hundred delegates participated in the fifteen-day-long session in July 1924 in Paghman (no representatives from the rebel tribes in *Samt-i Junubi* participated). The discussions relating to the provisions of the *Nizāmnāma* which directly affected the position of women illustrate the course of the debate:

- The ban on child marriage. *Nikāh* in childhood prior to attaining one's majority was forbidden, 13 years being defined as minimum age of majority for both sexes.
- Polygamy. The intending polygamist had to obtain the permission of the court as to his just character, which should be testified by at least two witnesses. This proviso was introduced to live up to the Qur'ānic requirement of fair treatment of co-wives.

The debate in the Loya Jirga turned out to be an exchange between the 'modernist' Islamic views and traditionalist ones. Regarding child marriage, the controversy centred around whether child marriage was defined as *mubāh* (permissible) in Sharī'a and thus, according to *fiqh*, open to the command of the Ruler, or whether it was *masnūn* (recommendable), in which case the ruler had no right to prohibit it. Another line of argument against the *Nizāmnāma* was that, according to Sharī'a, the guardian was granted the power of *ijbar* with respect to

the compulsory marriage of minors and that neither the ruler nor anyone else had any right to interfere. A compromise was reached in which child marriage was allowed but avoidance recommended.

In the case of polygamy, the debate centred around whether the *Nizāmnāma* was in accordance with the spirit of the Sharī'a and in keeping with the sayings of the Prophet, in terms of protecting the weaker part, the woman. The traditionalists' argument again centred around the *Nizāmnāma* violating the inalienable rights of the individual (i.e. the husband), with which the ruler had no right to interfere. Also here a compromise was reached, doing away with the requirement of witnesses, but with an assurance of legal protection of oppressed wives and the oppressor being liable to punishment.

These two examples show that the whole discourse of the Loya Jirga was based on Sharī'a, the authority of which was not challenged – rather, the debate was a testing ground for the modernists' interpretations of Islamic Law. And when legalistic arguments failed, King Amanullah appealed to the audience's sense of justice, decency and common sense, values which for him were essentially embodied in the spirit of Islam (see Grevemeyer 1987: 266-269). However, between the lines, another dimension of the debate can also be read, i.e. the rights of the individual (i.e. man/husband) vis-à-vis the state. The *Nizāmnāma* in effect was subjecting large areas of personal life, which so far had been governed only by customary law, to state control. Even if it could be argued that the imposition of the *Nizāmnāma* ensured the enactment of Sharī'a in social life, the traditionalist *ʿulamā* chose to be exponents of the tribal outlook in which the inalienable individual rights should be defended against any encroachment from the state and ruler. While the ideological content of the debate was different, i.e. the modernists invoking the ethical rather than the legalistic content of Islam, the underlying conflict was one of individual versus state – parallel to *Amīr* Abdur Rahman's 'Islamization' which contained the conflict of tribe versus state.

Another dimension of the debate related to the role of the *ʿulamā* in society. The *Nizāmnāma* had been worked out by a group of modernist *ʿulamā*, such as *Mawlawī* Abdul Wasay, who was representing the government position at the Loya Jirga and *Mawlawī* Mohammad Hussain and *Mawlawī* Mohammad Bashir. King Amanullah left no doubt that, in his view, the *ʿulamā* should be subject to the authority of the ruler: '...I propose that whatever authority the Sharī'a vests in a ruler, it is I who should possess it and not the ulema'. He continued, referring to a mullah who the previous day in a mosque in Paghman had delivered an address to the public in which he had said that the

Shari'ah was delivered and belonged to the *'ulamā*. 'No, the Shari'ah belongs to the Almighty, and the ulema are entrusted to throw light on the Shari'ah and explain it to people'.⁴⁴

The Loya Jirga, on the whole, endorsed Amanullah's reforms but had a number of minor amendments included, such as reintroducing the *qāzī*'s power to determine punishment, re-authorizing the *muhtasib* to supervise the observance of religious and moral duties (*ihtisāb*), making the Hanafi code official and reintroducing discrimination against non-Muslim minorities (i.e. infidel tax and special dress). Poullada (1973: 122) states that, in return for obtaining the approval of the *Nizāmnāma* as valid law in accordance with Shari'ah, Amanullah had to agree to the formation of a Committee of Islamic Scholars from amongst the Loya Jirga to sanction all future laws and certify their compatibility with Shari'ah. However, since the Mizan al-Tahqiqat, formed under *Amīr* Habibullah, was still functioning with modernist *'ulamā* like *Mawlawī* Abdul Wasay Kandahari (later executed by Bacha Saqqao because of his support for King Amanullah), the situation was, rather, that the Loya Jirga forced King Amanullah to include more traditionalist *'ulamā* on the Committee and extended its prerogatives regarding scrutinizing all new laws for their compatibility with Shari'ah. The Mizan al-Tahqiqat then also came to include *Mawlawī* Fazl Rabi (who had been very critical of the *Nizāmnāma*), *Mawlawī* Abdul Hye, *Mawlawī* Mohammad Rafiq, *Mawlawī* Mohammad Ibrahim Kamavi and *Mawlawī* Gul Dast (son of the *Hājji Sāhib* of Turangzai) (Khan 1978:41).

In view of the rebellion and the grievances of both mullahs and tribesmen, it is remarkable that none of the points of complaint of the Khosti people were included in the amendments. Current rumour suggested that the King had been forced to abolish outright the regulations relating to the education of girls as well as to women's rights in marriage, while in fact only minor amendments had been made.⁴⁵ Equally, the only change regarding the *hasht nafari* system was that a substitute for the person drafted could be accepted and that exemption price was lowered to 300 rupees (Khan 1978: 41).

Although the King's concessions to the opposition were limited, it seems that for the time being religious leaders in the Loya Jirga had been appeased. The influential Mullah Chaknaur, who had participated in the Loya Jirga, in the Friday prayer in Kabul pronounced that the *Nizāmnāma* had been declared *shari'i* (in accordance with Shari'ah) and praised the King for listening to reason. The government newspaper *Amān-i Afghān* concluded:

Now that the Fundamental Code [i.e. the Constitution passed by the Loya Jirga] had been proved to be in accordance with Islamic Law, it is obvious that those still in arms are irreligious rebels who must be crushed by every means available.⁴⁶

This was followed up in August by the 'Committee of *Ulamā'* (i.e. presumably the Mizan al-Tahqiqat) declaring that the war against the rebels was holy and that defiance of the King's orders was blasphemy (Khan 1978:41). It thus appeared as if Amanullah had mastered the skill of *Amīr* Abdur Rahman at this first confrontation and had won over the *ulamā* to his side with only minor concessions to their demands.

Although nothing is known in detail of the relative importance and repute of the religious leaders at the time, it appears that the Committee of *Ulamā* was composed of people of scholarly repute rather than being people of great personal influence vis-à-vis the tribes. Hence, Amanullah's achievement might have been smaller than it appeared (although *Amīr* Abdur Rahman at first had also used the little known *ulamā* to sanction his centralization policy, rather than the influential tribally-connected religious leaders). Some reports at the time indicated that many mullahs had declined to attend the Loya Jirga.⁴⁷ Nonetheless, such influential people as Mullah Chaknaur and *Ustād Sāhib* Mullah Baqi of Hadda participated, as well as the *Ḥazrat Sāhib* of Shor Bazaar, but none of these was enrolled in the Committee. One might wonder whether they thereby wanted to hedge their bets and be able to align themselves with the changing political loyalties of their followers – or they may have felt a bureaucratic position incompatible with their spiritual charisma.

Looking further into the circumstances relating to the Loya Jirga, it may have eased King Amanullah's task of appeasing the religious leaders about the acceptability of the *Nizāmnāma* that at the same time he proved his 'Islamic' disposition in action. As mentioned, the greatest blemish on the ideals of the *Nizāmnāma* were the amendments relating to minority religions. It so happened that in Kabul, about the time the Loya Jirga gathered in Paghman, the government permitted attacks on the followers of the Qadiani sect who, as a heretical sect, were much more objectionable for the *ulamā* than any of the minority religions.

In June 1924, i.e. the time leading up to the Loya Jirga, two mullahs, Abdul Haim and Niamatullah, had been arrested for being Qadianis.⁴⁸ The former was released on renouncing his faith but Niamatullah referred to the constitutional paragraph on religious freedom.⁴⁹ 'On August 31, 1924, the Qadiani Mullah Niamatullah was stoned to

death at Sherpur by order of the ecclesiastical court'.⁵⁰ The government paper *Amān-i Afghān* (nos. 11 and 12, 17 September 1924) tried to reconcile the execution with the existence of religious freedom by stating that religious freedom must have its limits and that Qadianism was 'a religion of mischief and diplomacy' and it was hinted that Qadianis had helped to foment the Khost Rebellion. Anti-Qadianism was increasing in the country, and another report (*ibid*, Despatch 10) told that on 5 February 1925 two Qadiani shopkeepers were publicly stoned to death in Kabul. Shah puts forward the official 'explanation' that during the reign of *Amīr* Habibullah Qadiani missionaries had been invited to a religious debate with Afghan *ʿulamā* regarding the validity of their dogmas. As they had failed to convince the *ʿulamā*, Qadianism had been banned in Afghanistan. Any propaganda against Islam was punishable with death and several commandments regarding *irtidād*, or infidelity, were emphasized in reference to the clergy of Qadian.

These proceedings, it was considered, were sufficiently definite to make it clear to the Ahmedis that they would be endangering their lives if they visited Afghanistan on a proselytizing mission. (Shah, 1982:213-214)

So much for religious freedom. This witch-hunt was a violation of all the highest ideals of the *Nizām-nāma* (and Amanullah is said to have personally regretted it) and the only reason was that the government badly needed a scapegoat to distract the attention of the *ʿulamā* and people during the Khost crisis – as well as prove itself as defender of the orthodox faith. An appeal to bigotry seldom fails in any society and the Qadianis paid the price.

With the Khost Rebellion finally crushed through tribal *jihād*, the rebels had to take their punishment. On 25 May 1925, Mullah Abdullah *Ākhundzada* Kharoti (*Mullah-i Lang*, i.e. Lame Mullah), one of his sons and a son-in-law, together with some fifty others, were taken to Siah Sang and shot. Although this was a logical consequence of the *jihād* declared by the *ʿulamā* in 1924 against the Khost rebels, not all the religious leaders kept silent about these executions. The Tagab Mullah, Hamidullah *Ākhundzada* Safi, denied that a religious decree condemning *Mullah-i Lang* to death could be issued but admitted that a civil punishment was lawful.⁵¹ These executions probably made the religious leaders wake up again after the ecstasy of the Qadiani witch-hunt.

The period from 1925 to 1927 was a more peaceful time. The King slowed down the reforms and he had relative peace with the religious

and tribal leaders. Disturbances among the Afghan Mohmands were reported⁵² and that a delegation led by Asmatullah *Khān*, son of *Mīr Zaman Khān* of Kunar, and *Bādshāh* Gul, son of the *Hājji* of Turangzai, had a meeting with the King in Jalalabad. They had sent a petition to the King warning that, unless he treated them well in all matters, they would elect their own *Amīr* and 'as their country was not self-supporting, they would have to make occasional raids on other Afghan subjects'. However, nothing much seems to have come of this.

The Afghan government had consolidated its power and managed to send troops and police to recover arrears of revenue from the Laghman valley, Kama and Chaknaur districts. The government had even forbidden the influential Mullah Chaknaur and other tribal leaders to maintain their own armed retinue or to summon *lashkars* and had demanded arrears of revenue due from the villages within the Mullah's sphere of influence.⁵³ In fact, it appeared that King Amanullah was learning to master the politics of tribal power and had even reached some sort of understanding with the powerful and conservative mullahs. It was thus reported⁵⁴ that, in spite of the above-mentioned imposition of restrictions, the Mullah Chaknaur and the *Hājji* of Turangzai had been supporting the King during the Khost Rebellion and were spreading pro-Amanullah propaganda amongst the Mohmands in return for a generous remuneration from the Afghan government. And in 1926 the Chaknaur Mullah interrupted his *hajj* plans to be sent by the Afghan government to Kunar to quell unrest.

In evaluating the situation after the Loya Jirga in 1924, two factors seem to have been at work. First, the Khost Rebellion was not a sign of *general* national unrest and dissatisfaction with the King's reform policy. This is plausible, since only a minor section of the population at this time would have been affected by the reforms. The rebellion was a local phenomenon and, equally, Mullah Abdullah *Ākhundzada* Kharoti seems to have been a *local* religious leader who did not command the loyalty of wider sections of the religious establishment. This explains why the King was able to execute him and some fifty other rebels without any national outcry following.⁵⁵

Second, King Amanullah still enjoyed the support and respect from the network of eastern Afghan Qadiriyya *pīrs* who, since 1915 and the events of the *Shaykh al-Hind* (the Silk Letter Conspiracy – see above), had regarded him as an honest supporter of their anti-British and pan-Islamic endeavours. While they hardly shared his visions of 'modernist' Islam, they still had a far wider perspective on Islam than the local village mullahs. All those associated with the *Shaykh al-Hind* were

aware of the need for education – albeit not secular education – for the progress of Muslim society. For example, the *Hājji Sāhib* of Turangzai built schools in the Frontier area for both boys and girls, and also preached social reform in order to eradicate such social customs as excessive dowries which impaired the status of women (M.F. Khan 1977). To this group, as long as King Amanullah did not compromise the independence of Afghanistan and could justify his reforms on the basis of *Sharī'a*, loyalty to him as a free Muslim Ruler far outweighed any temptation to spearhead and sanction local grievances against the state.

In this situation of comparative peace with the religious and tribal leaders, King Amanullah set out on his grand European tour (December 1927-July 1928). No other Afghan monarch had felt so safe in his seat as to dare to leave the country for such a prolonged period of time. Nothing happened until the King returned, overwhelmed by the impressions from abroad, much more strongly inclined towards secularization and convinced that the religious leaders formed the main obstacle to progress.

The Fall of King Amanullah

The new situation showed itself straight away, when the Mullah Chaknaur and the *Hājji* of Turangzai came to Kabul to greet the King, expecting great gifts (as *khairāt*) following his safe return. They received nothing but instead were insulted when the King even forbade them to collect money in the villages.⁵⁶

Amanullah was inspired by his Grand Tour, particularly from seeing the forceful modernization programmes of Mustafa Kemal in Turkey and Reza *Shāh* in Iran. He shared his inspiration with the Afghan people in a Loya Jirga of more than a thousand people summoned to Kabul in August 1928. The King first reported on the tour and then outlined a new reform programme for the rapid socio-economic transformation of Afghanistan – a programme highly charged with proposals aiming at the heart of clerical power. The proposal for the education of mullahs,⁵⁷ the *qāzī* school, the secular law school, the complete liquidation of *waqf*, the abolition of *pīr* and *murīds* in the army, and the banning of all mullahs educated in Deoband – not only one of the most respected *madrāsas* in the world but also a key centre in the region for Islamic revivalism and anti-British activities – were correctly interpreted by conservative religious leaders as a declaration of war (Poullada 1973:125-126).

As if the *jirga* delegates had not already been exposed to enough folly and humiliation by being forced to wear European dress on arrival in Kabul, the King proposed to raise the marriageable age of women and men to eighteen and twenty-two years respectively. He ordered the abolition of the veil in Kabul, and the Queen rose and tore her veil in front of the public. He talked against polygamy and proposed raising the land revenue and making the parliament, *Shawrā-i Milli*, truly representative through direct elections. However, during the *jirga* discussions, Amanullah had to amend his statements on purdah, marriageable age and on his proposal for co-education (Khan 1978:46-52). But the religious and tribal leaders were convinced that it was now or never if they were to defend themselves against the dangerous folly of the monarch.

Stewart (1973) as always has a vivid and emotional description of the Loya Jirga and makes one interesting observation which, even if it cannot be verified, has a ring of truth and plausibility. She describes how Amanullah first assured the Loya Jirga that no proposals would violate the principles of Islam then elaborated in a manner which may have made matters worse:

He ... discussed in a cerebral and intellectual context a subject which, for his listeners, shimmered with the untouchable halo of emotion. He was making the Prophet sound like a public official and the Koran like a textbook one might find anywhere, instead of being the supernatural emanations of Allah that every delegate knew them for. (*ibid.*: 387)

Although it had been rather peaceful in Afghanistan for about three years, gradually the reforms alienated important sections of the population. The new system of village administration introduced in 1925 had abolished the broker function of *maliks* and *qaryadārs* (village headmen) and, instead, the villagers had direct dealings with revenue officers to whom they paid their dues twice a year in cash – i.e. a consequence of the notion of the population consisting of individual citizens vis-à-vis the nation-state rather than being subjects belonging to certain communities. The new system was beneficial to both the state and the peasants who avoided any extortions on the part of the *maliks*. The *maliks*, on the other hand, not only lost a source of income but also had to pay up all arrears due from them; they also lost local prestige and influence by being deprived of the privilege of their formal relation to the centre of power. By cutting their local economic and power basis, the King had alienated this influential group (Ahmad 1930:22).

The conscription system was still very unpopular as it bred corruption and, in general, Amanullah's administrative reforms antagonized the older officials who were being replaced by young men of 'low origin' and insufficient experience (Ahmad 1930, Poullada 1973).

On top of this well-established discontent came the rumours relating to the King's tour abroad. The Indian press gave wide coverage to the tour and the news reaching Afghanistan included photographs of the Queen travelling unveiled around foreign countries. The Afghan Trade Agent in Quetta was reportedly anti-Amanullah and he purchased all illustrated papers depicting the unveiled Queen, despatching them to Kabul separately as soon as he got them.⁵⁸ Not all the photos of the unveiled Queen were real: Ghobar (1968: 464-465) writes that *Mawlawī Najaf Ali Khān*, who was a poet as well as an agent of the British, made many of the false photos of Amanullah and Queen Soraya, showing the Queen indecently dressed. All this produced much dissatisfaction in Afghanistan as it was considered detrimental to the honour of the whole nation. Thus, since the King obviously disregarded his *namus* obligation, the Afghan nation felt the corresponding duty of indirect *namus* (Steul 1981: 140-143) to restore the dignity and honour of the nation and its women.

After the convention of the Loya Jirga where, in speech and actions, Amanullah had confirmed the worst expectations, the Mujaddidis – probably the most influential religious family of the country – threw themselves into active opposition. The Mujaddidis had originally been strong Amanullah-supporters because of the latter's anti-British and pan-Islamic leanings. The *Hāzrat* of Shor Bazaar, Fazl Mohammad (alias Shah Agha) – titled *Shams al-Mashayikh* – had crowned Amanullah and had been a strong supporter of him. According to Stewart (1973: 135), he had even declared in 1920 at the Friday Mosque in Kabul that King Amanullah, as the only independent Muslim ruler, was now head of Islam and should be the Caliph. When *Shams al-Mashayikh* died in 1923, the title passed to his brother Fazl Omar (alias Sher Agha) – titled *Nur al-Mashayikh* – who, like his elder brother, had actively participated in the agitation for *jihād* against the British in 1919. However, the Afghan acceptance of the Durand Line, as well as the reform policy, turned him against the King and since his return from *hajj* in 1926, *Hāzrat Šāhib* Fazl Omar (Sher Agha) had been in self-imposed exile in India agitating against Amanullah (Khan 1978:53).

In September 1928, a brother of *Hāzrat Šāhib* Fazl Omar, Mohammad Gul (alias Gul Agha), together with his nephew Fazl Rahim, obtained some four hundred signatures from the country's religious leaders for

a petition to the King – presented on 7 September 1928 – in which it was stated that the King's intention to westernize Afghanistan, and the methods applied, were not in accordance with Islam.⁵⁹ In return, Amanullah summoned the Chief *Qāzī* of Kabul, Abdur Rahman of Bektut and asked him to sanction the reform programme in return for generous remunerations; and, if he did not, he would be punished with death (Ahmad 1930:23). *Qāzī* Abdur Rahman – being a Naqshbandiyya *murīd* of *Shams al-Mashayikh* – had his loyalties to the Mujaddidis. In this predicament, *Qāzī* Abdur Rahman and Mohammad Sadiq tried to escape to India via Khost. They were arrested, however, together with some thirty-five mullahs and others suspected of wanting to foment an uprising in this trouble-prone district. Around one month later, at the beginning of October, *Qāzī* Abdur Rahman and a few other mullahs were found guilty of treason and executed.⁶⁰ The *Hāzrat Sāhib*'s family was thrown in jail. Poullada (1973:127-29) relates that King Amanullah suspected the *Hāzrat Sāhib*'s family of having become agents of the British intelligence, presumably owing to the exile of *Nur al-Mashayikh*, and in that context plotting against the Afghan government. Amanullah was later to urge *Nur al-Mashayikh* to return to Afghanistan but in vain (Stewart 1973:401-421).⁶¹ Mohammad Sadiq Mujaddidi has given this account of the events (*ibid*):

At this time [1347, i.e. 1928], the humble writer of this piece adopted the cause of service to the Islamic religion. I called a number of the supporters of the Mujaddidis living in the south of Kabul and revealed to them what I had in mind. They were from Ahmadzai tribe. With great eloquence, they assured me of their support. I then took *Mawlānā* Abdur Rahman into my confidence. The latter, who had long been awaiting such initiative responded positively. In short, on the 21st of Rabi-usani we rode on horseback from Bektut of Paghman to 'Junubi' [the Province of the South].

Accompanying me on that journey was Mullah Abdul Qadir *Ākhundzada* from whom I had learned grammar and syntax. He was Arab by *qaum*... In addition to *mawlānā* and the mullah, there were: my dear Masoom the son of my master (i.e. Fazl Rahim, Senai Masoom), Mullah Hanan and Mohammad Ayan, the sons of *Mawlānā* Abdur Rahman, Mullah Fazli Haq, the judge in Paghman, and *Shaykh* Mohammad Sidiq Khan Urya-Khel of Paghman, Mullah Sultan Jan, one of the pupils and servants of the Mujaddidi monastery.

As we reached 'Junubi', the Ahmadzais who had given us such strong assurances, went back on their word and refused to cooperate. Because of our Islamic pride we did not run to the country of the infidels, which was very close [i.e. British India],

and decided to surrender to the Government. We were sent to Kabul under escort. There we met with Amanullah *Khān* in Paghman and told him what was on our mind. We were imprisoned in the Arq castle. *Mawlānā* Abdur Rahman and Mullah Fazli Haq spent 32 days in detention and then on Sunday 23rd of Rabi-u-sani 1347 [1928] they were sentenced to death by Amanullah *Khān* and executed in Siah Sang of Kabul. Three days later Mullah Abdul Qadir *Ākhundzada* and Mullah Abdul Hanan, the son of *mawlānā*, were also martyred.

(Translated by A. Safi)

The whole affair naturally created a lot of uproar in Afghanistan in view of the general discontent and as it concerned some of the foremost religious leaders. The King had now alienated for good the vast majority of the religious establishment and even members of the Committee of Islamic Scholars, such as *Mawlawī* Fazl Rabi, were arrested in this *Hazrat Ṣāhib* affair.⁶² The few liberal *‘ulamā* still supporting the King were mainly scholarly persons without the strong popular and tribal connections of his opponents (Poullada 1973: 129).

The Shinwari uprising in November 1928 became the start of the fall of King Amanullah. A section of Sanghu Khel and a smaller detachment of the Alicher Khel of Shinwari attacked and looted two villages and an army post in Pesh Boldak and Achin in the Khyber Pass. The feeble response of the governor of Jalalabad encouraged the tribesmen, and more Shinwaris joined in and moved towards the forts of Dakka and Torkham. The tribal leaders, Mohammad Alam and Mohammad Afzal, claimed to have the support of top political leaders in Kabul and also had the religious sanction of the *Hāfiz Ṣāhib* of Fakirabad (Poullada 1973:160). There are several versions of what the immediate cause of the Shinwari uprising was, ranging from it being a product of a conspiracy at court (Ali Ahmad 1930); a British plot;⁶³ a result of Shinwari-Ghilzai clashes and a military commander's venality (Fletcher 1965); a government attempt at tax collection among the Shinwaris (Taillard, 1929, Gregorian 1969); or a reaction against Mohmand rivalry and government interference in the *badragī* system, which involved caravans passing through a certain territory having to pay for 'protection' to the tribes of the area, for example around Khyber.

Poullada (1973: 161-162) regards the latter explanation as the most likely, without ruling out other factors, and points out that there had been no reference to any Shinwari opposition to the social or religious reforms; only later were such explanations invoked. Poullada thus

argues that, for the tribesmen, the revolt followed the historical pattern of conflict with the central government (the centrifugal tendencies of a tribal-based state) and that the religious sanction followed as the religious leaders had their own separate secular power struggle with the King.

The tribal conflict soon got out of control, with the Shinwaris joining in en masse, to be followed by the Khugiani, Zadran and Jaji. At the same time, banditry had grown considerably during the previous couple of years (it is argued that the banditry was a result of the impoverishment of the peasantry through increased taxation). By 1928 the gang of a certain Bacha Saqqao of Kalakan, Koh-i Daman, had grown so strong that it posed an actual threat to the government. With Bacha Saqqao attacking Kabul and the tribes of the eastern provinces in open rebellion, the King fled Kabul for Kandahar, handing over the throne to his brother *Sardār* Inayatullah (who was to occupy it for only three days).

Accounts of the details of these dramatic days are presented by several authors: Ali Ahmad (1930), Poullada (1973), Stewart (1973), Wild (1932), etc. What concerns us here is the accompanying ideological content of the uprising as well as the position taken by religious leaders. From the available sources, it appears that the arrival of Bacha Saqqao on the scene was a result of the general deterioration of law and order in the country. However, it seems plausible to assume that he and his short-term reign represented yet another case of 'social



Figure 14: *Hazrat Sāhib Fazl Omar*

banditry' in the 'Hobsbawm-ian' sense,⁶⁴ but so far no proper study and analysis of the phenomenon of Bacha Saqqao has been carried out. The sources consulted for the present study have not provided information which would place Bacha Saqqao as a combatant within the ideological struggle studied here – *his* battle, and particularly the subsequent mythologizing of him as a 'bandit-hero', should rather be analysed within the context of the socio-economic situation of the peasantry and not least in the perspective of inter-ethnic power relations at national and local levels.

Ideological Content of the Revolt

While Poullada (1973) found little of a 'religious nature' in the actual background of the rebellion against King Amanullah, Chokaiev (1930:325) found little of a 'political nature' and reached the conclusion that the defence of Shari'ah and of the tribal system constituted the source of the 'popular wrath' against Amanullah.

Poullada minimizes the religious issues involved and instead strives to prove complicated mechanisms of tribal politics in the rebellion, factors which should certainly not be underestimated. But in doing so, he makes the analytical distinction between 'politics' and 'religion'. While these two issues can hardly be separated in the sphere of everyday politics in Amanullah's Afghanistan, it is also questionable how useful distinguishing tribal identity and tribal politics from religious notions in this case is at the analytical level, since these dimensions in Afghan tribal society were inherent, each in the other. The danger in stressing this distinction appears when Poullada underlines that the religious issues were only later included in the official explanation of the revolt against the King, i.e. that the religious issues only served the purpose of justifying a secular power struggle, hence implying that this argument was mere propaganda and the mullahs were simply power-hungry instigators. While there may be evidence to justify it, such a view in effect becomes a reductionist approach, neglecting the importance of a people's religio-cultural outlook through which the world is interpreted, and which provides a model of the world, a 'Weltanschauung', and a model for their actions and responses (Geertz 1966). The danger of such reductionism is the denial of the sincerity of a certain culturally / religiously defined rationality and conceptualization, even when it may be utilized in a manipulative manner by certain protagonists in order to further worldly interests. Even then, this does not deny the reality and importance of a given Weltanschauung; on the contrary, it proves the profound force of it.

Around New Year 1928-29, the Shinwari leaders published a manifesto in which they denounced the King and argued their cause to the other Afghan tribes:

In the Name of God the Merciful, the Beneficent

This proclamation is made to all Muslim brethren whether they belong to Afghanistan or elsewhere in the world.

You might have heard that towards the east of Afghanistan there is a tribe known as Shinwaris, who have risen in revolt

and have spread disorder and that the Government of Kabul have taken measures to suppress this revolt and have sent troops to enforce peace and order. For the information of my Muslim brethren and to remove any misapprehension, I acting on the proverb that 'Hearing is not like seeing', have taken this opportunity to lay before them the following facts:-

(1) The tribe which has come forward, at the sacrifice of life and property, to fight the cause of righteousness with courage and gallantry is the Shinwaris; its fighting strength is more than 20,000. This tribe is to be found in Sufed Koh which is towards the south of Jalalabad. They have, with the advice of their brethren living in Sufed Koh and in eastern Afghanistan, united themselves for this cause.

(2) The first step taken by them was to reform their rulers, who were addicted to bribery and corruption and to the issuing of orders contrary to 'Sharia', e.g. to discontinue prayer, to shave off their beards and moustaches, to abandon purdah of their women and not to have any regard for Shariat. After this the Shinwari Lashkar [invaded] a fort which contained troops and other ammunition of war and after slight resistance, the walls fell inwards.

(3) As the shrine of Hazrat Akhundzada Sahib of Hadda is a sacred place and the meeting place of all the Ulemas and Sheikhs, therefore they all collected there and conferred with the eastern tribes and came to an agreement to cancel the reforms which were repugnant to Shariat and to murder Amir Amanullah who is lost. Accordingly in pursuance of this pact the Khugianis, who have a fighting strength of 20,000, attacked the Kabul troops of 9,000 strong who had been sent as reinforcements and who had reached the limits of Nimla and defeated them and their officers are still prisoners. Their leader is Mahmud, a trusted general of Amir Amanullah.

(4) Now that all connection with the Kabul government has been severed, the eastern territories are now governed according to laws and rules of Shariat, which are administered by the Ulemas, who in reality are the rulers.

(5) The city of Jalalabad is still invested. Some supporters of the Afghan Government, who are enemies of Islam, are living in it. As the residents of the City cannot get out of it, the tribal troops cannot assault the City for fear of innocent men being killed. They are therefore acting slowly and patiently and with the grace of God it is hoped that they will soon be victorious.

(6) The cause of all this disturbance is not any personal motives of the tyranny of the rulers, but it is simply to remove these reforms which are heathenish and to strengthen the religion,

because the laws promulgated by Amir Amanullah had seriously interfered with the Hanafi religion and had disgraced the laws of the sacred Shariat.

Accordingly I would mention here the following instances of Amir Amanullah's irregularities:-

- (a) The framing of his own codes and disregarding Shariat.
- (b) That no suit is to [be] entertained without documentary proof.
- (c) The marrying of 4 wives, which is allowed by the Qur'ān, had been limited to one wife.
- (d) The forcible divorce of the wives of his officials.
- (e) The cutting of the hair of women, the discarding of the chaddar of the women and keeping naked their arms and breasts.
- (f) The removal of purdah of women.
- (g) The sending of grown up girls to Europe.
- (h) The changing of Friday and the day of Haj.
- (i) The encouragement of bribery and corruption.
- (j) The opening of theatres and cinemas and other places of amusements.
- (k) On the day of the great Jirga, Amir Amanullah uttered words disrespectful to Mohammad, the Prophet of God, on whom be peace, in the presence of all the elders of Afghanistan.

He has thus become a 'kafir' and deserves to be put to death.

(7) Before his return from Europe and the great Jirga, he was introducing these reforms, which are against Shariat, secretly and politically, on account of which our Ulema were making enquiries about them. But after his return from Europe, he introduced his evil reforms publicly and as the population of Afghanistan generally belong to the Hanafi sect they have made up their minds to dethrone him and murder him.

(8) The interested persons will say that this action of the people is based on misunderstanding and due to ignorance. But this is not so. Islam contains all the elements required for civilization and religion. The attempt of the people is to strengthen the religion and civilization. As the Government in order to push forward its objects has sown discord and disunion among the people, hence to-day the whole Afghanistan desires to unite and to free itself.

(9) The politicians may take all this affair in any light they like but I assure my Muslim Brethren that on the day Amanullah is deposed and some honest and faithful to Shariat King is selected by the whole people of Afghanistan in accordance with the Shariat, then I shall be the first person to tender my allegiance to him. At present, I, Muhammad Alam Shinwari, with the consent of the well known 'Ulemas' without any

personal motives, have undertaken to do all this for the glory of the religion.

(10) The Muslim world will estimate our casualties on presumption. But from the beginning of this struggle up till now, our casualties do not reach one hundred, because our fighting men know that this struggle of the people is for the 'ghairat' of the religion. They do not wish to use their ammunition which is intended for their enemies against their own kith and kin.

(11) The Southern and Northern tribes know that the gathering of the Eastern tribes⁶⁵ is for righteousness and therefore no one assists the Government and they are solidly with us.

(12) In order that nothing may remain secret and the real facts may be known to friends and foes alike, I propose to start a paper which will be called 'Al Imam' to contradict the news which is published in 'Aman' so that the Islamic brethren may know the future of Afghanistan.

Sd. Muhammad Alam Shinwari
 Servant of Islam
 Written by Muhammad Afzal⁶⁶

In writing about this manifesto, Poullada (1973:175) says that, although purportedly written by Muhammad Afzal and Muhammad Alam, the document bears unmistakable signs of being the creation of minds with religious training. This evaluation is not convincing; the manifesto has nothing of the consistent logic of the *fatwās* issued by the various mullahs for or against the contesting parties. On the contrary, with its detail of tribal manpower, it appears as a document from a tribal leader aimed at other tribes – both within and beyond the Afghan borders – to convince them to join the winning side in time.

The legitimacy of the Shinwari cause appears to be claimed from two sources. First, it is based on the unanimity obtained among the eastern tribes in repudiating the reform policy of the King. This legitimacy neither emanates from the people and the nation as invoked in the *Nizāmnāma* nor from religious legitimacy as in the 'Islamic model' but rather from the tribal '*jirga* model' of legitimacy. Second, the decision obtains religious sanction by presenting rather loose 'proofs' of the King violating Shari'ah, so that the tribal action serves the defence of the faith. It claims the support of the *ulamā* but no *ulamā* have sanctioned the document with their signatures – not even the guardian of the Hadda shrine where the *jirga* was held. Probably no mullah of any standing has been involved in formulating the manifesto, which does not refer to any of the clergy's most serious grievances regarding the reform policy.

However, the concern about the public opinion in the Muslim world at large and the reference to Islam containing the elements for 'civilization', as well as the idea of publishing a newspaper to launch a propaganda counter-attack at Amanullah may give one the feeling that somewhere in the background there is a defector from the Young Afghan movement who has introduced these aspects, which seem quite foreign to tribal rebellion.

Shortly afterwards, a petition from the *ʿulamā* of Kandahar and Kabul appeared. It was quite different in tone; first of all, it was not a denunciation of the King but a list of demands for the King to fulfil (in order to maintain the support of the *ʿulamā*) and, secondly, it was much more factual in content:

- (1) the King should refute allegations that he ever showed disrespect to the Holy Prophet;
- (2) a permanent council of *ʿulamā* should be established to examine all laws passed by the National Assembly;
- (3) the girls sent to Turkey for education should be recalled;
- (4) special steps should be taken against bribery;
- (5) women should remain veiled and their hair should not be cut short;
- (6) any mullah might become a teacher without producing qualifications;
- (7) the *hasht nafari* system (conscription) should be abolished and the army organized tribally (i.e. based on tribal levies as in the past);
- (8) girls' schools should be abolished;
- (9) no restriction should be placed on the lending and borrowing of money.⁶⁷

Seen from the view of the *ʿulamā*, this petition was a very reasonable demand upon the King to win their support at this time of national crisis. This can be seen from an examination of each of these demands. With reference to point (1), in any Muslim state it would be unacceptable to have a ruler showing disrespect to the Prophet and, in fact, the King was obliged by his own Constitution to respect Islam. The point was particularly relevant because of all the damaging rumours during and after the European tour that Amanullah had abandoned religion and turned *kāfir*. So if the *ʿulamā* were still to support him, he had to prove the rumours wrong. With reference to point (2), just as after the 1924 Loya Jirga Amanullah had accepted a Committee of Islamic Scholars to check the laws, the demand here was a wish to have that

system institutionalized. Since the *Nizāmnāma* stated that the laws be in accordance with Shari'ah, this demand did not violate the Constitution but merely aimed at strengthening and integrating the 'ulamā's position in the state apparatus.

As for points (3),(5) and (8), we have seen that any change to the situation of women was one of the most touchy points not only for the religious leaders but certainly for the population at large, since the King's attempts to emancipate women was seen as a threat to the very foundation of family, morals and decency. The above formulations could hardly be justified on strictly religious grounds, but in the population, including the 'ulamā, the honour of the family and morals were regarded as very much a religious obligation, which was felt to have been violated by King Amanullah.

With reference to point (4), Amanullah had throughout his reign campaigned against bribery and alienated many people in that way. However, many sources point to the fact that corruption had in fact increased rather than decreased during his reign. So this was a sensible demand, to which the King could only agree.

As for point (6), rejecting the demand of qualifications for the mullahs was the only clear 'trade union' demand of the 'ulamā – there existed no support for this demand other than the protection of their own interests rather than protection of Islam. This was equally so with point (7); abolition of the *hasht nafari* system was a clear protection of the independence of the tribes and nothing more. Finally, point (9) was a curious demand and it appears that the only justification could be to protect the money lenders (who then presumably were tribal leaders, mullahs and *hājjis*).

The King was not yet ready to give in to his opponents, even though a man as prominent as the Chaknaur Mullah was holding back the Mohmands from participating in the uprising – on the condition that King Amanullah abolish all the laws on education for women and grant amnesty to the rebels. King Amanullah was still trying to win the battle over the Shari'ah by having a *fatwā* issued to the effect that the cause of the ruler was just and the rebels be considered as heretics:

In the name of God who is kind and merciful

A number of Shinwaris of Nazian having rebelled against His Ghazi Majesty, the Ulul Aman, our Ruler, have started killing human beings and plundering wealth of the Muslims. The peace of a portion of the Afghanic Islamic realm has been disturbed. We, the Ulema, give a Fetwa to the following effect in pursuance of the Koranic verse "Obey God, obey the

Prophet and the Ulul Amar who is from among you" [i.e. submission to the Ruler is binding]. It is also in accordance with the saying of the Holy Prophet who has said that "He who obeys me obeys God and he who disobeys me disobeys God. He who obeys his Amir obeys me and he who disobeys his Amir disobeys me. Verily, the Imam or the Amir is a shield which is used for protection in fighting. If an Amir through fear of God and observing justice gives orders, he will surely be rewarded. If he orders contrary to this the burden of this will fall on his shoulders".

We give this Fatwa that these mischievous Shinwaris are considered sinners and rebels. It is, therefore, obligatory upon all Muslims to take action under the directions of the Government for suppressing this disturbance and admonishing these rebels, so that perfect peace is reestablished.⁶⁸

While King Amanullah at the Loya Jirga in 1924 had managed to force the *‘ulamā* to some discussion on the basis of his 'modernist' Islamic notions, such discourse had not as yet gained any wider representation in society at large, and much less had his secularist notions of citizens and Western-style nation-state, which by the time of the Loya Jirga in 1928 was his predominant theme.

All this was given up by now and, with the above *fatwā*, King Amanullah was picking up the ideological weapon of *Amīr* Abdur Rahman, i.e. the classic Islamic 'model of power' according to which obedience to the (absolute) ruler equals obedience to God and vice versa. Although thus having abandoned his modernist and secular concepts, the *fatwā* in support of the King was not signed by *‘ulamā* of any particular note, and it failed to produce any tangible result. The 'theological battle' was lost, and the King was ready to give concessions to his opponents. By January 7, Amanullah released the brother of the *Hazrat* of Shor Bazaar from prison in order to calm the religious propaganda and for him to make contact with the Tagab Mullah, who had refused a summons to Kabul and thus was suspected of supporting Bacha Saqqao (Stewart 1973: 442). By January 8, the King rescinded most of the actual and proposed reforms but to no avail and finally he renounced the throne in favour of *Sardār* Inayatullah – who, however, abdicated within three days. Amanullah now attempted to cancel his renunciation and to continue the fight but his former authority had already been undermined. 'By dropping the reforms, he had cooled down the zeal of his staunch supporters, while on the other hand his retreat appeared to confirm the justness of the insurgents' cause and thereby strengthened their position' (Chokaiev 1930: 325-326).

By January 23, a Proclamation of the ‘*Ulamā*’ of the Northern Provinces finally denounced Amanullah as violating the Shari‘a and declared their loyalty to ‘*Amīr* Habibullah II’ (the Koh-i Daman rebel, Bacha Saqqao): ‘the Servant of the People, the Defender of the pure Faith of the Prophet...on the condition that he conducts the affairs of State in accordance with the Divine Will and laws of the Shariat’ (Chokaiev 1930). The most prominent religious leader of the North was Arab Dah Mullah Adina Mohammad of Mazar-i Sharif. In May he issued a *fatwā* for *jihād* against a Soviet force of a couple of thousand men led by Ghulam Nabi Charkhi, the Afghan ambassador to Moscow, that claimed to fight for the reinstatement of Amanullah (Khalili 1984, Poullada 1973: 184-185, Ali Ahmad 1930: Ch. 9). Ex-King Amanullah, however, disowned this ‘support’, reportedly under the influence of Mahmud Tarzi, who wrote him a couplet:⁶⁹

Indeed it amounts to the punishment of Hell
to go to Paradise with the assistance of the neighbour.

While the ‘theological battle’ in the form of *fatwās* and ‘counter’-*fatwās* did have some connection to both factual events as well as to the Shari‘a, the general propaganda campaign of public gossip and rumours spread by both parties was far removed from both and consisted of a hotch-potch of religious, tribal and ethnic idioms. The propaganda against Amanullah ranged from distorted versions of the reform policy (cf. the Shinwari Manifesto) to outrageous attacks on his so-called ‘irreligious behaviour’ (such as having embraced Christianity, gone mad by drinking alcohol in Europe, etc.), and his ‘immoral ways’.⁷⁰ It all centred around tribal/religious notions of the integrity of the family and its women and the unconditional demand for the defence of *ghayrat*, *nang wa namus*.

Regarding the anti-Amanullah campaign as a whole, on the one hand it was hard to imagine that anybody would believe it all to be true. On the other hand, as the propaganda developed, it had very little to do with Islam proper, although appeals were made to religion through the continued use of the concepts of *jihād*, *kāfir*, etc. However, in the words of Akbar S. Ahmed (1982: 198), ‘correcting the misuse or misunderstanding of Islam by Muslim tribesmen is a task for the orthodox ‘ulema. We are, as anthropologists, concerned with how society perceives religion, not how religion sees itself’. A number of studies dealing with the Amanullah period, such as those by Poullada (1973) and Stewart (1973), strive to show him as a good Muslim and not anti-Islamic, hinting at his opponents’ misuse of the faith. While

this might serve to rehabilitate King Amanullah's memory, it does not in fact increase our insight into the role of religion and religious concepts in Afghanistan, i.e. the perception of religion in society.

King Amanullah, being unable to turn the tide through either 'modernist' or orthodox Islamic discourse, had to turn to a more popular level of both the military and ideological struggle. The regular army having proved unable to stem the tide of rebellion, he had to rely on tribal levies and retreat to his own tribal bastion of Kandahar. Having reached Kandahar, he tried to persuade his reluctant kinsmen into active support through an emotional speech in which he referred to the mullahs supporting Bacha Saqqao, and the Shinwaris, as being in the service of '*kāfirs*', as 'satanic persons in the guise of priests having disseminated falsehoods amongst the masses' (Ahmad 1930:29).⁷¹ Amanullah thereby not only rejected their status as religious leaders but also nullified their accusations that he was *kāfir*; whereas there is hope for the *kāfir* (he can convert to Islam or be a repentant sinner), there is no hope for the *shaitān* since his defiance of God is unpardonable (Ahmed 1982: 197). The idiom is generally understood and thus an effective counter-attack, provided the audience accepts it as valid.

Amanullah also used other means; he outlined how he had given in to Shinwari demands but in spite of that they had continued the rebellion. Therefore the rebellion must be regarded as simple treason which, as generally known, was equal to heresy. Similarly, he told how he had accepted an oath of allegiance on the Holy Qur^{ān} from both Bacha Saqqao and the Khugianis and supplied them with weapons to go and fight the Shinwaris. However, both parties, on receiving the weapons, turned against the King. 'These people are utilizing the Qur^{ān} merely as an instrument for easy deception and I feel certain that the Holy Scripture will avenge itself on them' (Ahmad 1930:29). Breaking an oath on the Qur^{ān} was not only an issue for religious condemnation but had an equal appeal within the Pashtun code of honour in which a man is as good as his word. Speeches like this still did not produce the necessary support of the Durraniis. While there was nothing wrong with the use of idioms, prosaic minds in the audience might have paid more attention to the fact that Amanullah apparently was suffering from an acute inability to make sound judgements since he had supplied his worst adversaries with weapons. Who wants to ally himself with a fool, even if he is in the right? – because, as the saying of the Prophet goes: 'Trust in God, but tie your camel'.

A more forceful performance was given after the speech which Amanullah delivered at the *Da Khirqa Sharif Ziyarat* (The Shrine of the Holy Cloak) in Kandahar, one of the holiest shrines in the country.⁷² 'For two hundred years this genuine and thrice-holy relic of the Prophet had lain locked in a brass-bound chest. No infidel, no wavering and uncertain follower of the Prophet, could unlock the chest'. After his speech, Amanullah dramatically opened the casket containing the sacred cloak and lifted it above his head, demanding from his audience whether Allah would permit a heretic or apostate to perform this sacred act. The emotional effect was achieved and tribesmen rallied to pledge their support (MacMunn 1929/1977: 336, Poullada 1973: 181).

In spite of kinship obligations and miraculous deeds, the Kandaharis were still failing to give King Amanullah their wholehearted support – the *ulamā* had as yet not issued a *fatwā* in support of Amanullah. The War Minister, Abdul Aziz, turned out to be the man to solve this problem. He commenced to placate the mullahs, held daily consultations with them, presented them with gifts and sanctioned annual salaries for them. Certain individuals disguised as 'travellers from Kabul' were produced before the mullahs and swore on the Holy Qur'ān that they had fled from Kabul owing to the atrocities committed by Bacha Saqqao. They testified to Bacha Saqqao drinking wine. They swore that he forced his way into the public baths reserved for women; that he entertained himself by obtaining women and girls to dance before him. The mullahs, horrified, issued *fatwās* announcing that any man fighting against Bacha Saqqao was a *ghāzī* and that any man killed fighting such would gain the death of a martyr (*shahīd*). As soon as these *fatwās* were published, the Kandaharis commenced to collect men for the support of the King (Ahmad 1930: 44).

Having gained the support of the Kandaharis, Amanullah also received a most welcome reinforcement when Hazara contingents joined him. The loyalist forces then headed for Ghazni on the first stage of their plan to recapture Kabul from Bacha Saqqao. However, tribal politics are fickle: an old enmity existed between the Hazaras and the Pashtuns of the Ghazni district and, as soon as the news of the Hazara participation had spread, the leaders who were antagonistic to Amanullah, such as *Ākhundzada* Sarboland and the Mullah of Khado Khel, started a vigorous campaign. They toured amongst the Andar, Tarak and Suleiman Khel tribesmen, spreading propaganda along the lines that, if Amanullah had not in truth been a *kāfir*, he would not have called in the Hazaras, their traditional enemies, whose presence meant one thing only – the destruction of the Afghans

(i.e. Pashtuns) by non-Afghan tribes. This propaganda had an immediate effect. Where previously only twenty per cent of the tribesmen had been hostile to Amanullah, now there was a solid block against him (Ahmad 1930: 57).

The popular campaign from both sides illustrates the vital role of Islamic symbolism in Afghan society, providing the overall framework of the ideological debate, no matter whether the specific use and the underlying premises enjoy any actual theological support. As the last example suggests, and there are numerous other examples in Afghan history, ethnic conflict also found its formulation within the religious realm. The internalization of the tribal/ethnic identity in Islam was axiomatic in society;⁷³ the outcome in the form of beliefs, assumptions and actions might in many cases not be strictly tenable theologically, but for the actors this was not recognised.

The Mullahs and the Rebellion

Granted the importance of Islamic symbolism in society, the question which invariably arises is, to what degree the mullahs – the key holders of this symbolism so to speak – controlled the ideological battlefield. In his autobiography, *Amir* Abdur Rahman regretted the power of the mullahs and many contemporary observers have testified that the Afghan population was held in a stranglehold by their powerful mullahs. Both the experiences of *Amir* Abdur Rahman and of King Amanullah suggest that the influence of the mullahs was considerable. But as an Afghan proverb goes: 'When the knife is over your head, you remember God'. This expresses the (perhaps universal) truth that in times of crisis, when fundamental existence – either physically, socially, morally or ethically – is challenged, man turns to religion for consolation and for answers. In Afghan society it is certainly true that, in times of social conflict and crisis, religious symbolism is particularly evoked since that is the time when social and moral commitments stand their test. Whether this also indicates that the mullahs and religious leaders 'naturally' control the ideological battlefield and the direction of the struggle is another question. We will therefore take a closer look at the position of the most prominent religious leaders in the conflict.

It has already been pointed out that influential *pirs* of eastern Afghanistan, although initially favouring *Sardār* Nasrullah, displayed considerable loyalty to King Amanullah throughout his reign. Religious leaders like the *Hājjī Šāhib* of Turangzai (albeit a British Indian subject) and the Chaknaur Mullah on several occasions actively

encouraged the support of the King among the tribes and assisted in calming down unrest. And even as late as December 1928, it is reported that a *jirga* was held at the house of the *Naqīb (Effendi) Sāhib* at Chaharbagh,⁷⁴ where a Ghulam Sadiq and the successor of the Hadda-i *Sāhib*, *Mīr Sayyid Jan Bādshāh* of Islampur, representing the government, tried to reach a compromise with the rebels but apparently to no avail.⁷⁵ The Chaknaur Mullah, who so far had restrained the Mohmands from joining the uprising, together with *Mīr Sayyid Jan Bādshāh* finally broke with King Amanullah in January 1929, issuing a *fatwā* to the effect that the King was a heretic, thereby giving religious sanction to his overthrow.⁷⁶

Against this background it appears that, although these prominent religious leaders may not have favoured King Amanullah's reforms, they by no means launched the agitation against him. On the contrary, first they continued to support him and then to mediate in the conflict, until such time as continued loyalty would have discredited them completely in the population. The fact that the loyalty of Mullah Hamidullah of Tagab seems to have wavered earlier (his son actively supported Bacha Saqqao) is no doubt due to the fact that the Bacha Saqqao rebellion originated in the Mullah's home area, and he could not have gone against all the local population by maintaining support for the King.

As far as other religious leaders are concerned, the sources available from that time do not mention anything about the position of the Shi'a religious leaders, among whom the Kayan family in Doshi, the *Pīr* of the Ismailis, was very influential. However, as judged from the Hazara's participation in support of Amanullah, the religious leaders were in favour of him. The British sources also tell that 'the ulema of Kerbala and Najaf had decided to send messengers to the Hazaras of Afghanistan, directing them to support Amanullah'. And the British concluded that this step was taken out of hostility to the British whom the *'ulamā* believed to have engineered the rebellion against Amanullah.⁷⁷ However, it is quite natural that the King should enjoy support from this quarter since his reforms had aimed at doing away with ethnic as well as religious discrimination.

Across the border, the support of Amanullah did not seem to waver either and British reports tell of pro-Amanullah propaganda supported by *fatwās* declaring him not to be a *kāfir*. Afghans in Peshawar were in touch with the Khilafatists, publishing a book entitled "Shari'ats order regarding Amanullah" proving him a true Muslim and Bacha Saqqao a rebel to be beheaded. Thus Amanullah's popularity as pan-Islamic leader lasted much longer outside the borders of Afghanistan

and he is still regarded as a heroic figure among broad sections of the Frontier tribes today.

Quite a different picture emerges when considering the role of (probably in that time) the most influential religious family in Afghanistan – that of the *Ḥaẓrat Šāhib* of Shor Bazaar, the Mujaddidis. As mentioned above, Fazl Omar, *Nur al-Mashayikh*, assumed the title of *Ḥaẓrat Šāhib* of Shor Bazaar upon the death of his brother Fazl Mohammad, *Shams al-Mashayikh*, in 1923. Unlike his brother, the new *Ḥaẓrat Šāhib* opposed King Amanullah from the beginning and went into a self-imposed exile in British India in protest against the King's reform policy. While in exile, his brother, Mohammad Sadiq, was acting *Ḥaẓrat Šāhib*.

Immediately after the Loya Jirga in 1928, the Mujaddidi family headed the opposition to the new waves of reforms that were announced, and Mohammad Sadiq and his nephew Fazl Rahim were arrested. It is an indication of either King Amanullah's continued respect for, or fear of, the family's influence, that the two Mujaddidis were only arrested while *Qāzi* Abdur Rahman, who had joined forces with them, was executed. In January 1929, to cool down the religious agitation against him, King Amanullah released Mohammad Sadiq and Fazl Rahim, hoping to use them as intermediaries in negotiations with Bacha Saqqao. However, as events moved fast and Bacha Saqqao took Kabul, Mohammad Sadiq came instead to act as an intermediary between Bacha Saqqao and the British Legation in Kabul with the object of getting Bacha Saqqao to accept the RAF airlifting of *Sardār* (by then King) Inayatullah and his family out of Kabul (Ahmad 1930: 29).

Meanwhile, in his Indian exile, Fazl Omar was agitating against King Amanullah among the tribes. The British thus reported that Fazl Omar had already been plotting a coup in 1928 while Amanullah was on his European tour. The *Ḥaẓrat Šāhib* wanted a purely religious uprising which should not be jeopardized by any attempts on the throne, for example by sons of the late *Sardār* Ayub. Apparently the *maliks* of the Dera Ismail Khan District all met the *Ḥaẓrat Šāhib* in secret conferences and promised to lend him their support.⁷⁸ In 1928 the British expelled the *Ḥaẓrat Šāhib* from the North West Frontier Province under the Foreign Security Regulations on account of his agitation against the Afghan king. In the month of September when the troubles started to brew, King Amanullah invited the *Ḥaẓrat Šāhib* to return to Afghanistan but he declined. After the abdication of King Amanullah, Fazl Omar demanded at the end of March 1929 that the British grant him the right to participate in his country's internal struggle in

accordance with the self-imposed status of neutrality adopted by the Government of India. He was then permitted to enter tribal territory and began anti-Amanullah agitation among the Suleiman Khel Ghilzais, his traditional followers.

With Bacha Saqqao on the throne in Kabul, Fazl Omar at first toed the line but later also condemned the Bacha as an infidel (Stewart 1973: 571).⁷⁹ The next contender for the throne was General Nadir *Khān* of the Musahiban family, who had also been in voluntary exile during the last years of King Amanullah's reign but now took up the challenge from the Tajik rebel and aimed to reinstate the Mohammadzais on the throne of Kabul.

Initially, it seems that Fazl Omar's attitude towards Nadir *Khān* was neutral and allegedly he nourished ambitions for the throne himself.⁸⁰ By June 1929, the *Hazrat Sāhib* assembled a *jirga* of southern and eastern tribes and threw in his support for Nadir *Khān*, who initially had faced considerable difficulties in mobilizing an army against Bacha Saqqao (Gregorian 1969: 285). The combination of Nadir *Khān*'s tribal support and popularity as the war hero of 1919 plus the *Hazrat Sāhib*'s religious authority finally secured the victory. Nadir *Khān* was crowned King and Fazl Omar became Minister of Justice, with Fazl Ahmad Mujaddidi as Deputy Minister of Justice.

As hereditary *pīrs*, the family had several centres in the country – apart from the main centre in Kabul, another branch of the family was located in Herat, holding the title of *Hazrat Sāhib* of Jaghartan, and the *Hazrat Sāhibs* of Chaharbagh and Butkhāk were also of Mujaddidi descent. While the latter two were *khalīfas* of the late Hadda-i *Sāhib* (thus belonging to the Qadiriyya order) and closely involved with the eastern Afghan Sufi network centred around Hadda, the Herat and Kabul branches of the Mujaddidis, practising the Naqshbandiyya *tariqat*, seem to have maintained close connections. In the agitation against King Amanullah, it is thus the Herat and Kabul branches of the family who worked together, while no reference has been found to cooperation from the *Hazrat Sāhibs* of Chaharbagh and Butkhāk.

Being hereditary *pīrs* of prominence (i.e. descendants of *Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi*), the Mujaddidis enjoyed immense respect. However, it appears that the Kabul section's engagement in political affairs started in the beginning of this century with the sons of *Hazrat Sāhib Qayyum Jan Agha*,⁸¹ since no mention of the family in relation to the political affairs of the country can be found prior to this time. One may assume that until then the *Hazrats* had devoted themselves exclusively to the spiritual aspects of *pīrhood*, as was also the case with the al-Jilanis, the *Naqīb Sāhib* of Baghdad.

There can be no doubt that the Mujaddidi family was in the forefront of the religious agitation against King Amanullah, as is reflected in the fact that Mohammad Sadiq and his nephew collected four hundred signatures of mullahs for a petition to the King in September 1928. To what extent the family *controlled* the agitation against Amanullah is another question. It appears that Fazl Omar did not want King Amanullah overthrown at *any* cost but was biding his time for the right circumstances (as British intelligence reports indicate) for a purely religious uprising. Far from controlling the agitation, the *Ḥazrat Sāhib* sanctioned the view that the King and his policies were un-Islamic and beyond that popular imagination had free reign with all its far-fetched hotch-potch of tribal and religious idioms. The *Ḥazrat Sāhib* and his family, in view of their spiritual position, must have kept above this, while many an unknown village mullah no doubt enjoyed a field-day. However, invoking religious idioms is not a prerogative of the religious classes – even King Amanullah's War Minister, Abdul Aziz, proved skilful at that – since these were constituents of the whole conceptualization of life and therefore were integrated elements of any meaningful discourse.

The political role of *Nur al-Mashayikh*, however, appears to be significantly different from that of other religious leaders at the time. He was careful not to align himself with any particular movement but bided his time in British India until a situation arose by which he could enter the stage and channel the development in the desired direction. He was thus neutral vis-à-vis Bacha Saqqao, and did not join General Nadir *Khān* until he was sure that he was the most likely candidate to the throne in Kabul. Whether the British suspicion that the *Ḥazrat Sāhib* nurtured ambitions for the throne himself were true or not, we shall never know for sure. However, his ambition for actual political *power* seems far greater than any of the religious leaders we have seen so far – they all confined themselves merely to *influence* politics on the basis of their spiritual reputation. In comparison, Fazl Omar (and many of his relatives afterwards) placed himself squarely at the centre of politics by accepting the position of Minister of Justice. This is interesting in view of the fact that so far we have not seen a single *pīr* in any bureaucratic position – these had been occupied exclusively by religious scholars. Certainly Fazl Omar was a scholar of repute apart from being a *pīr* but he used the *pīr*hood to acquire political *power* and not just influence.

The above must be said to be a logical consequence of the policies of *Amīr* Abdur Rahman, continued by King Amanullah, of subjugating religion to the state. Where other traditional religious leaders tried to

defend the autonomy of the religious realm, Fazl Omar was the first to realize that the battle was no longer between 'church' and state, but concerned the control of the state, and that was what he opted for. In this sense, he was the first 'modern' religious leader in Afghanistan.

Conclusion

Raskolnikov, the Soviet envoy to Afghanistan, commented upon the fall of King Amanullah that 'the tragedy of Amanullah's case lay in the fact that he undertook bourgeois reforms without the existence of any national bourgeoisie in the country' (quoted from Gregorian 1969: 269). Chokaiev (1930: 330) stated that Amanullah, in copying Mustafa Kemal, forgot that for centuries Turkey had been subjected to Europeanization, did not have tribes of any strength comparable to Afghanistan, had a well-ordered and centralized apparatus of power and had a strong and loyal army. Both observations are no doubt correct.

Considering the ideological dimensions of this period, the whole discourse in *Siraj al-Akhbar*, as well as the ideological content of the reform policy aiming at the creation of a modern nation-state, can be viewed as a grandiose attempt to breakthrough with a new ideological paradigm in Afghan society, and to create the accompanying institutions (educational, legal, etc.) for establishing its hegemony. However, in the subsequent civil war it appeared that King Amanullah and his co-modernizers did not even manage to change the terms of the debate, but eventually themselves had to start fighting with *fatwās* and counter-*fatwās*.

With the overthrow of King Amanullah, the struggle for ideological hegemony was over. The King and his small group of basically urban intellectuals and educated bureaucrats had failed in their endeavour – their new concepts of nation and citizen and their modernist interpretation of Islam made little or no sense to the Afghans, living in a society where the socio-economic and political structures, communication and education all maintained the existing parochial identities. In addition, the concept of the state did not, for the population, denote national identity or loyalty either. Fröhlich (1970) sums up the population's conception of the state in the following words: 'forced settlement, forced labour, military service, taxation and bureaucratic haphazardness'. It would take several generations to change this negative image of the central power. In the long run, Amanullah's ability to substitute coercion for conviction was smaller

than the Kemalist regime's and he was ousted as a result of the power struggle with the traditional power groups of the country.

By possessing the seat of power in the person of King Amanullah, the practical policies of the Young Afghans had been carried out but the ensuing civil war had demonstrated the necessity of ideological hegemony if the legitimacy of power was to be maintained.

It was, however, not only a matter of the traditional groups of religious and tribal leaders managing to retain their influence and turn back the secularist tide. It was significant, that the religious leaders by no means constituted a homogenous bloc, hostile to all the reform policies of King Amanullah. As demonstrated above, the eastern Afghan *pīrs* remained loyal to the King almost to the end, motivated not by his reform policy but by his pan-Islamic and anti-imperialist attitude. The battle was thus *not* a simple question of being for or against secularism. This can also be seen from the stand taken by King Amanullah's religious adversaries, primarily the *Ḥaẓrat Sāhib* of Shor Bazaar, for whom the battle centered around securing the *‘ulamā's* control over the state. Yet another dimension of the ideological battle was also the failure of the lay *rawshanfikrān*, personified in Mahmud Tarzi, to challenge the *ruhānī* monopoly on Islamic interpretations. This had far-reaching consequences, as nobody during the next forty years attempted to challenge this monopoly and all subsequent attempts at 'modernization', democratization, liberalization, etc. have been influenced by plain secularist ideas while making concessions to Islam which was permanently established as a conservative force.⁸²

Notes

- 1 See for example Poullada (1973, ch. 2) and Stewart (1973). It is interesting to note that, although King Amanullah ultimately lost the throne and fled Afghanistan, a somewhat affectionate view of the King's personality has been transmitted to later generations of Afghans: the ex-King may be criticized for his youthful rashness and lack of religiosity but his patriotism and personal qualities are normally not doubted. (General impression from Afghanistan during the 1970s and confirmed through interviews with Afghan Islamist parties in Peshawar, Nov. 1986).
- 2 *Dastārbandī*, the ceremony of 'tying the turban' whereby for example the ruler honoured prominent subjects. In the present context, the *dastārbandī* was performed by a religious person to symbolize the religious sanction of the ruler, i.e. a logical consequence of the 'Islamic model' for the legitimacy of power.
- 3 All the sources from this period refer to the '*Naqīb Sāhib* of Baghdad' – and sometimes to the '*Naqīb Sāhib* of Chaharbagh'. However, both references

are wrong, as the person in question was *pir Sayyid Hassan Effendi*, brother of the *Naqib Sāhib* of Baghdad, who had been settled in Chaharbagh in eastern Afghanistan since 1904. During the reign of *Amir Habibullah* he was generally referred to as the *Effendi Sāhib* but gradually, as the representative of the *Naqib Sāhib* in Afghanistan, he seems to have been referred to by that title himself.

- 4 For.& Pol. Dept. Sec. Frontier, Prosc. June 1919, Nos. 1-158 (Kabul Diary, 28.02.1919). See also Gregorian 1969: 227. According to Ali Ahmad, a Mohmand from Ghazni, who was Personal Secretary to Amanullah, the King initially enjoyed the support of such influential people as the 'Hazrat of Shor Bazaar, Shah Sahib of Kala Qazi and other important mullahs, as well as tribal leaders like *Mir Zaman* of Kunar, *Abdul Ghaffar*, *Andar Ghilzai*, *Beys of Turkestan*, *Mirs of Hazarajat* and men of influence and importance amongst the *Durrani* and *Ghilzai*' (Ahmad: 'The Fall of Amanullah', manuscript in the Archives of the India Office Library, London (L/P&S/10/1285)).
- 5 L/P&S/10/203, 1916-19, Kabul Diary, 28.02.1919.
- 6 The British reports at the time hinted at a major conspiracy engineered by the *Musahiban* family, aimed at replacing not only *Amir Habibullah*, but the whole ruling lineage.
- 7 For.& Pol.Dept. 1919, Sec. Frontier, Prosc. Nos. 1-235, July 1919.
- 8 L/P&S/10/633. See a presentation hereof in Olesen 1991.
- 9 It was one of the associates of Mahmud al-Hassan, the scholar *Abu'l Kalam Azad* (1888-1958) who formulated the religious-philosophical basis of the *Khilafat* movement. No nation or community lives, Azad stated, without a political centre, and the only possible political centre for Islam in the twentieth century was the *Ottoman Caliphate*, the last important Muslim power able to protect the religion of God. For further information on the theological background of the *Khilafat* movement, see *Hardy* (1971). For a full account of the *Khilafat* movement, see *Minault* (1982).
- 10 For further details, see *Baha* (1979).
- 11 For.& Pol.Dept. Sec. F, Nov. 1920, Nos. 1-582.
- 12 For.& Pol.Dept., Sec. F, Nov. 1920, Nos. 1-582 – report from the British Consul-General in Mashhad.
- 13 For a full study of *Siraj al-Akhbar*, see *Schinasi* (1979).
- 14 In these thoughts, Tarzi was also fully in line with the foremost Muslim 'modernizer' of the Subcontinent, *Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan* – see for example *Ahmad* (1967), *Muhammad* (1981) and *Graham* (1885/1974).
- 15 *Siraj al-Akhbar*, vol. II, No. 15, pp.14-15, and V, No. 17, pp.10-11 (from Gregorian 1967:354).
- 16 *Siraj al-Akhbar*, vol. I, No. 12, pp. 1-2, and III, No. 8, p. 5, No. 17, p. 4 (from Gregorian 1967: 354)
- 17 *Siraj al-Akhbar*, vol. I, No. 7, pp. 6-7, and vol. IV, No. 20, p. 6.
- 18 *Siraj al-Akhbar*, vol. III, No. 16, p. 13, No. 22, p. 1 – also vol. II, No. 8, p. 12, No. 21, p. 2 (from Gregorian 1967: 361).
- 19 Tarzi's evaluation of the Afghan religious leaders and mullahs was very negative indeed, when he described what they ought to be and what they in fact were. It was under the mullahs' influence that the very words 'education' and 'schools' had become void of meaning and were stigmatized as 'blameworthy innovation' (*bid'a*) and 'imitation' (*taqlid*) opposed to

- religion and nation (*Siraj al-Akhbar*, vol. VI, 6, pp. 6-11, from Schinasi 1979:212).
- 20 Jamalud-Din al-Afghani and Sir *Sayyid* Ahmad Khan were contemporaries and al-Afghani spent a lot of energy on refuting the ideas of Sir *Sayyid*. However, it is clear that their conflict was of a political nature, i.e. their attitude towards the British and their respective treatment of *jihād*, and not rooted in any deeper disagreements on Islam, the necessity of modernization nor of their ambition to rehabilitate the Muslims in the modern world (Schleifer 1984:38-39).
 - 21 For a list of the ordinances and laws of King Amanullah (*Nizāmnāma, Qaumnāma, Taleemat*), see Poullada (1973) and M.A. Khan (1978).
 - 22 This was a policy which had also been continued under *Amīr* Abdur Rahman, who for example had consolidated the privileged position of the royal lineage and granted tax exemptions to tribes which supported him in the various uprisings.
 - 23 King Amanullah did not, however, change the traditional framework overnight. In matters of taxation and conscription, local communities were still regarded on a collective basis and the connecting link to the state administration became the locally-elected *maliks*, who thereby consolidated their position as 'middlemen' between the state and the population at large (see Grevemeyer 1987).
 - 24 *Roydād-e Loya Jirga-e darussaltana-e Kabul*, 1924: 150, from Kamali 1985: 29-30.
 - 25 See also article in *Anis*, quoted in Grevemeyer 1987.
 - 26 D.E. Smith (1974:Pt I) – applied to Turkey by Toprak (1981).
 - 27 Comparing these developments to Turkey, efforts to develop a secular educational system had already started there during the Tanzimat period (1839-1877) and the educational policy in fact showed the same duality as in King Amanullah's Afghanistan, with secular educational institutions existing side by side with the religious. With the educational bill in 1924, all schools were put under the Ministry of Education with the intention of unifying the educational system. Within a decade after the establishment of the Republic, there remained no religious educational institutions which received state support. This complete *polity separation* was reversed after 1946 with the reopening of religious educational institutions, so the end result so far has been one of *polity dominance* (Toprak 1981:48-58).
 - 28 See Gregorian (1969) for details on Habibullah's system of courts, and Kamali (1985) for a general discussion of Constitutions, Matrimonial Law and the Judiciary in Afghanistan.
 - 29 This turned out to be a dangerous position. One of King Amanullah's loyal supporters in the Committee of 'Ulamā, *Mawlawī* Abdul Wasay Kandahari, was later to be executed by Bacha Saqqao.
 - 30 See also Coulson and Hinchcliffe (1978) and White (1978).
 - 31 It should be noted here that although the Kemalist regime, unlike Amanullah, succeeded in complete legal secularization, this by no means implies that these reforms were socially acceptable to the majority of the Turkish population. The reforms within Family Law for example, which everywhere turn out to be the most difficult to change in Muslim society, had in practice only a very limited effect on changing the status of Turkish women (see Toprak 1981:52-56).
 - 32 See for example L/P&S/10/1286, File 53, Pt. 6, 1929, Ali Ahmad (1930: Ch. 5), Stewart (1973).

- 33 See for example article in *Anis*, 1 September 1930 (R/12/43) and Stewart (1973).
- 34 L/P&S/10/1085, Diary No. 9 of March 6 1923.
- 35 L/P&S/10/1085.
- 36 This view was confirmed by Mr. Gulab Ningarhari (personal communication, Peshawar, Nov. 1986), who at that time worked closely together with the grandson of *Shams al-Mashayikh*, Prof. Sebghatullah Mujaddidi. Mr. Ningarhari, however, stressed that *Shams al-Mashayikh* was against the *Nizāmnāma*, that his comment to a draft of the Constitution had been that 'as long as there remains a beard in Afghanistan you (i.e. the King) cannot introduce this Constitution'.
- 37 L/P&S/10/1085, 1922-24, Kabul Diary, 30.05.1924.
- 38 Willi Steul (1981:241). See also other studies on *Pashtunwāli* (Sigrist 1980, Janata & Hassas 1975).
- 39 In a controversial manner, Neale (1981) introduces new angles to recent Afghan history in the light of the puritanical Islam, defensive sexism and 'the poor man eating shame'.
- 40 Ghobar 1968: 464-65, translated by A. Ohadi.
- 41 The Young Afghans' ideological discourse centered around the concepts of *millat* and *watan* is here seen as a challenge of Islamic values, thus disregarding Tarzi's attempt to prove love of the Fatherland as a fundamental religious duty.
- 42 Afghan proverb.
- 43 The following discussion is mainly based on Kamali (1985) and the *Roydad-i Loya Jirga-i Darussaltana-i Kabul*, Kabul 1303/1924. See also Grevemeyer's discussion (1987) based on the *Roydad-i...*
- 44 *Roydad...* 1924: 50, quoted from Kamali 1985: 136-137.
- 45 L/P&S/10/0020, Despatch No. 24.
- 46 L/P&S/10/1085, Kabul Diary No. 16.
- 47 L/P/&S/10/1085, Despatch No. 85.
- 48 By Qadianis are meant people adhering to the Ahmadiyya sect. The sect was founded in Qadian, Punjab, India, in 1889 by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1839-1908) who claimed to be the *mahdi*. While the sect deviates from orthodoxy on several points, the recognition of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as prophet (*nabi*) is considered one of the greatest offences to orthodox Islam, according to which the Prophet Mohammad was the 'seal of Prophets' and thus not to be followed by any other prophets. The Ahmadiyyas/Qadianis are thus considered heretics.
- 49 L/P&S/10/1085, Despatch No. 88.
- 50 L/P&S/10/1120, Despatch No. 107.
- 51 L/P/S&10/1120, Despatch No. 36.
- 52 L/P&S/10/1207, Despatch No. 8.
- 53 L/P&S/10/1207, Despatch No. 8, January 1927.
- 54 L/P&S/10/1207, Despatch No. 14, February 1928.
- 55 This view of the rather isolated stand of Mullah Abdullah and the Khost rebels is also confirmed by Mr. Gulab Ningarhari (personal communication, Peshawar, November 1986).

- 56 L/P&S/10/1207, Despatch No. 83, September 1928. Both the giving of *khairāt* upon the safe return from a journey (or recovery from illness, or at the birth of a child, etc.) as well as the *pīrs* receiving donations around in the villages from devotees was customary.
- 57 Concerning the plans for the education of mullahs, the British military attache reported the following (L/P&S/10/1207, Despatch No. 84): "In the future Mullahs who act as teachers or preachers will have to present themselves for examination and obtain a certificate showing that they have sufficient knowledge to allow them to undertake these duties". While *Amīr* Abdur Rahman had used Examination Committees and the conditional granting of *wazīfas* as a means to control the religious leaders, King Amanullah now by one stroke had defined their whole profession as falling under the jurisdiction of the state, i.e. they were no longer to be pressurized with indirect state control but were henceforth subjected to clear-cut and direct state control as any other civil servant.
- 58 For. Pol. Dept. No. 51-F, 1928.
- 59 L/P&S/10/1207, No. 86, and Poullada 1973: 126.
- 60 L/P&S/10/1207, Despatch No. 98. An account of the events is also given in *A Brief Biography of the Martyr Mawlānā Abdur Rahman* by *Al-Shaykh* Mohammad Sadiq Al-Mujaddidi, written in 1929 and republished in 1983 by his great grandson *Sayyid* Fazl Rahman Fazli.
- 61 For an elaborate account of *Nur al-Mashayikh's* anti-Amanullah activities in British India, see Stewart (1973).
- 62 L/P&S/10/1207, Despatch No. 111.
- 63 A view still held by many Afghans and supported by Soviet sources. The visit of the famous Colonel Lawrence to the border area at that time is pointed out (see for example Korgun 1981). Stewart (1973) and Dupree (1973:458) leave the question open.
- 64 E.J. Hobsbawm: *Bandits*. Harmondsworth, 1972.
- 65 'Southern', 'northern' and 'eastern' may refer to the provinces of these names rather than geographically to 'south', 'north' and 'east' – thus, in this translation it is not clear whether 'northern' refers to Turkestan or to Shamali north of Kabul.
- 66 L/P&S/10/1288, File 53/1929.
- 67 L/P&S/10/1207, Despatch No. 6, 14 January 1929.
- 68 L/P&S/10/1288, Serial No. 350, 26. November 1928.
- 69 Khalili 1984. *Ustād* Khalilullah Khalili, who himself was a prominent supporter of Bacha Saqqao, describes the *jihād* mobilization in the north against this Soviet force and states that, although the Russians were not in favour of Nadir *Khān* either, they considered *Amīr* Habibullah II', alias Bacha Saqqao, as their main enemy since he had pledged to reinstall the former *Amīr* of Bokhara, *Amīr* Alam *Khān*.
- 70 See Ali Ahmad (1932), Poullada, (1973), Stewart (1973), Wild (1932), etc.
- 71 This invocation of Satan (*Shaitān*) is quite common in popular-level religious agitation in Muslim societies – see for example Ahmed (1982) concerning the Mullah Wazir, the 'Great Satan'-complex of the Khomeini regime in Iran, as well as the PDPa regime in Afghanistan in 1978-79 referring to its religious opponents as '*Ikhwan al-Shaiatin*' (i.e. the Satanic Brotherhood).
- 72 Dupree (1973: 339) informs that the shrine was constructed by Ahmad *Shāh* Durrani when he had been presented with the *khirqā* (cloak supposedly worn by the Prophet) by *Amīr* Murad Beg of Bokhara.

- 73 This point has mainly been elaborated in relationship to the Pashtuns (Ahmed 1980, 1982). However, it must be assumed that the internalization of ethnic and religious identity would be equally strong among the Hazaras, who have a long experience of being persecuted on ethnic as well as religious grounds (being a Shi'a minority).
- 74 British sources do not always distinguish between the *Naqib Sāhib* of Chaharbagh and the *Hazrat Sāhib* of Chaharbagh (a Mujaddidi and follower of the late Hadda-i *Sāhib*) – it seems most likely that this *jirga* was held at the house of the *Hazrat Sāhib*.
- 75 L/P&S/10/1207.
- 76 L/P&S/10/1288.
- 77 L/P&S/10/1287, File 53/1929, Part 4.
- 78 For. Pol. Dept. File No. 51-F, 1928.
- 79 As Bacha Saqqao was from the Koh-i Daman area, he seems to have enjoyed more loyal support from the local Koh-i Daman branch of the Mujaddidi family, where *Sāhibzada* Abdullah Jan Mujaddidi was appointed as the Bacha's governor of Qataghan and Badakhshan (Khalili, 1363: 16).
- 80 Poullada 1973: 190-191, L/P&S/10/1286, File 53/1929, Part 6.
- 81 See Chapter 2, and genealogical tables in Adamec (1975).
- 82 An indication that this need not have been the case is the situation of the *ulamā* in the neighbouring country of Iran, where high-ranking religious leaders – from the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-06 right up to the Islamic Revolution in 1978-79 – have sided with the liberal forces, pushing the demands for democracy and social equality. Equally, a layman like Ali Shariati with his 'socialist' interpretation of Islam, exerted a considerable influence in Iranian society during the 1970s.

Re-Establishment of the Social Order and Its Transformation (1930-1950s)

The accession to the throne of Nadir *Khān* showed that the tribes, in spite of the policies of *Amīr* Abdur Rahman and King Amanullah, had retained their force not only as 'king-breakers' but also as 'king-makers'. The skilful handling of tribal politics in combination with traditionally accepted Mohammadzai claims to the throne were the means whereby General Nadir *Khān* ousted Bacha Saqqao. Hence the 'tribal model of legitimacy' was still in force and in accordance with the realities of power politics.¹

However, the assumption of power by Nadir *Khān* was *not* a return to the *status quo ante*: the reformist measures of King Amanullah were continued albeit at a different pace and without its outward manifestations. The key to the next three decades of comparatively peaceful political development in Afghanistan lies in the new *modus vivendi* which was established between the state and the traditional power groups whose economic and political interests were being observed while the gradual reform measures (educational, administrative, etc.) catered for the interests of the new elite of bureaucrats and educated middle class. A gradual transformation of Afghan society hereby took place which above all was characterized by its outward form of continuity but laid the basis for power political and ideological confrontations among the state-supporting groups.

Relationship to British India

Nadir *Khān*'s victory in the civil war and election as King (*shāh*) was not only a result of the internal power struggle but was also due, indirectly, if not directly, to the favourable attitude of the British, who had no doubts about the fact that it served their interests better to have Nadir *Khān* on the throne in Kabul than King Amanullah.² The British interest in Nadir was basically centred on two objectives: firstly, to secure peace among the Frontier tribes and, secondly, to stop Russian

advances and ideological infiltration – and King Amanullah had been considered ‘unreliable’ in both respects. To secure these two objectives, the British were willing to supply considerable subsidies to Nadir *Shāh* to stabilize his rule:

We also contribute a considerable sum annually for the cost of the British Mission in Afghanistan and paid about 40 lakhs in 1929 to give Nadir Shah a fair start. We are prepared in addition to supply a certain number of Indian rifles to the Afghan government either free of cost or on long term deferred payment in order to increase the efficiency of the Afghan army which is a most important factor in the stability of that Government. Having done this we consider that we have discharged our responsibilities in full [sic!] and that His Majesty’s Government should undertake entire financial responsibility for all other measures which may be found practicable and necessary for maintaining the economic stability of Afghanistan.³

The reference to British ‘responsibility’ seems to indicate that Nadir *Khān* had enjoyed more than just British sympathy in the overthrow of King Amanullah. The available archival sources do not give a complete picture, but it seems clear that the Government of India at



Figure 15: King Nadir *Khān*

least gave him the facilities for the passage of money and supplies from India, and did not oppose Mahsud and Wazir *lashkars* crossing the border to support him.⁴ In 1930, the British also considered issuing a threat to the Ghilzai Powindah nomads on their annual migrations to Afghanistan: if they ‘disturbed’ the situation in Afghanistan, the Government of India would ‘have to consider what action should be taken in the autumn on the Ghilzai’s return to India’. Ultimately, the Government of India gave up the veiled or direct threats and just impressed upon the Ghilzai headmen that it regarded Nadir *Shāh* as king of Afghanistan.⁵

In this context it is interesting that, in his inaugural address to parliament on 6 July 1931, Nadir *Shāh* devoted most of the time to explaining how the British did *not* help him: 'I avow that I have received no help from any foreign Power'.⁶ But he also stated that, after his accession to the throne, the British rendered help all on their own and without any strings attached – and Nadir *Shāh* curiously enough justified this on the grounds that even King Amanullah on some occasions had received assistance from the British! He then listed all the military aid and equipment he had procured (perhaps to remove any doubts in the minds of the delegates that the government was able to fend off any rival claims to the throne).

Nadir *Shāh* no doubt needed this British assistance as the fighting against him went on for months in Bacha Saqqao's Tajik stronghold, Koh-i Daman, until it came to a very brutal end with the calling in of *lashkars* of Frontier tribesmen and the use of the Afghan Air Force. Also the Shinwaris, who had started the revolt against Amanullah, in May 1930 revolted against Nadir *Shāh*, and later the Ghilzais also rose. As usual, power struggles in Afghanistan resulted in a number of people seeking refuge in India – just as Nadir *Shāh*'s own family had done earlier. Also in this matter the Government of India proved to be most helpful and lists of names and photos were sent to Kabul for identification of the 'absconders' so that they could be restricted in their movements or punished. On a request from the Afghan government, the refugees from the Koh-i Daman fighting were detained in India until 1939, when the Government of India suggested releasing the prisoners. Although the Afghan government promised not to execute anybody, the detainees did not want to return to Afghanistan. However, in autumn 1939 they were all deported to Afghanistan.⁷

Nadir *Shāh*'s reign was brief, for he was killed in 1933.⁸ His main achievements were the dismantling of many of King Amanullah's reforms as well as the formulation of a new constitution in 1931 which was to last until 1964. It is interesting that, although Nadir *Shāh* at the time could present the image of himself as 'the saviour of the nation', bringing peace and stability after the turmoil and civil war, later generations of Afghans have remembered King Amanullah with love and affection (particularly so among the Frontier tribes) whereas there has been little room for Nadir *Shāh* in the hearts of the Afghans. One reason might be that, in his short reign, Nadir *Shāh* displayed an autocratic cruelty reminiscent of *Amīr* Abdur Rahman. Another reason was probably the fact that, once he had gained the Afghan throne, he failed to lend any support to the trans-Frontier tribes.

With the 'institutionalization' of Islam under the Musahiban brothers, the Afghan state guaranteed adherence to Islamic values internally in society, i.e. Islam was a device to maintain law and order and placate the religious leaders. However, it is interesting that vis-à-vis the Muslim world, Afghanistan lost its stand as a promoter of pan-Islamic ideals and Muslim solidarity. This was particularly reflected in the lack of support for the trans-Frontier tribes and the most significant political movement among them, the Khoda-i Khidmatgaran. Thus the same man who had mobilized the Frontier tribes for the cause of Afghan independence in 1919, and turned to them for support for his claim to the throne in 1929, failed to support them actively in the period of open revolt and civil disobedience that led to the independence of the Subcontinent. History shows that a deal had been struck with the British and at the time the Musahiban dynasty was subject to criticism for being pro-British. The suspicion that the overthrow of Amanullah had in fact been master-minded by the British was also thereby nurtured. This situation was of concern to the British, who knew well the suspicious nature of the Afghan public ('suspicions which are diligently fostered by the party of Amanullah and the Soviet Embassy in Kabul'). As such:

...the real nature of the present Afghan Government's foreign policy can never be advertised, and must sometimes even be camouflaged by a pretence of unfriendliness towards His Majesty's Government. It is important that any such gestures which are intended solely for Afghan (and Russian) consumption should not mislead HMG as to the real policy of the Afghan Ministers.⁹

However, it is clear that the Afghan government had stopped supporting the Frontier tribes:

The present Afghan Government...have entirely abandoned the "policy of intrigue" and would, in fact – although they could never afford to say so openly – be glad to see the frontier tribes of India more firmly controlled by the Government of India, so that all danger of attack by these tribes upon Afghanistan – such as occurred as recently as 1933 – might be finally removed. (*ibid*)

It was also recognized that the aggressive British policy in the Frontier at the time placed the Afghan government in a position of great embarrassment 'in rejecting appeals from their co-religionists who can plausibly represent themselves as fighting to maintain the independence of their country. It is the rejection of such appeals which

brings the Afghan Government into contempt among their own subjects and plays directly into the hands of the pro-Amanullah and Bolshevik party' (ibid.).

The developments on the Subcontinent and in Afghanistan had been closely interlinked, and Afghanistan had a special place in the hearts of the Indian Muslims throughout the period of British domination. However, the Indian Muslims felt that their love remained unreciprocated when Afghan politics were determined by *national* or dynastic interests rather than by pan-Islamic solidarity (see for example the somewhat bitter account by S. Irtizia Husain 1984).

The Constitution of 1931

Although Nadir *Shāh* at the time had allied himself with the traditional power groups in the country, he was not a 'traditionalist' in the Afghan context but had since the time of *Amīr* Habibullah been counted among the 'modernists'. The 'gradual modernization' of Nadir *Shāh* was reflected in the *Usūlnāma-i Asāsi*, the Constitution of 1931,¹⁰ which 'embodied a hotch-potch of unworkable elements, extracted from the Turkish, Iranian and French constitutions, including the 1923 Constitution of Amanullah plus many aspects of Hanafi Shari'ah of Sunni Islam and local customs (*ʿādāt*), several of them, in fact, contradicting the Shari'ah' (Dupree 1973: 464). It may also be said that the 1931 Constitution reflected the balance of power in the country at the time, and for that reason it remained unchallenged for several decades – until the 1950s where the new, educated middle class started pressing for political influence. Whereas the Constitution of 1923 had been a revolutionary document designed for the transformation of society, the 1931 Constitution mainly confirmed the status quo.

The model of the legitimation of transmission of power according to the Constitution of 1931 was very complex, if not inconsistent, as appears from numerous unclear or contradictory formulations. As in the case of the 1923 Constitution, the Constitution of 1931 specified that state power was vested in the person of the monarch and, next to him, in the executive branch of government. Article 6 stated that the King, before the National Council, should swear:

... to rule according to the Shariat of Mahomet (peace be upon him!) and the fundamental rules of the country [and to strive] for the protection of the glorious religion of Islam, the

independence of Afghanistan and the rights of the nation, and for the defence, progress and prosperity of the country, so help me God through the blessing of the sacred spiritual force of the blessed saints (the approval of God be upon them!)

Article 7 spelled out the powers of the King which included:

Bestowal of rank and office, awards of honours, appointment of the Prime Minister, sanction of the appointment, transfer and dismissal of Ministers, assent to measures passed by the National Council, proclamation and enforcement of the same, protecting and implementing the Shariat and civil laws, command of the military forces of Afghanistan in general, declaration of war and conclusion of peace and treaties generally, remission and reduction of punishments in general according to Shariat law.

In the section on the judiciary, all references were made exclusively to Shari'ah, and whenever both Shari'ah and statutory rules were mentioned, Shari'ah was generally mentioned first¹¹ – altogether, at least 18 of the 110 articles stated the adherence to Islam. The above led Kamali (1985: 27) to conclude that the 1931 Constitution upheld the classical Islamic doctrine that sovereignty belongs to Allah. However, an explicit declaration to this effect was not contained in the text and a closer scrutiny reveals that a certain ambiguity existed as to the source of legitimacy of power. Article 5 stated that the nation was the source of legitimacy of the monarchy (and specifically the line of Nadir *Shāh's* family), i.e. that Nadir *Khān* had been recognized as King by the Afghan *nation*:

In appreciation of the devotion shown and services rendered by His Majesty the Ghazi Muhammad Nadir Shah Afghan, in obtaining the independence and deliverance of the land of Afghanistan, and the uprooting of oppression and despotism, the Afghan nation in general has recognized His Majesty as fit and worthy King of his country, and has accepted him as such with the greatest esteem and respect ...


While the King pledged to carry out the administration of his duties according to the dictates of Shari'ah, the preservation of the independence of Afghanistan was stated to be one of his most important duties. Article 27 declared that the National Council (*Majlis-i Shaurā-i Milli*) 'was introduced at the instance of His Majesty the King, with the approval of the *Jirga*, held at Kabul in the year 1309 [A.H.]'. The oath to be taken by members of the National Council equally stressed the nation as source of legitimacy (Article 37):

We, the undersigned, on account of the confidence imposed in us by the nation and the Government, swear by God the Great and the sacred Koran that we will remain true to our nation and Government.

Parliamentary authority, therefore, emanated from the King and the will of the Afghan people, as represented by the *jirga*. These formulations, plus the extra-legal status of the *jirga*, meant that the National Council was subjected to the tribal concept of *jirga*. Hence the King was a constitutional monarch as well as a tribal chieftain. In his inaugural speech before the parliament, Nadir *Shāh* also referred to 'holding consultations' as an injunction of the Qur²ān, i.e. attempting to claim religious sanction to the institution of parliament as a consultative body (in the spirit of Tarzi and the Young Afghans), as well as on historical precedence, *jirgas* being a national Afghan tradition ('the Afghan Jirgah as the just Ruler of the Afghans'). And although the nation had expressed no desire for any such things, 'I considered ... a national Assembly to be the foundation of the prosperity and as a special instrument for the reform of the country'.¹²

In other words, the complex and inconsistent formulations of the Constitution of 1931 reflected the fact that Nadir *Shāh* was trying to placate simultaneously the modernists, the clergy and the tribes by evoking values and concepts from their respective, separate discourses. The difficulties involved were like squaring the circle, and the result

Figure 16: Model of the transfer of the legitimacy of power in the 1931 Constitution



naturally lacked logic or consistency – but served the purpose of securing peace up to 1964 when a new constitution was formulated.

The Constitution of 1931 created a facade of parliamentary government while the actual control remained in the hands of the King. The National Council was elected but the principles of election were not laid down in the Constitution. In practice it and the House of Nobles –the *Majlis-i A'ayan*, directly appointed by the King – had only an advisory capacity. Among its duties were to pass:

All regulations and procedure, the framing and existence of which are essential to strengthen the foundations of the Government, and for the administration of the affairs of the country... (Article 41)

The National Council was mainly to serve as a 'rubber stamp' for the executive branch of government, i.e. to approve whatever proposals were put before it. However, the National Council was also allowed to initiate measures but could only pass such ones which 'should not contravene the canons of the religion of Islam or the policy of the country' (Article 65).

The formal framework, stress on nation and notional guarantee of individual equality and civil rights, as well as outward forms of constitutional government, may be seen as a concession to the new urban classes who had supported Amanullah. While the supremacy and orthodoxy of the Hanafi school of jurisprudence was recognized, the judiciary system (civil and criminal law) reverted back to the religious leaders and the complete autonomy of Shari'a courts was guaranteed subject to the monarch's right of final approval (Article 70). Gregorian (1969: 305) offers the assessment that, by granting the Muslim *ʿulamā* broad powers while reserving for the monarchy the right of final appeal, Nadir *Shāh* seems to have made a deliberate though indirect attempt to make use of the religious establishment's power to extend the jurisdiction of the state over tribal territories; in other words, the *ʿulamā* was here to be the tool to ensure the polity expansion of the state. While the religious leaders apparently were granted a freedom and influence they had not known since before *Amir* Abdur Rahman, the policy of merging their interests with that of the state, and thereby pacifying them, was a continuation of past policies. Altogether the Constitution which was to be in force until 1964 was a showpiece of appeasement of the various power groups in society.

The stipulations in the Constitution regarding the tribes were a formal recognition of their ultimate power. Where King Amanullah

had wanted to abolish the whole (tribal) *jirga* concept, it was now laid down, not in the Constitution but in a separate law, that a national Loya Jirga was to be convened at least once every three years, and no new taxes could be imposed or radical changes made without the consent of this extra-legal body (Gregorian 1969: 305). Thus, in the view of the monarchy, the tribes represented the national consensus of the Afghans. And, by unwritten law, only the Loya Jirga could make changes to the Constitution.

King Amanullah's unpopular recruitment policy was abandoned, leaving recruitment of soldiers to the discretion of the chieftains or a tribal council. In case of need, the tribal leaders were required to supply levies of tribesmen, but they retained command of their units (*ibid*: 296). As if these concessions were not sufficient, Nadir *Shāh* granted certain Frontier tribes such privileges as complete exemption from taxation and conscription to the army in return for their support in securing him the throne, in spite of the Constitution, Article 13 specifying that 'all Afghan subjects have equal rights and duties under the Shariat law and the law of the state'. This can also be seen as a continuation of past (i.e. pre-Amanullah) policies. As far as the tribes in general were concerned, they were basically left in peace from economic and political pressures from the state during the following twenty years.

In the discussion of the Amanullah reforms, it appeared that his activities in the field of *symbolic secularization* carried a great responsibility for alienating the population. It was thus important for Nadir *Shāh* to distance himself and his rule from all these outward signs of 'godlessness'. First of all, the Constitution repeatedly stressed the conformity with Islam, and secondly, more than sixty of the *Nizāmnāma* introduced by Amanullah were abolished. The popular agitation against King Amanullah had centred around his policy of emancipating women as well as the defamation campaign regarding his personal conduct on the European tour. It was thus hardly a coincidence that Nadir *Shāh* immediately reaffirmed Bacha Saqqao's cancellation of the reforms regarding girls' schools, polygamy, etc. Heavy veiling of women once again became mandatory, and strict *purdah* and seclusion were re-established. While the Constitution granted all Afghan *Muslim* subjects equality and the right to enjoy civil rights and liberties, the *Jami'at al-Ulamā* interpreted Islamic law as prohibiting women from voting (and other Articles in effect also denied the equality of Shi'as and non-Muslims). The King denounced any breach of Muslim dietary restrictions, and specified consumption of alcohol as particularly repugnant and to be severely punished, and

reintroduced the old national emblem of 'Arch, Pulpit and Mosque' which Amanullah had replaced with 'Mountain, Sun and Star'. As an additional measure, Nadir *Shāh* ordered the first printing of the Qur'ān in Afghanistan. Altogether, King Amanullah's campaign of symbolic secularization was now followed by what could be called a process of symbolic re-sacralization. (This may also have been much more essential, as Nadir *Shāh* had spent a far longer time in foreign, 'infidel' countries than King Amanullah and on the whole was very wary about accusations of having acquired British support for the overthrow of King Amanullah).

While Nadir *Shāh* thus evoked the necessary religious symbols, it is interesting that his campaign as a whole had appealed more to national honour and fatherland than to religious values. An article in the newspaper *Anis* (on 1 September 1930) followed this line closely in its attacks on ex-King Amanullah's policies and did not include a single line about his reforms being un-Islamic – the point on which popular agitation had centred. His reforms were particularly criticized for not 'benefiting the country'. Even references to his policy regarding women, female education and expulsion of Deoband teachers were viewed in the light of the national interest and the 'popular opinion'. On top of that, the paper presented a comprehensive defence of the *‘ulamā* as champions of material progress – provided Islamic Law was observed.¹³

The accession to power of Nadir *Shāh* was thus not a return to the *status quo ante* – he and his brothers were 'modernizers' even if their concept of modernization did not include liberalization of the political life of the country. An example is the educational system: Article 20 of the Constitution stated that education was compulsory for children, and public schools were under the supervision of the government, so as to 'provide the benefits which accrue from the study of literature, art and science' (Article 22). With this justification of the public education system in the interests of society, the religious leaders were pacified by granting to any citizen the right to impart Islamic religious instruction (Article 21). On this basis, secular education gained ground gradually over the years and even girls' schools were reopened.

It is also interesting to note that some of the ideas of the Marriage Laws of 1921 and 1924 were retained, albeit in weakened form, in the Marriage Law of 1934. This was particularly the case with reference to the excessive expenses related to the engagement and wedding in the form of brideprice, presents during the engagement period as well as the engagement and wedding celebrations. While the Marriage Laws of 1921 and 1924 had forbidden both bride price and presents

during the engagement as well as the engagement ceremony (*shīrīnikhwurī*), the Marriage Law of 1934 specifically disapproved of these customs and imposed certain limitations on the amount of expenses as well as the duration of the festivities (Kamali 1985: 81-106). These attempts at changing local customs were generally favoured by the religious leaders, as such practices were considered to be contrary to Islamic injunctions and a social evil, putting many people into economic distress. However, neither legal measures nor the preaching of religious leaders succeeded in rooting out these customs (which were difficult to control and such control would no doubt have antagonized wide sections of the population) and they have continued to the present day.¹⁴

While being 'modernizers' rather than 'traditionalists', Nadir *Shāh* and his brothers – unlike King Amanullah – kept a low ideological profile in their reform policy. While King Amanullah had wanted the Afghan population to share his worldview and introduced the various legal reforms with political preambles of highly ideological content, similar kinds of reforms were carried out by the Musahiban brothers in silence and without ideological proclamations (Grevemeyer 1987: 181).¹⁵ To the extent that Nadir *Shāh* tried to justify reforms, he did so like King Amanullah by referring to 'Progress' and 'the Interests of the Nation' rather than to religious concepts. There were several reasons for this. First of all was the need to pacify the Young Afghan party with slogans of democracy, parliamentarianism, etc., as they were well-represented in the bureaucracy and their cooperation was essential for the administration of the country. Secondly, Nadir *Shāh* was fully aware of the influence and power of religious leaders, and particularly so of his own 'ally', the *Hāzrat Sāhib* of Shor Bazaar who was suspected of nurturing political ambitions himself. Keeping religious issues and ideological discourse altogether at a minimum was thus a way of avoiding bringing the religious leaders into the limelight.

The art of Nadir *Shāh* and the Musahiban dynasty was to formalize tribal, religious and dynastic interests, fusing them into a clear conception of the King as the personification of the state and government (Gregorian 1969:307). An added benefit of co-opting the religious and tribal leaders into the affairs of government through the parliament was that it kept them away from their home areas during the summer months, which was the normal time for uprisings to take place (James 1935:262). Although the Constitution of 1931 gave the appearance of some sort of constitutional monarchy and parliamentary practice, in effect all the final powers remained in the hands of the monarch and the executive branch of government, which was mainly

staffed with the royal family and its close associates (Moltmann 1982: 32).

However, due recognition was given to the interests of established power groups in society, and the following two decades of comparative peace proved this new *modus vivendi* to be workable. Although no major political changes took place, the reign of Nadir *Shāh* and his brothers' *de facto* reign (1933-53) was characterized by considerable socio-economic development, as Afghanistan increasingly opened up to foreign experts and the state encouraged increased foreign trade and private economic enterprise.

The Clergy and the State

During the previous fifty years, the relationship between the *‘ulamā* and the state had undergone considerable changes – changes which had their parallels in most other Muslim societies. Yapp (1980: 184) aptly summarises the whole process at a general level. His starting point is that, although it is commonly asserted that Islam knows no distinction between religion and politics, it should be kept in mind that ‘traditional Islam was a system of minimal government’ where most of the decisions affecting the daily life of ordinary people were made by non-governmental institutions, such as the family, tribe, village, guild or religious hierarchy. Thus, the areas of potential conflict between the political and the religious establishment were very limited until the nature of the state changed, i.e. until attempts at creating a ‘modern’ centralized state which happened in most of the Muslim countries during the nineteenth century (as in Afghanistan during *Amīr* Abdur Rahman). Until then there had been a *de facto* division of authority between religion and politics since decisions affecting the central institutions of personal law and education had largely been confined to the religious classes, which were formally independent of the state. Gradually, modernization destroyed this division and the government progressively took over the functions formerly discharged by the religious classes and by other institutions, as has been demonstrated with the policies of polity expansion and dominance in the case of the previous three Afghan rulers. Subsequently, the religious class accepted and put forward demands for influence upon, or control over, the operations of government itself. The effect of the first step of secularization (the transfer of the public functions of religion to the state) was to politicize religion, which subsequently brought about for the first time an intimate link

between religion and politics at the practical, as opposed to the purely philosophical, level (*ibid*). While a first effect may be the co-optation of the religious establishment into the state, transforming them to salaried civil servants, the second effect was the organization of religious pressure groups such as the Jamī'yat al-ʿUlamā in Afghanistan (1931), attempting to secure their interests vis-à-vis the state through these means.

The Jamī'yat al-ʿUlamā was the first national organization of ʿulamā in Afghanistan. It was entrusted with the interpretation of existing law and all proposed governmental regulations and laws were to be submitted to the ʿulamā in order to ascertain their compatibility with Islam. The organization of the Afghan ʿulamā in a formal organization as Jamī'yat al-ʿUlamā can be seen as an expression of *polity dominance*. It has already been demonstrated that, rather than separating 'church' and state by cutting the religious establishment off from political influence, the rulers, in general, had aimed at co-opting the religious establishment within the state apparatus through individual leaders. However, the religious establishment had so far remained an unstructured and internally divided group, and the formation of the Jamī'yat al-ʿUlamā may on the one hand be seen as an attempt to close ranks and present a common front in view of the growing 'bureaucratization' and co-optation into the state apparatus. On the other hand, the solution was attractive for the state as well for whom a 'clergy' with a centralized and less 'anarchic' structure was an easier partner to deal with. Altogether, this development was a logical development of the advisory board of ʿulamā, – the Mizan al-Tahqiqat – existing under Amīr Habibullah and King Amanullah. But while these boards had mainly consisted of hand-picked ʿulamā to endorse official policy, the Jamī'yat al-ʿUlamā by being a comprehensive, national organization, could better act as a pressure group for religious interests within the state.¹⁶

From the point of view of the state, an organized, cohesive ʿulamā may also be preferable to deal with, and to pacify, than the previous comparatively anarchic group, which could only be co-opted as individuals. The activities of the Jamī'yat al-ʿUlamā – which included not only the general propagation of the faith but also the promotion of national unity and the protection of both nation and government¹⁷ – suggest that the state's interests were predominant rather than those of the ʿulamā.

The Jamī'yat al-ʿUlamā did not come to play any particularly active role in Afghan politics in subsequent years. The state did not spearhead social reforms or development, Islam was not perceived as being in

danger, and the *‘ulamā* – who were not challenged by the secular authority – endorsed the government policy as being compatible with Islam and withdrew to their mosques and *madrasas* as loyal civil servants.

Another sign of the integration of Islam within the state was the fact that the Ministry of Justice was assigned the responsibility of enforcing Islamic law throughout Afghanistan, and a Department of *Ihtisāb*, which supervised the strict adherence of Muslims to the moral codes of Islam, was made ‘an essential feature of the government’ (Ali 1933: 171-172). Polity dominance, however, was still not possible in all fields. An indication of the strength of the religious leaders was Article 21 of the Constitution, which allowed all Afghan subjects to impart Islamic religious education – a field which both *Amīr* Abdur Rahman and King Amanullah had tried hard to get under state control.

While religious education as the only form of education available had always been a prerequisite for bureaucratic positions, these positions had been occupied by religious scholars rather than by *pīrs*. The new feature was that now persons of reputed *karāmāt* accepted positions within the state. The ultimate sign of the co-option of the *‘ulamā* within the state was that Nadir *Shāh* had to honour the support of *Hāzrat Sāhib* of Shor Bazaar, Fazl Omar Mujaddidi, with the post as Minister of Justice, with his son-in-law, Fazl Ahmad Mujaddidi (*Hāzrat Sāhib* of Jaghartan, Herat), as Deputy Minister while his brother, Mohammad Sadiq (Gul Agha), became Ambassador to Egypt. Fazl Ahmad replaced Fazl Omar as minister in 1932 and later on he also occupied the position of Chairman of the Senate. Over the years, many other Mujaddidis found their way into the formalized political system, and such people as Abdul Baqi (Herat branch) and Mahroon and Hashem Mujaddidi were also Senators at one time. While the Mujaddidis, owing to their sheer numbers, were probably the religious family which became most closely integrated into the ruling establishment – also through marriage connections to the royal family¹⁸ – a similar trend can be found among most other prominent religious families over the following couple of generations.

It has already been mentioned that *Miān* Gul of Tagab (son of Mullah Hamidullah of Tagab, *khalīfa* of the Hadda-i *Sāhib*) became President of the *Jamī‘yat al-‘Ulamā*. Ghulam Nabi Chaknaur (son of the Chaknaur Mullah, also *khalīfa* of the Hadda-i *Sāhib*) was in Parliament from 1958-73 – first as elected representative from the Mohmand area in the National Assembly, and afterwards as Senator. Shams ul-Haq *Pīrzada* (son of Mullah *Sāhib* Kajuri, another *khalīfa* of Hadda-i *Sāhib*) was also in Parliament. Moreover, the Minister of

Justice from 1963-65, *Sayyid* Shamsuddin Majrooh, was the son of Tegari Pacha *Ṣāhib*, yet another of the *khalīfas* of the Hadda-i *Ṣāhib*, while Dr. Enayatullah Eblagh, who was Chief Justice in Kabul and lecturer at the Faculty of Shari‘a at Kabul University, was son of *Mawlawī* Abdul Ghani, known as *Mawlawī Ṣāhib* Qala-i Beland, Parwan, who was a *khalīfa* of Mullah Hamidullah of Tagab.¹⁹

Hazrat Ṣāhib of Shor Bazaar, Fazl Omar himself, resigned from his post as Minister of Justice in 1932, having fulfilled his ‘mission’ of securing Islam within the modern Afghan state apparatus – perhaps also to avoid the ‘routinization’ of his charisma – and devoted himself to spiritual rather than temporal affairs. Or, to put it within the self-image of the Mujaddidis, spiritual leaders – and in Afghan context specifically the Mujaddidis – are assigned the role of controlling the temporal rulers and in times of crisis respond to the needs of society by entering the temporal realm and correcting the rulers. Thus, the political role of *Nur al-Mashayikh* had been a manifestation of the example set by spiritual leaders like *Shaykh* Ahmad Sirhindi and Shah Waliullah.²⁰

While the Mujaddidis as hereditary *pīrs* were able to keep a foot in both camps – the spiritual and political – descendants of non-hereditary *pīrs* converted their spiritual reputation into a position among the new educated elite of the country, giving up *pīr*-hood themselves, examples being Senator Ghulam Nabi Chaknaur and *Sayyid* Shamsuddin Majrooh. (Incidentally, this difference between the descendants of hereditary and non-hereditary *pīrs* also seems to have coincided with the distinction between *orthodox* versus *maraboutic pīrs* (see Chapters 2 and 4, and also below). Thus the process of integrating the interests of traditional power groups, in this case the spiritual elite, with that of the state was complemented by their integration into the bureaucracy and modern, educated middle class.²¹

Reforming Religious Education

King Amanullah’s recognition that the functioning of a modern state apparatus required adequately trained administrators was shared by the Musahiban dynasty. The educational policy pursued from 1930 onwards was thus characterized by a gradual extension of the secular school system and, parallel with that, a considerable extension of the religious educational institutions but under government control. The latter was a consequence of the inclusion of the *‘ulamā* in the government bureaucracy – the government needed a number of graduates from

religious institutions with standardized and sufficient knowledge of *fiqh*, etc. to occupy the government posts as *qāzī*, *muftī*, teachers etc. Although a School of Administration (*Dār ul-Hukkām*) had been opened in the 1920s, until the early 1940s only Shari'ah studies counted as educational credentials for entry into the bureaucracy.

The establishment of government *madrasas* was a continuation of King Amanullah's polity expansion whereby religious education was subjected to the jurisdiction of the state – for instance, the *qāzī* school, *Madrasa-i Quzāt-i Amāniah*, was founded by King Amanullah in 1928. And only graduates from government *madrasas*, and later on the Faculty of Shari'ah, were eligible for government employment. Graduates from private *madrasas* could apply for such jobs only after certification by a government *madrasa*.

While many Afghans went abroad for higher religious education, there still were a number of private *madrasas* in the country. The most prominent at this time was the *Nur al-Madares* at Qala-i Jawad, founded by *Ḥaẓrat Ṣāḥib* of Shor Bazaar, *Nur al-Mashayikh*, and merged with the *Dār ul-Hadith*, founded earlier by *Shams al-Mashayikh*. It had some five hundred students enrolled. The *Ḥaẓrat Ṣāḥib* had also opened a branch of the *Nur al-Madares* in Shelgara in Ghazni. Apart from these two *madrasas*, the *Madrasa-i Hamidia*, founded by Mullah Hamidullah of Tagab, was also a famous private *madrasa*. However, during the 1930s and 1940s the government opened *madrasas* in every province, presumably in order to gain direct control over the religious education (Grevemeyer 1987: 183-184). These were:

- *Dār al-‘Ulūm-i ‘Arabia*, Kabul (the former *Madrasa-i Quzāt*)
- *Madrasa-i Abu Hanifa*, Kabul
- *Fakhr ul-Madares*, Herat
- *Madrasa-i Jam-i Sharif*, Herat
- *Madrasa-i Asadiya*, Mazar-i Sharif
- *Madrasa-i Takharistan*, Takharar
- *Madrasa-i Abu Muslim*, Fariyab
- *Madrasa-i Mohammadiyya*, Kandahar
- *Najm al-Madares*, Jalalabad
- *Dār al-‘Ulūm-i Ruhānī*, Paktia
- *Madrasa-i Zahirshāhi*, Maimana

The curriculum of the private *madrasas* remained centred around exclusively religious subjects plus some Greek science, while ignoring all 'modern' subjects. On the other hand, these 'modern' subjects (such as mathematics, physics and geography) were increasingly

taught at the government *madrasas* – in the opinion of many traditional scholars, to the detriment of the religious subjects. The teaching methods also varied between the private and the government *madrasas*. In the private *madrasas* the teaching system of the ‘circle’ – in which the *ṭālīb* proceeded at his own individual speed with one subject at a time (see Chapter 2) – was maintained. The government *madrasas*, on the other hand, introduced teaching plans, a standardized curriculum and class teaching.

For the reorganization of the *Dār al-‘Ulūm-i ‘Arabi*, and presumably for the outlining of a suitable curriculum for the government *madrasas* in the future, the Afghan government sought the cooperation of *Dār ul-‘Ulūm* of Deoband. Although the influence of Deoband on the intellectual climate of Afghanistan had been very great indeed,²² King Amanullah had favoured connections to the modernist College of Aligarh and limited the connections to Deoband. In order to restore and strengthen the old academic and educational ties with Afghanistan, the Vice-Chancellor of Deoband visited Kabul to congratulate Zahir *Shāh* on his ascent to the throne in 1933 and also to submit a memorandum to the Afghan Prime Minister on what services *Dār ul-‘Ulūm* Deoband could offer Afghanistan regarding the educating of Afghan *‘ulamā* in the future:²³

The intellectual relations between the Dar al-Ulum of Afghanistan and the Dar ul-Ulum, Deoband, be developed for purely educational purposes in such a way whereby the authorities of the latter may directly estimate the latest academic needs of Afghanistan and the world of Islam and, in the light of this estimate, *prepare such ulema in the changed circumstances of the period that they may cooperate fully with the aim and purpose of the free governments in the world of Islam and prove sincere workers for the state.* (Rizvi 1980: 230, my emphasis)

Thus, Mahmud al-Hassan’s concern for the ‘free governments in the world of Islam’ was not entirely forgotten in Deoband, although the stress on co-operation with the worldly powers – that – seems to have acquired greater weight.

There seems in retrospect to be agreement among religious scholars that the government *madrasas* initially had a higher standard than most of the private *madrasas*.²⁴ And also that, as the number of secular subjects (geography, history, chemistry, physics, biology, mathematics, Dari and Pashto) grew, the standard of religious learning decreased.

The difference in education and outlook between the private and the government *madrasas* took on one more dimension with the establishment of the Faculty of Sharī‘a at Kabul University in 1952,

which then provided advanced religious studies. The Faculty was established with assistance from Cairo's Al-Azhar University, with which close cooperation was maintained in the following years, thus indicating a shift in spiritual inspiration from the Subcontinent to the Arab world.

Although Islamic Law according to the Constitution of 1931 was to provide the primary legal basis of Afghan society, the following decades brought an increasing number of supplementary statutory laws. In effect, two separate court systems developed – one handling criminal and civil cases arising under Shari'a Law and the other dealing with cases involving public security, civil servants, juveniles, traffic offences and commercial disputes. Although statutory law was supposed to be compatible with Islamic Law, i.e. with *fiqh-i Hanafiyya*, these secular laws, however, mainly reflected the values of Western jurisprudence and legal tradition. The extent to which reforms in the judicial system had any practical effect on the actual handling of legal cases in the country is hard to evaluate. Grevemeyer, for example, expresses great doubts in this respect (Grevemeyer 1987: 159). The education of Afghan legal specialists increasingly came to reflect this duality, too, as it was divided into a religious and a secular faculty with but little contact or cooperation (Weinbaum 1980).

The (secular) Law Faculty was established in 1938 with French support. Apart from secular law, some four courses on Islamic Law were also offered but there was no Chair and, in general, little expertise among the faculty in advanced religious law. Instead, advanced studies in secular law were pursued mainly in France but also later in the United States, Britain and West Germany.

The Faculty of Shari'a, on the other hand, offered a curriculum entirely within Shari'a tradition with the exception of minor courses in civil law, international and commercial law. This also reflected the background of almost all the faculty members. For advanced studies, many students went to Al-Azhar.

This duality in the legal system and in the legal education did not, however, reflect reality, as in practice it was impossible to keep the two systems separated. The jurisdiction of the two court systems intersected and often overlapped and their institutions were integrated within the same bureaucracy. But the members of the statutory courts were inadequately trained to handle the application of religious interpretations and precepts in their courts, while the judges of the Shari'a courts were ignorant of the statutory provisions that could be applicable to cases before them – as well as resentful of the alien systems of laws and judiciary (Weinbaum 1980: 41).

The candidates also became competitors for bureaucratic positions, which until the beginning of the 1940s had been almost entirely staffed by persons with a background of religious studies. After the establishment of the Law Faculty, candidates from here became the major source of personnel for the Ministries of Justice, the Interior and Foreign Affairs (*ibid*: 40).

The Secular School System

Like King Amanullah, the Muhsahiban brothers also attached importance to the development of a general educational system. The Constitution of 1931 made elementary education free and compulsory. Until 1940, the Afghan public education system was based on a ten-year programme consisting of four years of primary school, three years of middle school and three years of secondary school. Primary schools were started in provincial centres and the traditional mosque schools (*maktab*) which existed in every village and, indeed, in every street of the larger towns, were now systematized in such a manner that they became an integral part of the general school system, as junior primary schools (A. M. Khan 1936: 865). The village school and the *maktabs* provided religious instruction and some reading and writing. Even though the modern schools had been reopened, religious instruction continued to permeate the curriculum, particularly at primary and middle level. Aside from the Qur'ān, the basic text used in most of these schools was the *Panj Ganj* (Five Treasures), which had sections devoted to didactic moral lessons, Persian classics, and religious precepts and laws (Wilber 1962: 84). Given this type of education and the absence of both a uniform traditional school curriculum and qualified teachers, the Afghan students faced great difficulties in the transition to the secondary school level which, in general, was patterned on the German and French systems. Although a Teacher Training School (*Dār al-Mu'ālemīn*) had already been established in 1913, the vast majority of teachers in village and primary schools were the local mullahs, who themselves hardly had education above sixth grade level. Added to these difficulties was the fact that, while religious instruction took place in Arabic, Persian and Pashto were used for the other subjects but an appreciable number of the students did not have either of these as their mother-tongue (i.e. the major groups being the Turkic-speaking people of the North – Uzbeks, Turkomans and Kirghiz).

After social order had been restored by Nadir *Shāh*, Kabul's four secondary schools were reopened, namely:

- the *Habibiya* from 1903, originally modelled on the Anglo-Muslim College of Aligarh but in the 1920s reorganized on the French lycée pattern;
- *Istiqlal* (started in 1922 under the name *Amāniya*) on the French model;
- *Nejat* (1924 – formerly *Amāni*) on the German model; and
- *Ghāzi*, with British Indian staff.

After a couple of years the girls' school, *Malalai*, was also reopened but for some years to come, apart from some basic education, mainly offered training in domestic sciences and nursing in order not to antagonize conservative forces in the country. It was not until the 1950s that any noteworthy efforts were made within the field of girls' schools.²⁵

After World War II, the Americans took over the running of *Habibiya* and the British Council took on the *Ghāzi* School. Thus, the four prestigious secondary schools were supported by four different countries, this difference also being reflected in the teaching medium, curriculum and methods. The faculty staff was American, French, German and English respectively and the teaching was in their own language. The background for this was a conscious attempt to prepare students to attain the baccalaureate certificate, a prerequisite for entrance into European universities, where the first generations of secularly educated Afghans got their higher education.

These prestigious foreign-language secondary schools in Kabul, from where the future higher civil servants and military officers came (recruited mainly from the ruling or influential families), had little in common with the rest of the Afghan school system which was centred around religious instructions and where virtually no foreign language was taught. However, in spite of education being compulsory by law since 1931, the estimated literacy rate in Afghanistan was still as low as ten percent by 1967 (Area Handbook 1973: 135).

The dichotomy of the educational system became further aggravated with the foundation of Kabul University in 1932. The different faculties had been established with the support and cooperation of various foreign universities, the education being patterned on the foreign models, and with a considerable proportion of foreign lecturers employed. Kabul University's first faculty, the School of Medicine, was thus under the guidance and supervision of primarily French and

Turkish professors; the Department of Political Science and Law (1938) was also patterned on the French system; Natural Science (1941), Economy and Pharmacy on the German; the Faculties of Technology (1950), Agriculture and Education on the American system; while the Faculty of Shari'a was supported by the Egyptian Al Azhar University. In addition, a considerable number of Afghans went abroad on scholarships for higher education, most notably to the United States, the Soviet Union, Germany and France.

Spreading the academic cooperation over so many countries was hardly conducive for the building up of a coherent educational system. However, it may be assumed that the educational system in this respect was to a large extent determined by foreign political considerations, where since King Amanullah *bi-tarāfi* (i.e. 'without sides', non-alignment) had been the key-word. Thus, it was the official policy to attempt to balance the influence of different foreign powers and to avoid dependence on any one, particularly using connections to France, Italy, Germany and the United States to balance out the connections to Britain and the Soviet Union.²⁶

Later on, from the 1950s when Prime Minister *Sardār* Daoud strengthened the role of the Afghan state in the economic development, an increased cooperation with East Europe and the Soviet Union also came about, followed by a number of Soviet-financed development projects. The former British-Russian military competition of the nineteenth century was replaced after World War II by American-Soviet competition, which during this period in Afghanistan took the form of an economic competition (see Dupree 1973: 507-530). In 1967, the Polytechnic Institute was thus established with Soviet support. However, foreign political considerations were important as usual and, when Pakistan in 1954-55 became the receiver of considerable American military aid while Afghanistan received nothing,²⁷ the way was also paved for Soviet military assistance to Afghanistan including training of Afghan officers in the Soviet Union (some also received training in the United States) and supplying advisers to Afghan military schools (see Dupree 1973: Ch. 23).

Disappearance of the 'Activist' Mullahs

The previous five decades (1880-1930) had demonstrated the political influence and power of the spiritual leaders who had mobilized the population to resistance against temporal rulers, both indigenous and colonial; it had been a movement which had swept through

eastern Afghanistan as well as all along the Frontier. The spiritual leaders and most notably the *pīrs* had frequently, in alliance with tribal leaders but also alone, identified with the disaffection of different groups of the population and given religious sanction to their struggle against oppression or violation of established interests, norms and values.

The increasing co-optation into the state of the *‘ulamā* and other traditional leaders, culminating with the new Constitution of 1931, closed this chapter in Afghan history. In the transformation of the tribal confederation into a modern state, the spiritual leaders and propertied groups had managed to stake their claim and thus no longer spearheaded any challenge to the temporal rulers; the ‘activist mullahs’ in Afghanistan were a phenomenon of the past.

For the Frontier population, such a settlement and power-sharing did not take place and the struggle against the colonial rule continued. However, the undercover agreement between Kabul and the British meant that the Frontier mullahs could no longer count on Afghan support and cooperation but had to stay and operate east of the Durand line, a situation which inhibited their activities considerably. At the same time, resistance to the British resumed a more outright political form – also on the Frontier, where the Khoda-i Khidmatgaran social-reformist and political party came to play an ever greater role from 1930 onwards and tied the anti-British struggle of the Frontier closer to similar movements in the rest of India, notably with the Congress Party, whose Gandhian philosophy of non-violence it followed. Thus in the 1937 election the Congress Party, supported by the Khoda-i Khidmatgaran, won a majority in the Frontier Province and formed a ministry under Dr. Khan Sahib which, with interludes, remained in power until 1947.

The Qadiriyya *pīrs* of the Frontier had not, however, as yet played out their role. In 1938-39, the Shami *Pīr* – Mohammad Sadi al-Keilani of the Qadiriyya order and a distant relative of ex-King Amanullah’s wife Soraya – was travelling from Damascus to northern India and Afghanistan to visit his followers and collect contributions. Afghan members of the *tariqat* reportedly urged him to use his spiritual authority to denounce the Musahiban dynasty in Afghanistan and start a movement for the restoration of ex-King Amanullah as the rightful ruler on the throne in Kabul. (In this context, it may be worth recalling that the Qadiriyya *pīrs* of eastern Afghanistan had remained loyal to ex-King Amanullah much longer than other spiritual leaders, presumably because of his pan-Islamic attitude (see Chapter 4). And by now it was clear that the Musahibans had no intentions of

displaying any form of pan-Islamic solidarity). For this undertaking, the Shami *Pīr* got the cooperation of the *Faqīr* of Ipi, a prominent Qadiriyya *pīr* in Waziristan, who was very anti-British, and together they managed to raise a force of several thousand tribesmen, mainly Wazir and Suleiman Khel Ghilzai, to launch an attack in Khost. However, just as the situation was getting serious for the Kabul government, the British intervened, managing to buy off the Shami *Pīr* with £20,000 and send him back to Damascus, whereby the whole campaign was foiled.²⁸

With the outbreak of World War II, the *Faqīr* of Ipi, *Hājji* Mirza Ali *Khān*, who had led many Wazir attacks, again came to the fore. He had established himself in a base in Waziristan with a considerable armed force and reportedly also had an arms 'factory'. Germans and Italians sought contact with him, supplying him with arms and money to keep up the hostilities so that the British forces would be tied down on the Frontier.²⁹

World War II also brought up the issue of Afghan neutrality once again and the Axis powers made overtures to the Afghan government similar to those made during World War I. The British – and Russians – were closely following these developments and the British visualized a complete re-enactment of the Silk Letter Conspiracy: Obaidullah Sindhi had just returned to India (after 24 years of exile) and was reportedly, through Deoband connections, trying to re-establish old *muhājir* contacts in Kabul; Mahendra Pratap was in Japan; there were Germans, Italians and Indians in Kabul; and von Hentig had become German Ambassador to Afghanistan! The British also saw all this in connection with pro-Amanullah activities, and visualized major disturbances at the Frontier – 'though the Haji of Turangzai is dead his sons are alive and active'.³⁰ However, history did not repeat itself and all this remained a speculative British nightmare. In spite of anti-British feelings both in Afghanistan and on the Frontier, as well as pressure from the Axis powers on whom Afghanistan had become both financially and technically dependent for their development programmes, a Loya Jirga in 1941 solidly confirmed the government's policy of neutrality.³¹

However, the old spirit was not completely lost. A case in point is the first Kashmir War in 1948 between independent India and Pakistan, which in Pakistan was seen as a *jihād* for the liberation of the Muslim brethren from infidel (Hindu) rule – an appeal to which the Frontier tribesmen responded enthusiastically and in great numbers. In Afghanistan, the Jamī'yat al-'Ulamā issued a *fatwā* to the effect that the Kashmir War was not a *jihād* in its true sense and had no Islamic

legitimation – a true sign of how far the *‘ulamā* was identified with the Afghan state, which was interested in maintaining good relations with India – while the Durand line and Pashtunistan had become ‘issues’ with Pakistan as soon as the British withdrew from the Subcontinent. However, in spite of the *fatwā*, there was dissension among the Afghan *‘ulamā* on this issue – the *Ḥaẓrat Ṣāhib* of Shor Bazaar could not deny pan-Islamism to this extent, nor his followers among the Frontier tribesmen, and defied the *fatwā*, condemning it in public and urged the Afghans to join the *jihād* for the liberation of their Muslim brothers in Kashmir.³²

Not until the 1950s did domestic issues again take on a religious dimension when the state, under Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud, started spearheading social reforms (while holding back political reforms). The *‘ulamā* and tribes experienced the first encroachments upon their established positions and privileges since the 1920s. This took the form of abolition of the veil as well as enforcement of land taxation.

At the celebration of *Jashn* in 1959, Prime Minister Daoud, other members of the royal family, the cabinet and high-ranking officers appeared at the celebrations, without any prior announcement, with their wives and daughters unveiled. In response, a delegation of religious leaders had an audience with Daoud *Khān* in which they accused him of being un-Islamic and introducing infidel ways into Afghanistan. The Prime Minister informed the delegation that veiling was going to be a voluntary matter and if they could find incontrovertible justification for purdah and the veil in Islamic Law, he would be the very first to reimpose purdah on his womenfolk. Daoud *Khān* was on theologically firm ground here as the Qurʿān, *ḥadīth* and Hanafi code do not specifically prescribe the veil but rather decency in dress and behaviour. The mullahs did not take up the challenge and the public agitation which followed was quelled immediately with imprisonment of the leaders. Among the chief legal advisers of Daoud *Khān* were some of the graduates from the Faculty of *Sharīʿa* – such as Mohammad Moosa Shafiq Kamawi, whose father *Mawlawī* Ibrahim Kamawi was a member of the *Jamiʿyat al-‘Ulamā* – who had also studied at Al-Azhar and supplemented their education with studies of secular law abroad (Dupree 1973: 530-533).

Suddenly the tribes also had to face unexpected initiatives from the state. Since the time of Ahmad Shah Durrani, landowners in Kandahar had been exempted from paying the (extremely low) land tax. Whenever subsequent rulers attempted to collect the land tax, the landlords took *bast* (sanctuary) in the *Da Jami Khirqa-i Sharīf Zīyārat*

until the exasperated governor gave up the tax claim. In 1959, this annual tableau was abruptly ended when armed police blocked the way to the sanctuary in the mosque. Public riots of an anti-government nature started but were immediately and forcefully put down by the police and army (Dupree 1973: 536-537).

It is significant that no religious leader seems to have lent support to tribal disturbances during these three decades. Neither from the Safi Rebellion (1945-46),³³ the Mangal unrest (1959), nor from the above troubles in Kandahar are there any reports indicating that the tribesmen obtained religious sanction for their struggle against the state, which increasingly asserted itself in all corners of society. In the relationship between tribes and state, which was not as yet always peaceful, the *‘ulamā* now sided with the state.

The reason for this may not only be that the clergy itself had become part of the state, but also that the new reformist policy of the Afghan state in the 1950s was pursued in the spirit of *Amīr* Abdur Rahman: Prime Minister Daoud *Khān* only attempted to carry out reforms which could be enforced through the use of the repressive state apparatus, i.e. the police and military, quite unlike King Amanullah who took the reform battle to the ideological field without being able to support his ideas with physical force.

Yet another factor played a role – the fact that the ideological climate in Afghanistan had changed considerably during the previous three decades. Not only had the economic development and an expanded secular educational system produced a growing urban middle class with a far more liberal outlook than was the case in the 1920s but the debate relating to the abolition of the veil also indicates that among religiously trained people the outlook had also changed. The theological debate regarding whether veiling was compulsory according to the Holy Scriptures should in principle have been the same in the 1920s, but while hardly anyone at that time paid any heed to such theological subtleties (see chapter 5), in 1959 they actually closed the whole issue. The popular religious discourse, which throughout the period 1880-1930 had been dominated by the concept of *jihād*, had changed after the pan-Islamic fervour had died out and the legitimacy of the ruler was unchallenged. While any existing custom by definition was assumed to be supported by religion (see Chapter 2), the Musahiban dynasty's policy of gradual modernization, in which the *Jamī‘yat al-‘Ulamā* had been assigned the role as religious guarantor, opened the gates for a religious discourse of more scriptural character. This change in religious discourse may possibly also be ascribed to a generally higher level of scriptural learning

among the religious personnel as a result of the massive build-up of new government *madrāsas*. It was accompanied by a gradual replacement of the *pīr*, whose position depended upon the veneration of his followers, by the *‘ālim*, who owed his education and employment to the government.

Notes

- 1 In his campaign, Nadir *Khān* appealed much more to nationalism, fatherland and national (Pashtun) honour than to religious values (M. Ali 1933: Ch. X).
- 2 "...the policy of Nadir Shah has been of infinite service [to the Government of India]... In any case, the restoration of Amanullah Khan would almost certainly be followed by a revival of Afghan intrigue among the frontier tribes, such as has been abandoned by the present Afghan Government..." (British Legation, Kabul, 1933, in R/12/19 317/II) .
- 3 Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State, London, 15.05.1935, R/12/20 317/III.
- 4 R/12/43, No. 383, 1930.
- 5 R/12/22, File No. 334-R, 1930.
- 6 R/12/43, No. 383, 1930.
- 7 R/12/34, No. 361, Pt. 1, 1930.
- 8 The killing of Nadir *Shāh* was connected to a feud inside the royal family between the 'Musahibans' and the Charkhi family, who were pro-Amanullah. See Dupree (1973), Fletcher (1965), Fraser-Tytler (1967) and Poullada (1973).
- 9 Outline of the Foreign Policy of Present Afghan Government. From Sir S. Hoare to Lt.-Col. Fraser-Tytler, Kabul. R/12/20317/III (Confidential, June 1935)
- 10 The English text of the Constitution can be found in Moltmann (1982) – who has reproduced it from H.M. Davis: *Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of States in the Near and Middle East*. Duke University Press, Durham, N.C. 1953. Originally, the Constitution was published in the *Islah* magazine in Kabul, 22 November 1931. English translation in 'British and Foreign State Papers', vol. 134, 1931, London. For further discussion of the 1931 Constitution, see Dupree (1973), Gregorian (1969), Kamali (1985) and Moltmann (1982).
- 11 Kamali (1985: 36) thus also holds that naming the new constitution as *Usūlnāma* (Code of Principles) was a deliberate attempt to play down the role of statutory law in comparison to *Shari‘a*.
- 12 R/12/43, No. 383, 1930.
- 13 R/12/43, No. 383, 1930.
- 14 Kamali (1985) discusses this subject in detail and presents a number of related legal cases. Many anthropological case studies throughout the 1960s and 1970s describe the extravagant marriage ceremonies – see for example the articles on marriages in *FOLK*, vol. 24, 1982.
- 15 Nadir *Shāh*'s 18-year old son Mohammad Zahir was elected king after his father's death, but his paternal uncles were the *de facto* rulers in the position as prime ministers: Mohammad Hashim (1933-46) and Shah Mahmood (1946-53). In 1953, the King's cousin, Mohammad Daoud *Khān* became

- Prime Minister, and it was after he resigned in 1963 that Zahir *Shāh* became *de facto* ruler himself.
- 16 The composition of the Jami'iyat al-^oUlamā is not completely clear. Mr Ningarhari states (interview, Peshawar, Nov. 1986) that it had a total of 20 members (which is confirmed in Grevemeyer 1987: 180), who were selected by the religious leaders from each province, and that the King had the right to include supplementary members. The tenure of the Jami'iyat was not fixed. Other informants, however, tell that the Jami'iyat did not have a fixed number of members, and altogether included some 30-40 persons. *Miān Gul* of Tagab (Mohammad Sharif, alias *Bādshāh Gul*, son of Mullah Hamidullah of Tagab), was elected as permanent President of the Jami'iyat al-^oUlamā, but deputed Mullah Bozurg (also from the Tagab area) to act for him (L./P&S/20/B220, 1940.)
 - 17 *Salnāma-ye majaleh-ye Kābul* (1311 A.H./1932: 107), from Grevemeyer (1987: 180-181).
 - 18 See Adamec's (1975) genealogical charts for the family.
 - 19 Shahmahmood Miakhel, Peshawar, personal communication, July 1987.
 - 20 Mr Gulab Ningarhari, personal communication, Peshawar, November 1986. See also Edwards 1986b.
 - 21 For an analysis of the parallel process whereby the rural upper class became integrated into the state administration as 'mediators' between the bureaucracy and the population at large, see Grevemeyer (1987).
 - 22 In the period 1869-1979, a total of 109 Afghans graduated from Deoband (Rizvi 1980: 340).
 - 23 At *Dār ul-^oUlum Deoband*, the events in Afghanistan had been closely followed and the coronation of Nadir *Shāh* had already been celebrated with a congratulatory function. Equally, on the eve of his death, a meeting of condolence of his 'martyrdom' was held (Rizvi 1980).
 - 24 Personal communication, Peshawar, November 1986.
 - 25 For further details on the educational system, see for example Area Handbook of Afghanistan (1973), Gregorian (1969) and Klimburg (1966).
 - 26 Gregorian (1969: 335, 378), Dupree (1973: 477-479).
 - 27 See Dupree (1973: 510-511) for the Afghan and the American versions of the American 'refusal' to give military aid to Afghanistan.
 - 28 Adamec 1975: 175-77, Fletcher 1965: 239.
 - 29 R/12/119. No. 208/41, 1941-47. Gregorian 1969: 384, Hauner 1981.
 - 30 L./P&S/12/1760, 1939.
 - 31 R/12/43, No. 383, 1930-1944.
 - 32 S. Shpoon 1983, unpubl. manuscript.
 - 33 The Safi Rebellion has attracted little attention from scholars and researchers, but according to contemporary British sources, the rebellion was caused by the Afghan government's attempt to impose conscription, disagreements over certain *shirkat* arrangements (i.e. trading monopolies granted to Afghan merchant companies) and the fact that leaders of the Eastern provinces were put under surveillance from Kabul. It was also reported that 'the three *Bādshāh* Guls (i.e. grandsons of the *Akhund* of Swat) were active in support of the Kabul government' while the Gul *Sāhib* of Babra was secretly urging his followers in Chaharmung and Bajaur to support the Safis. 'However, further evidence of this has not been found' (L./P&S/12/1750, Coll. 3/153, 1936-46).

The Struggle for Political Reform (1950s–1970s)

During the Musahiban period, the role of the state in society had changed and the state apparatus had been greatly expanded, coming to exert control over hitherto independent social fields. One aspect of this was the build-up of what Althusser has called the ideological state apparatuses, the most important of which was the educational system, where it simultaneously assumed the character of polity expansion (e.g. establishment of a secular educational system) and polity dominance secularization (e.g. establishment of government-controlled educational institutions while undermining the influence of the independent *madrasas*). The institutional build-up was geared to the needs of the modern state and the public sector in which most of the new middle class found employment. This state-dominance in development became even further pronounced after the 1950s, where the state also took over a leading role in the economic development.

While the Constitution of 1931 had partly confirmed the influence of the traditional power groups in Afghan society, the general economic development and the expansion of the domains of the state led to the consolidation of new urban groups who ultimately asserted their claims to a share in the political power through constitutional reforms. The ideological paradigms (tribal and classic Islamic) on which the Constitution of 1931 implicitly rested were thus challenged and the discourse on the future shape of the Afghan state and society was now dominated by various sections of the new urban elite, culminating in the formulation of the new constitutions of 1964 and 1977.

Socio-Economic Development

Afghan development policy during the period 1880-1919 could be described as mercantilistic in the sense that economic development was geared first of all to the needs and consolidation of the state. During the Amanullah era, attempts had been made to formulate the framework for private economic enterprises but it was with the protection of private property in the 1931 Constitution (Articles 12, 15

and 17) that the foundation for the development of a market economy first was laid (Sarwari 1974: 125). After the onset of the Great Depression, attempts were made to replace the hitherto dominant Indian merchant and finance capital with Afghan capital and, particularly after 1930, a considerable expansion took place in the commercial sector. First of all, a National Bank (*Bank-i Milli*) was founded in 1934, then a considerable number of *shirkat* joint-stock companies were started. In the *shirkat* or monopoly system, the government controlled 40-45 percent of stocks in a company (although seldom investing that percentage of capital) whereas the private sector kept 55-60 percent of the stock. The *shirkat* system came into being in order to control production, to guarantee investment capital and profits to investors, as well as to provide the government with an easy source of income (Dupree 1973: 472-473).

A *laissez-faire* policy was followed whereby the state undertook the establishment of communication lines and infrastructure in the country, securing credits and promoting export, while the rest was left to private initiative. The economic policy thus nurtured the growth of a national merchant bourgeoisie, but did not benefit the producers who even experienced decreasing profits because of the monopolistic policies. Only to a limited extent were the profits of trade invested in productive enterprises, most instead being invested in further commercial activities or landed property, transferred abroad or turned into luxury consumption. Moreover, the liberal trade policy of the government during the 1930s and 1940s meant that hardly any local industry could be started or survive in view of the competition from imported products. As a result, the economic stratification of society widened with decreasing terms of trade for agricultural producers and a deteriorating standard of living for the urban population (Cervin 1952: 410-13). With the prime ministership passing over to *Sardār* Mohammad Daoud in 1953, the *laissez-faire* policy was replaced by the 'guided economy' concept with five-year development plans, etc. The state became the vehicle of social and economic development, the bureaucratic apparatus expanded but, apart from a short liberalization at the end of the 1940s, no parallel political development took place.

Within the rural sector, cash cropping had been expanding in certain parts of the country, for example cotton in the north as raw material for the incipient textile industry, and investment in landed property was steadily growing. This trend was strengthened, particularly after the 1950s, with the setback for the export trade from post-war stagnation. The result was increasing stratification in the

rural sector and a gradual undermining of the importance of tribal and community-based relations. Since an increase in land tax had to be passed by a Loya Jirga, no adjustments had taken place for years and land tax was extremely low.

While big landowners and the commercial bourgeoisie had profited considerably from the economic policy, the growing group of bureaucrats and civil servants with a Western-style education could only exert political influence through high positions in the executive branches of government. However, the development of the educational system was not harmonious, as the increase in students applying for university grew faster than the number seeking schooling. In addition, although the public sector experienced a drastic expansion, particularly after Daoud *Khān*'s premiership in 1953, the number of graduates exceeded the employment possibilities, particularly because the private sector with few productive enterprises only offered limited employment opportunities. Reardon thus informs that in 1962 the modern educated middle class comprised some 7,000 people of whom 93 percent were employed by the state (Reardon 1969: 171). The result was unemployment among highly educated people, alienation of students and frustrated ambitions, plus a growing distance between the academic elite and the population (Sarwari 1974: 166-167). All this added up to a growing pressure on the monarch for political reforms and a representative form of government.

Demand for Political Liberalization

The slow but steady growth of the urban middle class necessarily meant that it began nurturing ambitions for political change in terms of parliamentary democracy and increased civil rights. While Nadir *Shāh*, by including a number of the Young Afghans in the government, had managed to silence their opposition, throughout the 1930s and 1940s there continued to be reports on both 'pro-Amanist' and 'constitutional/republican' groups. In connection with World War II, the British surveyed the Afghan scene for such potentially 'subversive' groups which presumably could be plotting against the Afghan state and its neutralist policy. It was thus reported that a 'Young Afghan' group still existed, mostly consisting of young people educated in Europe or at the French and German schools in Kabul, graduates from the Technical and Medical Colleges plus a fairly large number of military officers trained in Turkey.¹ The main issues supported by these 'Young Afghans' were said to be:

- rapid westernization of life and manners
- replacement of old people with young people in positions of authority
- discarding of socio-religious forms and observances plus the destruction of the influence of religious leaders
- spread of nationalism, isolationism and territorial expansionist forms
- fusion of different races and tribes into one homogeneous whole under the domination of the modernist youth

A considerable number of high-ranking bureaucrats (listed by name in this report) supposedly belonged to the 'Young Afghans', which included people from 'different races and walks of life'. The party was most strongly represented in Kabul and Herat and weakest in places like Kandahar, where the Pashtuns were numerically dominant. Many of the 'Young Afghans' had earlier been pro-Amanullah but, since the younger generation of the royal (Musahiban) family now supported the movement, pro-Amanist feelings were waning.

A 'Republican Party' had also been in existence for some years and, although these two groups were not mutually exclusive, the Republican Party drew its main support from Tajiks and non-Durrani Pashtuns.² The demand for parliamentary democracy was its main issue as can be seen in the following list (*ibid*):

- increased control of the National Council over government
- free elections to the National Council
- National Council to have some control over the appointment of ministers and over the budget
- disagreement with the laissez-faire economic policy

The first sign of political liberalization came in 1949 when Prime Minister Shah Mahmud allowed comparatively free elections to the National Assembly, leading to the election of a major group of constitutionalists from among the urban intelligentsia.³ This 'Liberal Parliament' passed a law permitting freedom of the press, unleashing a whole wave of newspapers – all in opposition to the ruling regime – and political groupings both in parliament and at the university were formed, pressing for further political liberalization. When attacks on members of the ruling clique grew more vigorous, with increasing reference being made to 'religious fanaticism' as inhibiting progress and modernization, the government in 1952 retracted, banning all non-government newspapers and arresting a number of leading liberals (Dupree 1973, 1979). This was followed by an internal coup in

1953, whereby *Sardār* Mohammad Daoud replaced his uncle Shah Mahmud as Prime Minister. A number of reformist-minded people were included in high government positions, signalling a more active development policy in social and economic matters and strengthening the state sector vis-à-vis the private sector but shelving all ideas of political liberalization. However, after a decade (1953-63) of socio-economic reforms and expansion of education, the urban middle class had grown even stronger so that it also became imperative to accommodate its wish for political reforms.

'Modernization' and Nationalism

In 1929, the overthrow of King Amanullah had been a setback for the small 'modernist' urban elite with liberal aspirations, but its existence and continuous growth was reflected in the following years through the works of writers, poets and historians, i.e. a new ideological discourse developed among the educated urban middle class. It followed in the tradition of Mahmud Tarzi and the modernists of the 1920s, regarding modernization as the prescription for an Afghan renaissance and spiritual renewal.

From the 1950s onwards, the outlook of this 'nationalist' elite became more and more representative of the educated urban middle class, consisting primarily of bureaucrats and civil servants, among whom the concept of an Afghan national identity above the tribal and ethnic divisions gained ground. Modernist and nationalist sentiments were clearly reflected in Afghan historiography in which the ideological principles of the modernization policies formed the criteria according to which historical material was interpreted, i.e. the aspirations for Afghanistan's future became decisive for the interpretation of the past.⁴ The key issues were here the consolidation of the state (by the Pashtuns), anti-colonialism and 'nation-building'. Thus the existence of Afghanistan as a well-demarcated entity long before 1747 was 'proven',⁵ as was the struggle of the 'Nation' and the 'People' against foreign domination. Thus historical figures like the Pashtun 'warrior-poet', Khushhal Khan Khattak (1613-1689) – who spent his life fighting Moghul encroachment – and *Mir* Wais Hotaki – the Hotaki Ghilzai chieftain who led a successful rising against Gorgin Khan, the Persian governor of Kandahar, in 1709 and governed Kandahar until his death in 1715 – were presented as pioneers of Afghan (i.e. 'Pashtun') nationalism on the basis of their struggle against Moghul and Safavid domination (see for example Kābuli 1967).

With the focus on the consolidation and functioning of the Afghan state as decisive for the survival of the Afghan nation as an entity, it followed almost invariably – particularly in view of the events of 1929 – that Islam either was not incorporated in the discourse or was seen as a force to be harnessed or controlled by the state, if (as later on) it was not seen as an outright impediment to progress. A parallel can today be found in the writings of Afghans stressing the inalienable Islamic character of the Afghan nation during the ages (see for example Khattak 1986).

Within modern Dari and Pashto literature, realism was gaining ground with themes often including depiction of the negative effects of ‘outlived’ social and religious customs and superstitions. The general ‘rationalistic’ mood of the literary circles and the modern elite at the time is captured in the following poem by the Pashto poet, Gul Pacha Ulfat:

Give me wealth of heart and eyes,
 Keep the world with you;
 Do not give delicious food,
 That I cannot chew.
 What I want is inspiration
 For purposeful deeds.
 Fairies and the Paradise
 Are least of all my needs.
 Sacrifice of Abraham
 To me you can repeat.
 With sermons of fear, O priest
 My doubts you cannot meet.

(from Wilson 1969:91)

The failure in the 1920s to launch modernist Islamic interpretations as the basis for development of the state and nation had thus marginalized Islam in relation to the discourse on socio-economic justice and political liberalization, which were the main issues in the following decades. In a historical sketch in *The Kabul Times Annual* from 1967, Kābuli (1967: 80) presented a picture of a linear, progressive development in Afghanistan – omitting any specific reference to King Amanullah or the reasons for his overthrow – passing from the ‘enlightened’ *Amīr* Habibullah to the Musahiban dynasty with the following words:

Progress was interrupted by a brief but serious unrest in 1929, but was resumed under the reign of His Late Majesty Mohammad Nadir Shah...(*ibid*)

Instead, Pashtun nationalism was flourishing. The common origin for Farsi and Pashto was traced and so was the particular old age of Pashto – even the Avesta and the earliest Vedas were seen as masterpieces of Afghan/Pashto literature. On top of this came the first modern literary attempts in the Pashto language. Even Farsi, the lingua franca of the country, became subject to Afghan nationalism. There began a general promotion of the Pashto language at the expense of Farsi – previously dominant in the educational and administrative system (Gregorian 1969: Ch. 13) – and the term ‘Dari’ for the Afghan version of Farsi came into common use, being officially adopted in 1958. The use of this term was an attempt at establishing a uniquely Afghan identity for the language, although the literary form of the language closely resembles standard Farsi (Wilson 1969: 84). This tendency to equate Afghan nationalism with Pashtun nationalism also dated back to King Amanullah’s vision of the modern nation state.

The cause of Afghan nationalism among intellectuals was supported and encouraged by the Afghan government. An article in *The Kabul Times Annual* from 1967 on constitutional development in Afghanistan is indicative of this. The introductory paragraph reads as follows:

Constitutionalism in Afghanistan is a deeply rooted tradition that dates back 5000 years to the jirgahs of the Bokhdi civilization. These jirgahs, which were instruments of consultation, acted as courts of law, applying cultural and moral values to settle disputes; decided important issues relating to the jirgah participants, particularly the question of war and peace; and also assembled for the purpose of electing kings. (Rahel 1967: 15)

From the middle of the 1930s, the Ministry of Education, various semi-official publications and newly-established organizations like the Historical Institute and *Pashto Tulana* (Pashto Academy) were instrumental in studies of Afghan culture and the study and promotion of the Pashto language.⁶ At a later stage, *Pashto Tulana* became involved in ‘language purification’, i.e. the development of Pashto concepts to replace existing Farsi words commonly used. Moreover, according to Article 35 of the Constitution of 1964, “it is the duty of the State to prepare and implement an effective program for the development and strengthening of the national language, Pashtu”. All these efforts were comparable with cultural ‘nation-building’ efforts in a number of new states in the post-colonial area (*ibid*).

In Afghanistan, these attempts also reflected that times were changing. Although the Pashtuns as the biggest ethnic group in the

country had been militarily and politically dominant since 1747, this Pashtun state had to a considerable extent been administered by Farsiwans. However, the social and economic development, and the government policy of building boarding schools and providing stipends for Frontier students, now brought an increasing number of Pashtuns into the urban setting where they began to play their part in the economic, administrative, educational and general cultural life, and started challenging the dominant position of Farsi as the national language. These developments involved and affected rather narrow circles of the intellectual urban elite but set a trend which has been followed with undiminished fervour till today.

The Constitution of 1964


The 1964 Constitution was an attempt to accommodate the Afghan state and Constitution to the changing socio-economic structure of the society, i.e. to provide a legal framework for the government in accordance with notions of legitimacy of power among the new middle class. It was passed by a Loya Jirga in 1964, signalling the end of authoritarian rule and establishing the framework for a parliamentary democracy.⁷

The Constitution formally turned Afghanistan into a modern, democratic nation state. The tripartite division of power was prescribed and so was the establishment of a parliament consisting of a Senate (Meshrano Jirga) and a National Assembly (Wolesi Jirga). The latter was elected via free, secret and direct elections (general suffrage now being granted to men and women). The Senate was constituted by one third of members being appointed by the King, the rest comprising one representative from each Provincial Council and one representative directly elected from each province.

The demands for constitutionalism, securing of civil rights and freedom of the press (granted in 1965) and equality of all citizens including women, which had been the main demands of the urban classes, were fulfilled. However, the King retained the ultimate right to dissolve Parliament if and when it was deemed necessary. Article 1 stated that sovereignty belonged to the nation, personified by the King (Article 6) and that Parliament manifested the will of the People and represented the whole nation (Article 41). The King was to take the oath to protect Islam, guard the Constitution, and protect the independence and integrity of Afghanistan and the laws of the country and the rights of the people (Article 15).

The Constitution was worked out on a Western, particularly French, model and a French constitutional expert acted as adviser for the Constitutional Committee.⁸ Regarding the legitimacy of power, the Constitution thus reflected clearly Western concepts.

Figure 17: Model of the transfer of the legitimacy of power in the 1964 Constitution



While the legitimacy of the Mohammadzai rulers in the population at large was no doubt still rooted in tribal and religious notions, no attention was paid to this in the Constitution, apart from maintaining the King as protector of Islam (Article 7). With its concepts of popular sovereignty (Articles 1 and 41) and parliamentary democracy, the question of legitimacy was handled entirely with the educated urban classes in mind (by now anyway they constituted the biggest challenge to the state and the monarchy, not because of their number but because of their vital role in the functioning of the state):

Sovereignty in Afghanistan belongs to the nation... (Article 1)

The Shura [Parliament] in Afghanistan manifests the will of the people and represents the whole will of the nation. The people of Afghanistan participate through the Shura in the political life of the country... (Article 41)

The Shura consists of two houses:
Wolesi Jirgah (House of the People)
Meshrano Jirgah (House of the Elders) (Article 42)

Members of the Wolesi Jirgah (House of the People) shall be elected by the people of Afghanistan in a free, universal, secret and direct election, in accordance with the provisions of the law... (Article 43)

The Western ideological heritage of the Afghan constitutionalists was thus clear, but the Constitution also displayed an attempt to harmonize the secular thoughts with Islam. While Islam was stated to be the religion of Afghanistan and religious rites of the state should be performed according to the Hanafi doctrine, religious freedom was granted to all citizens (Article 2). Islamic Law became secondary to secular law, although cases where no secular laws applied were referred to Hanafi Shari'ah as a last resort (Article 69), *within* the limitations set forth in the Constitution (Article 102). However, Article 64 stated that no law should be repugnant to the basic principles of Islam and the other values embodied in the Constitution, which was sufficient to convince most of the religious leaders in the Loya Jirga to pass Article 69.

The only challenge to the implicit assumption that the Constitution had to be formed on the Western model apparently came from Mohammad Shah Irshad in his book, *Demokrassiy-i Islam*. M.A. Khan (1980: 11) points out that this book was the only one published in 1964 on the constitutional issue. It was written from a purely religious point of view, referring to Brotherhood, Trust, *Shawra* (council, i.e. popular representation) and Justice as pillars of the system of administration under the Prophet and the early caliphs of Islam, and that this system could 'well be revived if earnestly desired by the present society.

The fact that the Constitution basically turned Afghanistan into a secular state was hardly wasted on the not insignificant number of religious leaders participating in the Loya Jirga, who raised objections to many of the articles. Dupree, who gives the most detailed description of the constitutional debates, thus states:

Conservative religious leaders attending the Loya Jirga were argued down point by point by the finely trained Afghan mullah-cum-lawyers. In addition, the King held interviews with those conservatives who continued to fight various secular-oriented articles. A combination of flattery, cajolery, and partly veiled threats won over most recalcitrants. Some never wavered in their opposition, however. (Dupree 1973: 573)

In general, most of the religious leaders limited their comments to technical points in the Constitution, and Dupree (*ibid*) argues that the background for this timid attitude can be found, firstly, in former Prime Minister Daoud's harsh treatment of the religious opposition and, secondly, because of the well-qualified, religious-trained but liberal-minded members of the Constitutional Committee, like

Mohammad Moosa Shafiq (Director of the Law Department in the Ministry of Justice under Daoud) and *Sayyid* Shamsuddin Majrooh (Minister of Justice during Daoud's regime). This situation represented a continuation of the state trying to push forward reforms with 'loyalist' *ʿulamā* warding off religiously based criticism from 'traditionalist' *ʿulamā*, as had been the case both under *Amīr* Abdur Rahman *Khān* and King Amanullah. However, Moosa Shafiq and Shamsuddin Majrooh also reflected the transformation of the old religious elite into the new 'modern' elite: Mohammad Moosa Shafiq's father, *Mawlawī* Ibrahim Kamawi, was participating in the Loya Jirga as a member of the *Jamīʿyat al-ʿUlamā* and *Sayyid* Shamsuddin Majrooh's father was the Tegari Pacha *Ṣāhib*, one of the *khalīfas* of the *Hadda-i Ṣāhib*.

Regarding the judiciary, the group of conservative religious leaders defended the old system of *Sharīʿa* courts, while 'government mullahs' argued in favour of the independent judiciary of the constitution.⁹ More important, however, seems to have been the severe attack – launched by the many other delegates of the Loya Jirga – on the *qāzī* and the existing judicial system for injustices, corruption, etc. At that time, a case could be treated both by a *Sharīʿa* court and by the Provincial Council which would apply secular law, resulting in confusion, lack of consistency and hence loss of prestige for the *qāzī* and the whole judicial system. Among the principal aims of the judicial reforms of the Constitution was uniformity in judicial practice, organization and court procedure. A unified system of national courts replaced the previous judiciary (by the 1967 Law of Judicial Authority and Organization), which meant that all cases were referred to the *qāzī* but secular law had supremacy. The debate displayed the depth of popular dissatisfaction which reflected badly on the religious leaders and Dupree (*ibid.*: 583) implies that this cooled down the zeal of the religious members of the Loya Jirga in opposing other secularizing clauses of the Constitution.

Magnus (1974) argues that the Constitution relegated Islam to the status of a moral guide and standard but not a detailed legal code. While the intention of at least some of the founders of the Constitution no doubt was the gradual replacement of *Sharīʿa* with statutory law, this by no means became the case. Kamali (1985: 42), by scrutinizing the laws enacted after the 1964 Constitution, finds that, for example, the Guiding Rules on Criminal Affairs of 1971 merely consolidated the *Sharīʿa* law of crime into codified form, and the same was the case with the Civil Code of 1977 and to a large extent with the Penal Code of 1977. Article 2, requiring that no law should be repugnant to the

basic principles of Islam, had provided for continuous later debate between reformists and conservatives on what was to be considered as 'basic' and 'subsidiary' principles of Islam. As a result of this, the Marriage Law of 1971, for example, left out the question of marriageable age and polygamy and only touched upon the question of divorce. Thus the anti-reformists utilized Article 2 to their advantage but, as a result, strictly speaking the Marriage Law did not live up to the Constitution's vision for equality between the sexes (Kamali 1985: 47-48).

The attempt to harmonize Islam with the secular objectives of the Constitution thus raised more problems than it solved. There were also areas where the two schools of thought could scarcely be reconciled – as, for example, in the case of the clause on citizens' equality, also the requirement of legality in criminal law and the parallel principle which inhibited the imposition of punishment contradictory to human dignity found in Articles 25 and 26 (*ibid*: 21).¹⁰ The principle of legality requires certainty and accuracy in the language of the statute. Kamali points out that Hanafi law, which was the last resort, scarcely fulfilled this requirement, given the plurality of juristic manuals, diversity of juristic opinions and the whole question of which texts and opinions were most authoritative (*ibid*: 45-46). An example of the inherent contradictions now introduced in the judicial system was that the doctrine of *ta'zīr* (deterrence), which had been extensively applied in Afghan courts, in the Hanafi law grants the *qāzī* wide discretionary powers to order punishment in accordance with the individual circumstances of the case. In the words of Ghobar (1968: 794), the judge was free to issue any punishment 'ranging from a mere ear-pulling to death'! The principle of legality of the 1964 Constitution presumably would disallow such a measure of discretion, but nevertheless, the *ta'zīr* penalties continued to be applied in certain fields (Kamali 1985: 46-47).

The aspirations of the educated elite and their unwavering belief in 'Progress', embodied in the new constitution, was clearly expressed in a speech delivered on Radio Afghanistan by Prime Minister Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal on 24 August 1966 in which he wished 'to inform the intellectuals and progressive and patriotic elements about the salient features of the reforms which emanate from the political philosophy of "Progressive Democracy"'. In his preamble, Maiwandwal addressed 'the sons and *daughters*' [my emphasis] of the country, urging national solidarity and the unity of all Afghan citizens 'in the struggle against all kinds of discrimination, selfishness, tribalism, regionalism, fanaticism, despotism, reaction and exploitation'. To achieve this a 'national crusade was proclaimed

in accordance with the principles of Islam, constitutional monarchy, nationalism, democracy and socialism' to introduce reforms. 'Nation-building' and 'Progress' were the underlying concepts in Maiwandwal's address and, to achieve this, general education was of great importance:

We believe that the education and training of children and the young generation is of basic importance for understanding Islamic, national, and democratic values and for the preservation of order, respect for law, co-operation and sacrifice for the progress of society. (Maiwandwal: xxxii)

Education was thus no longer argued as being in accordance with Islam, but seen as a precondition for *understanding* Islam - presumably for understanding Islam in a way which would make it compatible with national values and the interests of the state. In cultural affairs, 'a struggle should be launched against superstition and backwardness' and in the use of mass media 'the ill effects of ideas contrary to national interests and culture' should be prevented 'so that no obstacle should stand in the way of the steady political, economic, social, cultural and spiritual progress of our people' (*ibid*: xxxiv).

Afghanistan had a constitution in accordance with the visions and aspirations of the urban, educated middle class, which controlled the cabinet and bureaucracy, while the legislature retained a considerably more conservative outlook. As the King held back his approval of the Political Parties Law, the cooperation between legislature and cabinet never got on a proper footing, resulting in increasing chaos and lack of political direction and decision-making. One may even go so far as to say that the Parliament just became a new forum for the old power struggles between religious, tribal and rural leaders with an added minor group of urban liberals. In the words of Weinbaum (1977:110), the *wakīls* (members of Parliament) were behaving vis-à-vis the government as brokers of personal and particular matters rather than as law-makers, which was a political culture suitable to an autocratic regime but not to the realization of the Afghan middle class's vision of parliamentary democracy.

At the first elections in 1965, only some 15-20 percent of eligible electors voted, and the composition of the Parliament showed little difference from that of the past with a high proportion of traditional leaders and local notables. All but a few *wakīls* were identifiable as *khāns*, *maliks* (village headmen), religious leaders, prosperous merchants, teachers and minor government officials – as Weinbaum (*ibid*) observes, all roles traditionally suited to mediating activity.

While the vast majority of the National Assembly could, according to Weinbaum, be classified as either *entrepreneurs*, utilizing their privileged status to the promotion of their private interests, or as *agents*, acting as nearly full-time intermediaries for parochial interests, at most some twenty members viewed themselves as *national* representatives. And even within this group, Weinbaum sees less than half as committed constitutionalists while he labels the rest as *ideologues* (religious, Marxist or ultra-nationalist) for whom the National Assembly was a useful platform to introduce their ideas to the public and pressurize the policy makers (*ibid*:115). Thus, even forty years after King Amanullah presented his vision of Afghanistan as a nation-state composed of free and equal citizens, the vast majority of people still maintained tribal and community-based identities and, politically, acted accordingly.¹¹

It was the so-called ideologues who came to dominate the political debate both within and outside Parliament as the New Democracy failed to meet the expectations of the people. After more than thirty years during which the main political issues had centred around economic policy, etc., the constitutional provisions of free speech and civil rights had set the stage for new and open contests between ideological paradigms, and Islam once again became a major issue.

The Re-Entry of Islam into Afghan Politics

As member of Parliament, I attended three Loya Jirgas – in 1955, 1962 and 1964. Religious issues were not discussed at the ordinary sessions of Parliament but only at Loya Jirgas – and at the two first Loya Jirgas there were no important religious issues since the laws of the country anyway were based on Shari‘a – and there was a King.¹²

With the new *modus vivendi* established between the state and the religious leaders after 1930, Islam had ceased to be a subject of political debate in Afghanistan. The main political issue had been economic development together with, from the late 1940s, an undercurrent of a growing demand for political liberalization, culminating in the democratic experiment in the 1960s. As the *Demokrassiy-i Naw* failed to deliver the expected results, an emerging social and political crisis could be detected in society, reflected in an increasingly radicalized and polarized political culture outside Parliament (Kakar 1974, 1978). With the comparative freedom of speech and the press, the political struggle took on a new – and public – dimension, affecting wide

sections of the population. In this situation, the general (or assumed) consensus about the position of Islam in Afghan society was broken and radical groups increasingly stressed their divergent views on this issue, thereby bringing Islam back into the political debate.

The Liberal Parliament and the short-lived freedom of the press at the end of the 1940s had already indicated that, while the struggle between religious and secularist forces may have been put to rest in 1929, by no means was it settled. The clash at the beginning of the 1950s between *Hāzrat* of Shor Bazaar, Fazl Omar Mujaddidi, and Ghulam Hassan Safi, belonging to the Wikh-i Zalmayan, proved to be indicative of the coming political confrontations of the 1960s and early 1970s. Ghulam Hassan Safi had published an article in the paper *Neday-i Haq*, in which he criticized the illegal diversion of construction materials designated for a school but used in a building designed for the protection of an alleged hair of the Prophet. The *Hāzrat Sāhib* took exception to this and tried to stir up a public outcry by accusing Safi of blasphemy, demanding that according to Shari'a he be stoned for this sin. A great uproar took place with many mullahs mobilized and the *Hāzrat Sāhib* reportedly tried to mobilize his followers among the Suleiman Khel of Paktya. But Ghulam Hassan Safi also turned to his tribal base, the Safis, for protection and even got support from the respected *Miān Gul Akhundzada* of Tagab, himself a Safi. *Miān Gul Sahib* issued a *fatwā* that the doubts which Ghulam Hassan Safi had expressed (about the authenticity of the Prophet's hair) did *not* make him a *kāfir* (Kakar 1978: 203, Shpoon 1983). Safi, however, was sentenced for blasphemy and imprisoned.

The emancipation of women remained another sore point for the more conservative and religious sections of the population. Although Prime Minister Daoud had managed to abolish the veil and an increasing number of girls were attending university and some were even parading Western-style fashions, it did not mean that it was accepted in religious circles. As a response to this apparent decay of tradition and decency, religious fanatics took action against young unveiled women by throwing acid on them. Unlike the situation in the 1920s when a similar issue concerning women had contributed to the halt of reforms, or as recently as 1959 when a riot took place in Kandahar against the unveiling of women, public sympathy was now on the side of the victims. How much times had changed, however, was also illustrated by the fact that for the first time in Afghanistan, more than 5,000 women took to the streets and demanded punishment for the attackers, who were subsequently tried and given long prison terms (Kakar 1978: 203).

Apart from the fact that Afghan society had changed so much over the past couple of decades that it was now possible for Afghan women to launch a demonstration, another factor also counted: in the paternalistic Afghan ethos, to attack and physically abuse women is considered disgraceful and contrary to the honour of a man. Women, as the weaker sex, were to be guided, controlled and protected - not physically abused. Every woman was somebody's mother/wife/sister/daughter, i.e. representing somebody's *namus* and should not be dishonoured.

Another example will illustrate this point. In 1966 in Parliament, a heated discussion took place regarding how girls' school uniforms should look. The views of more conservative members were strongly ridiculed by the leftist member, Babrak Karmal, who went so far that his opponents lost their temper attacked him physically and wounded him badly. Babrak Karmal's party comrades tried to protect him, including one of the very few female members of Parliament, Dr. Anahita Ratebzad, who also received many kicks and blows. This unbecoming event produced demonstrations in support of the Leftists in the city in which even some religious minded men joined in objection to the indignity shown to a women, even if she was a communist. To lay a hand on a woman was seen as both un-Islamic and un-Pashtun (Khan 1984: 4).

Another significant clash between leftists and the religious occurred when – on 22 April 1970 in the newspaper, *Parcham* – the leftist poet, Bareq Shafiyee, published a poem in celebration of Lenin's birthday centennial. In this he used the word *doroud* normally used for praise of the Prophet (Yousefzai 1974: 170):

For this matchless achievement [the October Revolution]
We send *doroud* to that pioneer party
And to the heroic people
We send *doroud* to that great leader
The Great Lenin

(transl. S. Shpoon)

The public reaction was strong. For several weeks the mullahs of Kabul and the nearby provinces staged huge demonstrations demanding that the government take action against the communists and that the poet be imprisoned. The prime mover of the mullahs' agitation is not known but Khan (1985:6-7) makes a qualified guess that it enjoyed the moral support of *Hazrat* Mohammad Ibrahim Mujaddidi of Shor Bazaar¹³ and Professor Ghulam Mohammad Niazi of the Faculty of Shari'ah. Two delegations of *'ulamā* also presented the

matter to Parliament but did not receive a favourable treatment, upon which a delegation of *‘ulamā*, including both the *Ḥaẓrat* of Shor Bazaar and his relative Sebghatullah Mujaddidi and *Miān Gul Akhundzada* of Tagab, went to the King urging him to restore religion to its proper position in society. The King was not moved, so the demonstrations, centred around the mosques, went on. As mullahs from the provinces joined in, the demands became diversified to include a range of points, reminiscent of the anti-Amanullah uprisings: the banning of alcohol, reintroduction of the veil, and abolition of secular education and legislation. The government was also attacked for not following the tenets of Islam and for not dealing with corruption and social injustice.

Ultimately, when the events were verging on rebellion against the state, the government intervened and forcibly deported the mullahs from the city and back to their home provinces (Khan (1985), Kakar (1978), Area Handbook 1973: XV). Again it is interesting to note that, whereas former rebellions had started with agitation of this kind out in the provinces, mobilizing tribal forces, the mullahs now congregated in Kabul to protest at the seat of power – but also, that they did not manage to mobilize sufficient popular support to threaten the government or even obtain concessions to their demands.

The Marriage Law of 1971 became yet another issue in the confrontation between conservatives and reformists. The Law had been delayed four years in Parliament, and as mentioned above, religious circles had managed to keep such issues as polygamy important for the Afghan women’s movement out of the law. As a result, the Women’s Institute was very critical of the law and it was strongly criticized in the Institute’s periodical, *Mermon*. This triggered off an attack on *Mermon* from the leading conservative-religious paper, *Gahiz*, which in an editorial, entitled ‘Does *Mermon* deny Qur’ān?’, accused *Mermon* of being anti-Islamic and ‘Westernized’. The editorial also supported the institution of polygamy as a favourable means of preventing sexual promiscuity. *Mermon* replied by challenging *Gahiz*’s Qur’ānic interpretations, and in this context it is interesting that *Mermon* could find support for its demand for prohibition of polygamy in the interpretation of the Qur’ānic verse on polygamy by the Vice-President of *Jami‘yat al-‘Ulamā*, Mohammad Siddiq Kubbari (Kamali 1985: 150-152). The issue here was the sentence: ‘...if you fear that you cannot do justice, then take only one wife’ (Sura IV: 3).

The agitation between the religious faction and the Left opposition accelerated during the 1960s, with both sides accusing the government

of conspiring with their opponent: the religious opposition accused the government of being infiltrated by communists while in Leftist circles towards the end of the 1960s there was a belief that the government secretly incited religious extremists against them, exemplified by the killing of a young, leftist government official in broad daylight by a mob in Laghman – and in a similar way, a leftist student was killed at the Kabul University campus. The University and many schools had thus turned into virtual battlefields between religious and leftist groups. The religious forces also got their martyrs, such as the editor of *Gahiz*, Minhajuddin Gahiz, who was mysteriously shot at his home in 1972 and, as the 1970s progressed, more were killed, supposedly at the hands of the government.

The most dangerous aspect of this polarization of society was that the increasing radicalization and militancy of the opposition was brought about by the growing lack of credibility of the government. With the rejection of the legitimacy of the government and of the existing social order, the way was opened for subversive strategies for both the religious and Left groups with the object of assuming power.

The comparative liberalization during the parliamentary interlude of 1963-73 displayed the pent up political effects of half a century's economic, social and educational policies – policies which had aggravated some of the existing divisions of society and created new ones, such as a rural-urban dichotomy and a widening gap between the aspirations of the educated and the uneducated.

Ideological Crisis in Society

In Afghanistan's modern history, the abuse of state power – at the local level personified in ruthless and often corrupt tax assessors and collectors, governors, police and gendarmerie – has been a major source of revolt. The main conflicts in Afghan society have thus been between the state and the people, rather than between different social classes where the economic differentiation has been moderate and kinship and tribal allegiances have served to 'smoothen' class conflicts.

The parliamentary democracy of the 1960s seemed to promise that this state of affairs should belong to the past. Consequently, when the democratic experiment failed – stifled by the internal power struggles of the Establishment – the crushed hopes, aspirations and ambitions led to an ideological crisis in society. However, both the ideological and the political crisis originated in Kabul and involved mainly the educated urban population, whereas earlier political crises had

invariably developed far from the political centre in areas where the central power was weak, thus giving better opportunities for criticism and uprisings to mature. With the introduction of parliamentary rule and considering that the struggle now was about the *nature* of the state, the political field of gravity had to follow the centre of political power. Hence, parliamentarianism and the existence of a highly politicized urban intelligentsia, an educated middle class and, not least, a student body had given a new and explosive dimension to the political process in Afghanistan. While the new urban classes were articulating their various political ambitions and demands, the rural remainder of the country acted as a sounding-board for the developments at the political centre. The rural and tribal population followed the political games in Kabul but only to a much more limited extent participated actively themselves.¹⁴

New ideas and concepts emerged, challenging not only all that the Establishment represented but first and foremost attacking the state, openly and covertly working for its overthrow and transformation. With almost inevitable logic, the 'alternative' visions of the state launched by the most radical opposition groups were inherently as autocratic and centralized as the existing one.

Another dimension of the social crisis was that the urban educated class was becoming increasingly alienated from its roots, both in terms of the classical tradition in Islam and from the rural, popular culture. This is pointedly described by Majrooh:

He was neither a complete Westerner nor a genuine Easterner. He became a stranger: stranger to his own society and still worse, stranger to himself... Thus the modern educated man was separated from the common people physically by his manners and Western clothes and morally by his value judgement and Western outlook; with the difference that the villager preserved his identity as a human being well integrated in his community, while the educated man had lost his own cultural and social substance. (Majrooh 1987: 133)

The result, as pointed out by Barry (1980, 1984) had a suffocating effect on Afghan culture in general, both among the population at large and among the elite, which was reflected in the sterility of the three new ideological trends which from the 1960s increasingly manifested themselves in Afghanistan: Pashtun nationalism, Islamism and the Afghan version of Marxism-Leninism.

From the 1950s, education was no longer the prerogative of the Europeanized aristocracy alone. A rapidly growing number of young people of more humble origin, many of whom drawn from the rural

areas, were also absorbed into the educational sector in Afghanistan. In the towns and cities, they were confronted with a new life-style, new norms, values and knowledge which proved a challenge to their rural background and whole outlook, to all their concepts of social hierarchy, kinship and tribal allegiance. Centlivres and Centlivres-Demont (1984) have described the situation with particular reference to the development of the Left movement in Afghanistan but in fact it has general validity.

In his study of the academics as an elite group in Afghan society, Sawitzki (1972) also deals with how traditional norms and values were being replaced by the new 'achievement-oriented' values inculcated through the education system which above the high school level was completely modelled on foreign norms. The challenge to the traditional norms and values which the students experienced through the educational system was, in Sawitzki's opinion, also reflected in the disturbances which took place at Kabul University during the 1960s – and particularly so among the students from a rural background who had to live at the University dormitories. Dormitory life cut them off from close contact with their families over prolonged periods of time. As such, they were 'rid of' the 'authoritarian norms' of Afghan family life and with this distance were better able to question these traditional values. However, the new, imported norms and values of the educational system were not reflected in the rest of society, where employment was not determined according to a person's factual qualifications but still depended far more on traditional values such as family background and ethnic affiliation. This situation was further aggravated by the fact that the public sector, which formed almost the only employment possibility for the educated young, could not continue to accommodate all graduates. The result of this situation was a marked frustration and disillusion particularly among the academics from the middle or lower social strata (*ibid*: 84).

This new social class was thus left stranded between the Westernized elite and their own traditional rural background. Their education had alienated them from their rural and spiritual universe and given them a veneer of Westernization, but without securing them a social and economic position according to their wishes. Most were obliged to accept poorly paid administrative positions in rural outposts or teaching jobs in village schools. Here, more often than not, they would feel themselves to be a stranger in relation to the local community, feeling intellectually apart from and above the rural scene, while resenting or envying the power and privileges of the local notables – and using all their efforts to try to get a posting in one of the major

cities, preferably Kabul. From the 1960s, these features of alienation, unsatisfied aspirations and frustrated ambitions were combined with a rising social and political awareness, producing a growing resentment and hostility to the impotence of the democratic institutions and what was seen as the abuse of power and corruption of the ruling establishment. The rejection of the existing social order was combined with a wish to influence or take power and redirect social development to create a just society based on equality. The more distant this goal appeared, the more radical the solutions became (Majrooh 1986a: 132-134).

The 'models' on which these identical aspirations were formulated differed regarding *what* should replace the existing social order. Most students came from a traditional, religious background where Islam was mixed up with local customs, superstition and the worship of holy men. These values were questioned – at times rejected *in toto* – and many young people instead turned atheist and communist, with blind fervour and conviction in *these* established dogmas, rather than as a result of reflection and knowledge. In other cases, Islam as traditionally practised was rejected as 'corruption of the original faith' with the belief that armed with a 'purified' Islam, society could be revolutionized and social justice reinstated (*ibid*).

These two groups shared not only an aversion towards the Establishment but also a strong mutual antagonism. However, they were the same social-psychological factors which provided the breeding ground for both the Leftist movement and the Islamic movement in Afghanistan. This meant that many young people may have been attracted at different times to both these movements which challenged the status quo but offered different solutions – albeit with striking similarities in terms of strategy – to their existential problems as members of society (see Chapter 8).

The Palace Revolution of *Sardār* Mohammad Daoud

The political crisis caused by the failure of the parliamentary regime, and aggravated by the drought and following hunger in 1971-72, ended with a palace revolution in 1973. Ex-Prime Minister *Sardār* Mohammad Daoud with the help of the military abolished the monarchy and proclaimed himself as the President of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. In his initial address to the nation over Radio Kabul, President Daoud declared that he wanted to bring the Afghan government back to the principles of Islam and save the nation from

economic disaster. A strong emphasis was laid on economic development, social reforms and social justice which, among other things, included land reform.

The coup brought two new groups into power which so far had been excluded from political influence: the army, which had never before played an active role on its own in Afghan politics, and a small group of basically urban, educated Leftists (mostly from the Parcham section of the PDPA) which also lent their support to Daoud *Khān*.¹⁵ The populist rhetoric of the 'Revolution of 26. Saratan' plus the formulations of the new Constitution of 1977 clearly reflected the influence of these leftist supporters.

In the 1977 Constitution, key concepts of socialism were added to the values of Islam and nationalism already invoked in the previous Afghan constitutions. The result was a populist discourse build up around the opposition between 'People' versus 'Exploiters/Oppressors' rather than the class-based discourse of Daoud's Leftist supporters.¹⁶ Thus, among the Fundamental Objectives of the 1977 Constitution was 'the elimination of exploitation in all its forms and manifestations' (Article 8), to institute constant and basic economic and social changes (Article 7), as well as to ensure the right to work (Article 9).

Islam, rather than Hanafi Sunni Islam, was stated to be the religion of Afghanistan, the basic principles of which were to be protected. Article 64 of the 1964 Constitution was retained – there could be no law repugnant to the basic principles of Islam *nor* to the Republican Order and other values embodied in the Constitution. However, the 1964 Constitution had stated that in areas where no secular law existed, the provisions of Hanafi jurisprudence (*fiqh*) of the Shari'a of Islam should be considered (Article 69). In contrast, the 1977 Constitution stated that in such cases the courts, by following the basic principles of Hanafi jurisprudence and within the limitations set forth in this Constitution, *shall render a*



Figure 18: *Sardār* Mohammad Daoud Prime Minister 1953-63. After a military coup in 1973, abolished the monarchy (despite himself being a member of the royal family) and ruled as President until overthrown and killed in the 1978 'Saur Revolution'.

judgement that in their opinion secures justice in the best possible way (Article 99, my emphasis). Thus, with the promulgation of the Penal Code (*Qanun-i Jezā* in September 1976) and Civil Code (*Qanun-i Madani* in December 1976), based on but superseding Shari'ca and certain customary laws, a further step was taken towards the secularization of Afghanistan. Even without these legal changes, President Daoud could hardly have counted on support from the religious establishment who from the 1950s knew what to expect from his rule. Daoud *Khān's* populist-revolutionary rhetoric gained him some initial support among the educated, reform-minded middle class but, as the revolutionary zeal proved itself more in words than in acts, disillusionment set in.

While President Daoud denounced the 1964 Constitution as being pseudo-democratic, the alternative he offered was outright undemocratic (Agwami 1981: 3). No parliament was in existence between 1973-77, the judiciary was put under direct executive rule and was merged with the Ministry of Justice, and he came down hard on all political opposition.

In January 1977, President Daoud called a Loya Jirga to pass the new republican constitution, which stipulated presidential rule, a single-party system and a unicameral parliament.¹⁷ Both parliament and judiciary lost much of the powers they had enjoyed under previous constitutions. While the 1977 Constitution evoked the same constitutional legitimacy as the 1964 Constitution, some major changes had taken place.

While the 1964 Constitution had declared the parliament as manifesting the will of the people and representing the whole of the nation, the 1977 Constitution proclaimed that national sovereignty in Afghanistan belongs to the people (Article 21), and 'exercise of power by the people' was stated as one of the prime objectives of the Constitution (Article 2), the social-revolutionary rhetoric showed up in the subsequent definition of the 'People', 'the majority of whom consists of farmers, workers, the enlightened people and the youth'. The Loya Jirga was the supreme manifestation of the power and will of the people (Article 65), while the Melli Jirga (National Assembly) 'is where the will of the people is manifested and it represents the whole of the nation' (Article 48). Compared to the 1964 Constitution, the two-chamber system was thus abrogated and, in line with the 1934 Constitution, the Loya Jirga was brought in as the ultimate source of legitimacy.

The new constitution did not contain any explicit clause on the personification of sovereignty, unlike the 1964 Constitution in which

sovereignty was personified in the King. Nonetheless, it 'seems probable' (Kamali 1985: 26) that the 1977 Constitution vested sovereignty in the Loya Jirga (Articles 21 and 65). Such a view is further substantiated by the provision which empowered the Loya Jirga to elect the head of state by a two-thirds majority after his nomination by the Melli Jirga (Article 76) and vested the Loya Jirga with powers to remove the President from office if found guilty of high treason (*ibid*). However, whereas the institution of Loya Jirga in the 1934 Constitution provided *tribal* legitimacy to the monarchy, the Loya Jirga of the 1977 Constitution – with its composition of bureaucrats and loyalists – hardly contained any tribal elements or traditional leaders of any kind. This traditional institution symbolizing tribal democracy was thus reduced to a rubber-stamp for the real powerholders.¹⁸ It was now composed of:

- members of the Melli Jirga
- members of the Central Council of the Party (see below)
- members of Government and the High Council of the Armed Forces
- members of the Supreme Court
- 5-8 representatives from each province
- 30 members appointed through decree by the President

As such, while sovereignty was institutionalized in a representative body rather than being personified, retaining the traditional institution of Loya Jirga was a matter of form rather than composition. The representation of the High Council of the Armed Forces in the Loya Jirga can be seen as a recognition of the fact that the legitimacy of the regime (and of those which were to follow) rested on the repressive state apparatus rather than on the popular will.

Constitutionally, Afghanistan also became a one-party state – this situation to remain until the population had reached political 'maturity' – led by the Hizb-i Inqilab-i Melli (National Revolutionary Party) as the vanguard of the Revolution (Article 40). Members of the Melli Jirga, half of whom should be farmers and workers, were to be nominated by the Party and elected by the people through free, universal, secret and direct elections (Article 49). The President was to be nominated by the party and elected by the Loya Jirga with a two-thirds majority (Article 75). The legitimation of power according to the 1977 Constitution was thus as shown overleaf. In spite of the apparently democratic structure, the reality was an extremely autocratic presidential rule, as the President through the Party


controlled both the Melli Jirga and the Loya Jirga (see above with regard to composition of Loya Jirga).

President Daoud had promised extension of civil rights and liberties and carried over most of these formulations from the 1964 Constitution, but with one significant qualification, that:

... no one can harm national independence, territorial integrity, national unity, and the dictates of the interests of the majority of the people, or the objectives of the Revolution of Saratan 26 of the year 1352, by the exercise of the rights and freedoms embodied in this Constitution. (Article 47)

Hence, through these means, the 1977 Constitution turned Afghanistan into an autocratic and highly centralized state with a very strong presidency. The influence of the leftists supporters could be seen from the social-revolutionary rhetoric and the 'vanguard' one-party model.

Figure 19: Model of the legitimation of power in the 1977 Constitution



As far as the traditional rural power groups were concerned, they were alienated from the start and effectively cut off from any formalized channels of influence. Thus the progressive wording of the Constitution, invoking concepts of social justice, civil rights and parliamentary democracy, turned out to be empty.

President Daoud's initial support among the Left was soon alienated and the announced social reforms and economic development failed to materialize but remained empty phrases. In this situation President Daoud, like *Amīr* Abdur Rahman, relied upon a strong and loyal army and bureaucracy to silence any challenge to his authoritarian rule.

And his downfall and death were also logically brought about by shifting loyalties in the very army that he – more than anyone else – had built up since the 1950s, thus paving the way for the ‘Saur Revolution’, the coup d’état of 27 April 1978.

Summary

During the years of Musahiban rule, an incongruence developed between the socio-economic and the political structures of the state, i.e. the lack of representation of the urban middle class in the political structure of the state. This resulted in a growing challenge to the legitimacy paradigm (contained in the Constitution of 1931) on which the state was founded. A solution to this incongruence was attempted through the introduction of parliamentary democracy of the 1964 Constitution.

The legitimacy paradigm of the 1964 Constitution was thus brought in accordance with the political thinking of major parts of the new middle class, which dominated the executive and ideological state apparatus. However, the majority of the Afghan population still relied on a subsistence economy and was largely unaffected by public sector activities, including education. Another incongruence thus developed between the ideological paradigm of the state and its institutions and the still dominant ideological discourse of society. This ‘gap’ was represented in a growing conflict between the ‘Weltanschauung’ of the ‘traditional’ power groups in society and the new state-supporting middle class, and contributed to the failure of the democratic experiment in the 1960s. The result was political unrest, leading to Daoud *Khān*’s coup d’état in 1973, whereby one section of the new middle class assumed power. Law and order returned with the authoritarian rule of President Daoud, which initially co-opted part of the Left and silenced the religious opposition. However, the policy of repression, far from solving the underlying problems and conflicts, instead aggravated these. Moreover, below the surface calm, the ideological crisis was deepening also within the urban middle class. Meanwhile the political culture was becoming ever more radicalized and militant – ultimately making Afghan society victim of the *internal* power struggles between various sections of the new middle class.

Notes

- 1 R/12/162, File No. C4/42, 1942.
- 2 Ghobar (1968) and Kakar (1978) refer to the existence of both a Republican and Constitutional movement in Afghanistan dating back to the reign of *Amīr* Habibullah. The movement involved the court officials, *ghulām bachas* (court pages), bureaucrats and *rawshanfikrān*. Ghobar himself had been a leading figure among the Young Afghans in the 1920s.
- 3 Several political discussion groups existed at this time, aiming for liberalization and parliamentary democracy. Although they shared a general nationalistic outlook, they still split up along ethnic lines and later on, according to political ideology. The Wikh-i Zalmayan group was started in Kandahar in 1947, and consisted mainly of Pashtuns (who were concerned about the 'Pashtunistan' issue which had arisen with the independence of Pakistan in 1947), while the Azadi Khwahan was non-Pashtun. It later split into two socialist groupings in which Dr. Abdur Rahman Mahmudi and Mir Ghulam Mohammad Ghobar respectively were leading figures (Khan 1984).
- 4 See Gregorian (1969: Ch. 13), also Grevemeyer (1987) who has made a thorough survey of Afghan source material from this period.
- 5 Grevemeyer points out that stressing the historical continuity in an 'Afghan' identity has been a preoccupation for virtually all Afghan historians and was closely associated with the formation of the Afghan nation state in 1919 (Grevemeyer 1987: 140).
- 6 See Grevemeyer (1987: 299-320) who has a comprehensive discussion of newspapers and magazines since the 1920s.
- 7 For the full text of the 1964 Constitution, see Moltmann (1982: 101-123), reprinted from the *Kabul Times Annual*, 1967: I-XIII. For a more detailed discussion of the constitution and the failure of the 'democratic experiment', see Dupree (1973), Grevemeyer (1987), Kakar (1978), Kamali (1985) and Magnus (1974).
- 8 The members of the Constitutional Committee were *Sayyid* Shamsuddin Majrooh (Minister of Justice), Chairman; Said Qassim Rishtya (Minister of Press and Information); Dr. Mir Najmuddin Ansari (Adviser to Ministry of Education); Mohammad Moosa Shafiq (Dir. of Law Department, Ministry of Justice); Dr. Abdul Samad Hamed (Chief of Secondary Education, Ministry of Education); Hamidullah (Professor of Law and Political Science, Kabul University); and Mir Mohammad Siddiq Farhang (Chief of Planning, Ministry of Mines and Industries) (Dupree 1973: 566).
- 9 According to Kamali (1985: 209), the existing executive domination of the judiciary in Afghanistan was partly due to the fact that religious scholars in the past had dominated the judiciary – for which reason it had been unattractive for the government to create an independent judiciary – and partly due to the nature of judicial authority in the constitutional organization of Islam.
- 10 For a general discussion of 'Human Rights' issues involved in the application of *Shari'a*, see Hjärpe (1988).
- 11 For an analysis of the continued role of 'mediators' (*wāsita*) between the people and the administration at various levels, see Grevemeyer (1987). He explains this with reference to the structural organization of the Afghan state rather than as a consequence of peoples' 'parochial worldview' – an explanation which has been more prevalent in Dupree (1973), for example.

- 12 Personal communication, Peshawar, Nov. 1986. 'Senator' Ghulam Nabi Chaknauri was member of Parliament 1958-73, representing Mohmand *Wuliswāli* - three times as elected representative in the Assembly, and for the last two years as appointed member of the Senate. His father was one of the *khalifas* of the Hadda-i *Ṣāhib*.
- 13 Mohammad Ibrahim Mujaddidi succeeded his father, Fazl Omar, *Noor al-Mashayikh*, as *Hazrat Ṣāhib* on the latter's death in 1956.
- 14 For a more detailed account of these turbulent years, see Kakar (1978), Dupree (1973) and, for a recording of the parliamentary debate, see Khan's presentation in the journal *Central Asia* during the years 1980-85.
- 15 I have discussed the PDPA, its composition and ideological development elsewhere (see Olesen 1980, 1983). Many other writers have dealt with the formation and development of the PDPA - see for example Arnold (1983), Dupree (1979), Halliday (1978), Male (1982), Samimy (1981).
- 16 For a discussion of Populism, see Laclau (1977).
- 17 For the full text of the 1977 Constitution, see Moltmann (1982). The English text is from the *Kabul Times*, 5-16 March 1977. The new constitution was never tried out as it was abolished after the 'Saur Revolution' of 27 April 1978.
- 18 The erosion of the tribal basis of the Loya Jirga had already started with the 1964 Constitution, according to which the members of both houses of parliament and the chairmen of Provincial Councils were included in the Loya Jirga.

CHAPTER 8

The Development of the Islamic Movement from the 1960s

The assumption of power by Daoud *Khān* for a while pacified the Left movement, part of which was co-opted into the republican regime. The religious opposition, on the other hand, was silenced through repression which, however, led to a further radicalization of its political ideology and strategy, so that by the end of Daoud *Khān*'s regime, both among the Left and the religious movement, underground and subversive groups existed.

Background of the Islamic Movement

The development of the ideological crisis in Afghanistan (described in the previous chapter) produced what Barry (1984) terms as 'cultural schizophrenia', a situation whereby the 'Westernized' elite in life-style, outlook and value-orientation became ever more alienated from the majority of the population, whose 'traditionalism' and 'religiosity' was being increasingly perceived by the elite as the main obstacle to 'progress' and 'modernity'.

In a society like that of Iran, where the cultural Westernization process was far more pronounced than in Afghanistan, the writer Al-e Ahmad aptly coined the term '*gharbzadegi*' (i.e. Westomania) to describe the undermining of traditional values through the blind copying of the technically more advanced Western culture – a culture which, however, questioned even its own cultural basis (Khalid 1982: 17). The reaction to this development has, with differing intensity, consisted of an Islamic revival in a number of Muslim countries – once more a search for own cultural roots and values as a third and indigenous way, independent of the foreign '-isms'.

In Afghanistan, where the social and economic development was considerably slower than in the neighbouring countries and the cultural polarization thus less pronounced, the Islamic revival movement was felt among the small group of educated young, rather

than in the population at large. Since the revival largely affected the educated middle class, there was a comparatively close correspondence between revival as a social-psychological phenomenon and the spreading of the religio-political ideology of what came to be known as the 'Islamism'. This distinction and interrelation between Islamic revival ('Re-Islamisierung') and the political ideology of the Islamists ('Islamismus') is stressed by Khalid, who uses the metaphor of the 'Re-Islamismus' being a 'Fluss' (river) on which the 'Floss' (fleet) of the 'Islamismus' is moving (Khalid 1982: 21).

The first signs of a new (political) trend in Islam in Afghanistan – of a questioning not only of the *modus vivendi* with the state which obtained after 1930, but also of established orthodoxy – came from the *‘ulamā* (i.e. from religious scholars) but outside its organized expression, the co-opted Jami‘yat al-‘Ulamā. Later on, the religious opposition split into two directions with intellectuals (*rawshanfikrān*) rather than theologians (*ruhāniān*) spearheading the most radical direction. This was the first time since Mahmud Tarzi and his 'modernist Islam' that religion and religious interpretations had been the point of focus for laymen in Afghanistan.

The appearance in the 1950s and 1960s of new political ideologies among intellectuals and students in Afghanistan was closely related to the translation of the works of foreign scholars to Farsi/Dari and Pashto. The Islamic movement thus benefited from the Farsi translations of Sayyid Qutb and others published by *Intisharaat-i Dār al-Fikr* in Qom, *Dār al-Kutub-i Islami* in Teheran and the translations of *Mawlānā* Abul A‘la Maududi from *Al Mansoorah*, Lahore.¹ Parallel to this introduction of new religious interpretations fostered mainly in Egypt, but also in Pakistan, the Left movement obtained their ideological ammunition from the Farsi publications of Marx and Lenin carried out by the Tudeh Party in Iran, which the PDPA resembled both structurally and ideologically.²

This reliance on the printed word for the oppositional forces was new in Afghanistan and is one more indication that the field of gravity in politics had moved to the urban middle class, unlike former times where opposition had been mobilized through the spoken word and direct propagation among the target groups, the tribal and other rural communities. Equally, the political struggle was now fought out in three new arenas: the university, press and parliament (Ghani 1987a: 90).

Yet another interesting shift is that, whereas ideological inspiration had formerly been largely from Muslim India (Deoband plus modernist influences from Aligarh) and to some extent Turkey, from the 1950s

the orientation had changed: while the Left looked to the stronger Tudeh Party in Iran, the religious opposition was mainly orientated towards Egypt. The reasons were several – while religious scholars earlier went to Deoband and Aligarh for education and the constant interaction of tribesmen across the border easily channelled thoughts and ideas from the Subcontinent to Afghanistan, the increased weight of the middle class had moved the ideological centre towards religious *scholars* at the educational institutions rather than to religious leaders of popular renown. And in recent years increasing numbers of theology students went to Egypt for education while in the 1950s lecturers from Al Azhar were employed in Afghanistan under a collaboration contract with Kabul University (Roy 1985: 95-96)

The newest breakthrough in religious thought had occurred in Egypt, with Mohammad 'Abduh and later Hassan al-Banna and *Sayyid* Qutb. Here too was signalled an unparalleled politicization of Islam in the form of the Ikhwan ul-Muslimin movement, founded in 1928.³ A subcontinental parallel could be found in Jama'at-i Islami, founded by *Mawlānā* Maududi. While the initial inspiration in Afghanistan came from Egypt, Maududi's influence on the Afghan Islamist movement seems to have increased greatly from the 1970s, when a number of Afghan activists went into exile in Pakistan. Minhajuddin Gahiz may have been one of the first to forge connections with Jama'at-i Islami of Pakistan. Finally also, in spite of being separate from the Sunni mainstream, the Islamic Revolution in Iran and *Āyatullāh* Rohullah Khomeini became a *political* inspiration for the most revolutionary section of the Islamists/fundamentalists.⁴ Among the young, the Iranian sociologist and religious thinker, Ali Shariati also had considerable appeal during the 1960s and 1970s. In 1986, when asked by a Westerner, most Afghan Islamists vehemently denied that *Āyatullāh* Khomeini had any influence. As far as Shariati is concerned, a few reluctantly admitted that Shariati had been widely read by the young but asserted that 'his influence is not lasting since he is inconsistent and his knowledge of religion is too shallow'.⁵

Development of the Islamic Movement in Afghanistan

In Afghanistan, the pioneers among these modern Islamic activists were persons like *Mawlānā* Ataullah Faizani and *Sayyid* Ismael Balkhi, both of whom had participated in the intellectual Kalab-i Jawanan which was a meeting place for 'concerned intellectuals' during the liberal period at the end of the 1940s. Khan (1984) thus traces all the

present political movements in Afghanistan – religious, communist and liberals alike – back to the Kalab-i Jawanan. Since the modern educated elite at that time still consisted of a very narrow circle, it is hardly surprising that men from Taraki, Mahmudi and Ghobar to Etemadi, Majrooh, Ataullah Faizani and *Sayyid* Ismael Balkhi should at a time have moved in the same circles, discussing the future of their society. As this discussion group split up along ideological (socialist vs. religious), ethnic and sectarian lines, Balkhi and Faizani each established their own groups. Balkhi's road to political radicalism was short; in 1949 he planned a coup against Zahir *Shāh*, (or as Adamec (1987: 36) puts it, an assassination attempt on Prime Minister Shah Mahmud) which however was discovered before implementation and the six leading persons (all Shi'as) were arrested.⁷ Following this, Balkhi was jailed until 1964.

From approximately the same time, *Mawlānā* Ataullah Faizani started his attempt at a spiritual restoration of society which involved an elaborate programme of teaching and preaching in the organization Madrasa-i Qur'ān, attached to his library near the Pul-i Khishti mosque in Kabul. *Mawlānā* Faizani was an unorthodox *‘ālim* and *pīr* in the sense that he started a Sufi order without connection to any established *tariqat* and without himself having been under any guidance of a *pīr*.⁸ While he considered political progress to be contingent upon spiritual advancement, he devoted himself to demonstrating that scientific knowledge was presaged in the Qur'ān and that modern science did not challenge the philosophical system of the Qur'ān. Faizani's preoccupation with science was unusual among *pīrs* and traditional *‘ulamā*, and it gained him considerable influence among the young educated who, when exposed to the results of the scientific revolution, were losing faith in the dogmatism of the traditionalists.

Mawlānā Faizani, according to Khan (1984), was the founder of the political party the Khuddam al-Fuqan back in the 1950s, while Marwat (1986) claims it was founded in 1966 by *Hāzrat* of Shor Bazaar, Mohammad Ibrahim Mujaddidi. Whatever the exact position, both Faizani and the Mujaddidis supported this organization which later on was followed up with the publication of the paper *Neday-i Haq*.⁹ It is less clear whether Faizani also had the support of the Mujaddidis in the political radicalization he went through in the beginning of the 1970s. After Daoud's coup in 1973, Faizani forged an alliance between the Madrasa-i Qur'ān and two, mainly Shi'a, dissident groups, the Qiyam-i Islami and the Payam-i Islami, with the goal of overthrowing President Daoud using the extensive network of military supporters

which these three groups had built up over the years. The plans, however, were discovered and the ring-leaders imprisoned (Edwards 1986b: 220).

Around the Faculty of Shari'ah, another more organized and less 'adventurous' movement developed at the same time. It seems to have started in 1957 with the return from Egypt of Professor Ghulam Mohammad Niazi, later Dean of the Faculty of Shari'ah, who, after attending the Madrasa-i Abu Hanifa, went to Al Azhar and got an M.A. (Khan 1984: 8-9, Adamec 1987: 138). In Egypt, Niazi had been strongly influenced by the Ikhwan ul-Muslimin.¹⁰ On return to Afghanistan, and probably in view of the policies pursued by the then Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud *Khān*, Niazi took the initiative to establish a small cell at the Madrasa-i Abu Hanifa in Paghman, in which a group of devout Muslim lecturers such as Dr. Mohammad Musa Tawana (Faculty of Shari'ah) were members. It took the form of clandestine meetings and lectures on the message of the Qur'ān, translation of the works of scholars like *Sayyid* Qutb¹¹ and *Mawlānā* Abu A'la Maududi, and discussions on the advantages of Islam as compared to the new ideologies (such as atheism and materialism) seeping into Afghan intellectual circles. Marxism, in the form of Tudeh literature was discussed and scrutinized in order to develop counter-propaganda (Khan 1984:9-10).¹² Minhajuddin Gahiz, the publisher of the religious-oriented magazine *Gahiz*, later got involved with this circle which supported his magazine both financially and with articles.

The movement seems to have consisted of a secret brains trust or 'thinkers' cell', chalking out the educational and political strategies. This cell was initially under the leadership of Professor Ghulam Niazi until his arrest in 1972, after which it was taken over by Burhanuddin Rabbani and assumed the name *Jami'at-i Islami*. Next, there was a 'workers' cell', called the *Jawanan-i Muselman*, carrying out the outward political activities of the movement, which during the first years mainly centered around the university. And finally, there was a 'link cell', working on establishment of contacts in the bureaucracy with a view to influencing policy makers. How close organizational ties there were between the 'grey eminences', the brains trust of the movement at the Faculty of Shari'ah and the *Jawanan* is today hard to tell, as the leading figures of both (Burhanuddin Rabbani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar) now belong to different parties and present differing versions of this (see Khan 1984, Roy 1985)). However, there is hardly anything surprising in the fact that the *Jawanan* ultimately turned more radical than the 'grey eminences'.

The Jawanan was an activist organization, the 'storm troopers' so to speak of the movement, mainly involved with the active political propagation at the university and at high schools. The at times violent clashes between religious and leftist students during the 1960s were a sign of this activity where both the Left and the Jawanan had identified the Establishment *and* each other as the main enemy. Khan (1984: 14-15) mentions the Jawanan leader, Abdul Rahim Niazi, and his vociferous campaign against atheism and communism, leading a number of big rallies. Altogether, the religious agitation at the University was quite successful since the Jawanan were also getting the support from other religious-oriented student groups, as in their victorious campaign for the Student Council elections in 1969. When Abdul Rahim Niazi died in 1970, the engineering student Gulbuddin Hekmatyar became the leader of the Jawanan.

The Islamist group around the professors at the Faculty of Sharī'a, in 1965 formulated its programme in a *shab-nāma* ('night-letter') called *Jihād*, declaring it as its aim to work for the establishment of an Islamic state in Afghanistan. But as in the case of the first clandestine organizational attempts on the Left, written material on the platform and programme of the Islamic movement is hard to come by as it only consisted of a few cyclostyled pamphlets plus the few magazines published during the liberal 1960s, when the papers were not banned. The reasons are obvious: political parties were not legalized so a low profile had to be kept, freedom of speech and press only existed in the sixties, and even then within limits, and a 'culture of publishing' including sufficient technical facilities had not as yet been established (see Grevemeyer 1987).

However, Khan (1984) has surveyed the first publications of the Islamic movement. In the late 1960s, an introductory pamphlet was cyclostyled to inform the wider public about the movement (*Ma ki asteem wa chi me-khwaheem*, i.e. 'Who are we and what do we want'). The pamphlet started in a classic way by pointing to the decay and degeneration in society, among the ruling group and the subversive effect of foreign ideologies, preachings of class war and the corruption of youth. It was stated that the remedy was to be sought in the renaissance of religion, as Islam provides justice from tyranny, exploitation, poverty and discrimination. Islam guarantees equality, freedom, prosperity, intellectual attainment, moral upgradation and material uplift (*ibid.*)

In the initial stages, the common goal of advancement of Islam was a unifying feature among the various Islamic-oriented groups, but with increasing radicalization of politics towards the end of the 1960s,

the dividing lines became clearer. By 1970-72 it appears, that the Islamists were changing their strategy from general mobilization within the university circles towards a more systematic build-up of cadres in different sectors of society with the aim of ultimately taking power (Roy 1985: 99). Parallel with this, Edwards (1986b) implies an increasing association with the Jama'at-i Islami of Pakistan, which, however, seems to have alienated some of the other Islamic-oriented groups, particularly the Shi'a groups as well as *Mawlānā* Faizani's followers (*ibid*: 218-19).

The position of the Mujaddidi family in these developments is quite intriguing. Throughout this century, it had been the most influential religious family in the country and from the 1920s onwards heavily involved in politics. It had been a moving force behind the *Jamī'yat al-ʿUlamā'*s involvement in government since 1930, and had itself forged many ties with the ruling circles through intermarriage.



Figure 20: Sebghatullah Mujaddidi

Mujaddidi is the grandson of *Shams al-Mashayikh*. He has been active in the Islamic movement in Afghanistan from the 1950s, which also means that he has *not* been active in the *Naqshbandiyya tariqat*, of which the Mujaddidis are the hereditary *pirs*. After Daoud *Khān*'s coup d'état in 1973, Sebghatullah Mujaddidi went into exile in Denmark where he ran an Islamic Centre in Copenhagen. Following the Saur Revolution, he moved to Pakistan where he founded *Jabha-i Nejat-i Melli* (Hayat Khan, 1984: 53, Adamec, 1987: 125).

Regarding the political awakening in religious circles after World War II, it appears that the family, rather than bringing itself to the forefront, supported various initiatives. It has thus been mentioned, that the *Ḥāzrat Ṣāhib* Mohammad Ibrahim Mujaddidi was behind the *Khuddam al-Fuqan* in the 1960s and lent economic support to the paper *Neday-i Haq*.

As for the more radical tendencies, Sebghatullah Mujaddidi had, since his return with an M.A. in Islamic Law and Jurisprudence from Al Azhar in 1953, been involved in the Islamic activist circles in Afghanistan, which led to his imprisonment several times. Khan (1984:18, note 8) informs, with reference to Sebghatullah Mujaddidi, that *he* should have requested the university teachers (Professor Niazi and others) to launch the Islamic movement at the university, which he himself had no access to as he was under

constant surveillance (presumably by already having attracted the attention of the authorities). His close connection to the Islamic movement is further underlined by his frequent contributions to the *Gahiz* magazine, which was the mouthpiece of the movement. And when one of the Islamist supporters, the Director of Curriculum Planning in the Ministry of Education, Mohammad Sadiq Rashid Seljuqi, around 1970 constituted a committee – entirely composed of dedicated Islamists – to draft a programme for the study of Islam in the educational institutions, both Sebghatullah and Mohammad Hashim Mujaddidi were members. In 1972, Sebghatullah Mujaddidi founded a political party, the *Jami'iyat al-'Ulama-i Mohammadi*. However, the party hardly managed to exert any influence because Sebghatullah Mujaddidi, like many of the Islamists, went into exile in 1973 when Daoud *Khān* assumed power.

One may wonder whether the activities of Sebghatullah Mujaddidi were an expression of the radical Islamic tendencies resulting in a division within the Mujaddidi family, with the *Ḥaẓrat Ṣāhib* representing the traditional *'ulamā* and its close association with Sufism (the *Ḥaẓrat Ṣāhib* being a *Naqshbandiyya pīr*), and Sebghatullah representing the new generation rejecting Sufism and putting up a competing party.¹³ However, the situation may also have been one of a skilful division of labour within the family to ensure its influence in all the Islamic movements. This situation may have been viable until the beginning of the 1970s, when an increasing radicalization led to more militant strategies and clear-cut divisions also inside the movement. Just as the break appeared between Faizani's *murīds* and the Jawanan, the connection between the Mujaddidis and the Islamists may have suffered at this time, causing Sebghatullah to launch his own Islamic party as an attempt at encapsulating the Islamist movement (rather than in competition with *Ḥaẓrat Ṣāhib's* *Khuddam al-Fuqan*). Edwards (1986b) is implying that the increasing association with the *Jama'at-i Islami* of Pakistan contributed to the radicalization of the Afghan Islamists, and this may also have sharpened their attitude towards Sufism – and thereby strained the relationship to the Mujaddidis in general. Hence, in spite of years of collaboration, Sebghatullah Mujaddidi after Daoud *Khān's* coup d'état in 1973 chose to go into exile in Denmark rather than in Pakistan like all the other leading Islamists.

Membership of the Islamic Movement

While the initial inspiration for and leadership of the most influential and organized group within the Islamic movement originated among the professors of the Faculty of Shari'ah, the recruitment to the movement through the 1960s and 1970s spread from the Faculty to the following institutions: the Polytechnic Institute, the Faculty of Engineering and the government *madrasas* from where some effects also were felt in the ordinary schools. Geographically, their bastions were in the west, around Herat and north-east and east, particularly among civil servants outside the religious fields. Being clandestine and forbidden movements, it is not possible to be very exact about the initial membership of neither the Islamist movement nor of the Leftist groups. While the actual membership of both movements is unknown, the social background of the membership base can be established both from various contemporary and present reports as well as from each movement's *own* historiography.

It is significant, that the Islamic movement in Afghanistan, as in other countries, has recruited its supporters particularly among students at the technical and science faculties. One may assume that the background of this is the particular challenge which these disciplines presented to traditionalist dogmas, while not offering any coherent, alternative worldview. In other words, modern science was taught separately from the social, historical and philosophical context of which it was a product. The Islamist movement is thus also characterized by a great faith in 'Progress' and technological development – and the conviction that these features are essentially 'Islamic', whereas the Leftist movement saw Islam as the main obstacle to the same cherished goal of progress. Comparatively far fewer followers of the Islamist movement seem to have been recruited from the social sciences or humanities – presumably because these disciplines challenged traditionalism at a different level.

The recruitment pattern also displays another interesting feature – the conflict which had developed between the private and the government *madrasas*, established since 1930. The government *madrasas*, as described in the previous chapter, had been developed with the assistance from Deoband and applied teaching plans, standardized curriculum and class teaching, while the private *madrasas*, of which a considerable number still existed in the 1960s and 1970s, maintained the teaching system of the 'circle' and shunned all 'modern' subjects. Thus, the government *madrasas* were in much closer touch not only with general developments in society but also with the

contemporary theological debate in the Muslim world than were most private *madrasas*. As the government recruitment policy favoured the government *madrasa* graduates – in the sense that students from here fulfilled the requirements in terms of curriculum, exams etc. – these *madrasas* were integrated with the general educational system, while the private *madrasas* more and more came to be the last bastions of traditionalism reflecting the old, classic religious culture, including its Sufi content. One may perhaps say that while the students of the government *madrasas* could be considered as part of the general student population with all its cultural and identity crisis (as described above), the students of the private *madrasas* were set apart in a way not of the ‘modern’ times but unquestioningly maintaining an age-old religious tradition closely associated with Sufism.

Ideological Basis of the Islamic Movement

In the general debate, the term ‘fundamentalist’ is loosely applied to a wide-ranging spectrum of religious-political movements in the Muslim world. However, the term ‘fundamentalism’ (or Islamism) as such refers to those movements and ideologies which insist that a necessary part of the Islamic religion is a form of government: *al-Islam-u dinum wa dawlatun* – ‘Islam is a religion and a State’ (Muslehuddin 1977: 134). An Islamic state must apply the tenets of Islamic doctrine, and above all Shari‘a, to *all* aspects of social and economic life. What this ‘fundamentalism’ has in common with virtually all recent Islamic thinkers and reformers is the call for the return to the ‘fundamentals’ of Islam and the insistence on the centrality of the Qur‘ān as compared to *Sunna* and *hadīth* as the means to reinvigorate Muslim societies and populations.

What characterizes modern fundamentalism/Islamism is thus not so much a common *doctrinal* position distinguishing them from other Muslim thinkers/reformers but more their *political* stand which challenges the government and rulers of Muslim countries (Zubaida 1982: 140). This is clearly reflected in the paranoia towards groups inspired by Iran’s Islamic Revolution, even in Wahhabi-dominated Saudi Arabia, and how the Ikhwan movement has acted, and been treated like a subversive organization in many countries.

The Islamists first of all stress Islam’s holistic view of man:

... Islam looks at man as forming a unity whose spiritual desires cannot be separated from his bodily appetites, and

whose moral needs cannot be divorced from his material needs. It looks at the world and at life with this all-embracing view which permits of no separation or division. In this fact lies the main divergence between communism, Christianity and Islam.¹⁴

But rather than getting bogged down in theological dogmas, the Islamists formulate their ideas primarily in relation to what they see as the biggest challenge to their ideas within Muslim societies – the concept of Western-style democracy and of communism: ‘How... can these regimes be superior to Islam, which astonishingly unites all their merits and avoids all their sins?’ (*ibid*: 82).

Characteristic of the Ikhwan as well as other Islamists is their uncompromising attitude regarding jurisdiction of the divine law. They severely criticize the theories which divide human life into two spheres, i.e. secular and spiritual. Islamic society in their opinion is a compact whole in which spiritualism and secularism are completely indistinguishable – or in the formulation of *Sayyid* Qutb, the Faith of Islam is strictly in consonance with the spirit of human nature, and since human nature remains eternally the same, there is no need for any change in the Islamic doctrine (Ali 1983: 637). Islam has laid down the general, universal rules and principles, leaving their application in detail to be determined by the processes of time and by the emergence of individual problems.

While the Islamist insistence on the total application of Sharīʿa at first may appear as doctrinal agreement with the traditional *ʿulamā*, this is not the case. One of the main distinguishing points here is the Islamists’ stress on the *historicity* of the works of the legal scholars, which should not be confused with the eternal validity and sacred nature of the Sharīʿa. In other words, the legal scholars (*fuqāh/fuqahā*) are to be considered important guides for the present, but their works and decisions have no binding effect on Muslims today. The motivation, reminiscent of the reformism of the nineteenth century, was to liberate the *umma* from the chains of the past in order to cope with modern times – which was also considered to be true to the nature of Islam. The implication of this was a new interpretation of the Qurʾān and a critical review of *ḥadīth*. The ‘freedom from the past’ led directly to asserting the ‘reopening the gate of *ijtihād*’, along with the established principles of *qiyās* and *ijmā*. In this respect, however, support could also be found in tradition – for example Maududi refers to Shah Waliullah who had maintained that *ijtihād* is obligatory on the Muslim scholar in every age, since every age has its own peculiar problems and cognizance of the Divine injunctions is essential with regard to

these (Maududi 1973: 84). Maududi, who has gone further than the Ikhwans in operationalizing the concepts, specifies that *ijtihad* applies only in the areas about which the Sharī'a is silent. The real object of *ijtihad* is to impart dynamism to the legal system by keeping it in conformity with the fundamental guidance of Sharī'a and abreast of the changing conditions of the world. In his formulations, the process of *ijtihad* remains the domain of the legal scholars – and his position vis-à-vis the *‘ulamā* is formulated altogether softer than that of the more social-revolutionary Ikhwans (Maududi 1980).

In spite of the Islamists' literal application of Sharī'a, they share with the Muslim 'modernists' the apologetic arguments when it comes to issues such as criminal and merchant law, as well as to 'prove' that all cherished values of 'modernity' are essentially Islamic in character. A case in point are the concepts of Freedom and Human Rights, which have preoccupied both the Ikhwans as well as Maududi.¹⁵ On these subjects, the Islamists' discourse invokes a range of concepts from Western political philosophy which are thus integrated into an Islamic discourse. However, by this transition, the meaning of the concepts is transformed since, in the Western framework, these concepts have been developed on the premises of a secular state, popular sovereignty, individualism and citizenship in a civil society, while they are being grafted onto the notion of a religious state, divine sovereignty and the believer's membership of the *umma*. All rhetoric and arguments apart, the concepts are thus *not* identical and may even be difficult to compare.¹⁶

Another feature of the Islamist movement is an equal invocation of social justice and what is normally considered socialist values. These ideas and formulations first and foremost originated in *Sayyid* Qutb's thesis on Islam and Social Justice (1948) and, while social justice is seen as a basic Islamic principle, materialism is at the same time condemned.

For Islam prescribes the basic principles of social justice, and establishes the claim of the poor to the wealth of the rich; it lays down a just principle for power and for money, and therefore has no need to drug the minds of men, and summon them to neglect their earthly rights in favor of their expectations in Heaven... Thus Islam urges men to fight for their rights; "and he who fights without injustice, the same is a martyr". (S. Qutb, in Donohue and Esposito 1982: 124)

Another pillar in *Sayyid* Qutb's concept of social justice in Islam is in the field of economics and involves the notion of the dignity of human

labour. And while the right of individual possession is considered sacred, the Islamic view of property also entails that 'property belongs to the community in general; individual possession is a stewardship which carried with it conditions and limitations' (Qutb, *ibid*: 110). Almost identical formulations can also be found among the Afghan Islamists (Al Sobh 1981: 5).

It is thus in their social and political outlook that the main difference between the Islamists and the *‘ulamā* can be found, the latter being more concerned with maintaining the legal structure of society rather than installing the 'just society' (see Arkoun 1988) – a tendency which for example in the Afghan context became more pronounced with the growing co-option of the *‘ulamā* into the state. However, the Islamists do not argue for a disassociation of the *‘ulamā* and the state; on the contrary, the Islamist parties are invariably advocating a yet more powerful and interventionist government, a programme of more rapid industrialization and far-reaching plans for modern education. In other words, as compared to earlier movements arising as reactions to the Western challenge, the Islamists are neither rejectionist nor assimilationist but uncompromisingly modern. While they are traditional in their formulations, they are modern in their practice. Islam is a *vehicle* of their political demands, not the *inspiration* of those demands (Yapp 1980: 189). The drive for reforming/revolutionizing society and, above all, for modernizing the economy, technology and education is as strong among the Islamists as among the Left – and their unlimited belief in Progress is of the same kind.¹⁷

The Islamists' conception of Afghan history is a logical consequence of their 'modernist' position, on the basis of which their judgement of King Amanullah is far milder than of the Musahiban dynasty. The latter is held responsible for the degradation of Islam in Afghanistan ('During Zahir *Shāh*'s reign, Islam got a bad name vis-à-vis the people, since it was used as a cover for corruption, etc').¹⁸ The mild judgement of King Amanullah seems to be based on two factors. Firstly, his nationalism/anti-imperialism was beyond doubt – i.e. he won Afghanistan's full independence through the Third Anglo-Afghan War – plus he held at least initially a pan-Islamic position. Secondly, he strongly stressed the need for education, modernization and the eradication of social injustice in Afghanistan. The 'revolutionary' vision of King Amanullah has such a strong appeal to today's Islamists that he is mainly seen as being 'misguided' by the 'Christian Syrian influence' of his wife Soraya Tarzi as well as by Reza *Shāh* and Atatürk. Equally so, Bacha Saqqao is not considered in any way as a hero but just earns a passing reference as 'an illiterate'.

This relatively positive attitude goes so far as to point to the 'un-Islamic life-style' of Afghanistan in the 1960s which would 'never have happened in King Amanullah's Afghanistan'.¹⁹ Among the more 'moderate' and traditional groups, King Amanullah is viewed as having been pro-Soviet and even a crypto-communist, who was only restrained in the beginning of his reign by his spiritual mentor *Shams al-Mashayikh*. However, probably due to Afghanistan's present predicaments it is also stressed here, that King Amanullah was a most sincere *patriot* and, although he was not at all religious, he did do good things for the country such as constructing roads, hospitals and schools.²⁰

The Islamic State


The ideology of the Islamists is thus, like the reform movements of the past couple of centuries in the Muslim world, formed in the encounter with and challenge from the Occident. Its trademark is the integration of key concepts from the occidental political discourse – such as sovereignty, state, democracy, revolution, etc. – into an Islamic discourse. However, the integration of Western thought is not primarily in the concepts as such, as in the Islamist discourse they are based on different premises: on the notion of divine sovereignty rather than on those of popular sovereignty and the secular state, as is the case in the Western discourse. More important is the fact that a space and an autonomy for the political has been created (Roy 1985).

For the Islamic thinkers of the Medieval period the question of legality of the state and legitimacy of the ruler was not posed beyond the simple formal requirement for an Islamic state. The question which exercised their minds were those of faith and dogma, and it was on the occasion when the state or the ruler attempted to dictate on those matters that the pious *ʿulamā* and their followers resisted and confronted the state. However, in the interest of the religious community, in Sunni political thought the stress on preserving the unity of the *umma* and maintaining stability has also had precedence over ideals of rulership. Thus, for the traditional *ʿulamā*, the question of legitimacy of power did not arise as long as the *ʿulamā* could apply Shariʿa to civil society. This situation has existed for centuries – i.e. although Islam applies to the totality of social life, there has been a de facto division of labour between 'church' and state (Yapp 1980). While for the traditional *ʿulamā* the political is an extension of the juridical, for the Islamists the nature of the state defines the nature of society

(Roy 1985: 107). The consequent demand for the Islamization of the state thus distinguishes the fundamentalists in the present situation in most Muslim states, from the *‘ulamā* who in most cases have learned to live with semi-secular states.

The Islam of the Islamists is total and universal. As far as their models of power is concerned, it is logically and directly derived from the caliphate model of Sunni Islam. But although for the Islamists the caliphate was certainly an authentic and respectable Islamic institution, it was by no means the one, only, and eternal form of Islamic power.

Figure 21: The Islamist model of the legitimacy of power



As Mozaffari (1987: 61-62) points out, it is an indication of the political realism of the Islamists, more precisely of the Ikhwan, that in 1928 they dared to forward an Islamic power model which acknowledged the end of the caliphate, replacing it with the *umma*. It is central here that rulers are envisaged as custodians of the delegated authority – given to them by the *umma* – who are the original recipients of sovereignty from Allah.

This view has several implications. First of all, it is a challenge to the classical ‘Pious Sultan’ theory through which *Amīr* Abdur Rahman sought legitimacy. Maududi thus stresses that the concept of the ruler as ‘God’s shadow on earth’, as formulated by Ibn Taimiyya, is a misconstruction of a Qur’ānic saying, according to which the worldly government and authority is a reflection of Allah’s sovereignty – rather than the ruler in person being God’s reflection on earth (Maududi 1973: 29). In the same line of thought, *Sayyid* Qutb stressed that in Islam the authority of the ruler is derived from the faith and not from Heaven, which means that the ruler’s right to rule lapses the moment he abandons the path of righteousness. One of the most popular *hadīth* on this issue says ‘Hear and obey – even if your ruler is an Abyssinian slave with a head like a raisin’. In *Sayyid* Qutb’s

interpretation this *ḥadīth* does *not* mean that 'One day of lawlessness is worse than thirty years of tyrannical rule' (Ibn Taimiyya) but on the contrary it is a clear evidence that obedience to the ruler is only contingent upon his observing the ordinances of the Holy Script and that there is no question of hereditary right or custom. 'Satisfaction of the community alone gives legitimacy to authority' (Ali 1983: 629). In the Afghan context, this leads to a particularly strong condemnation of the Musahiban dynasty and the 1964 Constitution – the point of reference for the liberal educated elite – for being a violation of Islam as it constitutionalized hereditary monarchy (in fact that had already happened with the *Nizāmunnāma* of 1923) and defined the King as being above the law.²¹

The second implication of the Islamists' power model is that it excludes the *ʿulamā* as an intermediary authority. The argument here is that the basic principles of Islam have been rendered unalterable and that no authority, whether secular or religious, is in a position to subvert or circumvent them – in other words, the prerogatives of the religious authorities in Islam are very limited. Here also lies the explanation of the hostility which has existed between the traditionalist *ʿulamā* and the Islamists: the *ʿulamā* have historically been partners to the 'Pious Sultan' theory and carry part of the responsibility for what the Islamists see as the corruption of the Islamic message during the centuries, and the Islamists' solution would divest them of considerable power and influence in the future.

The fact that Nadir *Shāh* established *Jamīʿyat al-ʿUlamā* and granted it formal power to scrutinize legislation does not soften the judgement of the Islamists, as the creation of *Jamīʿyat al-ʿUlamā* is seen as only an attempt to placate the tribes and in fact it became a rubber stamp of the government. It was the government which appointed the members and secured their loyalty through gifts, stipends, etc.²² However, not *all* members of *Jamīʿyat al-ʿUlamā* are dismissed as loyalists – for example *Mawlawī Fazl Haq* (from the 1960s) is mentioned as an example of an *ʿālim* of the right calibre, 'but such people were persecuted'. Another negative effect was that the mere existence of *Jamīʿyat al-ʿUlamā* deceived the people so that they did not recognise the true un-Islamic character of the regime: 'If it had not been for the machinations of the *Jamīʿyat al-ʿUlamā*, the Islamic Revolution would already have taken place in the 1960s' (*ibid.*) The viewpoint of the 'moderates' or traditionalists is, on the other hand, that society as such is Muslim since the majority of its members are Muslims – and 'the *Jamīʿyat al-ʿUlamā* did not have much reason to be active [in *Zahir Shāh's* time] as the country was ruled by the *Sharīʿa*'.²³

The system of rule in the Islamist Model is considered democratic as far as the concept of popular *khilāfat* means that the entire community is responsible for the affairs of the state, and that a government only can work legitimately if it has been constituted by popular will (Maududi 1980: 184). In what way this 'popular will' is going to express itself, however, is not spelled out clearly. Maududi operates with the concept of a Consultative Assembly (*majlis-i shawrā*), finding numerous references to 'consultations' in both the Qur'ān and *ḥadīth*, but just how it should be established is not clear, nor is the question of how the ruler gets elected or appointed. From the general writings of the Islamists it appears that there is no room for party politics in the Islamic state, since that in their view breeds friction, generates trouble and produces moral corruption, all of which are anathema to Islam. Instead, in the view of Hassan al-Banna, the *umma* should unite in a single, Islamic party, which should be a movement, a political party and an army in the crusade of the Islamic movement (Mitchell 1969). Although the one-party state also appears to be in accordance with Maududi's thoughts, his conception seems to centre more on an avant-garde party rather than on the mass party which the Ikhwan envisaged (Maududi 1980).

For Maududi, a prerequisite for founding the Islamic state is the process of Islamic Revolution, which partly appears as a *spiritual* prerequisite – hence the Islamists' stress on a cultural purging of society and the education and mobilization of the masses. This argument is partly based on analogies to the French, Russian and Nazi German revolutionary movements which would not have been brought about without the appropriate social consciousness. Although he is also mindful of the interplay of certain moral, psychological, cultural and historical factors pre-existing the Islamic state, the success of the entire scheme of revolution hinges upon the firm resolve, integrity and steadfastness of individuals in a hostile environment (Enayat 1982: 103). Here, more pronounced in the Maududi formulations than among the Ikhwan – who did attempt to build up a mass party – are the roots of the concept of the revolutionary avant-garde party whose members with a 'true understanding of Islam, single-mindedness, strong power of judgement, and complete sacrifice of personal feelings and selfish desires' will be able to withstand all hardships and finally overcome public apathy or enmity (Maududi 1955: 37-55).

Roy (1985: 108) identifies this notion of a centralized avant-garde party with the Leninist party concept, just as the myth of revolution seems close to that of the Marxists. In this connection, the kinship

between the Islamists and the Left could also be extended to the organizational structure with its build-up of a clandestine hierarchy of cells under the leadership of a council (*shawrā*) (Khan 1984, Roy 1984: 99). However, it may be worth remembering that the Afghan Islamists were also directly copying their Egyptian counterparts in organizational matters (although their party as an elite cadre party resembled the Jama'at-i Islami of Pakistan more than the mass party of the Ikhwan), and that al-Banna was more inspired by the organizational features of Fascism than of Communism (Hussaini 1956, Mitchell 1969). Although the influence from the communist movement no doubt has been stronger in recent years, and certainly among the Afghan Islamists, the general features of elitism, the totalitarian concept of the state plus subversive strategies employed for taking power is neither an exclusive prerogative of the ultra-Left nor of the ultra-Right.²⁴

In the beginning, the main activities of the Afghan Islamists were geared towards the educational efforts among members but, in anticipation of a communist coup, the strategy from 1972 onwards was changed towards infiltrating central government agencies – with the Ministries of Defence and Education having highest priority. In these strategic considerations, there was a close parallel particularly to the Khalq which during the 1970s also aimed at, and succeeded in, building up loyal cadres within the armed forces in preparation for a coup.

The elitist party concept combined with the general myth of Revolution in the 1960s, led the Afghan Islamists into a disastrous, 'guevarist' adventurism in the 1970s. With President Daoud's coup in 1973, the suppression of the Islamists increased, particularly after Faizani's misfired coup plans, and the Islamists became internally divided over strategic questions. The Jawanan, headed by Hekmatyar, wanted to engineer a popular uprising while Rabbani, fearing lack of support in the population, was in favour of continued infiltration of the army in preparation for a counter-coup. However, the Jawanan, presumably supported by the Pakistani government,²⁵ proceeded and a series of insurrections was planned in July 1975 (in Panjshir, Laghman and Badakhshan). The plan failed miserably as no popular support was forthcoming and a couple of hundred Islamist activists were imprisoned – later to be executed in June 1979 after the PDPA take-over (see Roy 1985: 101-102, Naby 1986: 140, Marwat 1986b). The movement was thus close to decimation with almost all its leaders in exile, a considerable number of activists in prison and a clear lack of popular support. Puig (1984) also sees the split in the Islamist move-

ment between the Jami'at of Rabbani and the Jawanans of Hikmatyar as reflected in the disagreements regarding the insurrections in 1975. However, he interprets it as an expression of a more profound ideological disagreement of the religious scholars with the militancy of the Jawanans (mostly students of non-religious subjects). While in retrospect it is hard to judge the correctness of these evaluations, later developments seem to justify Puig's view (see below).

Jihād and Martyrdom

In the historical development of dogmas within Sunni Islam, as discussed in Chapter 1, the concept of *jihād* has assumed a more and more withdrawn position and since last century the dominant tendency has been that of defensive *jihād* (Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Muhammad 'Abduh, Rashid Rida). However, we have already seen that special features of Afghan history made both *Amīr* Abdur Rahman and the Sufi *pīrs* maintain the unapologetic interpretation of *jihād* well into the twentieth century. 'Modernist' Islam has altogether had a more elusive influence in Afghanistan, where the traditional *pīrs* have exerted a comparatively greater influence than the *ulamā*.

The new Islamic paradigm forwarded by the Islamist movement in Afghanistan above anything else has centred around the concept of the state, which consequently raised the issue of legitimacy of power again as discussed above. In this connection, the concept of *jihād* has been reinstated in its old, unapologetic form and taken a prominent place within the Islamists' political strategy. Since the theory of defensive *jihād*, at least in its dominant form by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, introduced a separation between the religious and the political (*jihād* only as a defence against *religious* oppression), this could obviously not be accepted by the Islamists. While they too stress that *jihād* aims at defending Islam, this is not its sole aim – the function of *jihād* is also the propagation of Islam:

... the real objective of Islam is to remove the lordship of man over man and to establish the kingdom of God on Earth. To stake one's life and everything else to achieve this purpose is called *Jihad* while *Salah*, fasting, *Hajj* and *Zakat* are all meant as a preparation for this task. (Maududi 1978: 243)

... I tell you that all the *ibadaat* of that person are meaningless in whose heart there is no intent of *Jihad* and who does not keep in view this purpose of *Jihad* (*ibid*: 253)

In the formulations of the Islamists, *jihād* is not only a universal revolutionary struggle for the sake of the whole mankind but it has also been ascribed the highest religious function, subsuming all forms of worship and ritual acts. *Sayyid* Qutb in particular has pointed to *jihād* as an essential ingredient in the philosophy of *revolution* in Islam (Ali 1983: 624) – which thus forms one more of the many modern Western concepts integrated into the Islamic discourse, ‘updating’ the original message and thereby attempting to disarm competing, modern secular ideologies.

Jihād as equally an individual and a communal obligation and responsibility has been defined as the means to achieve the aim of the Islamists as appears from the slogan of the Egyptian Ikhwans:

Allah is our goal. The Prophet is our leader. The Koran is our constitution. Struggle (jihad) is our way. Death in the service of Allah is the loftiest of our wishes. Allah is great. Allah is great. (from Mitchell 1969: 193-194)

And for the the most radical of Islamists, *jihād* certainly means armed struggle, which underlines the virtue of martyrdom (*shihādāt*).²⁶

How literal the above is to be understood in terms of actual strategy has differed widely – the Egyptian Ikhwans did resort to armed struggle, while for example the Jama‘at-i Islami in Pakistan has been comparatively more peaceful and aimed more for actual power-sharing with the Establishment. As far as the Islamist movement in Afghanistan is concerned, how the overall strategy changed in the beginning of the 1970s has been described above – but the prospects of armed struggle seem to have been in view most of the time. In spite of the ideological ‘upgrading’ of *jihād*, the Islamists’ rejection of *tasawwuf* means that the *jihād*, like for al-Afghani, is stripped of its spiritual content and is reduced simply to mean the lesser or external *jihād*, only being subject to political, strategic and tactical considerations (Muzammil 1981: 25-27).

The Islamist and Traditionalist

Like the Muslim reformers of the nineteenth century, the fundamentalists’ ‘project’ is to revitalize Islam and defend the faith against the onslaught from internal decadence and external threats in the form of irreligious ideologies and imperialist domination. However in this century, as decolonization has reached virtually all Muslim populations, the battlefield is mainly ideological, i.e. a cultural purge of society. This is clear in al-Banna’s Manifesto for the Ikhwans, where

the cultural and educational policies are spelled out in far more explicit detail than any other (political, judicial, administrative and economic) points of the Ikhwan's programme (see Ali 1983: 538-544). The object is to purge Muslim society of depravation, indecency and the undermining influence of Western norms and values regarding public morals, family life and the relation between the two sexes. The course advised is a strict adherence to Islamic injunctions as well as the consequent upgrading of religious instruction within the educational sector. Thus, in cultural affairs, the Ikhwan and general Islamist puritanism is reminiscent of the Wahhabis.

This cultural policy constitutes the point where (in Khalid's terminology [1982]) the religio-political ideology of Islamists comes closest to responding to the general social-psychological phenomenon of the Islamic revival movement of Muslim societies in this century, i.e. a return to well-tried and cherished traditional values in view of the alienation and normlessness of modern urban life. And the cultural policy also forms a meeting ground with the traditional *ʿulamā*.

Considering the Afghan context, where 'Westernization' of public life was far less than in the majority of Muslim societies (most notably in neighbouring Iran), the Islamists consequently had much greater difficulty in reaching people with their 'message'. In other words, Afghan society was hardly experiencing a re-Islamization movement and the Islamists' appeal was limited to a small group of the urban educated or semi-educated, i.e. exactly the group which was exposed to the cultural alienation in modern Afghan society. An illustration of this situation is that, in their opposition to the emancipation of Afghan women that was just beginning, from the late 1950s onwards the Islamists did not manage to mobilize any noteworthy popular support.

While their puritan cultural policy could ensure the Islamists the sympathy if not the support of the most traditional *ʿulamā*, it was quite another story as far as their attitude to traditional religious education as well as traditional practices was concerned.²⁷ The Islamists were equally condemning in respect of the governmental and the private *madrassa* system. The private, tradition-oriented *madrassas* were condemned for depriving the students of acquiring political consciousness and modern education and thus of coming to know the world. The reason for this state of affairs was, according to the Islamists, that the educational system was based on Greek philosophy more than on the science of Qurʾānic interpretation. Within the field of *fiqh*, technical and scientific abilities were frozen and no expansion of these laws was made to meet the requirements of the changing

times and needs. Islamic schools of thought from the fourth and fifth centuries A.H. blended with Greek philosophy were held to be irrefutable facts and hence the staff of these private *madrasas* fought civilization and science in the name of Islam, neglecting physical and experimental sciences on the grounds that these supposedly were anti-Islamic.²⁸ On the other hand, according to the Islamists, the government *madrasas* had over the years increasingly come to resemble the secular schools, where experimental sciences were upgraded to an extent that the students remained ignorant about Islam – or maybe even ended up fighting Islam in the name of science.

So while the private *madrasa* system isolated Islam from the realities of life, the government *madrasas* and the secular school system paved the way for destructive thoughts like communism. In support of their view, the Islamists point to the fact that prominent communists and important PDPA members like Suleiman Layeq, Bareq Shafi'i, Abdul Hakim Shara'i Jauzjani and Nizamuddin Tahzib had all studied at the Faculty of Shari'ah and later became communists!²⁹ Today, in view of the events in Afghanistan, most of the *'ulamā* share the Islamists' condemnation of the government *madrasa* but differ as far as the traditional *madrasas* – with which many of them identify (and from where the older generation are educated) – are concerned.

An essential part of the Islamists' cultural programme is to purge the community of believers of superstition, un-Islamic beliefs and practices (for example related to the wedding and funeral ceremonies), idolatry (such as worship at saints' tombs) and the like. In this connection, the Sufi orders in particular attracted their wrath. Hassan al-Banna was himself deeply affected by Sufism in his youth and maintained throughout his life a deep respect for 'original' Sufism but over the ages it had in his view been corrupted by foreign elements (i.e. the sciences of philosophy and logic and the heritage and thought of ancient civilizations) (Mitchell 1969: 214). However, among his followers, there was a widespread revulsion and contempt for Sufism, which was considered a phenomenon of Greek-Hindu origin with no relation to Islam. The rejection of Sufism was not only doctrinal, but also rooted in the activist strategy of the Ikhwan, as Sufism was seen as drugging the masses, inspiring them to a spiritual withdrawal from life, being useless members of society and thus forming an obstacle to progress (*ibid.*: 215-216). It is hardly necessary to point to the striking similarity between the Islamists' position and that of the Left – religion as the opiate of the people.

However, when we come to the Indian Subcontinent, from where historically the influence on Afghanistan has been the greatest, the

schism between fundamentalist movements and mystical orders was less clear-cut, as the greatest reformers of fundamentalist character have clearly been influenced by mystical orders. This is obvious in the case of *Shaykh* Ahmad Sirhindi but so, too, was Shah Waliullah of Delhi affiliated with the Naqshbandiyya, although he was against the custom of worship at saints' tombs and other idolatrous practices. Maududi, who clearly presents his own mission as a continuation of these great reformers, thus also quotes Shah Waliullah for condemning visits to saints' tombs – here one of the most famous shrines in North India, that of Mu'ih-ud-Din Chishti in Ajmer:

Those people who visit Ajmer or the grave of Salar Massud for the purpose of praying for the fulfilment of their desires commit a sin more heinous in nature than murder and adultery. What difference one may ask, does remain between such an act and worshipping self-made idols? (Shah Waliullah, in Maududi 1973: 80).

However, showing due respect for these great reformers, Maududi is stronger in his rejection of Sufism than was al-Banna. In fact, he attributes *Shaykh* Ahmad Sirhindi's and Shah Waliullah's failure to establish an Islamic state exactly to their lack of recognition of the Muslims 'morbid attachment to Tasawwuf':

True to God, I bear no personal grudge against the Tasawwuf presented by these reformers; in spirit it was indeed the real Tasawwuf of Islam, nothing different from Ihsan. But what I think should be carefully eschewed are the mystic allusions and metaphoric references, the mystic language, and the continuance of a peculiar mystic lore, customs and traditions. Obviously, the real Islamic Tasawwuf does not stand in need of this particular mould. (Maududi 1973: 92)

In addition, the *pīr-murīd* relationship should also be abolished, as the role and authority granted to the spiritual guide, plus his claims on divine inspiration, border on polytheism. This in particular has infected the followers of the *Shaykh* Ahmad Sirhindi right from the beginning.³⁰

The condemnation of Sufism by the Afghan Islamists has been as strong and unequivocal, and phrased in almost the same terms as that of their spiritual mentors: that Sufism is a misrepresentation of Islam and that the *pīr* families have been parasites on the innocent people. Intermarriage between these hereditary Sufi families and the court has further added to the corrupting influences (here is an obvious hint at the Mujaddidi and the Gailani families). The shallow and defeatist

pattern of thinking in Afghanistan can thus be seen to have two main underlying reasons: firstly, illiteracy and, secondly, the prevailing Sufi mentality that neglected the realities of life and led people into doubt and mistakes. For example the belief that God and *pīrs* protect Afghanistan from external military might was a naïveté produced by this type of mentality (Muzammil 1981).

Other Afghan Islamists moderate this position vis-à-vis Sufism in an acknowledgement that there is a clear line back from the recent struggle against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan to the anti-imperialism of al-Afghani and the resistance towards British imperialism by the *Ākhund* of Swat and the Hadda-i *Ṣāhib*. 'But while the *pīrs* of last century were without blemish, their *sons* were not of the same quality. And it is neither good to collect presents from followers nor to let anyone kiss your hand in submission'. The declining importance of Sufism in Afghanistan in this century is explained by a growing knowledge of Islam among people, i.e. a realization of the fact that part of *tariqat* is not in conformity with *sharī'at*.³¹

While we have earlier seen (in Chapter 1) that the concept of *jihād* mediates rather than juxtaposes *tariqat* and *sharī'at*, the Islamists' reduction of *jihād* to its external aspects – to a political-strategical tool in their revolutionary struggle – reinforces the postulated opposition between *tariqat* and *sharī'at*. (While Hassan al-Banna himself would hardly endorse this opposition, the antagonism towards *tasawwuf* is a general phenomenon among the Ikhwans and other Islamists alike). However, it is equally clear that this opposition is identified primarily at the political-strategical level rather than on the level of religious dogmas or philosophy – but then, the Islamists are political activists and hardly count any philosophers among their ranks.

Summary

During the last couple of centuries, Muslim political thought has basically been shaped through the encounter with Western political domination and Western thought in general, these having constituted the main external challenge and threat to the existing systems of thought and political rule in the Muslim societies.

Yapp (1980) has argued for the following classification of Muslim reactions to 'modernity' in its predominant form of Westernization/secularization. First, there was a response to the political threat from the Western, colonial powers which took the form of remodelling institutions, first and foremost the army (such as was the case for

example in the Ottoman empire and later on in the Turkish Republic). In the Afghan context, this was reflected in the measures of centralizing and modernizing the state under the reign of *Amīr* Abdur Rahman, including the building up of a strong, standing army. While this first reaction came from the rulers, a rejectionist approach originated mainly among the orthodox *‘ulamā* and from Sufi circles. The mobilization against the British in 1897, 1914-17 and 1919 along the Frontier can be viewed in this light. It is worth mentioning that these ‘reactions’ do not necessarily constitute a strict chronological order but could appear simultaneously as they had their origin among different social groups.

The two first approaches having failed to dispel the Western challenge, a third reaction consisting of a ‘compromising’ attitude developed in the form of ‘Islamic modernism’ attempting to reconcile Islam and ‘modernity’. This development particularly centred around legislation and education in the form of grafting Western forms of law, legal procedures, education, etc. onto the Islamic base of *Shari‘a*. The accompanying ideological discourse basically referred to ‘Islamic principles’ rather than to religious dogmas. In the Afghan context, while King Amanullah and Mahmud Tarzi were the first and very clear representatives of this reaction, one may argue that all subsequent Afghan rulers as well as the modern, educated elite have followed this pattern.

Hence, during the previous century, the ideological discourse of the elite – and these responses were basically limited to the elite, who were the most exposed to the impact of Western ideas – and thus of the Afghan state can be seen as a series of consecutive attempts first to pacify and later on to harness Western concepts and ideas into its nation-building efforts. As such, the attempts took the form, roughly speaking, first of trying to interpellate Western concepts and ideas into an Islamic discourse but gradually, manifest with the Constitution of 1964, to interpellate Islamic concepts into a Western democratic-parliamentary discourse.

With the appearance of the Islamists’ discourse (partly as a reaction to the above ‘responses’ as described in this chapter), the integration of Western political thought with Islam reached a new stage. With the focus on the social-revolutionary heritage of the West (rather than as before on the liberal-democratic), an Islamic polity of the state has been created. This has resulted in a predominantly political-strategic (rather than religious-philosophical) discourse which, in spite of its fundamentally Islamic concepts and formulations, in its structure

and principles of interpellations is more akin to Western totalitarian ideologies than to classic Islamic thought.

One of the distinguishing features of the first three types of responses to the Western challenge was that they were limited to the elite. But with the continuing 'modernization' – in terms of political liberalization, overall socio-economic development, urbanization and extension of the state apparatus – an unprecedented popular involvement in politics took place, as has been the case in Afghanistan after World War II and particularly since the 1960s. Political involvement ceased being the prerogative of the elite but became a main concern for the whole educated middle class. (In other Muslim societies, where the socio-economic development had gone much further than in Afghanistan, one can even talk about a mass involvement in politics.) The new political ideologies in Afghanistan (both among the Left and the Islamists), while claiming to represent the latent opposition between the 'People' and the 'State', thus reflected the alienation and aspirations for political power of the new middle class. Consequently, they challenged the state as well as the existing social order. While such an identification was successfully achieved in the Islamic Revolution in Iran (where even a temporary alliance between the Left and the Islamist forces was established), neither the Afghan Islamists nor the Left managed to absorb the views of broader sections of the population in their discourse.

Another indication of this was that, just as the traditional parochial identities and primordial alliances of the mass of the Afghan population had been considered a 'problem' for successive generations of absolutists and constitutional 'nation-builders', neither the Islamists nor the Left were able or willing to take account of this fact in their totalitarian political ideology. Hence, the Islamists in 1974-75 had to acknowledge what the Left was to realize after 1978 – that primarily their appeal was to a certain section of the new educated middle class and that broad popular support was not as yet forthcoming.

Notes

- 1 Roy (1985: 96) informs that the first Afghan translation of *Sayyid Qutb* seems to have been *Mawlawi* Younos Khaled's translation in 1960 of *Islam wa edalat-i ijtemāi* (Islam and Social Justice), followed by some translations by Rabbani, while he studied in Egypt (1966-68).
- 2 Grevemeyer (1987: 312) tells how forbidden publications, like the Tudeh magazine *Mardom*, were copied by hand in Afghanistan and secretly distributed. The influence from Iran on the Afghan Left was not only in

- terms of theoretical development but also involved actual cooperation. Equally, the new wave of social realism within Afghan literature was also clearly and directly inspired from the Iranian Left, which had been forced into exile, but grown in influence, after the coup against Prime Minister Mossadegh in 1953 (see N. Dupree 1985 and Ohadi 1988, for a discussion of the literary developments in Afghanistan from the 1950s till today).
- 3 Although the Ikhwan ul-Muslimin's basic attitude to Al Azhar was one of hostility for Al Azhar 'having permitted Egypt to fall into religious, cultural, political, economic, social, legal, and moral decadence and impotence', there were close personal contacts, and Al Azhar students formed an important and active core of the Ikhwan (Mitchell 1969: 212).
 - 4 Mozaffari (1987: 60-61) points to the strong influence of Ikhwanism on Khomeini, and mentions that both *Āyatullāh* Khomeini and Khalkhali (reputed for the summary executions he staged just after the Islamic Revolution) in the 1950s belonged to the Fedaiyin-i Islam, the Shi'a branch of the Ikhwan ul-Muslimin.
 - 5 Personal information, Peshawar, Nov. 1986.
 - 6 There is not much information available on Faizani's and Balkhi's activities nor on the extent to which they were influenced by religious movements elsewhere in the Muslim world. However, it seems probable that particularly Balkhi, being a Shi'a, was inspired by the Fedayin-i Islam (the Shi'a branch of Ikhwan ul-Muslimin) in Iran, who after World War II were increasingly radicalized to the point of employing terrorist strategies in the form of political assassinations.
 - 7 Khan (1984) refers to Balkhi as leader of the organization Qiyam-i Islami, while Edwards names his organization as Payam-i Islami and states the leader of Qiyam-i Islami to be Gausavar, one of Balkhi's accomplices in the coup plans. For further details, see Edwards (1986b).
 - 8 Edwards (1986b: 217-218, note 29) informs that the belief in Faizani as the *khalifa-i mahdī akhir al-zamān* was expressed to him by several of Faizani's disciples, who believed he was still alive despite reports of his execution in 1979.
 - 9 According to Majrooh (1986b: 419), *Neday-i Haq* was published during the period 15th Sep. 1971- 18th Jan. 1972. The editor was *Mawlawī* Abdul Sattar Siddiqi and the paper was owned by the Mujaddidi family.
 - 10 Roy, who has carried out the most thorough study of the Islamist movement in Afghanistan, states that there are no indications of organizational connections to similar movements abroad, although there seems to have been clear personal connections right from the start. An example is thus Harun Mujaddidi, son of Mohammad Sadiq (Gul Agha), who settled in Egypt where he was an active member of the Ikhwan ul-Muslimin in Egypt and thus got arrested under Gamal Abdel Nasser. However, from Edwards (1986b), Khan (1984) and Roy (1984) it appears that the collaboration with Jama'at-i Islami of Pakistan had been closer.
 - 11 In 1960, *Mawlawī* Younus Khales published the first book of *Sayyid* Qutb in Afghanistan, *Islam and Social Justice*. Later on, Burhanuddin Rabbani also undertook translations of Qutb's works (Roy 1985: 96).
 - 12 The practical utility of such an approach was reflected when *Mawlawī* Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi had a radio-broadcasted clash in Parliament with Babrak Karmal as to whether Marxism and Islam were compatible: 'It fell to Mawlawi Muhammadi to recite detailed passages from Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin to demonstrate the opposition of Marxist ideologues to religious belief' (Ghani 1987a: 91).

- 13 Some writers (Edwards 1987b, Shpoon 1983) imply that such ideological differences may have been augmented by a conflict over the spiritual leadership of the family with Sebghatullah being a descendant of *Shams al-Mashayikh* and Ibrahim Mujaddidi being a son of *Noor al-Mashayikh*.
- 14 Hassan al-Banna, in Donohue & Esposito 1982: 125-126.
- 15 See for example Maududi: *Human Rights in Islam* (1982).
- 16 See for example Hjärpe (1988) and *Afkar Inquiry*, vol. 4, no. 7, July 1987.
- 17 This impression not only appears from the writings of the Islamists in general, but the feeling of 'kinship' between the Afghan Left and the Islamists was further reinforced through interviews and discussions which I had with various Afghan parties in Peshawar, November 1986.
- 18 *Mawlānā* M. Zaman Muzzamil, Hizb-i Islami, personal communication, Peshawar, November 1986. *Mawlānā* Muzzammil was one of the 'ideologues' of the Hizb-i Islami.
- 19 *Mawlānā* Muzzamil, Hizb-i Islami, personal communication, Peshawar, November 1986.
- 20 Mr. Gulab Ningarhari, Jabha-i Nejat-i Melli Afghanistan (Mujaddidi group), personal communication, Peshawar, November 1986. In view of the historical events, it is interesting to notice that also here in the Mujaddidi-group, the general Afghan opinion prevails that the British were behind the uprisings causing the fall of King Amanullah.
- 21 In the Loya Jirga of 1924, King Amanullah had specifically objected to the inclusion of such a clause in the *Nizāmnāma*: "If I can appoint and dismiss ministers and officials of the administration, then surely I must take full responsibility in their success as well as in their failures ... Besides, even the inclusion of this clause does not free me from the ultimate responsibility that I would have to bear before God on the Day of Judgement..." *Mawlawī* Abdul Wasay insisted that the clause should remain. He argued that the inclusion of His Majesty in responsibility for the actions of the ministers would make them even more incompetent and lazy...' (*Roydad-e...*, 1924)
- 22 *Mawlānā* Muzzamil, *Hizb-i Islami*, personal communication, Peshawar, November 1986.
- 23 Senator Ghulam Nabi Chaknauri (son of the Chaknaur Mullah, Amir Mohammad Gul, *khalīfa* of the Hadda-i *Ṣāhib*), personal communication, Peshawar, November 1986.
- 24 In terms of structural features, Khalid (1982) argues that Islamism has its closest pendant in the National-Catholicism of Spain under General Franco.
- 25 Tahir Amin from the Department of International Relations, Quaid-i Azam University, Islamabad writes that the Pakistani government, worried about President Daoud's revived Pashtunistan policy, welcomed the Islamist exiles from Afghanistan and clandestinely trained a military force of close to 5,000 Afghans at secret camps in Peshawar (Amin 1984: 378).
- 26 The main ideologue for the Left-Islamist movement in Iran during the 1970s, Dr. Ali Shariati, has also devoted particular attention to the concept of *shihādāt*. However, in his (Shi'a) conception, it is not *jihād* itself as much as martyrdom being the goal of *jihād* that is stressed.
- 27 Personal communication with Afghan Islamists, Peshawar, Nov. 1986.
- 28 Personal communication, Peshawar, Nov. 1986. Almost all the elements of the Afghan Islamists' social analysis and political programme can be found in the writings of the Ikhwan or Maududi. The criticism of the private

- madrasas* is identical to the Ikhwan's criticism of Al Azhar (see Mitchell 1969).
- 29 M. Zaman Muzzamil (1981:13-14); also personal communication, Peshawar, Nov. 1986.
- 30 Maududi here refers to the followers of *Shaykh* Ahmad Sirhindi calling him and his successors by the title '*Qayyum* the First' and '*Qayyum* the Second' respectively. *Qayyum* being an attribute of Allah, the use of the title in this context is almost the same as claiming divine status for *Shaykh* Ahmad and his successors, i.e. verging on polytheism.
- 31 Prof. Fadhalallah Fiadh, formerly Faculty of Sharī'a, Kabul University, personal communication, Peshawar, November 1986.

The PDPA and Islam

When it seized power in 1978, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was quite aware of the fact that a working class had hardly developed in Afghanistan. Accordingly, to make up for this 'deficiency' and to prepare the 'toiling people' for other forms of class struggle, the new regime gave pre-eminence to the ideological class struggle:

Under the specific conditions prevailing in Afghanistan which is a developing nation, the ideological class struggle was given top priority at the initiative of our great leader [i.e. Taraki] and the ideological struggles were greatly emphasized as opposed to the two other forms of socio-economic struggle. (Hafizullah Amin 1979b: 725).

The PDPA thus embarked upon presenting to the Afghan public their ideological discourse centred around the class struggle of 'feudals' and 'exploiters' versus 'toiling workers and peasants' (*zahmat-keshān-i tabaq-i kārgar wā keshawār*). Concerted efforts were made to acquire ideological hegemony: no Afghan government has so consistently and actively tried to reach the population with its message and presented its world-view – through radio (later on television), public rallies, study groups, schools, literacy campaigns, etc. The campaign was successful in *reaching* the people – within one year there was hardly anybody in Afghanistan who did not know of the 'feudals' and 'workers' (*kārgars*) – but *how* the 'message' was received is another matter.




Figure 22: Dr Najibullah, President 1986-92

The shallow popular base of the PDPA, its deadly internal power struggles, hasty and badly-implemented reforms plus its very repressive methods caused a series of local uprisings during the following year, ultimately leading to a state of civil war in most parts of the country. The situation culminated in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 which, for the majority of the population, removed the last traces of the regime's legitimacy.

The PDPA's Islamic Strategy

While initially there was no room for Islamic elements in the PDPA discourse, the leaders denied being 'communists' and declared that they would respect the principles of Islam.¹ How this respect was to materialize remained an open question, as only Decree No. 7 on the abolition of the bride price made direct claims to be in accordance with the Shari'a regarding the size of *mahr* (Article 3). Much later it was also pointed out that, according to Shari'a, a boy and a girl can freely marry each other. Apart from that, Islamic values were only invoked to the extent of referring to fallen PDPA cadres as *shahidān*, and the struggle against counter-revolutionary forces plus the literacy campaign as *jihād*. Rather than trying to demonstrate the compatibility between the reform policy and the injunctions of Shari'a, which certainly would have been possible with several *ulamā* among the PDPA ranks, the policy was instead to disassociate the opponents from the 'toiling Muslims' by slandering their religious credibility, cursing them as Muslim-looking *farangis* (Europeans) in the service of imperialism, Ikhwan-us-Shayatin misusing religion, etc. By turning the 'Ikhwan' into the regime's 'first degree enemies' (Taraki 1979: 352), the PDPA indirectly lent support in particular to the Islamists' claim to be the leaders of the anti-communist *jihād*.

While the Taraki-Amin leadership had little success with their ideological class struggle, renewed efforts were made after the Soviet troops had rescued the Revolution in December 1979:

The work of all the means of exerting ideological influence upon the people should be stepped up and further activated to meet the demands of the present and subsequent phases of the revolution. (Karmal 1982: 18)

The strategy was now changed from claiming the regime as non-offensive to Islam into making an effort to gain credibility as 'Defenders of Islam' (and thereby acquire religious legitimacy) – through rhetoric,

forming religious institutions, appeals to the *‘ulamā*, etc. The strategy can roughly be outlined as follows:

- (1) to prove that the PDPA regime respected and protected Islam and that the revolutionary transformation did not contradict Islam.
- (2) to prove that the people in the resistance were hypocrites, i.e. they did not defend Islam but their own feudal, reactionary interests and persecuted honest and innocent Muslims.
- (3) to slander the personal integrity of the leaders of the *mujāhidīn* organizations in Pakistan.

Proving Respect for and Protection of Islam

In respect of the first strand of this strategy, the party rules of the PDPA specified that one of the duties of the party members was ‘to respect the religious beliefs of the people, to preserve their positive traditions and customs’.² Religious freedom was guaranteed in Articles 5 and 25.2 of the Interim Constitution of 1980 and it was strongly hinted that for the first time Shi‘as could enjoy this freedom. However, Article 5 of the Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan also specified the limits of this freedom:³

None of the citizens has the right to use this opportunity [i.e. the religious freedom] for the purpose of anti-national and anti-people propaganda and as a means for committing acts contrary to the interests of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan ...

As in the 1964 Constitution in cases where the law was not clearly defined, the courts would settle the cases in accordance with Shari‘a and the principles of democratic legality and justice (Article 56). But it was *not* stated that no law should be repugnant to Islam.

The PDPA also claimed to have promoted the organization of religious institutions in the country as compared to previous regimes where the *Jami‘yat al-‘Ulamā* was just an ordinary section within the Ministry of Justice. First, a General Department of Islamic Affairs was created within the Prime Minister’s Office serving as a central organ of the country’s religious organizations and institutions. While the Department was to direct its activities towards the respect and protection of Islam (Article 3 of Regulations), it should also ‘fulfil its activities according to laws, decrees, resolutions and other instructions

of the Revolutionary Council, Presidium of the Revolutionary Council, the Council of Ministers as well as in accord with this regulation and the orders of religious directives' (Article 4). Within the Department, a High Council of *ʿUlamā* was established as a consultative body (Article 8), the members of which were appointed by the Prime Minister on the proposal of the General President of the Islamic Affairs Department (Article 9). In March 1985, the Department was turned into a separate ministry under *Mawlawī* Abdul Wali Hujjat.⁴

Apart from directly religious duties such as facilitating *hajj*, maintaining mosques and holy places etc.,⁵ holding religious conferences and promoting study and research in religious subjects, the duties of the General Department also involved ensuring that the 'right kind of learning' was spread:⁶

To explain the aims of the April Revolution and the values envisaged in the Fundamental Principles of the DRA on the basis of ensuring observance and protection of the holy religion of Islam ... (Article 11.1).

To render help for ensuring unity of action of all working Muslims of Afghanistan towards the national independence, national sovereignty, territorial integrity and defending the gains of the April Revolution and the popular regime of the DRA against the aggression of counter-revolution, imperialism, hegemonism, colonialism and reaction. (Article 11.2)

To expose the filthy intentions and conspiracies of the avowed enemies of Islam, the counter-revolutionary elements, inside the country and the international imperialism who commit aggression under the false slogan of defense of Islam against the new regime of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the Afghan nation and the holy religion of Islam. (Article 11.3)

To prevent misinterpretation and incorrect propaganda of the orders of Islam at schools, religious institutions, mosques, publications, radio and television. (Article 11.5)

To take measures to prevent use of Islam in the interest of the enemies of the April revolution or as a means of securing personal purposes. (Article 11.6)

To prevent superstitions and customs which disturb the civilities and orders of social and economic life of the country. (Article 11.11)

The first Conference of *ʿUlamā* and Clergymen was already living up to the principles outlined above and, with reference to the Soviet assistance to the Saur Revolution, quoted the Holy Prophet in saying:

'In the eyes of God, the rights of a neighbour is so great that I feel maybe a neighbour has the right to inherit from another neighbour' (*ibid*: 105).

The efforts of the Afghan regime were presented as a continuation of the patriotic efforts of *Ghāzī* Amanullah (i.e. King Amanullah) in liberating Afghanistan from the clutches of imperialism and, in this spirit, recourse to a pan-Islamic rhetoric was sought, pointing towards how an imperialist conspiracy was launched against freedom-loving Muslims in the disguise of a defence of Islam (Karmal 1981: 21-35). To gain credence for these views, support for *Imām* Khomeini and the Islamic Republic of Iran's struggle against imperialism was frequently proclaimed (*ibid*: 17, 44).⁷

To prove that revolutionary transformations do not contradict the substance of Islam and its historic call for justice, equality and the abolition of the exploitation of man by man, reference was made to Islamic countries like Algeria, Syria, Libya and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.⁸

Proving the People in the Resistance were Hypocrites

In respect of the second strand of the PDPA strategy, the opponents of the regime were labelled as 'satanic'. Reference was made to cruelties committed against civilians, to reactionaries and 'feudals' defending their class interests as well as to them being unpatriotic agents of imperialism. Their claim to defend Islam was sought to be undermined by pointing out that their alleged atrocities were *not* in accordance with the spirit of Islam, that they were known to have been burning copies of the Qur'ān, and that they were against education even though Islam encourages the seeking of knowledge.

Generally speaking, while using religious concepts, the PDPA regime did not enter into any Islamic discourse, the exception being Babrak Karmal's opening speech at the first Conference of the *Ulamā* and Clergy (June-July 1980), in which he likened the opposition to the regime with the tribe of Aad and the Samuds, as mentioned in the Qur'ān:

They raised rebellions in cities, sowed sedition and disorder. The Creator sent down severe punishment upon them. Allah is surely watching the deeds of the raging hooligans and sedition-mongers. (*In Defense of Islam* 1980: 12)

And Karmal went on to stress, that these 'criminals' would be brought before Allah's court of justice and be punished according to Shari'a –



Figure 23: PDPA political poster, Kabul 1981

This blood-splattered poster depicts Gulbuddin Hikmatyar and ex-King Zahir Shāh as villains and enemies of the people. While intending to discredit the *mujāhidin* leaders by portraying them as hypocrites, agents of imperialism and capitalism, etc., the PDPA campaign backfired; its targets achieved greater prominence than they had had hitherto.

and the constitution (*ibid*: 16). This was supplemented by Mullah Sayyid Kamal Abbasi:

'Aye! God's curse is on the unjust who turn men away from the path', for both in the Shariat and in secular laws, Islam strictly forbids friendship with villains, murderers ... Since all this is prohibited by religion, the violator by God's will is cast for this into hell fire, where he will be punished with torture ... As Allah directs in *ayat* 115, *sura* 'Hood': 'Lean not into those who do wrong, lest the Fire touch you'. (*ibid*: 43)

The opponents of the Revolution were also labelled as 'hypocritical' (*munāfiq*) enemies, which further underlined the religious character of the conflict, the *munāfiqīn* being those who at the time of the Prophet outwardly professed to believe in his mission, but secretly denied the faith – i.e. the most treacherous and dangerous of enemies.

In order to stress further the pro-Islamic character of the regime and the anti-Islamic character of the resistance, the magazine *Payam-i Haq* issued by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs published its own list of 'martyrs': religious scholars, *imāms*, etc. who were the martyrs (*shahīdān*) of 'the cause of truth, the cause of Islam, God and the homeland'. In the short biographies presented of nineteen such *shahīdān* of the PDPA regime, it appears that most had studied privately, two had studied at the respected *Nur al-Madares* in Ghazni and no one seems to have graduated from any of the government *madrasas*.⁹ This is interesting since they formed the frontline of religious scholars co-operating with the PDPA in the sense that no less than eight of these *shahīdān* were members of the High Council of 'Ulamā (which presumably was the reason for their killing).

Although information on the composition of this High Council has not been available, this list may indicate that the government was only able to recruit religious supporters from among the fairly unknown and uneducated; most seem to have been functioning as *imāms* at village or town mosques until they shot into prominence either by the simple fact of their death or previously through their cooperation with the regime. Only two, *Mawlawī* Abdul Hakim Jauzjani, former head of the Gozar-Shahan religious school at Sar-i Pul, and *Mawlawī* Assadullah Nasrat Andkhoy, former head of the *Abu Muslim Madrasa* in Maimana, appear to have had any previous prominence. Altogether, this may be interpreted as an indication that the PDPA was rather unsuccessful in co-opting the 'ulamā into any cooperation¹⁰ and thus suffered from the lack of (implicit) religious legitimacy such a cooperation would give. However, by 1987, the

regime was boasting of twelve religious persons being members of the Revolutionary Council and that twenty percent of the entire membership of the local organs of state power and administration was staffed with religious figures (*Afghanistan Today*, No. 3, 1987). The oppositional *Afghanistan Tribune* informs that in 1986 the PDPA regime was claiming to have some 12,000 mullahs on the payroll and that material benefits seem to have been the main means of co-opting religious functionaries: high level salary (1,500-4,000 Afs per month), presents at religious holidays, exemption from military service, subsidized food, etc. All in all, this was a new variation on the 'stick and carrot' principle previously used so successfully by *Amir* Abdur Rahman.

The religious credibility of the resistance was not only challenged by their martyring of 'good Muslims' but also the PDPA regime pointed out that – with their improved weaponry – the rebels did not even refrain from launching attacks on the shrines of the country. Consequently, serious damage had been effected on the Shahzadeh mosque in Herat, the Mullah Sharin mosque and the *Khirqā-i Sharīf* in Kandahar as well as on the ḤaQrat Ali mosque in Mazar-i Sharif – in other words on all the holiest shrines of the country (APN [Novosti], 08.02.1988).

Slandering the Personal Integrity of Mujāhidīn Leaders


Yet another dimension of the ideological struggle was the third strand of the PDPA's strategy: to undermine the credibility and integrity of the leaders of the resistance. This mainly consisted of framing the leaders of the main exile parties in Pakistan, i.e. portrayals of Mujaddidi as reactionary and feudal; Gailani as feudal, capitalist and aligned with British colonialism; Mohammadi as a landlord; and Rabbani and Hikmatyar as Ikhwan and CIA agents. Right from 1978, Hikmatyar in particular was the target of attack. It was pointed out that he was sentenced for murder in 1970 and on top of that he was accused of being a homosexual.¹¹

Legitimacy of Power

Considering the actual content of the PDPA's policy vis-à-vis Islam, it is first of all clear that, as far as legitimacy of power is concerned, the 'PDPA model' – according to the interim constitution of 21 April 1980, passed by a Loya Jirga on 25 April 1985 – did not seek recourse to any

Islamic values.¹² Sovereignty was rooted in the working people of Afghanistan to whom the state belonged (Article 1), with the Loya Jirga as highest state authority (an attempt to invoke a mixture of tribal legitimacy and popular sovereignty – Article 35). However, a duality existed here, as the Revolutionary Council in the preamble was labelled the highest authority wielding state power and the real representative of the free will of the entire population, i.e. the Loya Jirga had a mere decorative effect. The will and interest of all the progressive forces were reflected in the PDPA, which would be the guiding and mobilizing force of society (Article 4), below which the National Fatherland Front served as an umbrella organization for the wide spectrum of progressive forces and groups of the country – including the High Council of *‘Ulamā*.

Figure 24: The PDPA model of the transmission of power



In other words, while the main ideological thrust of the post-1979 regime had been to achieve some sort of religious and tribal legitimacy vis-à-vis the population, this was *not* reflected in the juridico-legal structure of the state as represented in the Constitution. But the 1985 Constitution shared this feature with both the 1977 Constitution *and* the 1964 Constitution; there too Islam was *not* the ultimate source of legitimacy of power. While the PDPA was suspected of aiming for a total secularization of society, in its actual policies more circumspect ways were followed: *polity expansion* within the legal field in the form of gradual replacement of Sharīʿa with secular law continued. And what PDPA called a strengthening of religious institutions was – in the spirit of *Amīr* Abdur Rahman – not just a matter of an ‘Islamization’

of society but an example of *polity dominance*. In fact, after the change of strategy towards Islam from 1980, all the government's religious endeavours could be summarized under this heading: building up a number of institutions but according to guidelines and regulations serving the purpose of the state. A parallel could also be found in the 'ethnic and tribal' policies of the government.

The efforts of the government did not result in any higher credibility or legitimacy vis-à-vis the population. Even for the Loya Jirga in April 1985, the regime only managed to muster some six hundred delegates (Samimy 1987). In view of the Geneva negotiations, a new face-lift was attempted which involved replacing Babrak Karmal with Najibullah and summoning a new Loya Jirga (of 1860 members) on 29 November 1987 to endorse a new constitution laying the foundations for the policy of National Reconciliation.¹³ The new Constitution introduced a two-chamber parliament with a directly elected Wolosi Jirga and a Senate composed of elected and presidentially-appointed members. The attempt to produce a model resembling the 1964 Constitution appeared obvious.

Article 3 of the new Constitution specified that state power belonged to the people and was to be exercised through its deputies in the National Assembly and the local councils, elected according to the provisions of the law. Thus, legitimacy was to be derived from popular sovereignty which, according to Article 65, found its expression in the Loya Jirga – in accordance with national historical traditions, this was the highest manifestation of the will of the people. In spite of this, the President could veto decisions of the National Assembly and only a two-thirds majority in each chamber could overrule such a veto (Article 93).

While the PDPA lost its vanguard role, it was still mentioned as the organizer and guardian of the implementation of national reconciliation (Article 4). Political parties were legalized (Article 4), provided they did not oppose the values embodied in the Constitution and the laws of the country, but the National Fatherland Front was still envisaged as an umbrella organization, uniting political parties, social organizations and individuals (Article 5).

Concessions to Islam were quite limited. Article 2 stated that the sacred religion of Islam was the religion of Afghanistan. Article 40 guaranteed freedom of religious rites to all Muslims but no citizen had the right to use religion for anti-people propaganda purposes, creation of enmity or the commission of other deeds contrary to the interests of the country. Regarding the judiciary, Article 121 stated that, where no explicit provision existed in the law, the court should,

following the provisions of the Sharīʿa of Islam, render a decision that secured justice in the best possible way. On a more symbolic note, the Presidential oath was to be sworn 'in the name of Allah, the Almighty, to protect the sacred religion of Islam, observe the constitution ...' (Article 93). Furthermore, the national insignia were to consist of 'a rising sun, adytum and pulpit with a green background, an open book [sic] in the centre, ensconed in two sheaths of wheat, and with a tricolour ribbon in black, red and green' (Article 7). Finally, the name of the country was changed from the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan to the Republic of Afghanistan.

The downgrading of the PDPA and the formal legalization of political parties were perhaps the biggest 'concessions' in the new Constitution although there were enough articles to keep a multi-party system under strict central control. As a 'proof' of its good intentions, in February 1988 the regime could already boast of two new parties: the Popular Islamic Party headed by Abdul Sattar Sirat¹⁴ and the Peasant Party of Justice. An official opposition thus now existed and, in the elections in April 1988, according to the Constitution and Law on Elections the opposition would have 25 of the 62 seats of the Senate (APN [Novosti], 4 April 1988). Parallel with this development, with much publicity, increasing numbers of non-party members were included in government and appointed to high posts in the bureaucracy.

As in Daoud *Khān's* Constitution of 1977, in this new constitution the Loya Jirga constituted a principal source of legitimacy for the regime (see Article 67) in terms of approving, amending and interpreting the Constitution, election of the President, conclusion of war and peace as well as in decisions on national destiny. However, there was in fact nothing left of the original *jirga* concept. The Loya Jirga was *not* constituted by representatives of the people but (as per Article 66) was composed of the following:

- Members of the National Assembly
- Governors and mayors of Kabul
- Members of the Council of Ministers
- Members of the Supreme Court
- The Attorney General and his/her deputies
- Members of the Executive Board of the National Fatherland Front
- Outstanding individuals, appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Secretariat of the National Fatherland Front

These constitutional attempts at National Reconciliation were followed up with a selective amnesty in January 1988 for some of the opposition commanders who had been sentenced to death in absentia – among these even such prominent people as Ahmad Shah Massoud and Mohammad Ismael of Herat (APN [Novosti], 26 Jan 1988). Including non-party members in government and allowing an official opposition was one thing but it was rather ineffective compared to the coup that cooperation with the *active* resistance groups would have constituted. For this reason, over the years the PDPA government sought to achieve separate agreements with various resistance groups, a policy in which it was been entirely unsuccessful. The ‘nationalities’ policy of the Constitution presumably served the same purpose of ‘divide and rule’, aiming for the creation of administrative units based on national characteristics (Article 12). The tribally-organized resistance groups seem to have been particularly susceptible to the cooption by the regime, presumably in view of their very localized interests and commitments. The Kabul regime thus seemed to gradually learn the ‘politics of tribal power’ but this – as both former rulers in Kabul and the British Indian colonial regime experienced – was only a short-term solution. It was besides something of a two-edged sword.

An illustrative example is the case of Ismat Muslim, who for five years had led the resistance of the Achakzai tribe around Kandahar. Then in 1987, shortly before Najibullah’s takeover, he changed sides and started to work actively in support of the Kabul regime for which in return he was made a general in the Afghan army. Rumours tell that his personal lifestyle had been a cause of tensions between him and the more religious-inclined parts of the resistance. At the Loya Jirga in November 1987, Ismat Muslim was at first appointed as a delegate but ultimately left out. Again rumours speculated that his lifestyle and drinking habits had also become a cause of concern for the Kabul regime, which was increasingly stressing its Islamic character and thus could not risk this image being tainted by the presence of this controversial general. Anyway, since neither religious leaders nor the PDPA should dictate to the Achakzai leader, Ismat Muslim would not accept such a humiliation. He thus tried to force his way into the Jirga assembly, which resulted in an embarrassing shooting incident at the Polytechnic, where the Jirga was assembled, reportedly resulting in two people killed and several wounded. Shortly afterwards, on 3 December 1987, Ismat Muslim departed for the Soviet Union with two of his wives (Samimy 1987a, Parwesh Mehra 1987). Thus, the PDPA might have achieved some skill in the art of ‘divide and rule’

but it still had many lessons to learn before they could handle tribal politics to their own advantage.

Events were to prove that the PDPA had insufficient time to harvest the fruits of its 'divide and rule' policy. However, the effects of this policy have long outlived the PDPA and are a key factor influencing events in present-day Afghanistan.

The Fall of the PDPA

In February 1989, after close to ten years' occupation, Soviet forces were withdrawn from Afghanistan. Contrary to the expectations of most observers, this did not signal the overthrow of President Najibullah's PDPA government, which displayed great ability to survive the continued *mujāhidīn* attacks. Pressurized by the Soviets, Najibullah carried on with his reconciliation policy albeit while still receiving their military assistance. An increasing number of non-Communists were included in the Afghan government and in June 1990 the PDPA was transformed into the Hizb-i Watan (the Fatherland Party). Najibullah's policy of national reconciliation did not, however, produce any tangible results, since all his overtures were turned down by the resistance parties and prospects for reaching an understanding with the *mujāhidīn* remained dim. On the other hand, due to lack of coordination and internal conflicts, the *mujāhidīn* were not able to produce any tangible military breakthrough in their warfare against the PDPA regime.

The continued internal factionalism of the PDPA was as dangerous to the Najibullah government as the *mujāhidīn* attacks and, in March 1990, an internal coup attempt failed. The coup was headed by General Shahnawaz Tanai, Chief of Staff of the Afghan Armed Forces since 1986 (Adamec 1987:196). Partly, this coup attempt illustrated the long-lasting internal split in the PDPA – rooted in personal and ethnic oppositions rather than in ideological ones – between its Khalq and Parcham factions. Partly it signalled other, future alliances, since General Tanai was supported by one of the most radical Islamic opponents of the PDPA regime, i.e. Gulbuddin Hikmatyar's Hizb-i Islami. This unholy alliance showed that, even among the Afghan Islamists, ethnic and personal considerations weighed heavier than ideological differences. The other Afghan resistance parties condemned Hikmatyar's support for the coup attempt and interpreted it as yet another illustration of Hizb-i Islami's urge for power.¹⁵

Another significant development was that in early 1992 an important new military force joined the resistance. In 1988, the PDPA regime had recruited a local militia among nationalist Uzbeks in northern Afghanistan. It was known as the Jawzjani militia and was led by the Uzbek, General Dostam. Not only had it proved an efficient force in the north but had also been engaged in fighting the *mujāhidīn* in the eastern (Pashtun-dominated) provinces, where it had acquired a reputation for brutality. But in 1992 General Dostam turned against the PDPA regime, entering into an alliance with the Tajik *mujāhidīn* commander, Ahmad Shah Massoud, because he claimed "Najibullah humiliated us and violated the rights of minorities".¹⁶ Dostam's mutiny quickly led to the fall of Mazar-i-Sharif to *mujāhidīn* forces.

On 18 March 1992, in this deteriorating military situation, President Najibullah announced his willingness to resign to pave the way for a UN-negotiated settlement which should re-establish peaceful conditions in the war-ridden country. Najibullah's declaration was the outcome of heavy pressure from the UN special envoy, Benon Sevan. However, rather than being conducive to the establishment of a broad-based interim government – which contrary to all advice apparently had been anticipated by Sevan – it created a power vacuum in the country which all the fighting forces tried to exploit. Soon after, Massoud's capture of the strategically-important Bagram air base only fifty kilometres north of Kabul led to Najibullah being forced to resign. The armed forces gradually disintegrated with the Parcham and Khalq factions choosing sides in the internal power struggles among the various *mujāhidīn* groups. On 15 April 1992, Najibullah took refuge at the UN Office in Kabul whereupon rival *mujāhidīn* groups occupied Kabul. Thereafter, the PDPA dissolved into its two factions. Since then the Parcham faction has supported the Tajik, Ahmad Shah Massoud, as well as the Islamic Jami'at-i Islami which, apart from General Dostam's militia in northern Afghanistan, also allied itself with other rebel generals like Sayed Jafer Naderi and the former governor of Herat, General Abdul Momin. The Khalqis have generally sided with Hikmatyar's Pashtun-dominated and more radical Hizb-i Islami.¹⁷

Ideological Class Struggle and the Aesthetics of Reception

The collapse of the PDPA regime was not solely due to its internal disunity – if anything, its *mujāhidīn* opponents were even more disunited – nor to any significant deterioration of military situation.

Arguably, the crucial factor in the downfall of the PDPA was its losing the other (ideological) war, the struggle for the 'hearts and minds' of the Afghan people.

The regime's main efforts, as pointed out by both Amin and Karmal, had been directed towards the 'ideological class struggle' in which at first what could be labelled as a 'symbolic socialization' process played a role. Like their cherished predecessor King Amanullah, the PDPA tried to carry out a cultural transformation through changing symbols. It took the form of mass rallies of 'toiling workers and peasants', and of happily 'emancipated' school girls, leaving out '*Bismillah-e Rahman-e Rahim*' at the start of speeches and public announcements, changing the national flag and the name of the country – it even went to the extent of ordering all the wooden doors of the old Khulm bazaar to be painted red on the first anniversary of the Saur Revolution.

When the backlash came, the PDPA government retracted in this field as in all other fields, and initiated a process of 'symbolic desecularization' in order to placate its opponents. This took the form of reintroducing '*Bismillah-e ...*', changing the flag and the official name of the country again, getting high officials to participate in all public religious functions, and in maintaining that breaking the fast in public was punishable by law. Self-criticism within the PDPA reached new heights with the acknowledgement that initially it had failed 'to take due account of religious, tribal and ethnic factors', that the land-and-water reform was ill-considered, that the regime had shown a 'demonstrative emphasis on atheism and a maximalist attitude to religion' and that 'the emancipation of women decreed from above in contradiction to the laws of the Shari'a could not rally support in the country inhabited by devout Muslims' (APN [Novosti], 10 Oct. 1988).

However, while the process of 'symbolic socialization' was met with an outcry that the country was turning communist, little confidence could be found in the reverse process, as it was considered mere 'eyewash'.¹⁸ While none of the above processes of change in symbolic expressions altered anything in the social structure, the difference in popular reaction was essential – in other words, it was a question of the 'aesthetics of reception'.

The secret in achieving ideological hegemony is not just to *reach* the masses with one's vision of the world or to impose it upon them but to have it accepted. Hence, when entering a discourse on religious subjects, the PDPA leadership were at a disadvantage since their credibility as believers was already tainted, i.e. from earlier days they

were known as being very 'bad' Muslims, not respecting any religious commandments. They were surely not the only ones among the urban middle class in that situation but they had been more brash about it as a matter of conviction rather than of laxity, i.e. they had been intentionally blasphemous. With this background, no invocation of Islamic virtues could be taken seriously from them but was considered even more offensive. (This was also directly reflected in the uprisings in Eastern Nuristan as described by Strand 1984).

The suspicion of personal irreligiosity was further confirmed by the behaviour of many smaller officials in the initial phases of the Revolution and seen as confirmed by the government's harsh attacks on religious dignitaries. Other Afghan rulers (for example *Amir* Abdur Rahman) had attacked religious dignitaries equally fiercely. But there was a difference. First of all, Abdur Rahman had had enough military power to quell resistance and be successful. Secondly, he outmanoeuvred the religious establishment by keeping to a fully orthodox Islamic discourse. In contrast, the PDPA tried to get the population to believe that they respected Islam while simultaneously attacking all the religious-learned. To disassociate Islam in the public mind from all its functionaries was in itself a task. But when the PDPA could claim no religious credibility for themselves, it was impossible.

At a more fundamental level, the PDPA's ideological struggle also faced serious difficulties. To return to Laclau's formulation (1977: 161), ideological hegemony can only be achieved to the extent that the discourse in question can articulate the different visions of the world in such a way that their potential antagonism is neutralized. The PDPA's obeisance to Islam was a simple outward addition to its discourse centred around class struggle. Although the PDPA leadership claimed to defend the 'true' faith, they neither presented *their* interpretation of Islam nor were religious concepts or values integrated in their discourse to constitute a challenge to the discourse of the resistance. In short, no integrated synthesis was achieved in the spirit of Tarzi's Islamic modernism nor of Ali Shariati's social-revolutionary Islam. Therefore, even if the PDPA had been successful in discrediting the resistance leaders, the chance of *neutralizing* the Islamic discourse of the resistance would have been much less likely to succeed.

It might have been another matter when it came to the ethnic and tribal dimensions of the policy. Here a divide-and-rule policy had far better chances of success and, equally important, the PDPA leaders' credibility in this respect was far higher; by and large, ethnic and tribal loyalties were values which they identified with themselves and

were, moreover, to a large extent what caused all the splits in the party from the 1960s.

The conflict in Afghanistan was, apart from its military and power political perspectives, also an ideological conflict – a conflict between opposing ideological discourses. The two main ‘contenders’ were the ruling PDPA and the Islamists, who each represented an all-embracing ideological discourse with a considerable similarity in structure but centred around different key concepts and values. The goal of both was to control the modern centralized state apparatus and revolutionize society. Both were acutely aware of the importance of the ‘ideological state apparatuses’ in achieving ideological hegemony, particularly the modern educational system of which both were products. (It is thus no coincidence that the Islamist parties were ahead of the other resistance parties in opening schools, both for the refugees in Pakistan and in liberated areas in Afghanistan).

When seizing power in 1978, the PDPA virtually ‘proved’ the Islamists right in their ideological discourse against the Establishment and communism, and the Islamists could thus ‘thank’ the PDPA for the main part of the support they gained among the Afghan population. However, when it comes to achieving ideological hegemony, the Islamist discourse suffers from the same weakness as the PDPA in the sense that it rejects, rather than integrates, the heterogeneity of social identities in the Afghan society. And if the ambition for power cannot be combined with ideological hegemony – which is the precondition for a regime’s legitimacy – force remains the only alternative. The chaos following the PDPA collapse thus stemmed not only from the disunity among the *mujāhidīn* already mentioned but also from the continued absence of an ideological hegemony that addressed the heterogeneous nature of Afghan society.

The nature of the ideological discourse represented by the Islamists which enabled the *mujāhidīn* to win power – but not consolidate it – is discussed in the following chapter.

Notes

- 1 In this respect, Hafizullah Amin’s ‘proletarian revolution’, which broke with the thesis of national-democratic development (see Olesen 1983), has been labelled a ‘leftist deviation’ or a CIA plot.
- 2 Section I, Paragraph 5, Article 15. For the full text of the ‘Rules of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan’, see ‘Documents and Records of the National Conference of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan’, Kabul, March 14-15 1982, pp. 53-68.

- 3 For a discussion of the Constitutional Acts (Fundamental Principles) of the governments, 1978-1985, see Moltmann (1986).
- 4 *Mawlawī* Hujjat was a Tajik from Takhar province, educated at the Islamic College, Kabul. He was imprisoned in 1941 and is said to have been attacked as 'unorthodox' in the 1960s. Was imprisoned and tried for disrespect of the Prophet Mohammad but the case was dropped due to government intervention. Taught at private *madrāsas* until 1972. Appointed to the Ministry of Justice, Kabul. President, Provincial Court, Herat, 1978. Member, Revolutionary Court, 1979. Gen. President, Islamic Affairs Department. Minister of Islamic Affairs, March 1985. Present whereabouts unknown (Adamec 1987: 72).
- 5 It was thus claimed that 114 new mosques had been built and 1,026 others repaired – as well as religious scholars receiving a higher salary than previously (*Afghanistan Today*, No.3, 1986)
- 6 From *Afghanistan. Multifaceted Revolutionary Process* (undated) Government Printing Press, Afghanistan, pp. 81-89.
- 7 The attitude of the PDPA, and communist parties around the world, towards Iran and Khomeini was dependent upon the relationship between the Tudeh Party and the regime. This relationship was cordial – see for example press interview with Karmal 21.01.1980 (Karmal 1981: 17) – until most of the politburo of the Tudeh Party was arrested during February and May 1982. However, it was not until spring 1983 that Tudeh and other communist parties clearly started condemning not only the Iranian regime as such but also *Āyatullāh* Khomeini himself.
- 8 From 'Documents and Records of the National Conference of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan', Kabul, March 14-15 1982, p.81.
- 9 In 'Martyred for the Cause of the Truth' (undated) by the Islamic Affairs Department, Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.
- 10 However, the Vice-President of the Revolutionary Council was a *Mawlawī* Faqirullah Sāhibul Haq (*Afghanistan Today*, No.3, 1986).
- 11 See for example 'The True Face of Afghan Counter-Revolution, Editorial Office of the Newspaper *Haqiqat Enqelab Sawyer*, Kabul, 1982.
- 12 Text in an unofficial translation into English, printed in Moltmann (1986: 565-574).
- 13 The following is based on 'Udkast til Grundlov for Den Demokratiske republik Afghanistan' (English text published in photocopy form in October 1987 by APN's bureau in Copenhagen).
- 14 Abdul Sattar Sirat was born in Samangan and attended the *Madrasa-i Abu Hanifa*, and later got his BA in Islamic Law from Kabul University. He was Dean of the Faculty of Shari'ah 1965-68. Attended Al Azhar University 1967-68, and became Minister of Justice 1969-71. Later on he was a professor at the Al-Qura University, Mecca, and became a member of the Constitutional Council of the Muslim World League (Adamec 1987: 181).
- 15 Eliot 1991.
- 16 Newman 1988: 738; *AIC Monthly Bulletin*, Nos. 132-135 (March-June 1992); Rashid 1992b.
- 17 *AIC Monthly Bulletin*, Nos. 132-135 (March-June 1992).
- 18 Although there is little indication that the PDPA was able to convince its enemies about its sincerity in religious matters, it is interesting that the Jamī'at-i Islami in *Afghan News* (vol. III, no. 11, 01.06 1987) felt it necessary to comment on *why* all these measures should only be considered as a religious mask, an attempt to 'destroy Islam with Islam'.

The *Mujāhidīn* and Islam

After the abortive uprisings in 1975, the Islamist leaders were living in relative obscurity in Pakistan until the overthrow of President Daoud by the Islamists' dire enemies, the reconstituted PDPA.

As resistance to the regime developed, various more or less organized groups appeared – both inside and outside Afghanistan – that were continuations, reorganizations or new factions of political groups from the 1960s and 1970s. Initially, according to Samimy 1981: 65-90, they could be divided into the following main categories:¹

- religious-oriented groups covering the spectrum from conservatives/traditionalists to revolutionary Islamists (Samimy lists twenty groups in this category)
- national-democratic groups (Samimy lists five groups)
- non-Moscow communists of varying shades (Samimy lists eleven groups)

After the Saur Revolution in April 1978, the two latter categories – mainly consisting of the urban educated – had great difficulties in establishing representation within the resistance. The small communist/socialist groups, subjected to attack from both the Kabul regime and the religious-defined groups, appear to have been virtually eradicated from active participation in the fighting but can still be found in the Afghan exile communities in Western Europe. As far as the national-democratic groups are concerned, their adherents were either absorbed into one of the more 'moderate' religious parties or withdrew into exile in the West, leaving the scene in Afghanistan and in Iran and Pakistan (the main seats of 'exile politics') to the religious-oriented parties. Parallel to and connected with this development, the discourse of the conflict took on an increasingly homogeneous Islamic character – to the extent that even the PDPA regime ultimately had to formulate itself in religious idioms.

Islam in the Popular Resistance

Since 1978 numerous authors have offered as many different explanations for the armed resistance to the PDPA regime. These have mainly centred around the following models or combinations of these:

- a religious population's reaction to an un-Islamic regime or to un-Islamic reforms;
- a tribal population's reaction to (increased) government interference in local affairs;
- a fiercely independent and nationalistic people's reaction to foreign domination; and
- the reactionary resistance of feudal lords and religious fanatics to progressive reforms.

All these different explanatory models suffer from the basic weakness of trying to give a generalized picture where such does not exist. All reliable reports from Afghanistan point towards a host of different and frequently specifically local factors behind the initial outbreak of armed resistance in various parts of the country.² However, as the resistance spread and took on the dimensions of a nationwide civil war, the PDPA government identified its enemies primarily as the religious establishment – referred to as *Ikhwan-us-Shayatin* (i.e. 'The Satanic Brotherhood')³ – plus 'feudals'. In accordance with this agitation, the resistance to the government was soon formulated as opposition to a godless regime and even those who until April 1978 had never heard of the PDPA (the large majority of the population) were soon 'enlightened' in this respect by the more knowledgeable. In this they were greatly assisted by the PDPA cadres' insensitivity to Islamic values, their provocative acts and growing repression, particularly of respected and renowned religious leaders – most significantly the execution in January 1979 of 79 members of the Mujaddidi family, including the *Ḥazrat Ṣāḥib* Mohammad Ibrahim Mujaddidi.⁴

At a comparatively early stage, the PDPA government thus became identified not just with un-Islamic ways but indeed with outright *kufir* with all its connotations of moral bankruptcy and inherent evil. Accordingly, the existing social order and all those well-established customs which the PDPA reform policy aimed at changing (through land reform, abolition of debts and mortgages, restrictions on bride price, etc.) became conceived of as being sanctioned by Islam. While

these reforms were poorly planned and even worse in their implementation, still they addressed very real problems in Afghan society. Ultimately then they suffered the fate of being labelled as attacking *Islamic* values. This point is further stressed by A.H. Khan (1981: 164) who states that 'defending his religion, country, neighbour, customs and traditions becomes a sacred duty for the Afghan. Defending anything that is sacred to an Afghan, be it religion or the Pushto code, is a Jihad for an Afghan'. In view of the close integration of Islamic elements with tribal code and age-old customs as described in Chapter 2, this equalization of 'Islam' with the established order of things was probably unavoidable and followed the pattern of religious sanctioning or sacralization of uprisings and revolts during the last hundred years.

On 27 November 1979, *jihād* was declared jointly by the resistance parties in Peshawar but no further details as to who proclaimed the *jihād* are available (Reshtiya 1984: 67). Although by this time the armed resistance in its own self-understanding was a *jihād*, initially the PDPA regime was not entirely unsuccessful in labelling the rebels as *ashrar* (sinful) and *basmach* (rascals). It had even taken the offensive in the use of religious concepts by claiming that the first uprising, i.e. that in Nuristan, was brought about by the population of this area having reverted back to their '*kāfir*' ways. An equal willingness of the PDPA to engage in the traditional discourses could be seen in connection with the Hazara uprising in Darra-i Suf, where volunteers for the Defense of the Revolution were sought and enlisted by an appeal to existing ethnic enmities (Olesen 1983). A similar appeal was also used in Nuristan (see Strand 1984 and Puig 1984).

The starting point of this study was that the basic function of all ideology is to constitute individuals into subjects, i.e. to define the Self as well as the surrounding world. This is clearly illustrated in the Islamic discourse dominant in the resistance, which revolves around the concepts of *hijra* and *jihād* leaving two identities available for the believer: *muhājir* (exile), *mujāhid* (holy warrior) and in the last instance *shahīd* (martyr). As has been demonstrated in the previous chapters, these are deep-rooted concepts in Afghan history and politico-religious practice, and readily lend themselves to a strongly emotional identification. Centlivres (1987) elaborates this point in terms of the 'double identity' of the Afghan refugees: when approaching Afghanistan to engage in guerilla activities, a person sees himself as a *mujāhid*, while after completing the mission he returns to the camps in Pakistan as a *muhājir*. The two identities do not conflict; the term

muhājir does not denote the helpless resignation of the refugee – such is incompatible with the concept of the *mujāhid* as one who is fighting in the way of God – but rather contains the connotation of a person who has (willingly) migrated to uphold the cause of God (*ibid*).

Accordingly, the neighbouring countries of Iran and Pakistan which received the bulk of Afghan refugees were not only Muslim brothers but fell in the category of *ansar*, a term readily used when the Afghan Islamist leaders addressed for example their Pakistani hosts (*ibid*). For the Afghans, this terminology lent respectability and religious justification to their refugee situation. They could thereby retain their self-respect in exile and not feel humiliated and inferior in view of their actual dependence on Pakistani (and Iranian) goodwill. The official policy in these two countries, due to the Islamist nature of their regimes and geopolitical considerations, was to support the Afghans' definition of the situation. The public opinion in these countries during the first years also appeared to share this conceptualization and made it possible to accommodate such huge number of refugees with admiringly few tensions and problems. However, after ten years this consensus ceased to exist and, not surprisingly, tension between the refugee population and their local hosts increased.

In the Islamic discourse of the resistance, enemies are classified either as *kāfir* or, almost worse, as *munāfiq* (hypocrites) a term applied to those apparent allies who turn out to be false and traitorous:

They have taken their oaths as a covering, then they have barred from the way of God. Surely they – evil are the things they have been doing. (Sura LXIII, 2)
God will never forgive them. God guides not the people of the ungodly. (Sura LXIII, 6)

It is with reference to the *munāfiqīn* that particularly Hizb-i Islami was on a militant collision course with the other resistance groups, at times leading to speculations of whom Hizb-i Islami considered to be the main enemy – the *kāfirun* or the *munāfiqīn*.⁵

In the religious discourse, the battle is between Good and Evil and all constitutes the Lord's test of the Believers (see also Zadran undated: Ch. 4):

When we declared jihad, it was not on our initiative. We merely transmitted the commandments of God and the Prophet...Our jihad is a test that God has placed before us. We succeeded in the first test, namely to do hijrat. (Mujaddidi 1986).

In the abundant literature published on *jihād* among the Afghan refugees, *jihād* was presented as the greatest form of worship, having priority above anything else in religion and an individual obligation upon everyone (i.e. a *farz ʿayn*).⁶ Within these lines of thought, the *mujāhid*'s life and death was the same in *jihād* and the ultimate goal was to earn the honour of becoming *shahīd*, aptly illustrated in the host of exile publications, full of the heroic deeds of the *mujāhidīn* and eulogies of the *shahīdīn*. Far less attention was paid to the future Islamic order for which the *mujāhidīn* fought and the *shahīdīn* were martyred – but then, this would be where the ways of even the *muʿminīn* (believers) parted.

The popular discourse on the resistance, on the other hand, contained many incongruous elements reflecting other dimensions of identity than could be contained in the *muhājir-mujāhid* paradigm. Among the tribal Pashtuns, rather than seeing the refugee situation as *hijra*, they conceived of it in terms of the *milmastiya* (hospitality), *nanawatia* (refuge), or *panah* (asylum), obligations which *Pashtunwāli* imposed on their tribal brothers in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province (Centlivres 1987). Tribal identity, then, was given priority over religious identity. This conceptualization also rendered self-respect, honour and equality to the refugees vis-à-vis their Pashtun hosts in the NWFP, at least in the short term (*ibid*). In view of the fact that the majority of refugees in Pakistan were Pashtuns and most settled in the Pashtun-dominated areas of the NWFP where close kinship and tribal connections exist to the Afghan Pashtuns, this definition of the refugee situation clearly enjoyed widespread support both among the Afghan as well as the Pakistani Pashtuns – but again, the time factor and dimensions of the refugee population also tended to put strains on the concepts of hospitality, etc. in *Pashtunwāli*.

Hence, besides the religious discourses on the resistance – be it the Islamist or the Islamic-national variants of the moderates – there existed other discourses at work reflecting the motivation and conceptualization of the Afghan resistance. For instance, the popular songs in Pashto by Rafiq Jan,⁷ while condemning the 'Khalqis' as 'godless people', appealed more to honour and shame within the context of *Pashtunwāli* than to piety. One example is a song related to the Land Reform, claimed by many foreign observers to have been considered un-Islamic by the Afghan population. In Rafiq Jan's song it is presented more as a plot to increase the individual's dependency on the state through 'finish[ing] the ownership of everyone. Everyone will be like a castrated goat ... he will be a servant only for his stomach, nothing else'. The main point here is the violation of the independence,

integrity and honour of the individual, since ownership of land (*zamin*) is an essential part of Pashtun identity.

Predictably, the theme which aroused the strongest condemnation was the emancipation of women, which in the initial months after the Revolution in 1978 was given some priority by the PDPA government:

O, Muslim, modesty, shame and to be in purdah
is a great *nang wa namus*

Then follow some lines on how the 'Khalqis' considered the women as oppressed, which made Taraki issue Decree No. 7 'on dowry (*mahar*) and marriage expenses to ensure equal rights of women with men':

You can't tell her not to go somewhere
She has the freedom to be at everyone's side,
whoever she wants
She could spend her night with him ...

Everyone has to accept this command
All of us should taste each other's women
Khalqis believe that *zar, zan wa zamin*
are common things
O, Muslim think about it ...

Again, the invocation of *zan, zar wa zamin* (women, gold and land), *nang wa namus* as well as the violation of the patriarchal order – which emancipation of women involves – also point to traditional values beyond a strictly religious discourse. However, whether justified or not, the equation of the existing social order with Islamic values led with inevitable logic to the equally unfounded assumption or claim that the enemy represented everything anti-Islamic. It was thus not sufficient to point to violation of national sovereignty, warfare against civilians, political persecution, etc. No, the enemy was represented as embodying all kinds of godlessness (a Muslim variant of Anti-Christ) and in particular moral depravity of any kind (such as promotion of incest, etc.) The struggle was thus transformed from the political level to become a struggle between Good and Evil. The same pattern appeared in the anti-Amanullah campaign in 1928-29 and, in the construction of an 'Enemy Image' by the negation of all one's 'own' values, it reflected a general psychological pattern (see for example Kristiansen and Rasmussen 1988). A similar pattern can also be found in the PDPA propaganda against the resistance (see Chapter 9).

Another of Rafiq Jan's songs deals with how the 'Khalqis' had carried out the 'funeral of Islam', so there is no need of '*sayyid nor pir*'

– exemplified in the arrest and murder of *Hazrat Sāhib* of Shor Bazaar, Mohammad Ibrahim Mujaddidi, and his family and followers (mentioned above) and in the attack on the famous 75-year-old Qadiriyya *pir*, Mia Gul Jan of Tagab. When on Friday 26 January 1979, Mia Gul Jan *Sāhib* declared *jihād* against the PDPA regime, government forces moved against Tagab and a battle took place in which Afghan army forces withdrew after suffering many casualties. Subsequently, Tagab was levelled by air and artillery attacks (A.H. Khan 1980:57) though Mia Gul Jan *Sāhib*'s followers managed to carry him and his family to safety in Pakistan:

Mia Gul Jan comes into my mind
 The planes came after him in the late afternoon
 He was praying at that time ...
 This is a fact, all people knew about it
 It was God's wish that the bombs shouldn't explode
 However, these evil-doers tried a lot
 They encircled Mia Gul *Sāhib* by tanks
 Now all the Khalqis will fall down
 The mouth of their tanks turned to the sky
 They couldn't find the mosque of Mia Gul ...

(translated by Shahmahmood Miakhel)

While Sufism was in official disrepute and only practised in a very withdrawn and almost clandestine way among the Afghan *muhājir*, obviously the Islamists did not manage to uproot the popular veneration for *pirs* nor the belief in their *karāmāt* – to which even the Khalqi tanks had to submit.

Other songs by Rafiq Jan evoke *Pashtunwāli*, referring to Pashtun heroes like Ahmad *Shāh* Durrani, *Mīr* Wais and Mahmood of Ghazni while still others appeal to a compound Afghan nationalism by enlisting all the ethnic groups and tribes of Afghanistan to join forces against the enemy.

Other notes are struck if we turn to the part of the Hazara resistance, even though in later years it became increasingly dominated by Islamist groups with strong Iranian backing. Despite the fact that the increasing repression in Afghanistan led to the formation of the *Tanzim-e-Nasf-e-Now-e-Hazara* in Quetta in 1971, Hazara nationalism continued to find its expression in the cassettes of the popular singer, Sarvar Sarkhush (Bindemann 1988). The themes are the beautiful places of Hazarajat, the stress on Hazaras' suffering at the hands of oppressors and the need to wake up and defend Hazara honour (*ibid*).

In his analysis of the resistance songs of the Hazaras, Bindemann points out that the songs singularly address Hazaras, that Afghanistan

as such hardly appears, and in particular the Hazaras suffering at the hands of *Amīr* Abdur Rahman is mentioned. While of course the current resistance was against the Russians, Parchamis and the Khalqis, it is obvious that the 'hundred years of slavery' referred to in the songs was not at the hands of these forces but meted out by the Afghan state and the Pashtuns as the dominant ethnic group. Hence, by liberating their own areas, the Hazaras saw themselves as earning the right to regional autonomy in a future free Afghanistan, a sentiment that is also stressed in other songs by Sarkhush (*ibid*).

The overall religious formulations of the Afghan resistance were both natural and unavoidable in view of the historical background, political context and the culture and worldview of the Afghan population. However, the attempt of the Islamists to turn Islam into a political ideology sowed serious discord. The latent conflict between *sharī'at* and *qaumwālī*, as described by Anderson (1984) for the Ghilzai, was made manifest in later years. *Sharī'at* and *umma* did not complement *qaum*; rather, the attempt was made that they should replace *qaum* as a medium of identity. By these means, *sharī'at* became a divisive force vis-à-vis the social order of *qaum* and the religious leaders representing this tendency became seen as attempting a 'clericalization' that was anathema to *Pashtunwālī*, in which 'Muslimness' is *a priori* internalized. The Islamist discourse centred around *jihād* was all-embracing in the sense that it not only subsumed but also directly negated other primordial identities among the membership of the *umma* – even though such affiliation and identification might have been the most important factor for the participation (or non-participation) in the *jihād* of many people.⁸ Thus the ethnic and sectarian (Shi'a-Sunni) identities reflected in the variety of parties and groups were not recognized, nor were tribal affiliations nor the concept of a national liberation war. Here existed the foundation of a major conflict when the Afghan resistance acquired power and indeed full-scale civil war quickly followed the victory of the *mujāhidīn* in 1992.⁹

Divisions in the Resistance

It is neither surprising nor strange that the Afghan resistance formulated itself in terms of religious idioms. From the first scattered uprisings in 1978, it was a broad, popular resistance, lacking organized leadership and coordination, and consequently it was formulated within the existing, predominant *Weltanschauung* which is still for a

large section of the population today mainly structured by a religious consciousness integrated with tribal, ethnic and other local values.

The educated middle class, which during the 1960s and 1970s dominated the political scene, was conspicuous only by its comparatively limited participation in the resistance. This is particularly striking when considering the leadership of the resistance, where not a single one of the former liberal and more secular-oriented politicians could be found. This impression is further confirmed when considering that, of 276 exiled former lecturers of Kabul University (who may be considered to have formed a major part of the new intellectual elite of Afghanistan), only 27 went to Pakistan and two to Iran – the two countries from where they could either have participated directly in the resistance or at least have been partners in the political process or organization of the resistance.¹⁰

The comparatively low profile of the 'modern' educated intellectuals in the Afghan resistance (except to some extent in the Islamist parties) can partly be seen as an indication of the ideological crisis and the widening gap in cultural outlook and values between the new elite and the rest of the Afghan population (see also Rubin 1992). However, it is also an indication of the development of 'exile politics' from 1978, where the ideological discourse of the Islamists and, to a far lesser extent, the traditional *'ulamā* came to dominate the scene. They claimed to have fought 'communism' for years and stressed the responsibility of the Musahiban dynasty in 'letting the communists in'; by induction, all the leading politicians of that time could be discredited as 'King's men' or 'communist lackeys'. The result was the alienation of a wide section of the non-Islamist, educated middle class.¹¹ A tragic example (in February 1988) was the killing of one of Afghanistan's most prominent and internationally known intellectuals, Professor S.B. Majrooh, who from the Afghan Information Centre in Peshawar had tried to maintain the liberal and democratic values embodied in the 1964 Constitution. A large number of Afghans attributed his assassination to the more radical Islamists having taken offence at Majrooh's alleged royalist inclinations.¹²

A number of different factors contributed to the alienation of the liberal middle class. The brief and unsuccessful experiment with parliamentary democracy meant that, with the exception of the clandestine 'ideological' parties on the Left and among the Islamists, the culture of political parties had *not* as yet taken root in Afghanistan; political life still revolved around person-centred political factions. Apart from the Islamists, all the other parties which managed to assert themselves in the resistance thus drew on primordial relations such

as tribal and *qaumi* affiliation, and the personalized relations between leader and followers of the *pīr-murīd/murshīd*, *‘ālim- tālib* and patron-client types. And superimposed on this pattern were the ethnic, sectarian and regional loyalties. However, these divided loyalties also affected the ‘ideological’ parties among the Islamists and the Left. (For a detailed description of the recruitment to various parties according to the above networks, see Roy 1985 and also Puig 1984 and Ulfat 1979).

However, it is also important to note that the initial decentralized and strongly localized nature of the Afghan resistance meant that the exile parties neither *grew out* of the resistance nor were they the *origin* of it – on the contrary, the situation at first was that of several ‘generals without an army’ who then gradually were able to take over a leading role in the resistance. This situation initially caused many observers to distinguish between the internal resistance and the front commanders on the one side and the exile parties (as ‘parasites’ on the resistance) on the other. However, as time passed, it was the parties who came to dominate the resistance both inside and outside Afghanistan. The main factors in this development were the parties’ ability to raise funds, supply weapons and organize successful resistance actions (see Strand 1984 and Puig 1984). The predominant role of the exile parties has continued in the power struggle that followed the fall of the PDPA regime.


The strength of the Islamists was in part due to the initial advantages they had over the other resistance groups. They had an existing organizational structure, had been established in Pakistan for several years and already enjoyed international recognition and support (from Pakistan and the Gulf states). This enabled them at an early stage to supply weapons and organize resistance activities. Moreover, the registration of refugees in Pakistan was handled via the recognized political parties, thus adding yet another dimension to the formation of the exile parties. Altogether, this meant that there were a multitude of factors affecting the party structure of the resistance; the specific political programme of a party was hardly of primary importance for recruitment. The relative strength of the various parties today can thus by no means be taken as an expression of adherence to a specific political programme – nor is this a field to which the parties have devoted much attention.

The uniform Islamic rhetoric of the resistance should thus not be interpreted as a result of unity but, on the contrary, can be seen as an expression of the fact that Islam has served as the medium through which the various divisive forces in the Afghan society have been

played out. For this reason, there developed still at least seven major Sunni-based parties in Peshawar making claims on Islam:

- Hizb-i Islami, headed by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar;
- Hizb-i Islami, headed by *Mawlawi* Mohammad Yunus Khales;
- Jami'at-i Islami, headed by Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani;
- Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami, headed by *Mawlawi* Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi;
- Jabha-i Nejat-i Melli, headed by Prof. Sebghatullah Mujaddidi;
- Mahaz-i Melli Islami, headed by *Pir Sayyid* Ahmad Gailani; and
- Ittehad-i Islami barai Azadi-ye Afghanistan, headed by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf.

Figure 25: Leadership profiles of the main Peshawar (Sunni) groups




To this list should be added various, mainly Hazara/Shi'a parties, based in Quetta (see Figure 26). Representing a religious and ethnic minority in the more inaccessible part of Afghanistan (as seen with the view of visiting journalists in Peshawar) and mainly being supported from the equally 'inaccessible' Iran, these groups received far less attention than the seven parties in Peshawar. For information, see Roy (1985) and Edwards (1986b). Among these were:

- Harakat-i Islami Afghanistan, headed by *Shaykh Asef Mohseni Kandahari*;
- Shawra-i Inqilab-i Ittifaq-i Afghanistan, headed by *Sayyid Behishti*; and
- Sazman-i Nasir-i Islami (with a decentralized leadership).

Besides these main groups, there were also more tribally organized groups like the Shawra Islam-i Millat Afghanistan, representing five Pashtun tribes in south and southwest Afghanistan, under the leadership of Gul Jan Farahi.¹³ Finally, there were also the 'Front Commanders' who, although they may have had party affiliations, during the struggle they established themselves as respected, powerful and quite independent local leaders, mainly of national-Islamic observance. The best known of these were Ahmad Shah Massoud from Panjshir,¹⁴ Major Hassan from Ghazni, Assadullah Ahmadi from Herat,¹⁵ Khazan Gul Taniwal from Paktia, Aziz from Paghman, and Anwari from the urban guerilla groups in Kabul (Samimy 1988). Reports also indicate that they sought to establish greater internal collaboration, independent of the party organizations.

Figure 26: Leadership profiles of the main Quetta (Shi'a) groups



While all the resistance parties and groups agreed about fighting the Kabul regime in the name of Islam, they fundamentally diverged as to what should be the future of a free Afghanistan. By unfolding the banner of *jihād*, they simultaneously unleashed the ever-pertinent question in Afghanistan as to what constitutes legitimate power and authority. Although agreeing that sovereignty belongs to Allah, deep disagreements occurred when it came to define just who would be the keepers of the mandate of legitimate authority.¹⁶ As discussed previously, for the Islamists there is no space for monarchy in Islam; the only legitimate rule can be through some kind of *consultative* body (*shawrā*), embodying the interest of the *umma*. The 'traditionalists' have a somewhat different view – exemplified in the following statement of Sebghatullah Mujaddidi:

Islam prescribes neither monarchy, nor republic. The Prophet of God had not chosen his successor. He had predicted that after him there would be thirty years of caliphate and then emirates would take over. He left the matter of succession to the discretion of the Muslims. Thus a king is regarded as king as long as he rules in accordance with the Islamic Law. Otherwise the elders should overthrow him. The second caliph, Omar, was asked 'Why don't you nominate your son to be your successor?' He had replied: 'It is enough that from my family one Omar should bear the grave responsibility of the caliphate before God'. But who are the elders, who should choose the ruler? Well, the elders correspond in principle to our Loya Jirga. It is a kind of republic where authoritative people choose the leaders. (Mujaddidi 1986)

The Mahaz-i Melli Islami ('National Islamic Front') of *Pir Sayyid Ahmad Gailani*, as the name implies, 'recognize[d] legitimacy only to that government which [was] established through free and universal suffrage' and declared the principles of 'Islam, Nationalism and Democracy' as the basis of its philosophy, activities and approach to the solution of internal problems.¹⁷ The other points mentioned in its brief manifesto – such as the safeguarding of the basic freedom of the individuals, freedom of press and associations and the separation of the powers of the state organs (the Judiciary, the Executive and Legislative powers) – indicated a wish to return to the parliamentary democracy enshrined in the Constitution of 1964. However, like Mujaddidi, the Mahaz manifesto also looked to a resurrection of the Loya Jirga:

... the Loya Jirga, as the highest reflector of the collective will of the Afghan nation, will be elected in the free and traditional

manner by the people to make the final decision on the form of the Afghan government. (*ibid*: 6)

Notions of legitimacy thus revolved around the nation – embodied in the Loya Jirga, popular sovereignty and Islam – a combination more like the 1931 Constitution than that of 1964. (What was meant by the proposition that the Loya Jirga would be elected ‘in the traditional manner’ is unclear since the basis for membership of different Loya Jirga has varied depending on the ruler).

In practical politics, these differences meant that, while the Islamist parties agreed about the goal being an Islamic *state* (whatever the content of this may be), the two ‘moderate’/traditionalist parties wanted rule in accordance with the *principles* of Islam, which seemed to imply a return to the *status quo ante*, i.e. prior to Daoud *Khān*’s coup in 1973. Among other things, this was reflected in various overtures made to ex-King Zahir *Shāh* in order to use him as a unifying figure for the national liberation. For the revolutionary Islamists, any attempt to bring the ex-King back into focus confirmed and aggravated the old enmity between the Islamists and the traditional religious leaders (particularly Mujaddidi and Gailani), ‘proving’ that they always were an integral part of the establishment.¹⁸ Hizb-i Islami thus pointed out that during the 1950s and 1970s when the Mujaddidis were harmed politically ‘it was not because they were anti-Establishment, but because they took part in the internal power struggles among the ruling elite’ (i.e. were in favour of Zahir *Shāh* and *Sardār* Abdul Wali against Daoud *Khān*).¹⁹

The question of ex-King Zahir *Shāh* was further highlighted by the Soviet invitation to the ex-King to return to Afghanistan in an attempt at national reconciliation.²⁰ Mujaddidi and Gailani, supported by various Afghan groups in the West, committed themselves in favour of the ex-King, if his return would lead to a withdrawal of Soviet troops and to the establishment of a government headed by Muslims. This position was indirectly supported by a survey which on 30 July 1987 the BBC Farsi Service informed had been conducted by the Afghan Information Centre in refugee camps.²¹ According to this, 71 percent of the men interviewed (the total number was not given) wanted ex-King Zahir *Shāh* to be the leader of a free Afghanistan. The other Islamists and Harakat were vehemently opposed to a comeback for Zahir *Shāh*, Gulbuddin Hikmatyar pronouncing that ‘the believing and courageous people of Afghanistan will not agree to anything but an Islamic government. Otherwise, the people of Afghanistan will fight [against a Zahir *Shāh* government] as they fought against Taraki

and [Hafizullah] Amin governments'.²² In addition, the Hizb-i Islami journal, *Shehadat*, on 10 June 1987 listed the 'anti-religious' episodes that occurred during Zahir Shāh's reign to prove his unacceptability from a religious point of view and the 29 June 1987 issue of *Al-Noor* (published by the Khaless group) quoted *Mawlawī* Jalaluddin Haqqani as saying that, during his forty-year reign, Zahir Shāh failed even to perform *hajj* (i.e. his personal credentials as a Muslim were brought into doubt). On this issue, the Shi'a front, Nasr, joined forces with the (Sunni) Islamists in rejecting, on behalf of Afghan Shi'as and the majority of the population, any solution involving the return of ex-King Zahir Shāh.²³

The episode again underlined that the struggle for the Islamists was not a national liberation struggle but a struggle for Islam. Since a believer should know no other fatherland than that where Sharīf reigns, the *jihād* was for Islam and for the *umma*. Or, in the words of an Afghan Islamist recorded in Peshawar in November 1986:

The present *jihād* is *not* for the *watan* (fatherland), but for Islam – the *watan* is only *khāk* (dust).

Al-Noor has formulated it thus: that the concept of 'nation' neither refers to an ethnic/tribal group nor to a geographic entity but only to a people of one mentality, much like 'infidelity is one nation' (*ibid*).

The Islamists' notion of an avant-garde party was also looked upon with suspicion and resentment by the 'moderates', who pointed to the historical precedent that the basic feature of the old Islamic movement – led by such as *Shaykh* Ahmad Sirhindi, Shah Waliullah, etc. – was that it constituted popular pressure on the governments and rulers to reform their ways. This, they claimed, was opposite to the Islamist parties of today which want the *government* to reform the people – as is the case with Maududi, the Ikhwan ul-Muslimin, etc. – a reform which could only take place by force and some kind of dictatorship. In the view of the 'moderates', the role of the Muslim scholar in society was to respond to the *need* of the people. The authoritarian governments of Afghanistan (from *Amīr* Abdur Rahman to Zahir Shāh) thus consulted a circle of *ulamā* in order to keep in touch with the people, i.e. the *ulamā* advised the rulers and channelled popular opinion.

However, in view of the previous ten years' developments, even 'moderates' were critical of the role which the Jami'iyat al-*Ulamā* had played in Afghanistan since the 1930s:

The existence of the Jami'iyat al-*Ulamā* just served the purpose of pleasing the people that religion was still there. Over the

years, the *‘ulamā* did raise various issues, such as the level of their own salaries, that the king did not have a beard etc. – i.e. no issues of any importance. And even the population did not realize that communism was seeping into the country and in general the religious consciousness in the population was very low.²⁴

The different resistance groups all pointed to the Afghans' former, successful battles against colonialism as encouragement in their present struggle and also pointed to the fate of the Central Asian Basmachi movement to underline the necessity for continued resistance. The Hikmatyar faction of Hizb-i Islami, however, challenged this historical parallel (a favourite among both Western and Soviet observers), by pointing out the special characteristics of the Afghan *jihād*, which made it something 'unparalleled in recent history' (Hasan 1986):

- 1) In the Afghan *jihād* there was no sharp division between traditionalists and modernists as in the Basmachi movement which also suffered under all the leaders being unaware of the Islamic Renaissance in the Arab World and Indian Subcontinent (i.e. the Ikhwan ul-Muslimin and Maududi).
- 2) Whereas the Basmachi movement had a national (pan-Turkish) and tribal colour, the Afghan *jihād* was not and would not become a national war at any stage.
- 3) Only a weak Afghanistan supported the Basmachis whereas the not-so-weak Pakistan (and Iran, were it not for the Gulf War) supported Afghanistan.
- 4) The Afghan *jihād* was taking place in the age of Islamic resurgence and had become a symbol of this renaissance.

According to Hasan, the effect of the *jihād* had pulled Afghan society out of the narrow grooves of tribalism, integrated this multiple and multi-racial society and 'organized the entire population on the basis of mature political thinking because its leadership never was in the hands of traditional elders and other influential personalities, but in those of *political parties which initiated the jihad*' (*ibid.*, emphasis added):

This great transformation has electrified the entire Afghan society and has generated a new strength in it ...

With a single leap forward, the Afghan society has passed through various stages of evolution. Jihad has given the call for a revolution which has transported the society to the high plane of humanity, far above racial, linguistic and national levels ...

The inmates (of refugee camps) are all inspired with the idea of universal revolution. (ibid: 20, emphasis added)

The above formulations have a certain ring of familiarity in terms of line of argument and thought. After the purge of the Parcham faction of the PDPA, Hafizullah Amin argued that the originality of the Saur Revolution was that Afghanistan had been able to *pass from the evolutionary stage of feudalism into a proletarian stage* (i.e. by-passing the bourgeois and national-democratic stage):

A new thesis has brought about to enrich the epoch-making theory of the working-class, according to which feudal society gave birth, through the heroic struggle of the working class party, to a working class revolution ... (Hafizullah Amin 1979, emphasis added)

The party struggles which were characterized by their class nature helped to discard all sorts of local, regional, racial and nationalistic tendencies ... (Hafizullah Amin 1979b: 728, emphasis added)

As for the possibility of 'leaps in development' within the socialist strategy, this 'is only possible when a social system more progressive than capitalism, namely, the socialist system already exists' (Solodovnikov and Bogoslovsky 1975: 22).

The revolutionary vision of the Islamists was hardly shared by the non-Islamist parties for whom 'primordial' loyalties and traditional leaders play an important role. All differences apart and after many attempts, in early May 1987 the seven parties in Peshawar (almost) reached agreement on a charter for a joint council for Ittihad-i Islami Mujahedin-i Afghanistan with a view to forming an interim government 'for the sake of hoisting the Word of God and liberating the country from the rule of unbelief and atheism'.²⁵ Chapter 1 of this charter stated that sovereignty belongs to God and that one of the tasks of the interim government was to draft the future constitution of the country and pave the way for elections leading to the formation of an elected government. The charter also contained the notion of popular sovereignty being embodied in a Revolutionary Council. This Council – which (according to Chapter 4, Article 49 of the Charter) 'is the manifestation of the will of the Muslim and mujahed people of Afghanistan and represents the entire nation [of Afghanistan]'

– would be the highest organ of the interim government. These formulations thus implied a duality in the concept of sovereignty as emanating from God or from the nation/people – a duality which was hardly surprising considering the difficulties involved in reaching a compromise between the parties.

However, the unity immediately broke down over the composition of the Revolutionary Council: five parties agreed that the council should be selected on the basis of equality among the seven constituent organizations – while Hikmatyar and Gailani proposed that members of the Council should be elected by the *mujāhidīn* and *muhājirān*. The separate stand of Hikmatyar and Gailani indefinitely postponed the implementation of the Charter. The argument of the other parties was that it was not possible to hold elections under the present circumstances and that a council had to be formed in the interest of unity. However, the Khaled faction of Hizb-i Islami, in the 22 June 1987 issue of its journal *Al-Noor* aired the view via an interview with two *mawlawīs* that ‘there are no general elections in Islam’. The question of elections seemed to be a dividing issue between the two factions of Hizb-i Islami which otherwise were considered to agree on ideological issues.

On 19 June 1988, the Peshawar Alliance finally announced the formation of a government-in-exile, under the leadership of the comparatively unknown Ahmad *Shāh* from Ittihad-i Islami. The cabinet posts were carefully divided between the member parties but still there was little confidence in the internal unity of the Alliance. The formation of the government-in-exile had no impact on the overall situation and was not a serious attempt to create unity across all the divisions of either the resistance or the Afghan nation (see for example the commentary by Kandahari 1988).

Considering the absence in the Alliance as well as in the government-in-exile of any of the Shi’a parties representing central Afghanistan, one may suspect that particularly the two articles in the Alliance Charter mentioning Hanafi jurisprudence and centralism were a source of offence to a sizeable minority of the Afghan population which had been among the first to offer resistance to the PDPA government and since autumn 1978 had been virtually autonomous and independent of the government in Kabul. It was thus not surprising that, parallel with the above seven-party alliance, another alliance was formed in the summer of 1987 in Mashhad in Iran with the name *Jabha-i Inqilab-i Afghanistan* and comprising the following groups (Samimi 1988):

- Nohsat-i Islami
- Sazman-i Pasdaran
- Jihad-i Islami
- Jabha-i Motahed-i Islami
- Sazman-i Nasr
- Hizbullah
- Hizb-i Dahwat-i Islami
- Harakat-i Islami

This alliance was composed almost entirely of Shi'a groups, mainly from Hazarajat, northern Afghanistan and from the bigger cities. On a national level they represented up to twenty percent of the population but little attention was paid to them in connection with the Geneva Accord and the initiatives of the Peshawar Alliance. In June 1990, the Shi'a front was strengthened when all of the Iran-based Shi'a groups united in a new alliance, Hizb-i Wahadat.

The Present Struggle for Power

On 27 April 1992, following their victory over the PDPA, a feeble compromise was formed between the seven Peshawar-based *mujāhidīn* parties and a number of internal commanders. Sebghatullah Mujadidi from Jabha-i Nejat-i Melli was pronounced interim president until June 1992 when, in accordance with the agreement, he was replaced by Burhanuddin Rabbani from Jami'at-i Islami. Although Gulbudin Hikmatyar's radical Islamist Hizb-i Islami joined the alliance at the last minute and Hikmatyar has since been appointed Prime Minister, the in-fighting between the various *mujāhidīn* groups has continued until today, particularly between the two Islamist parties, Rabbani's Jami'at-i Islami and Hikmatyar's Hizb-i Islami.

The coalition, which assumed power after Najibullah's resignation in April 1992 and which at time of writing (mid-1994) is still headed by Rabbani, has neither established peace nor managed to organize the transition to a representative system of government. Although in July 1992 the eight-party Shi'ite alliance of Hizb-i Wahadat was included in the coalition – meaning that it thus enjoyed the formal support of the most significant non-Pashtun groups – the question of the rights of minorities continues to be a touchy issue. This is partly underlined by the non-Pashtun groups' comparative military strength and fighting ability during the fourteen years of resistance and partly by the suspicion and widespread reluctance among Pashtuns towards sharing their previous monopoly of power with other ethnic groups.

An attempt to give a constitutional framework to the new regime was made in December 1992 when a hand-picked consultative assembly of 1,335 delegates elected Rabbani as president for two years and appointed an interim parliament of 250 members. However, this was far from constituting a national compromise as from his exile ex-King Zahir *Shāh* denounced the election, claiming that the delegates were bribed; also, certain Muslim factions reportedly boycotted the assembly.²⁶

Fighting broke out again between the Hikmatyar group and the government forces only to be followed by renewed peace talks which on 7 March 1993 in Islamabad lead to a new agreement between eight parties: Rabbani was to remain in office for eighteen months from December 1992 and Hikmatyar was given the post of Prime Minister for the same duration. A cabinet and Defence Council were to be formed by the new Prime Minister in consultation with the President and other leaders. Furthermore, an independent electoral commission would be formed with the approval of all the signatories to the agreement and it was to supervise the holding of elections to a constituent assembly. This assembly would be required to approve a constitution under which parliamentary elections must be held before 28 June 1994, when Rabbani's (and Hikmatyar's) term would expire. The March peace agreement furthermore demanded collective responsibility by the Afghan leaders in setting up a national army and arranging for elections.²⁷

An annex to the agreement made the Prime Minister the chief executive of the government but this was diluted by the formation of two supervisory councils, a Defense Council and an Economic Affairs Council. The sixteen-member Defence Council comprising two nominees from each of the eight groups which signed the agreement was to raise a national army.²⁸

The Islamabad agreement, however, suffered from serious shortcomings and has not been implemented. Not only did the Khaled faction of Hizb-i-Islami boycott the negotiations but also the delegation of General Dostam was excluded from the talks since he was regarded as having been a Soviet protege. Although Rabbani and Dostam had been allies until November 1992, now they are pitted against each other while, at time of writing, Dostam and Hikmatyar – formerly deadly enemies – have reached an understanding. Rabbani is also fighting his erstwhile allies, the Hizb-i Wahadat group of the predominantly Shi'a Hazaras. Hence, presently there are five major military factions operating in Afghanistan, adding to the fragmentation of the country and the continued state of anarchy:

- Dostam's militia, dominating six provinces along the borders of Central Asia, has set up an effective administration with tax collection and other state functions;
- Rabbani's Jami'at group dominates Kabul and some other areas;
- Hizb-i Wahadat controls six provinces in central Afghanistan;
- Hikmatyar's forces are to the south and east of Kabul; and
- contrasts with the pacified Herat region, controlled by 'amīr' Ismael Khan.²⁹

Today, the Afghan population has thus fallen victim to the in-fighting between the various resistance groups. The most acute problem remains Hikmatyar's Hizb-i Islami, which in spite of several ceasefire agreements – and despite its inclusion in the interim government – has militarily opposed the new regime. Hikmatyar attacks the coalition and in particular the Jami'at-i Islami for not being Islamic. But the main problem seems to be that all the involved parties and groups engage in power struggles at all levels of society, creating the most unlikely and unstable alliances in order to obtain short-term benefits, criss-crossing also major ideological differences.

Extra fuel is added to this state of general anarchy by the existence of foreign volunteers or mercenaries, not only from the Arab countries, who actively engage in the on-going fighting. Moreover, during the summer of 1993, the political upheaval in the Central Asian republics also spilled over into Afghanistan as Islamist forces from Tajikistan used northern Afghanistan as a base for launching attacks on the elected government of that republic. This led to Russian-CIS forces retaliating with attacks across the border into Afghan territory in order to defend the Tajikistan government as a CIS member state.

In Afghanistan, the struggle against the PDPA regime and the Soviet occupiers had almost unanimously been formulated in religious terms as a *jihād*. However, this definition of the liberation struggle was superimposed upon the existing ethnic, tribal, religious and political divisions in the heterogeneous population. Before the fall of the PDPA regime, the question of the national versus the religious character of the resistance was unsettled. Today, the questions of secular versus religious tendencies and what constitutes the Islamic character of the Afghan state are still not resolved.

It also remains an open question whether the majority of the Afghan population suffered fourteen years of civil war in order to achieve an Islamic regime. One of the first edicts which the new *mujāhidīn* government passed was that all women had to cover their heads in public and wear the traditional *shalwar kamez* or baggy

trousers and long shirt.³⁰ This was well in line with the extreme restrictions suffered by Afghan women in the refugee camps in Pakistan, which had also seriously hampered any aid and assistance directed to them. On top of this, already in September 1992 Amnesty International was pointing out that human rights violations had continued after the assumption of power by the Islamic coalition.³¹

Hence this record confirmed the worst expectations among that part of the Afghan population for whom the resistance towards the Soviets and the PDPA was a national liberation struggle rather than a *jihād* and who wanted the re-establishment of the parliamentary democracy rather than any form of Islamic republic. Such an attitude is represented not only among significant parts of the educated middle class but also among those ordinary people for whom Islamism has been a foreign element in relation to their traditional loyalties.

Although for fourteen years the Afghans fought to liberate themselves from the Soviet occupation and PDPA regime, the realization of these goals has brought neither peaceful nor orderly conditions (Clerc 1993a, 1993d). On the contrary, the result has been anarchy (with Kabul alone divided between up to ten rival military groups) and thousands of civilian casualties as a general plundering of and infliction of excesses against the civil population have taken place. The infighting between President Rabbani's forces and those of Prime Minister Hikmatyar, presently in alliance with Dostam, has caused a complete breakdown in the country's administration and, at time of writing, reportedly threatens up to 800,000 of Kabul's inhabitants with starvation (Bourke 1994, Whitaker 1994).

Although the resistance to the PDPA was formulated almost wholly in religious terms, as we have seen this did not imply any kind of unity within the resistance. The ideological differences between Islamists and moderates were compounded by sectarian and ethnic divisions plus other age-old divisions based on tribal and regional loyalties.³² During this resistance, the concept of *jihād* had the potential to unify the nation. However, the 'ideologization' of Islam as practised by the Islamists pitted *sharī'at* against not just *tariqat* but also *qaumwālī*. Rather than heralding unity, divisions in the resistance added a new dimension of conflicts to the existing ones. This is a situation that bodes ill for the future. But the collapse of the PDPA regime and the seizure of power by the *mujāhidīn* has also signalled a gradual degeneration of many of these ideological conflicts and disagreements into a non-ideological warlordism. Here the most unlikely alliances are forged in the struggle for power that currently is tearing the country apart.

Notes

- 1 A.H. Khan (1981) refers to three categories: (1) Fundamentalists, (2) Nationalists – among whom he counts both groups led by traditional religious leaders like *Pir Ahmad Gailani* and *Sebghatullah Mujaddidi*, as well as groups organized under tribal leadership – and (3) Socialists and Leftists. This categorization thus leaves no space for liberal democrats among the resistance groups.
- 2 Among the more analytical works on the background of the resistance, see the contributions in *Canfield and Shahrani (eds.) (1984)*, *Grevemeyer (1980)*, *Puig (1984)* and *Roy (1985)*.
- 3 *Edwards (1987: 50, note 15)* informs that references to the '*Ikhwan us-Shayatin*' in the press began on 1 October 1978, in an article written by *Suleiman Layeq*, in which *Ikhwanis* were accused of having torn up copies of the *Qur'an* at *Kabul University* in 1970 and of hollowing out copies of the holy book to carry weapons. (See also *Utas 1977-78: 18*).
- 4 Information from *Nadir Khuram*, the official 'biographer' of the *Mujaddidi* family, *Peshawar*, Nov. 1986. *Edwards (1987b)*, on the basis of interviews with family members and disciples of the *Mujaddidi* family, also informs that the male members of the *Mujaddidi*-family were arrested, and 'although their fate has never been disclosed, most believe they have been executed...'
- 5 See for example *Hikmatyar: Jang az Didgah-i Qur'an* (undated) pp. 140-181, and *Hikmatyar (1986: 38-40)*.
- 6 See for example *Ahkam-i Jihad* by 'Ulamā-i Riasat-i Dār ul-Iftah Ittehadī-yi Mujāhidin-i Afghānistān (undated).
- 7 I am grateful to *Shahmahmood Miakhel* for the following translations of songs of *Rafiq Jan*. *Shahmahmood Miakhel* had translated a large collection of *Rafiq Jan's* songs for *David B. Edwards* and brought them to my attention.
- 8 The importance of these factors was for example reflected in the passive or loyalist stand of the *Ismaili* community vis-à-vis the *PDPA* regime in view of the oppression they had been subjected to by previous governments as well as by their *Sunni* neighbours (*Shahrani 1984b: 167, Roy 1985: 136*).
- 9 The *Western-based, often royalist-inclined Afghan exile-groups* frequently point out that, just as the biggest failure of the communists was that they disregarded the social order and cultural characteristics of *Afghanistan*, so too the *Islamists* will have to reckon with the realities of *Afghan* society and culture. Otherwise they will face the same difficulties. See for example *Mujāhid Ullus* (23 July 1987) and many articles in *Afghanistan Tribune*.
- 10 Of the remaining 247, 34 went either to the *Gulf states* or to *India* and *Sri Lanka*. A further 36 were executed and six imprisoned. As there is no information about how many lecturers were employed at *Kabul University* in 1979, it is not possible exactly to assess the magnitude of the drain which the *University system* suffered from 1979 (*Elmi 1986: 72-125*).
- 11 See also interview with *Roshan* in *Afghanistan Tribune*, No. 6, 8. Jhg. 1986.
- 12 See for example *Roshan*, in *Afghanistan Tribune*, No. 1, Jan-Feb. 1988.
- 13 *Farahi* is by education a high school teacher. The tribes involved are the *Nurzai, Ishaqzai, Alizai, Mako* and *Khugiani* from the provinces of *Kandahar, Farah, Uruzgan, Herat, Helmand, Nimroz* and *Badghis* (*Heel 1986*).
- 14 Associated with *Jamī'at-i Islami*. In 1975, he was involved with the misfired coup plans of the *Islamists* and fled to *Pakistan*. From 1979 he was involved in the resistance struggle with base in *Panjshir valley*, which for

- long periods of time was under *mujāhidīn* control. In 1983, Massoud concluded a temporary truce with the Soviet forces. At time of writing, he is a key player in the current factional power struggle.
- 15 See interview with Assadullah Ahmadi in *Afghanistan Tribune*, (Agha 1987).
 - 16 Mozaffari (1987) points out that Islam has produced numerous models of power – which ‘are true and faithful models to the extent that they contain and reflect bits and pieces of Islamic truths’. The only commonly recognized model is the Medina model developed and administered by the Prophet himself (Mozaffari 1987: 15).
 - 17 From the *Manifesto of the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan* (undated).
 - 18 On the basis of interviews with Sebghatullah Mujaddidi, Edwards (1987b) informs that – on hearing the news of the Saur Revolution in 1978 – Mujaddidi immediately contacted ex-King Zahir *Shāh* in Rome to urge that they combine forces against the PDPA regime. The King agreed in principle to his proposal, after which Mujaddidi started to contact other Afghans in exile. The preliminary talks were followed up with a meeting in Mecca in late 1978, whereupon the Jabha-i Nejat-i Melli was formed.
 - 19 *Mawlānā* Muzzamil, Peshawar, Nov. 1986, personal communication. This view finds considerable support in Edwards (1987b), from his interviews with Sebghatullah Mujaddidi.
 - 20 See Samimy (1987b) regarding Zahir *Shāh*’s own activities in this respect.
 - 21 The Afghan Information Centre in Peshawar was run by Professor *Sayyid* Baha’uddin Majrooh until his assassination in February 1988. He was the son of *Sayyid* Shamsuddin Majrooh, Minister of Justice 1963-65 then Deputy Prime Minister. Both father and son were generally supposed to be royalists.
 - 22 *Afghan Jihad* 1987: 8-9.
 - 23 Interview with Mohammad Natiqi, Member of the Executive Council of Nasr, BBC Farsi Service, 8 August 1987.
 - 24 Mohammad Gulab Nangarhari, personal communication (Peshawar, November 1986). Mr. Nangarhari is a Mohmand from Nangarhar, son of *Mawlawī* Mirajan. He graduated from *Dār ul-‘Ulum Arabi*, 1953 and held various high government posts 1954-1973, the latest (1971-73) as Minister of Tribes. After President Daoud’s coup in 1973, he went to Mohmand country for three years, and then escaped to Peshawar. Here he became an aide to Sebghatullah Mujaddidi (Adamec 1987: 130).
 - 25 The whole text of the Charter is published in *Afghan Jihad*, vol. 1, No. 1, June-August 1987, pp. 23-33.
 - 26 *The Economist*, 6-12 February 1993: 61.
 - 27 *The Economist*, 13-19 February 1993: 72; *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 18 March 1992.
 - 28 *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 18 March 1992.
 - 29 *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 18 February 1992: 23; Clerq 1993a-e.
 - 30 Ahmed Rashed, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 23 April 1992.
 - 31 *Afghanistan Info*, No. 32, October 1992.
 - 32 See also Tarzi (1991) for a discussion of the general suspicion of the Durrani sub-tribes towards the Islamic parties. Given that Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, *Mawlawī* Mohammad Younus Khaled and *Mawlawī* Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi are all Ghilzai Pashtuns, there is perceived a lack of Durrani representation in the leadership of these parties.

Conclusion

From the start as a tribal confederacy till today as a (principally if not actually) centralized state, religion and politics have been intrinsically connected in Afghanistan. In the preceding chapters, covering the period from 1880 till today, the following major issues appear in relation to Islam and the Afghan state and society: centralization and Islamization; Islam and legitimacy of power; and the aesthetics of reception.

Centralization and Islamization

It was demonstrated with reference to *Amīr* Abdur Rahman's reign that centralization took the necessary form of *polity dominance* and *polity expansion* and that, in the existing ideological heritage of society, Islam lent itself particularly well as the medium of polity dominance and expansion. This was because the religious tradition operated with the concept of a community of believers (*umma*) that transcended the parochial identities of tribe, ethnic group and local community that otherwise formed the main components in the identities of the heterogeneous population. This Islamic heritage also contained the possibility of sanctioning the centralized state in the form of absolute monarchy through the 'Pious Sultan theory' hence could also be utilized to neutralize the egalitarian claims in the tribal *jirga* concept of *Pashtunwāli*.

Starting with the reign of *Amīr* Abdur Rahman it was also demonstrated that, through the mechanisms of polity expansion and polity dominance, Islamization in the long run thus became a precondition for the secularization of state and society. Such a policy was followed both by *Amīr* Habibullah, King Amanullah and under the Musahiban dynasty. The ultimate 'expropriation' of the religious domain by the state was carried out by the PDPA government. This 'de-sacralization' of the religious was challenged by its opposite, the Islamists' demand for a 're-sacralization' of the state, i.e. for all spheres of life, and in particular the state, to be subjected to the religious domain. However, the absolutist and centralized structure

of both models of state means that vis-à-vis the society and population they are equally totalitarian.

Islam and the Legitimacy of Power

Throughout the period researched, the legitimacy of power has almost constantly been at issue and, both in the 'tribal model' as well as in any Islamic variant, the ultimate source of legitimacy is Allah. However, in terms of practical policy and, not least, the formation of the state, the central theme has been *how* and through which institutions this legitimacy is mediated and sanctions the distribution of power between various social groups. A peculiar feature has been, that *jihād* has recurrently been a central concept in this discourse.

The concept of the legitimacy of power must naturally relate to the existing ideological discourses in society since legitimacy, like beauty, 'lies in the eyes of the beholder'. Consequently, the discourses on legitimate power, at a formal level reflected in the constitutions of the state, also reflect what could be called the 'ideological class struggle' of society – or, who was to dominate the state and its institutions, a question becoming ever more pertinent as the nature of the state changed through the centralization process.

At the starting point in the period researched, the Afghan state was a tribal confederacy resting on the tribal legitimacy of the ruler and religiously sanctioned by the *ʿulamā*. In the reign of *Amīr* Abdur Rahman, the 'Pious Sultan' paradigm was utilized to challenge and (partly) substitute the 'tribal model'. Correspondingly, the power of the tribes vis-à-vis the state was curtailed, while the *ʿulamā* as a group were strengthened through being co-opted into the state. By thus weakening the traditional ties between *ʿulamā* and tribes, the basis for a conflict between *sharīʿat* and *qaumwāli* was thus also laid.

The ideological discourse of King Amanullah's reforms signalled an attempt to revolutionize society and state through a new ideological paradigm, which defined the population vis-à-vis the state as individual citizens rather than as tribesmen, believers or subjects. The failure of this attempt resulted, during the following years, in a constitutional structure which however inconsistent and contradictory reflected the distribution of power in society as well as the existence of different ideological discourses. Thus, as well as maintaining claims on popular sovereignty, legitimacy of power and of the ruler could be seen as emanating partly from a tribal basis and partly a religious one.

Socio-economic developments and, not least, the development of the state and its institutional structure on which the new educated middle class founded its strength, necessitated a constitutional readjustment and new distribution of power between the various groups in society. This was attempted with the Constitution of 1964, where the state-supporting middle class succeeded in defining the state as based on popular sovereignty and parliamentary democracy. The co-option of the *‘ulamā* into the state was reflected by the fact that there was no separate religious discourse on the state beyond whether or not certain constitutional paragraphs were ‘compatible’ with Islam. Equally, the ‘tribal model’ appears to have been subsumed by the parliamentary discourse.

The final reflection of the middle class having taken over the state and its institutions is seen by the development of the conflict over the state since 1978. The main ideological paradigms are here represented by the PDPA’s model centred around ‘People and Party’ versus the Islamists ‘Allah and Party’ model – both representing a numerically small but well-organized section of the educated middle class struggling for state power and trying to achieve ideological hegemony by force where persuasion failed.

Aesthetics of Reception

It was stated above that legitimacy ‘lies in the eyes of the beholder’. This leads us to the general question of how a discourse is received by the group addressed through this interpellation. The present study has revealed a number of factors decisive for the reception of a given discourse, i.e. whether it is considered ‘sincere’ or ‘fake’ and whether it is successful in constituting the recipients as subjects in such a manner that they ‘recognize’ themselves in the discourse.

The Islamic discourse of *Amīr* Abdur Rahman stayed well within the tradition of orthodox Sunni Islam, which formed a major part of the cultural heritage of Afghan society, and could thus *not* be successfully challenged. Consequently, for opponents of the *Amīr*’s policies there were only two possibilities open:

- attacking the personal qualities of the *Amīr*. Indirectly this meant accepting the official discourse but denying the *Amīr* the right to propagate it. In other words, the harshness and cruelty of the *Amīr* did not undermine the official discourse but discredited *him* as the keeper of the religious sanction of power, thus opening the way for a legitimate *jihād* to remove him as ruler.

- focusing on the inherent contradictions between *Pashtunwāli* and Islam, i.e. focusing on the popular-democratic elements in *Pashtunwāli* which could be used to counter the *Amīr*'s exclusive focus on the authoritarian aspects of Islam. The opposition between Islam and *Pashtunwāli* was thus a cover for the conflict between state and tribe, or even for the conflict between 'Power Bloc' and 'People'.

King Amanullah, on the other hand, introduced a new ideological paradigm in society which had no precedent and which made little sense to people – at least not to the ruling groups who could only recognize their power positions being challenged. The extremely limited 'modern' elite identified with the discourse, as did the suppressed Hazara minority for whom the concept of equality of all citizens irrespective of tribe and creed was meaningful. While those identifying with the new paradigm were far too few to achieve a hegemonic position, the King's enemies had free play to challenge both his ideological discourse for not being 'Islamic' and the person of the King himself for not being 'a good Muslim'. Hence, both the ideological paradigm of the state and its policies as well as the person of the ruler were challenged on religious grounds. However, when the King was forced to retreat on all fronts and retract his position, he still lost not only the battle regarding the structure of the state but also his position as ruler. This may primarily have been due to Amanullah's failure in practical power politics since the concept of 'might is right' still remains an essential ingredient of legitimacy, particularly so in tribal politics, where chieftaincy is not institutionalized but an ongoing achievement. (This fact may also help to explain the success of *Amīr* Abdur Rahman who was certainly not lacking in 'might').

It was suggested initially that for any political discourse to reach the majority of the people, it will have to integrate and articulate the most common and shared ideological elements from the popular traditions, from what Arkoun (1988) calls 'the social imagery', representing a historical continuity outliving any political discourse. The PDPA and the Islamist parties in their own ways are examples of what happens when that is *not* done.

The numerically insignificant PDPA took power in 1978 thanks to its limited membership being placed close to the seat of power. It thus could muster a physical force (through the military takeover) quite out of proportion to its membership. The PDPA put the ideological class struggle on top of its agenda after assuming power but this was in the form of a pure, unmediated class discourse (particularly

extreme in Hafizullah Amin's version) that neglected the culture, traditions and parochial identities of the people. Accordingly, the PDPA's discourse appealed only to the already 'converted'. The irony of the matter is that the PDPA's membership and whatever support they managed to mobilize was mainly based on ethnic, tribal and regional loyalties rather than on 'class consciousness'. And when finally the PDPA leadership were forced to incorporate tribal and religious rhetoric in their discourse, their personal credibility, at least as 'good Muslims', was too tainted to alter the picture. Moreover, the tribal elements were utilized in a divide-and-rule strategy rather than as a source of popular-democratic traditions. The PDPA discourse did not thus manage to command much support on its own but in retrospect it may gain some indirect credibility by the failure of its opponents, the Islamists.

The point hinted at here is that what determines the reception of a political discourse cannot be determined purely on the basis of the structure and content of the discourse in question. Circumstantial factors have a great bearing upon the receptivity and interpretation of the discourse. This has been amply demonstrated by recent Afghan history. The principle of segmentary opposition seems to be very much alive. Thus the Pashtun tribes and the *ʿulamā*, having so far cursed *Amīr* Abdur Rahman for violating Islam, joined him and bestowed upon him the title of *Zia ul-Millat wa ul-Dīn* when he turned towards the conquests of Hazarajat and Kafiristan. Equally and quite undeserved, *Amīr* Habibullah enjoyed respect as 'King of Islam', etc., as the politico-religious situation in the Subcontinent and along the Frontier during World War I required such a figure, even though apparently he had no intention of opposing the British or risking his handsome subsidy from them. King Amanullah's fate illustrates the point even more clearly. His popularity as a pan-Islamic leader after the Third Anglo-Afghan War remained strong among the Qadiriyya *pīrs* in eastern Afghanistan, along the Frontier and in the Muslim community in British India, since *this*, rather than the King's modernist reforms, was essential in these areas. Among other sections of the *ʿulamā* and the tribes, his glory and even personal credibility wore out as soon as the battle of the Afghan state started as here other interests were involved.

A final example is the Islamist parties which, since their start in the 1960s, managed to command only very limited support among certain sections of the educated middle class in Afghanistan. This was exemplified even as late as 1974-75 in their utter failure at trying to start a popular uprising against the unpopular reign of President

Daoud. However, after the assumption of power of the PDPA in 1978, the Islamists by their 'negation' managed to launch themselves as the most credible opposition to the regime, i.e. they virtually could 'thank' the PDPA for the support they suddenly enjoyed. But now, having suffered two years of internecine infighting among the victorious *mujāhidīn* parties, the ephemeral nature of this support and the paradox of the Afghans' hard-won 'liberation' may be reflected in this piece of Kabul graffiti: "Mujahedin brothers, you took our ox [Najibullah] and brought us seven donkeys [the party leaders from Peshawar]. Please, remove the donkeys and let us have our ox back".¹

After the *mujāhidīn* takeover in April 1992, the new government renamed the country the Islamic State of Afghanistan and initiated changes to bring the legal and social system into line with Islamic law. The intention was a resacralization of the centralized state but, according to Amnesty International, each *mujāhidīn* group has its own standards for the application of Islamic principles. This can be seen, for example, in the varying composition and standards of Islamic courts under the control of individual *mujāhidīn* commanders. Hence, Islam was once invoked by former rulers to unite and centralize the country and now justifies its fragmentation by the victorious *mujāhidīn*.

The present situation can hardly be perceived as a return to *qaumwāli*, to a tribal society where primordial loyalties define friend and foe and determine alliances. The central state has existed more than a century; the clock cannot be turned back. Rather, from the outside it seems that in many areas the years of warfare and dislocation have ruined the fabric of civil society; even *qaumwāli* has lost its power. Instead, largely nurtured by foreign weaponry, many former *mujāhidīn* commanders have developed into local warlords holding great swathes of the country in their grip. As such, any attempt to analyse the present chaotic situation in terms of political ideologies, primordial loyalties and so on is bound to fail unless the realities of warlordism are taken into consideration.

In spite of its liberation, then, it is still an open question when (or if) Afghanistan will get a constitution and government enjoying general legitimacy in the ethnically, religiously and ideologically divided population. So far, the 'Islamic Revolution' threatens to be as fatal to the Afghan population as the Saur Revolution was.

Notes

1 *Afghanistan Info*, No. 32, October 1992: 13.

Glossary

‘ādāt	customs, manners, conduct (sing. ‘ādāt), customary law.
ahl al-kitāb	people of the book, i.e., Jews and Christians, to whom were added later Sabeans and Zoroastrians.
akhlāq	(pl. of khulq), ‘innate disposition’, ethics.
ākhund	a title of respect given to eminent religious teachers, a mawlawī .
‘ālim	a learned man (especially in religious knowledge).
amīr	lit. ‘military commander’. The title of Afghan rulers until King Amanullah introduced the title of King (shāh).
Amīr al-Mu‘munīn	Commander of the Faithful.
anṣār	‘the helpers’, i.e. those men of Medina who supported the Prophet after the hijra . In contra-distinction to the muhājirūn , ‘the emigrants’, i.e. his Meccan followers.
‘āq-i mādar	‘the one cursed by his mother’.
ashrār	pl. of sharīr , wicked, sinful, seditious.
aṭrāp	(lit. aṭrāf), countryside.
awqāf	pl. of waqf .
badragī	a guide, guard, escort.
bādshāh	variant of pād-i-shāh (king) but in the Afghan context used as for a local lord (cf. khān). Also rendered as pādshāh .
barakat	(sing. baraka) blessing, ‘beneficent force’ (of divine origin). God may imbue his prophets with barakat , some of which may touch ordinary people in various – sometimes strange – ways.
basmach	lit. bad-ma‘āsh which means a rascal and villain. Has come to denote the Muslim resistance to Soviet rule in Central Asia in the 1920s and 1930s.
bast	sanctuary, asylum. An inviolable sanctuary to any malefactor, however grave his crime. Once within its protection, the malefactor could negotiate with his pursuers and settle the ransom that would purchase his immunity when he left it.
bayt ul-mal	i.e. ‘the House of Wealth’, the public treasury of a Muslim state, which the ruler is not allowed to use for his personal expenses, but only for the public good.
bid‘a	innovation, a belief or practice for which there is no precedent in the time of the Prophet. Innovations may be good and praiseworthy or bad and blameworthy. Any innovation running contrary to the Qur‘ān, the traditions or ijmā is an erring innovation, according to Al-Shafi‘i.
bigār	forced labour, unremunerated.
chāh siāh	‘black well’, i.e. prison dungeon.

dār al-ḥarb	'the abode of war', orig. including those countries where Muslim law is not in force in the matter of worship and the protection of faithful and dhimmī .
dār al-Islām	'the abode of Islam', i.e. territory in which Muslim law prevails.
darbār	the court or levee of a prince; an audience chamber.
dārughā	supervisor of judicial process ensuring that proceedings conform to law.
darwīsh	religious mendicant, often associated with Sufi order.
dastārbandī	ceremony of 'tying the turban', whereby for example the ruler was honouring prominent subjects; (dastār , the sash or fine muslin cloth wrapped round the turban).
dastārkhwān	a long tablecloth on which food is served.
dhikr	'reminding oneself'. Ritual prayer or litany practised by Sufis for the purpose of glorifying God and achieving spiritual perfection.
dhimmī	one who has the status of someone belonging to the ahl al-kitāb (see above).
dīn	religion.
effendi	English form of iffendi , an Ottoman title of Greek origin, meaning 'Lord', 'Master'.
faqīh	(pl. fuqahā/fuqān), in its non-technical meaning denotes anyone possessing knowledge (fiqh) of a thing. A specialist in Islamic law and its derivative details.
faqīr	a poor, destitute. In mystic terminology meaning a person who 'lives for the Lord alone'.
farangī	i.e. 'Frank', old term for 'European' in Asia. Used in the general sense, hostility or disparagement is often implied.
farmān	royal command, mandate, ruler's edict.
farz	lit. 'something which has been apportioned, or made obligatory', the omission of which will be punished and the performance of which will be rewarded.
farz 'ayn	a duty incumbent upon the individual, such as ritual prayer, fasting etc.
farz kifāya	a duty incumbent upon the community, such as holy war, the fulfilment of which by a sufficient number of individuals excuses other individuals from fulfilling it.
fatwā	an opinion on a point of law, an evaluation of a religious question or a binding religious pronouncement given by a muftī .
fiqh	Islamic jurisprudence.
fitna	'putting to the proof', a temptation sent or permitted by God to test the believers' faith. The dominant idea of fitna in the Qur'ān is that of 'revolt', 'disturbances', 'civil war', but a civil war which breeds schism and in which the believers' purity of faith is in grave danger.
fuqahā	plural of faqīh (see above).
fuqān	plural of faqīh (see above).
futuwwa	pious chivalry; can be connected with Sufism as well as with professions, guild, groupings.

gharbzadigī	i.e. 'westomania'.
ghayrat	honour, self-determination.
ghazā	(Arabic ghazwa), expedition, usually of limited scope, conducted with the aim of gaining plunder. Used particularly with reference to the Prophet's expeditions against the infidels.
ghāzī	indicates those who take part in a ghazā , 'raid against the infidels'. Later became a title of honour reserved for those who distinguished themselves in the ghazā .
ghulām bacha	page boy.
gund	(Pashto), party (pol.), faction, gund-bāzi , 'politicizing', factionalism.
ḥadd	punishment laid down for acts forbidden in the Qurʾān. The ḥadd is a right or claim of Allah and no pardon or amicable settlement is possible once the case has been brought before the qāzī (judge).
ḥadīth	a tradition of what the Prophet said or did, or of his tacit approval of something said or done in his presence.
ḥāfiz	one who has learned the Qurʾān by heart.
ḥajj	the pilgrimage to Mecca, the fifth of the five 'pillars' of Islam.
ḥājjī	a person who has performed ḥajj .
Ḥājji Bāshi	the chief commander/leader of a group of pilgrims.
ḥākīm	'a ruler', 'a master', 'an authority'.
ḥaqīqa	stage of Truth (Sufism).
harām	forbidden (action) according to Sharīʿa .
hasht nafarī	system of conscription to the army whereby a community should supply one man out of every eight.
Ḥazrat	honorific religious title, in Afghanistan especially given to the head of the Mujaddidi family.
ḥijra	migration. The Muslim calendar is dated from the migration of the Prophet from Mecca to Medina in September A.D. 622.
ḥikma	wisdom; philosophy.
ḥisba	the duty of every Muslim to 'promote good and forbid evil'. A muḥtasib is the person officially entrusted with the application of ḥisba . (See also iḥtisāb).
ḥudūd	(plural of ḥadd , see above), the penalties of the law.
ḥujra	guesthouse.
ḥukūmat	government.
iḥtisāb	enjoining good and forbidding evil; the duty and function of the muḥtasib . Iḥtisāb is the office of hisba (Irano-Turkish territory).
ijāza	authorization, license, permission; certificate of qualifications for teaching, for example from a Sufi pīr or ʿālim .
ijmā	consensus; being in theory the unanimous agreement of the community (especially of Muslim scholars) on a regulation imposed by God. This consensus is based on the ḥadīth , "My people will never agree in error", and is the third of the four sources of Islamic jurisprudence.
ijtihād	'to endeavour' or 'to exert effort' to solve a problem. In early Islam this took the form of the exercise of individual reason-

	ing or independent judgement but this was put to an end (in Sunni Islam) during the second century AH when 'the gate of <i>ijtihād</i> ' was closed and <i>qiyās</i> came to the fore. In Shi'a Islam, the lawyer qualified to use <i>ijtihād</i> is called <i>mujtahid</i> .
'ilm	knowledge (primarily knowledge of God); hence religious learning.
'ilm kalām	'defensive apologetics', or 'the science of discourse'.
'ilm nujūm	astrology.
imām	the originator of an acknowledged norm or <i>sunna</i> ; a source or precedent for the establishment of religious law, a prayer leader; the leader of the Islamic community, the caliph.
irtidād	apostasy.
ishārat	gesture, sign, indication. Has acquired in rhetoric the technical meaning of 'allusion'.
jadid	'new'; a loose term for the ideology of late nineteenth century modernists and reformers – <i>Jadids</i> (q.v. <i>qadīm</i>).
jāgīr	land tenancy in which the collection of revenue of an estate and the power of governing it was assigned to an official (often for life) in exchange for certain services such as levying and maintaining troops for the benefit of the realm.
jamā'a	meeting, assembly. In the religious language of Islam it denotes 'the whole company of believers', and hence its most usual meaning of 'Muslim community'.
jashn	a feast.
jihād	etymologically signifies an effort directed towards a determined objective. In principle, the <i>jihād</i> is the one form of war which is permitted in Islam.
jirga	tribal council (Pashtun), based on egalitarian principles.
jizā	recompense, both in a good and bad sense, especially with reference to the next world. <i>Jizā-i Khodā</i> , God's punishment.
jizya	in the early conquests a tax imposed upon the subject populations, which later developed into a poll tax on the <i>dhimmī</i> , i.e. levied on non-Muslims in Muslim states.
kāfir	in the Qur'ān the word is used as 'concealing God's blessings' thus 'ungrateful to God', hence acquiring the general meaning of 'infidel'.
karāmāt	(sing. <i>karāma</i>), 'charisma', the favours bestowed by God completely freely and in superabundance. More precisely, the word comes to denote the 'marvels' wrought by the 'friends of God' which God grants to them to bring about (usually consisting of miraculous happenings, predictions of the future or interpretations of secrets of the heart).
kārgar	worker.
khairāt	charities.
khalīfa	caliph, representative, vice-regent; one who is a successor to the Prophet in rulership.
khalwat	technical term of mysticism, meaning 'retirement, seclusion, retreat', and, more specifically, 'isolation in a solitary place or cell' involving spiritual exercises.
khalwat dar anjuman	lit. 'solitude within society'; i.e. not to seek seclusion from society in devotion (from Naqshbandi Sufism).

- khān** originally this was a title, equivalent to Lord or Prince used among Mongol and Turkic nomads. Hence the English derivation *khanate*, a state ruled by a **khān**. Also applied to various other chiefs and nobles. Besides this sense, in Afghanistan it has become a sort of respectful title of address.
- khānaqāh** a building usually reserved for Muslim mystics belonging to a **darwīsh** order.
- khān-i ‘ulūm** lit. leader of the learned, i.e. chief judge.
- kharwar** measure of weight, varies locally.
- khāṣṣadār** militia, irregulars. In the Indian Subcontinent, **khāṣṣadār** also refers to a private secretary to a royal person.
- khawānīn-i mulk** landed proprietors.
- khilāfat** vicegerency, caliphate.
- khilat** robe of honour.
- khirqā-yi mubarak** blessed garment. From **khirqā** ‘rough cloak, scapular, coarse gown’. Taking such a cloak, symbolizing embarking on the mystical path, is mentioned as early as the third century A.D.
- khums** one fifth of the booty which, according to the Sunnis, belongs to the Prophet or his successors and, according to the Shi‘as, to the **imām**.
- khutba** a special sermon given by the **khaṭīb** (‘spokesman’) in the mosque on Fridays in which the ruler’s name is customarily mentioned.
- khwāja** patrilineal descendant of Abu Bakr, the first **khalifā**.
- kufr** unbelief.
- kūtwāl** commander of a fortress, town etc.
- langar khāna** a hospital or bedhouse for the poor.
- lashkar** originally ‘an army’, ‘a camp’. In the Afghan context it refers to tribal levies.
- lungī** turban.
- ma‘ārif** (pl. of **ma‘rifa**), education, public instruction.
- madhhab** a school of law, religious rite.
- madinat al-naqisa** ‘the imperfect state’.
- madinat al-tamma** the ideal theocratic state.
- madrasa** institution where Islamic sciences are taught. In medieval usage, essentially a college of law in which the other Islamic sciences, incl. literary and philosophical ones, were ancillary subjects (cf. **maktab**).
- maḥalla** quarter (of town).
- mahdī** ‘the rightly guided one’ is the name of the restorer of religion and justice who, according to a widely held Muslim belief, will rule before the end of the world.
- majlis** ‘a place where one sits down, where one stays’, hence ‘a meeting place’, ‘meeting, assembly’, ‘a reception hall (of a dignitary)’, ‘a council’, etc.
- maktab** lit. ‘a school where one learns to write’, religious school (lower level). In Afghanistan, the term is also used today to refer to ordinary public schools.

malik	(in Afghanistan) representative of a tribe or local community appointed by the government.
manṭiq	the discipline of logic.
maʿrifa	‘knowledge’, gnosis, stage of the Sufi path.
mashruʿiya	constitutional.
masnūn	lawful, recommended (cf. mubāḥ).
mawlānā	scholar of religious learning.
mawlawī	scholar of religious learning.
miān	a polite form of address: Master, Sir (particularly in the Indian Subcontinent, used primarily with religious persons).
millat	nation.
mīr	‘head’, ‘chief’.
mīrās	laws of inheritance in Sharīʿa .
mubāḥ	permitted, indifferent (of an action), according to Sharīʿa (cf. masnūn).
mufti	an Islamic legal authority who gives a fatwā (opinion) in answer to an inquiry by a private individual or a qāzī (judge). Islam’s foremost legal authority in the time of the Ottoman Empire was the Mufti of Istanbul.
muhajir	an emigrant (see hijra above).
muḥtasib	the official entrusted with the supervision of moral behaviour and of the markets. Normally a faqīh , who apart from the above ‘police’ functions also acted as qāzī (judge).
Muʿīn ul-Sultanat	‘Helper of State’.
mujāhid	one who leads the faithful in holy war or takes part in holy war.
mujtahid	legal expert, one qualified to exercise ijtihād (within Shiʿa Islam only. Sunni Islam deems ‘the gate of ijtihād ’ to be closed).
mukhlis	devotee (of Sufi pīr).
muʿmin	believer.
munāfiq	hypocrite.
murīd	novice in ṭarīqat , disciple.
murshid	a guide to the right way, i.e. salvation; a spiritual adviser.
nabī	a prophet.
nafs	the lower or passionate soul.
nahw	the subject of grammar (Arabic).
nāʾib	a deputy.
Nāʾib al-Sultanat	viceroys.
namak ḥarām	untrue to the salt eaten together, i.e. ungrateful, faithless, disloyal.
nāmus	reputation, chastity.
nang	disgrace.
naqīb	‘a chief’, ‘a leader’ (applied mostly to religious persons). Naqību ʿl-ashrāf refers to the chief of the descendants of the Prophet.
nawrūz	New Year, i.e. 21 March.

nikāh	matrimony, marriage.
nizāmnāma	set of governing, regulating rules; constitution.
pād-i-shāh	king, emperor, monarch, sovereign lord. In the Afghan context, <i>bādshāh</i> (or <i>pādshāh</i> , 'lord') is more applicable.
Pashtunwāli	Pashtun tribal code.
pīr	lit. 'elder'. In Sufism, the <i>murshid</i> (spiritual guide) is called <i>pīr</i> .
purdah	'veil', 'curtain', the general idea that women should be secluded. The Qur ^{ān} , <i>hadīth</i> and Hanafi code do not specifically prescribe the veil but rather decency in dress and behaviour. Veiling in Afghanistan was only an urban phenomenon which rural and nomad women did not follow. Observance of <i>purdah</i> and decency for women was maintained in many other subtle ways in the countryside.
qadīm	'ancient'. <i>Qadimists</i> represented the conservative trend in Russian Islam before 1917.
qārī	one who reads the Qur ^{ān} and is acquainted with the science of reading the Qur ^{ān} ; a reciter of Qur ^{ān} .
qaryadār	village headman.
qaum	people, nation, tribe, family, kindred.
qaumwāli	(or <i>qaumīyat</i>), connection, the being of the same tribe; clanship; nationality; stay, support.
qāzī	a judge applying <i>Sharī'a</i> .
Qāzī al-Quzāt	chief <i>qāzī</i> .
qānūn	law, code of regulations, state law (of non-Muslim origin).
qiyās	reasoning by analogy, analogical deduction, the fourth source of Muslim law.
rawaj	customs, tradition (probably derived from Persian <i>rawiya</i>).
rawshanfikir	'enlightened', intellectual in the modern sense.
ribā	lit. 'increase/growth', usury and interest (on capital, stock etc).
ruhānī	spiritual, contemplative, 'learned' in the traditional sense.
sādād	plural of <i>sayyid</i> .
ṣadaqa	legal alms, often used synonymously with <i>zakāt</i> , but unlike <i>zakāt</i> these are voluntary.
sadr	lit. 'chief', but the term acquired a technical application under Muslim rule to mean a chief judge.
safar dar watan	lit. 'journey within the homeland'; i.e. journey in Man's inner world (from Naqshbandi Sufism).
ṣāhib	in Afghanistan and the Subcontinent a title of courtesy, equivalent to Mr. and Sir.
sanad	a royal ordinance, warrant, any royal deed or appointment under which another acts.
sardār	male leaders of the royal lineage, 'prince'.
ṣarf	the subject of metaphysics.
sayyid	'patrilineal' descendant of the Prophet via the sons of his daughter, Fāṭima (cf. <i>khwāja</i>).
sepoy	in Anglo-Indian use, a native soldier disciplined and dressed in the European style (from Persian <i>sipāh</i> , 'soldiery', 'army').

shabnāma	'night-letter', i.e. clandestine publication.
shāh	king.
shahūd	martyr, witness. Later also martyr as 'bloodwitness' who dies in defence of the faith against infidels.
shahr	town, city.
shaiṭān	devil, demon.
Sharī'a	or sharī'at, the sacred law of Islam.
shawrā	a council.
shaykh	superior of the darwishes .
Shaykh al-Islām	highest legal authority in Islam, theoretically presiding over the whole judicial and theological hierarchy.
shihādat	martyrdom.
shirīnikhwurī	i.e. 'the eating of sweets', ceremony marking the conclusion of an engagement.
shirk	idolatry, polytheism, attributing partners to God. Has come to be used as the opposite of tawīd and, for each sect, synonymous with any belief or practice which it rejects.
shirkat	partnership.
silsila	line of spiritual succession in Sufi ṭarīqat .
sūd	advantage, profit, interest, usury.
sunna	a precedent, normative legal custom; a tradition (of the Prophet).
tafsīr	Qur'ānic interpretation.
ṭālib	student at a madrassa .
taqiyya	dissimulation of one's religion, esp. in times of persecution or danger. This practice is permitted by Shi'ism.
taqlīd	the unquestioning acceptance of a doctrine as laid down by a school or earlier authority.
ṭarīqat	road, way, path; the whole system of rites for spiritual training within various Muslim religious orders (Sufi orders).
tasawwuf	Sufism.
tawīd	the oneness of God.
ta'wīz	praying for protection; a charm, amulet.
ta'zīr	a discretionary punishment, which is a right of a man (ḥaqq ādāmī) as opposed to ḥadd , which is a right of God.
ṭuruq	pl. of ṭarīqat .
ʿulamā	(sing. ʿālim) 'the possessors of 'ilm', religious scholars.
umma	the Islamic community.
ʿushr	tithe, to the benefit of public welfare.
ustād	a master in an art or profession.
wakīl	representative, authorized, proxy.
waqf	(pl. awqāf), pious foundation, or state land conquered or taken over by the Islamic community.
wāsiṭa	mediator.
watan	fatherland.
wazīfa	a pension or stipend granted to pious person.

wilāya	public function; competence; jurisdiction; authority.
yāghistān	the land of enmity, hostility / land of freedom and unrestraint.
zakāt	alms-tax, one of the 'pillars of Islam', hence obligatory.
zamīn	land.
zan	woman.
zar	gold.
zinā'	adultery, fornication, i.e. sexual intercourse between persons who are not in a state of legal matrimony (or concubinage).
ziyāra	'visit' in a religious sense (pilgrimage), visit to a sacred place or tomb. Hence, in the Afghan context, ziyārat directly refers to the place (shrine, sacred tomb) visited.

Notes on the Sources

General Comments

The source material for research of this kind is varied and uneven. There are great differences in what is available from period to period and, for certain subjects, material is virtually non-existent. Unavoidably, this situation is reflected in the present study. In particular, religion in Afghanistan attracted very little scholarly attention prior to the 'Saur Revolution'. The few exceptions included Ashraf Ghani's work on *Amir* Abdur Rahman's religious policy (1977) and Einzman's study on religious customs and saint worship in the Kabul area (1977). Prompted by the Islamic resistance to the PDPA regime, these few exceptions were supplemented by Roy (1984, 1985), Barry (1984) and Edwards (1986a, 1986b, 1987b). Much of the field covered in this study thus had to be 'reconstructed' from the ground up.

The primary sources used range from written material – such as British intelligence reports for the period 1880-1930, royal pamphlets and official publications (including the various constitutions), autobiographies, and the eye-witness accounts of foreign travellers in Afghanistan – through to my own interviews with exiled Afghan scholars and *mujāhidīn* conducted mostly in 1986 in Pakistan. The reliability and representativeness of such diverse sources obviously varies.

As far as popular religious movements and their leaders are concerned, British political and intelligence reports (available in the India Office Library & Records, London and in the National Archives of India, New Delhi) constitute the most important primary source. The background here was the almost paranoid British concern with any religious leader and movement in Afghanistan and along the Frontier, these being seen as the most dangerous and fanatical adversaries of the Empire. Intelligence reports are thus very detailed regarding religious leaders, their movements and popularity in the population and their attitude towards the British. The reports contain information ranging from the most far-fetched street rumours to hard facts. Little information, however, is included regarding the spiritual dimension of the activities of religious leaders nor is there any substantial analysis of any religious issues of the time.

Three groups of official diaries – British officials, Indian Muslims, and local newswriters – recorded events in Afghanistan and from the Frontier area. Diaries from British officials date from the 1879 occupation, hence fall outside the scope of this study. Subsequently, often very detailed diaries were submitted by 'agents' located in Kabul, Herat and Kandahar. The quality and reliability of these reports vary greatly, depending on the actual situation of the person as well as upon their individual qualities. Kakar (1979) thoroughly discusses the situation

surrounding these intelligence reports during the reign of Abdur Rahman and gives an evaluation of their varying quality as source material.

Research for this study began after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. I was thus unable to conduct any kind of research inside the country. As far as archival research is concerned, the loss may have been minimal as usually Afghan official records are not open to the public. Kakar (1979) informs that he was given special permission to consult the Afghan files relating to *Amir* Abdur Rahman but was disappointed to discover how little material was available. He and Ashraf Ghani were able to procure some of the official Afghan publications from this time from the bazaar of Kabul and thus utilize them in their research. Schinasi (1979) managed to establish a private collection of source materials from the Habibullah period through similar means. In this study, such materials could only be consulted directly in cases where official publications (translated into English) found their way into British records as subjects of reporting or were kindly made available to me from private collections.

However, from this period onwards, one may also be lucky enough to collect first hand accounts through interviews. The afore-mentioned interviews conducted span different views and interpretations of the situation in Afghanistan as well as the role of Islam today and in society in general. The information supplied by elderly informants allowed a degree of cross-checking against the otherwise scanty sources on the development during this century of the religious educational system and the Sufi orders as well as against the information supplied by other informants. Moreover, all the information had to be carefully evaluated in the context of the past *and* the present situation of the informant as well as with regard to the existing ideological and 'party' situation among Afghan refugees.

The effect of the interviewer on the situation and the information collected is a standard anthropological dilemma but, in view of the war journalism to which many of these people had been exposed over the recent years, it appeared to benefit the quality of the information that the interviewer was a female anthropologist (i.e. acquainted with Afghan history and culture but as a female less 'dangerous' and 'political'). As for the reliability of the oral testimony, previous anthropological fieldwork in Afghanistan leads me to agree with Poullada (1973: 299), who stresses the importance of the fact that Afghan culture has remained largely an oral culture, one in which memory and narration still play an important part.

Sources for Each Period

Prior to 1880, the main sources on Afghan history consist of various (mainly British) travel accounts, the most significant being Mountstuart Elphinstone's *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul* from 1815. The unchallenged standard work on modern Afghan history covering the period from about the 1830s to 1946 is Vartav Gregorian's *Emergence of Modern Afghanistan* from 1969, supplemented by Louis Dupree's *Afghanistan* from 1973 plus more specialized studies of different epochs. The foremost local source are the three volumes of *Seraj ul-Tawarikh* (1914-15) by Mullah Faiz Mohammad, the official historian of *Amir* Habibullah. Regarding the Pashtun tribes and the Afghan State, various modern

anthropological studies have also been used. As far as the 'religious situation' is concerned, historical sources are scattered and weak, and describing it can at best be likened with the compilation of a jigsaw puzzle.

The reign of *Amir* Abdur Rahman (1880-1901) and the centralization of the Afghan state has been the subject of considerable attention, and is in fact the most researched epoch in Afghan history, notably in the works of Hasan Kakar (1971, 1979) and for the particular perspective of the present study, also the work of Ashraf Ghani (1977, 1978). Gregorian (1969) deals with both internal and external aspects of Abdur Rahman's reign and so does Dupree (1973), while Adamec (1967) deals with the external aspects only. The official religious policy of *Amir* Abdur Rahman has mainly been dealt with by Ghani (*ibid*), but as far as popular religious movements and leaders are concerned, the British political and intelligence reports constitute the primary source. However, the most important primary sources on this period are the alleged autobiography of *Amir* Abdur Rahman – compiled by *Mir Munshi* Sultan Mohammad *Khān* (1900/1980) – and Faiz Mohammad's *Serajul-Tawarikh*. Kakar (1971, 1979) provides a comprehensive discussion of the background and situation of Sultan Mohammad *Khān* and Faiz Mohammad plus an evaluation of these two documents as historical source material. See also Tarzi and Ahang (1970). In addition, there are a host of contemporary (non-Afghan) writers, most notably Frank Martin's 'Under the Absolute Amir' (1907). Also the number of religious pamphlets, which the *Amir* either wrote himself or supervised the production of, constitute important source material. A number of these are available in translation in the India Office Library & Records in London and at the National Archives of India.

The reign of *Amir* Habibullah has been subject of comparatively limited research, except for its foreign political aspects, which have been dealt with mainly by Adamec (1967, 1974), and the ideas of the emerging 'Young Afghans', centred around the newspaper *Siraj al-Akhbar* and Mahmud Tarzi, as described by Schinasi (1979). British anxiety regarding Afghanistan's possible entry into the 1. World War resulted in extensive supervision of 'the Afghan scene' and consequently in voluminous reporting. The main sources for this period have thus been contemporary British political reports on Afghanistan, which are particularly numerous and informative during the first two decades of this century and focus on the movements of religious leaders in Afghanistan and along the Frontier.

There are numerous sources on the Amanullah period (1919-29), both scholarly as well as contemporary travel accounts and more recent journalistic expositions. The main work on the period is Poullada (1973), analysing the failure of the reform policy primarily in the light of the tribe-State relationship. Also Gregorian (1969) is an important source on the period and among Afghan historians Ghoobar (1968) should be mentioned. For an account from a direct participant, see also Ahmad (1930) and *Roydad-e Loya Jirga-i Darussultana-i Kabul* (1924). Among the numerous British reports, particularly the Kabul Diaries are important. See also Stewart (1973) for a vivid, journalistic but comprehensive and detailed account. With the Amanullah period, constitutionalism was introduced into Afghanistan. The text of all previous Afghan constitutions can be found in Moltmann (1980) and are also discussed *in extenso* in Moltmann (1986). Poullada (1973) gives an assessment of the source materials available for this period.

The years 1930-64 were comparatively peaceful and 'uneventful' years in Afghanistan, where the society, however, underwent considerable socio-economic changes. This is clearly reflected in the scholarly interest in the period, where economic studies by far outnumber political studies. The socio-economic development of Afghanistan during these years and earlier in the twentieth century has mainly been studied by German economist and cultural geographers (or Afghan scholars associated with German universities) such as Hahn (1964/65), Rhein & Ghaussy (1966), Hayatullah (1967), Büscher (1969), Grötzbach (1972, 1976), Nägel (1971), Wiebe (1973), Kanne (1974), Sarwari (1974), Oesterdiekhoff (1978) and Grevemeyer (1987).

In general the period has attracted less interest than the *Amīr* Abdur Rahman and the Amanullah periods. The main sources for the overall development is Gregorian (1969), Dupree (1973) and, for the constitutional developments, Moltmann (1982, 1986) and Kamali (1985). Among local historians are Ghoobar (1968) and archival sources which, however, 'dry out' early in the period due to the fifty-year clause on public accessibility. Apart from that, material has been compiled from a host of British intelligence reports and scattered articles and books, supplemented by interviews with elderly Afghan academics (of different persuasions) in Peshawar during November 1986. The latter were an important source of information (particularly regarding the development of the system of religious education) as well as a means to adjust the perspective on the period.

The sources to the modern epoch (i.e. since the 1960s) consist of a multitude of books and articles written by Afghan and international scholars divided mainly on the following topics: social anthropological studies, economic development, political development, a multitude of more or less journalistic accounts on the 'Saur Revolution' and resistance, plus a few more scholarly works on the development of the Islamic movement and on the role of Islam in the resistance. Regarding the ideological crisis in society throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, the source material in the form of books, pamphlets, magazines etc. from this time is very limited.

For a discussion of the political developments in Afghanistan since 1979, including the strategy of the PDPA, the reform programme and its implications, see among (numerous) other publications on this issue: Halliday (1978, 1980), Dupree (1979), Grevemeyer (1980), Samimy (1981), Newell & Newell (1981), Chaliand (1981), Misra (1981), Amin (1982), Moltmann (1986), Olesen (1983), Rahin (n.d.), Arnold (1983), Gille (1984) and Reshtia (1984). For views more sympathetic to the PDPA, see Male (1982), Chakravarty (1983) and Goyal (1984), the latter two virtually echoing the official PDPA views. For the full text of the initial reform programme, see 'Democratic Republic of Afghanistan Annual, Saur 7, 1358', edited by A.M. Baryalai (1979). In addition see also the official presentation of PDPA policies in the form of speeches, declarations and analyses by Taraki (1979), Hafizullah Amin (1979, 1979b), Babrak Karmal (1980, 1981, 1982) and the government as such during 1978-87. See also Vercellin (1985) for a discussion of the present literature on Afghanistan during this period.

The development of the Islamic movement in Afghanistan did not attract any attention from researchers until the 1980s, when the Islamists came to occupy a prominent position among the Afghan exile parties in Pakistan (and Iran). Source material prior to the 1980s is also very scarce, as the movement's existence until that time was more or less clandestine. After the 1980s, however, there exist

numerous publications from the various exile groups and parties but these mainly concentrate on battles won and lists of Soviet/Afghan atrocities. Only rarely do they contain material regarding the background or actual programme, etc. of the organization in question. This type of material I supplemented in 1986 by carrying out a number of interviews with Afghan Islamists and intellectuals in Peshawar regarding the background, development and current state of the Afghan Islamist movement. Among other materials used, first and foremost should Roy (1984, 1985) and Barry (1984) be mentioned plus the more limited and specific studies of Edwards (1986b, 1987b), A.H. Khan (1984), Ghani (1987a), Amin (1984). For the 'ideological heritage' of the Afghan Islamist movement, works on the Ikhwan ul-Muslimin (such as Mitchell, 1969, Ali, 1983 etc.), the voluminous writings of *Mawlānā* Maududi, as well as more general studies of the Islamist movement (e.g. Khalid 1982) have been used.

References

Adamec, L. W.

- 1967 *Afghanistan 1900-1923. A Diplomatic History*. Berkeley.
1974 *Afghanistan's Foreign Affairs to the Mid-Twentieth Century*. Tucson.
1975 *Historical and Political Who's Who of Afghanistan*. Graz.
1987 *A Biographical Dictionary of Contemporary Afghanistan*. Graz.

Adams, C.J.

- 1983 'Mawdudi and the Islamic State'. In: Esposito, J.L. (ed.): *Voices of Resurgent Islam*. Oxford, pp. 99-133.

Agha, N.

- 1987 'Interview mit Asadullah Ahmadi: Das unveräusserliche Recht an afghanischen Völkerschaften'. In: *Afghanistan Tribune*, no. 4, jhg. 9.

Agwami, M.S.

- 1981 The Saur Revolution and After. In: Misra, K.P. (ed.): *Afghanistan in Crisis*. London, pp. 1-18.

Ahmad, Ali

- 1930 'The fall of Amanullah'. In: IOL. L/P & S/10/1285.

Ahmad, Aziz

- 1960 'Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Jamal al-din al-Afghani and Muslim India'. In: *Studia Islamica*, XIII.

Ahmad, Aziz

- 1964 *Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment*. Oxford.
1967 *Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan 1857-1964*. Oxford.

Ahmad, J. and Aziz, M.A.

- 1936 *Afghanistan. A Brief Survey*. London.

Ahmed, A.S.

- 1975 *Mataloona. Pukhto Proverbs*. Karachi.
1976 *Millennium and Charisma among Pathans. A Critical Essay in Social Anthropology*. London.
1980 *Pukhtun Economy and Society. Traditional Structure and Economic Development in a Tribal Society*. London.
1982 'Order and Conflict in Muslim Society: A Case Study from Pakistan'. In: *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 36, no. 3, pp. 184-205.
1984 'Religious presence and symbolism in Pukhtun society'. In: Ahmed, A.S. and Hart, D.M. (eds): *Islam in Tribal Societies. From the Atlas to the Indus*. London, pp. 310-331.

Ahmed, A.S. and Hart, D.M. (eds)

- 1984 *Islam in Tribal Societies. From the Atlas to the Indus*. London.

Algar, H.

- 1976 'The Naqshbandi Order: A Preliminary Survey of Its History and Significance'. In: *Studia Islamica*, vol. XLIV, pp. 123-152.

Ali, M.

- 1933 *Progressive Afghanistan*. Lahore.
1959 *Afghanistan*. Kabul.

- Ali, S.**
1983 *Masters of Muslim Thought*. vols. I and II, Lahore.
- Amin, H.**
1979a 'Address to Party cadres'. In: *Kabul Times*, 19.04.1979.
1979b 'Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Academy of Sciences of Afghanistan'. In: *DRA Annual*, pp. 712-737.
- Amin, T.**
1982 *Afghanistan Crisis: Implications and Options for Muslim World, Iran and Pakistan*. Islamabad.
1984 'Afghan Resistance. Past, Present, and Future'. In: *Asian Survey*, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 373-99.
- Anderson, J.W.**
1983 '*Khan and Khel: Dialectics of Pashtun Tribalism*'. In: Tapper, R. (ed.): *The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan*. Beckenham, pp. 119-149.
1984 'How Afghans Define Themselves in Relation to Islam'. In: Shahrani, M.N. and Canfield, R.L. (eds): *Revolutions and Rebellions in Afghanistan*. Berkeley, pp. 266-289.
- Arkoun, M.**
1988 'The Concept of Authority in Islamic Thought'. In: Ferdinand, K. and Mozaffari, M. (eds): *Islam: State and Society*. London, pp. 53-74.
- Arnold, A.**
1983 *Afghanistan's Two Party Communism: Parcham and Khalq*. Stanford.
- Arunova, M.**
1981 'Glimpses from the History of the Liberation Struggle of the Afghan People in the 18th Century'. In: *Afghanistan: Past and Present*. Oriental Studies in the USSR (no. 3), Moscow.
- Aslanov, A.G.**
1969 Ethnography of Afghanistan. In: Grassmuck, G., Adamec, L. and Irwin, F. (eds): *Afghanistan. Some New Approaches*. Ann Arbor.
- Asmussen, J.**
1981 *Islam*. Copenhagen.
- Ayoob, M.**
1979 'Two Faces of Political Islam: Iran and Pakistan Compared'. In: *Asian Survey*, vol. 19, no. 6, pp. 535-547.
1981 *The Politics of Islamic Reassertion*. London.
- Baha, L.**
1970 'The North-West Frontier in the First World War'. In: *Asian Affairs*, N.S. vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 29-37.
1979 The Hijrat Movement and the Northwest Frontier Province. In: *Islamic Studies*, vol. XVIII, no. 3, pp. 231-242.
- Bakar, Abu et al**
1888 *Takwim-ud-din*. Kabul.
- Banuazizi, A. and Weiner, M. (eds)**
1986 *The State, Religion and Ethnic Politics. Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan*. Syracuse.
- Barry, M.**
1980 'Afghanistan, terre d'Islam'. *Les Temps Modernes*. no. 408-409, pp. 29-55.
1984 *Le Royaume de l'Insolence*. Paris.
- Barth, F. (ed.)**
1969 *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*. London.

Beck, S.

1928 'Das afghanische Strafgesetzbuch vom Jahre 1924 mit dem Zusatz vom Jahre 1925'. In: *Die Welt des Islams*, Bd. 11, Heft 1-2, pp. 67-157.

Bellew, H.W.

1862 *Journal of a Political Mission to Afghanistan in 1857, with an Account of the Country and the People*. London.

1864 (1977) *A General Report on the Yusufzais*. Lahore.

1880 (1982) *The Races of Afghanistan*. Delhi.

Bennigsen, A.A. and Wimbush, S.E.

1979 *Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union*. Chicago.

Bindemann, R.

1988 'Kunst im Widerstand. "Revolutionäre" und "nationale" Lieder der Hazara'. In: *Neue Beiträge zur Afghanistanforschung*. Liestal.

Bourke, G.

1994 'Kun Allah kan hjæpe os'. In: *Information*, 16-17 April, p. 3.

Bourdieu, P.

1977 *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. Cambridge.

Burnes, A.

1834 (1975) *Travels into Bokhara. Together with a Narrative of a Voyage on the Indus*. vol. I-III, Karachi.

Büscher, H.

1970 *Demokratisierung und Ansätze zur Parteienbildung in Afghanistan. Viertel Jahresberichte. Probleme der Entwicklungsländer*, no. 39.

1969 *Die Industriearbeiter in Afghanistan. Eine Studie zur gesellschaftspolitischen Problematik sozial schwacher Bevölkerungsschichten in Entwicklungsländern*. Meisenheim/Glan.

Canfield, R.L.

1973 *Faction and Conversion in a Plural Society*. Ann Arbor.

1989 'Afghanistan: The Trajectory of Internal Alignments'. In: *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 43, no. 4, pp. 635-648.

Castagne, J.

1921 'Notes sur la politique extérieure de 1921 l'Afghanistan depuis 1919 (Missions et traites)'. In: *Revue du Monde Musulman*, vol. XLVIII, pp. 1-26.

Centlivres, P.

1987 'The Afghan Refugee in Pakistan: an ambiguous identity'. Paper delivered at *Arbeitstagung der Arbeitsgemeinschaft Afghanistan*, 13-14 November 1987, Eichstätt.

Centlivres, P. and M.

1984 'La Société afghane, structures et values'. In: Centlivres et al (eds): *Afghanistan - La colonisation impossible*. Paris, pp. 57-80.

Centlivres, P. and Centlivres-Demont, M.

1981-82 'Village en Afghanistan'. In: *Commentaire*, vol. 4, no. 16, pp. 516-525.

Cervin, V.

1952 'Problems in the Integration of the 1952 Afghan State'. In: *The Middle East Journal*, vol. VI.

Chakravarty, S.

1983 *Dateline Kabul*. New Delhi.

Chaliand, G.

1981 *Rapport sur la Résistance Afghane*. Paris.

Chokaiev, M.

1930 'The Situation in Afghanistan'. In: *Asiatic Review*, vol. XXVI, pp. 324-330.

Clerc, J-P.

1993a 'Afghanistan: l'optimisme du président Rabbani'. In: *Le Monde*, 12 November, p. 5.

1993b 'Le puzzle afghan, I: Herat, l'émirat pacifié d'Ismail Khan'. In: *Le Monde*, 19 November, p. 6.

1993c 'Le puzzle afghan, II: Mazar, le fief industriel de Rashid Dostom'. In: *Le Monde*, 20 November, p. 5.

1993d 'Le puzzle afghan, III: Kaboul, toujours livrée aux factions'. In: *Le Monde*, 22 November, p. 5.

1993e 'Le dilemme des réfugiés du Tadjikistan'. In: *Le Monde*, 25 November, p. 6.

Coulson, N. and Hinchcliffe, D.

1978 'Women and Law Reforms in Contemporary Islam'. In: Beck and Keddie (eds): *Women in the Muslim World*. Harvard, pp. 37-52.

Curzon, Lord of Kedleston

1923 *Tales of Travel*. London.

Davies, C.

1932 *The North-West Frontier, 1890-1908*. Cambridge.

Dekmejian, R.H.

1980 'The Anatomy of Islamic Revival: Legitimacy Crisis, Ethnic Conflict and the Search for Islamic Alternatives'. In: *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 34, no. 1, pp. 1-13.

Djan-Zirakyar, R.R.

1978 *Stammesgesellschaft, Nationalstaat und Irredentismus am Beispiel der Pashtunistanfrage*. Frankfurt/Main.

Donohue, J.J. and Esposito, J.L. (eds)

1982 *Islam in Transition. Muslim Perspectives*. Oxford.

Dupree, L.

1973 *Afghanistan*. Princeton.

1973a 'The Political Uses of Religion'. In: K.H. Silvert (ed.): *Churches and States: The Religious Institution and Modernization*. New York.

1974 'The Emergence of Technocrats in Modern Afghanistan'. *American Universities' Field Staff Reports*, vol. xvii, no. 5.

1976 'Saint Cults in Afghanistan'. *American Universities' Field Staff Reports*, vol. xx, no. 1, 1976.

1979 'Red Flags over Hindu Kush', parts i and ii. *American Universities' Field Staff Reports*, no. 44-45.

Dupree, N.

1985 'The Conscripting of Afghan Writers: An Aborted Experiment in Socialist Realm'. In: *Central Asian Survey*, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 69-87.

Edwards, D.B.

1986a 'Charismatic Leadership and Political Process in Afghanistan'. In: *Central Asian Survey*, vol. 5, no. 3/4, pp. 273-299.

1986b 'The Evolution of Shi'i Political Dissent in Afghanistan'. In: Cole, I.R. and Keddie, N.R. (eds): *Shi'ism and Social Protest*. New Haven, pp. 201-229.

1987a 'Origins of the Anti-Soviet Jihad'. In: Farr, G.M. and Merriam, J.G. (eds): *Afghan Resistance: The Politics of Survival*. Boulder (Colorado).

1987b *The Political Lives of Afghan Saints: The Case of the Kabul Hazrats*. (unpublished manuscript).

Einzman, H.

1977 *Religiöse Volksbrauchtum in Afghanistan. Islamische Heiligenverehrung und Wallfahrtswesen in Raum Kabul*. Wiesbaden.

Eliot, T.L.

1991 'Afghanistan in 1990: Groping Toward Peace?'. In: *Asian Survey*, vol. XXXI, no. 2, pp. 125-134.

Elmi, S.M.Y.

1986 'The Impact of Sovietization on Afghan Education and Culture'. In: Majrooh, S.B. and Elmi, S.M.Y. (eds): *The Sovietization of Afghanistan*. Peshawar, pp.72-125.

Elphinstone, M.

1839 (1972) *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul*. vols. I-II. Karachi.

Embree, Ainslie T. (Ed in Chief)

1988 *Encyclopedia of Asian History*, vol. 3. New York.

Enayat, H.

1982 *Modern Islamic Political Thought*. London.

Esfahani, A. Ohadi

1987 'Den traditionelle madrasa i Iran - et historisk perspektiv'. In: Olesen A. (ed.): *Islam og undervisning i Islam*. Århus, pp. 38-67.

Eshrati, A.A.

1984 *Khalwat dar Anjuman. Nasharat-i Shora-i Seghafat-i Jihad-i Afghanistan*. n.p.

Esposito, J.L.(ed.)

1983 *Voices of Resurgent Islam*. Oxford.

Fairchild, H.P.

1944 *Dictionary of Sociology*. Philosophical Library. New York.

Faksh, M.A.

1983 'Theories of State in Islamic Political Thought'. In: *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. VI, no. 3.

Fallon, J. E.

1980 'The Response of National Liberation Movement to Soviet Domination in Southern Central Asia: A Parallel between the Basmachi insurgency and the current Afghan Revolt'. In: *Central Asia*, no. 6, pp. 69-107.

Ferdinand, K.

1962 'Nomadic Expansion and Commerce in Central Afghanistan: A Sketch of some Modern Trends'. In: *Folk*, vol. 4.

Ferrier, J.

1857 *Caravan Journeys and Wanderings in Persia, Afghanistan, Turkistan and Baluchistan*. London.

Fischer, M.M.J.

1980 *Iran. From Religious Dispute to Revolution*. Harvard.

Fletcher, A.

1965 *Afghanistan. Highway of Conquest*. New York.

Florinsky, M.

1953 *Russia. A History and an Interpretation*. New York.

Fraser-Tytler, W.K.

1967 *Afghanistan. A Study of Political Developments in Central and Southern Asia*. Oxford.

Fröhlich, D.

1970 *Nationalismus und Nationalstaat in Entwicklungsländern*. Meisenheim/Glan.

Gankovsky, Yu.

1981 'The Durrani Empire'. In: *Afghanistan: Past and Present*. Oriental Studies in the USSR (no. 3), Moscow.

Gardezi, H.N.

1982 'The resurgence of Islam, Islamic Ideology and Encounters with Imperialism'. In: *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 451-463.

Geertz, C.

1964 'Ideology as a Cultural System'. In: Apter, D.E. (ed.): *Ideology and Discontent*. New York.

1966 'Religion as a Cultural System'. In: Banton, M. (ed.): *Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion*. ASA Monograph 3, London.

Gellner, E.

1981 *Muslim Society*. Cambridge.

Ghani, A.

1977 *State-Building and Centralization in a Tribal Society. Afghanistan 1880-1901*. MA Thesis, American University of Beirut (unpublished).

1978 'Islam and State-Building in a Tribal Society. Afghanistan 1880-1901'. In: *Modern Asian Studies*, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 269-284.

1987 'The Afghan State and its Adaptation to the Environment of Central and Southwest Asia'. In: Malik, H. (ed.): *Soviet-American relations with Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan*. London, pp. 310-332.

1987a 'Afghanistan. Islam and Counterrevolutionary Movements'. In: Esposito, J.L. (ed.): *Islam in Asia. Religion, Politics and Society*. New York, pp. 79-96.

Ghaznavi, M.

1978 'Interaction of Islam and Socialism in the religious thought of the Muslim of British India'. In: *Journal of Central Asia*, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 69-81.

Ghobar, M.

1968 *Afghanistan dar Masir-i Tarikh*. Kabul.

Ghose, D.

1960 *England and Afghanistan: A Phase in Their Relations*. Calcutta.

Gille, E.

1984 'L'accession au pouvoir des communistes prosoviétiques'. In: Centlivres et al (eds): *Afghanistan. La colonisation impossible*. Paris, pp. 179-213.

Gilsenan, M.

1982 *Recognizing Islam: Religion and society in the modern Arab world*. New York.

1984 *Recognising Islam: an anthropologist's introduction*. London.

Glasneck, J. and Kircheisen, I.

1968 *Türkei und Afghanistan - Brennpunkte der Orientpolitik in zweiten Weltkrieg*. Berlin.

Glatzer, B.

1977 *Nomaden von Gharjistan: Aspekte der wirtschaftlichen, sozialen und politischen Organisation nomadischer Durrani-Paschtunen in Nordwestafghanistan*. Beiträge zu Südasienforschung 22. Wiesbaden.

Gochenour, T.S.

1965 'A New Try for Afghanistan'. In: *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 1-19.

Goyal, D.R.

1984 *Afghanistan. Behind the Smoke Screen*. Delhi.

Graham, G.F.I.

1885 (1974) *The Life and Works of Syed Ahmad Khan*. Delhi.

Grassmuck, G., Adamec, L.W. and Irwin, F.H.

1969 *Afghanistan. Some New Approaches*. Ann Arbor.

Gregorian, V.

1967 'Mahmud Tarzi and Saraj-ol-Akhbar: Ideology of Nationalism and Modernisation in Afghanistan'. In: *The Middle East Journal*, vol. XXI, no. 3, pp. 345-368.

1969 *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan. Politics of Reform and Modernization, 1880-1946*. Stanford.

Grevemeyer, J-H.

1980 'Afghanistan: Das "neue Modell einer Revolution" und der dörfliche Widerstand'. In: *Revolution in Iran und Afghanistan* (1980 thematic issue of *Mardom Nameh. Jahrbuch zur Geschichte und Gesellschaft des Mittleren Orients*). Hamburg, pp. 140-177.

1981 'Im Windschatten des Widerstands. Zentralstaatsbildung und koloniale Intervention im Afghanistan'. In: Grevemeyer, J-H. (ed.): *Traditionelle Gesellschaften und europäischen Kolonialismus*. Frankfurt/Main.

1987 *Afghanistan. Sozialer Wandel und 1987 Staat im 20. Jahrhundert*. Berlin.

Grötzbach, E.

1972 *Kulturgeographischer Wandel in Nordost Afghanistan seit dem 19. Jhr. Meisenheim am Glan*.

1976 (ed.) *Aktuelle Probleme der Regionalentwicklung und Stadtgeographie Afghanistans*. Meisenheim/Glan.

Haddad, Y.Y.

1983 'The Qur'anic Justification for an Islamic Revolution: The View of Sayyid Qutb'. In: *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 37, no. 4, pp. 14-30.

1983a 'Sayyid Qutb: Ideologue of Islamic Revival'. In: Esposito, J.L. (ed.): *Voices of resurgent Islam*. Oxford, pp. 67-99.

Hager, R.

1983 'State, Tribe and Empire in Afghan Inter-polity Relations'. In: Tapper, R. (ed.): *The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan*. Beckenham, pp. 83-118.

Hahn, H.

1964-65 *Die Stadt Kabul (Afghanistan) und ihr Umland*, Bd. I-II. Bonn.

Halliday, F.

1978 'Revolution in Afghanistan'. In: *New Left Review*, no. 112, Nov-Dec, pp. 3-44.

1980 'War and Revolution in Afghanistan'. In: *New Left Review*, no. 112, Jan-Feb, pp. 20-91.

Hamid, A.

1967 *Muslim Separatism in India*. Lahore.

Hamilton, A.

1906 *Afghanistan*. London.

Hardy, P.

1971 *Partners in Freedom and True Muslims*. Lund.

Hasan, M.

1986 'Afghan Resistance Movement and Its Future'. In: *The Mujahideen Monthly*, vol. 1, no. 4.

Hauner, M.

1981 'One Man against the Empire: The Faqir of Ipi and the British in Central Asia on the Eve of and during the Second World War'. In: *The Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 183-213.

Hayatullah, A.

1967 *Die Wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungsprobleme Afghanistans unter besondere Berücksichtigung der natürlichen Gegebenheiten und der Bevölkerung*. Nürnberger Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeographische Arbeiten, Bd. 6. Nürnberg.

Heel, M.

1986 'Pluralistische Demokratie, Blockfreiheit und Achtung der Menschenrechte - Gulljan Farahie auf Europareise'. In: *Afghanistan Tribune*, no. 5, jhg. 8, pp. 17-20.

Hekmatyar, G.

1986 *Die politische Lösung des Afghanistan-Problems*. Hezb-i Islami. Wiesbaden (3rd. ed.).

n.d. *Jang az didgah-i Qor'an*. n.p.

Hjärpe, J.

1988 'The Contemporary Debate in the Muslim World on the Definition of "Human Rights"'. In: Ferdinand, K. and Mozaffari, M. (eds): *Islam: State and Society*. London, pp. 26-39.

Hondrich, K.O.

1964 *Die Einstellung Afghanischer Studenten zum sozialen Wandel*. Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Heft 4, 16. jhg., pp. 703-726.

Howell, E.

1931 (1979) *Mizh. A Monograph on Government's Relations with the Mahsud Tribe*. Karachi.

Hughes, T.P.

1885 (1982) *Dictionary of Islam*. New Delhi.

Hussain, S.I.

1984 *Afghanistan - Some Aspects*. Islamabad.

Hussaini, I.M.

1956 *The Muslim Brethren*. Beirut.

Hyman, A.

1982 *Afghanistan under Soviet Domination 1964-81*. London.

Iblagh, S.J.

1975 'Islam wa Jumhuriat'. In: *Auqaf Magazine*, vol. 5, no. 36.

Jafri, S.H.M.

1976 *The Origins and Early Development of Shi'a Islam*. Qum.

Jäkel, K.

1972 'Fünftausend Jahre Geschichte auf dem Boden des Landes'. In: Kraus, W. (ed.): *Afghanistan*. Tübingen.

Jalali, S.S.A.

1971 'Madrassa-i Hefāz dar Mazar-i Sharif'. In: *Auqaf Magazine*, vol. 1, no. 2.

Jameelah, M.

1983 *Islam in Theory and Practice*. New Delhi.

James, B

1935 *The Secret Kingdom, an Afghan Journey*. New York.

Janata, A. and Hassas, R.

1975 'Ghairatman - Der Gute Paschtune'. In: *Afghanistan Journal*, Jg. 2, Heft 3, pp. 83-98.

Johansen, B.

1981 'Islam und Staat im Imperialismus', parts I and II. In: *Das Argument*, no. 129 and 130, 23. jhg., pp. 690-704, 787-812.

Kābuli, Kh.

1967 'An Historical Sketch'. In: *Kabul Times Annual 1967*. Kabul, pp. 73-81.

Kakar, M.H.

1971 *Afghanistan. A Study in Internal Political Developments, 1880-1896*. Kabul.

1974 'Trends in Modern Afghan History'. In: Dupree, L. and Albert, L. (eds): *Afghanistan in the 1970s*. New York, pp. 13-33.

1978 'The Fall of the Afghan Monarchy in 1973'. In: *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 195-214.

1979 *Government and Society in Afghanistan. The Reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman*. Austin.

Kamali, M.H.

1985 *Law in Afghanistan. A Study of the Constitutions, Matrimonial Law and the Judiciary*. Leiden.

Kandahari, S.M.

1988 'Ringens um die Zukunft Afghanistans'. In: *Afghanistan Tribune*, no. 4, jhg. 10.

Kanne, J.

1974 *Interne Investitionsfinanzierung in Afghanistan*. Bochum.

Karmal, B.

1980 'The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan Tricolour Flag Reflects the Will, Tradition of our People'. In: *Afghanistan Quarterly*, vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 1-7.

1981 *Excerpts of Interviews and Speeches*. Kabul.

1982 'Draft Programme of Action and the Tasks in Consolidating the Party and Strengthening Its Links with the People. In: *Documents and Records of the National Conference of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan*. Kabul.

Katrak, S.K.H.

1929 *Through Amanullah's Afghanistan*. Karachi.

Kaye, J.W.

1851 *History of the War in Afghanistan*. vol. I-II. London.

Keddie, N.R.

1963 'Symbol and Sincerity in Islam'. In: *Studia Islamica*, no. 19, pp. 27-63.

1968 *An Islamic Response to Imperialism*. Berkeley.

1972 *Sayyid Jamal ad-Din "al-Afghani"*. Berkeley.

Khalfin, N.

1981 'The Struggle of the Peoples of Afghanistan for Independence and against the British Colonialists'. In: *Afghanistan: Past and Present*. Oriental Studies in the USSR (no. 3), Moscow.

Khalid, D.

1982 *Reislamisierung und Entwicklungspolitik*. Köln.

Khalid, M.

1986 'Glimpses of Afghan Education'. In: *The Mujahideen Monthly*, vol. 1. no. 5.

Khalili, Kh.

1984 *The first Russian invasion of Afghanistan (1929 A.D. or 1308 A.H.)*. n.p. (Persian).

Khan, A.H.

- 1980 'Afghan Groups Based in Peshawar'. In: *Central Asia*, no. 6, pp. 49-59. University of Peshawar.
- 1981 'Afghan Resistance and National Leadership'. In: *Central Asia*, no. 9, pp. 163-177. University of Peshawar.
- 1984 'Factional Organisation of the Afghan Mujahedeens in Peshawar'. In: *Central Asia*, no. 14, pp. 51-73. University of Peshawar.

Khan, A.M.

1936 'Progress in Afghanistan'. In: *The Asiatic Review*, pp. 863-867.

Khan, M.A.

- 1978 'The First Constitution of Afghanistan: Its Evolution and Abolition'. In: *Central Asia*, vol. 1, no. 1. University of Peshawar.
- 1979 'The Second Constitution of Afghanistan. Part II (1943-1953)'. In: *Central Asia*, vol. 2, no. 2. University of Peshawar.
- 1979a 'The Second Constitution of Afghanistan. Part III (1953-63)'. In: *Central Asia*, vol. 3, no. 4. University of Peshawar.
- 1980 'The Third Afghan Constitution. Part I (1964-65)'. In: *Central Asia*, no. 5, pp. 1-30. University of Peshawar.
- 1980a 'The Third Afghan Constitution. Part II (1965-1968)'. In: *Central Asia*, no. 6, pp. 1-25. University of Peshawar.
- 1980b 'The Third Afghan Constitution. Part III (1966-67)'. In: *Central Asia*, no. 7,, pp. 39-65). University of Peshawar.
- 1981 'The Third Afghan Constitution. Part IV (1966-67)'. In: *Central Asia*, no. 8, pp. 1-39. University of Peshawar.
- 1981a 'The Third Afghan Constitution. Part V, 1967'. In: *Central Asia*, no. 9, pp. 111-129. University of Peshawar.
- 1982 'The Third Afghan Constitution. Part VI (March-August 1968)'. In: *Central Asia*, no. 10, pp. 29-49. University of Peshawar.
- 1982a 'The Third Afghan Constitution, Part VII (Political Parties and Newspapers of 1968)'. In: *Central Asia*, no. 11, pp. 1-21. University of Peshawar.
- 1983 'The Third Afghan Constitution. Part VIII (1968)'. In: *Central Asia*, no. 12,, pp. 1-17. University of Peshawar.
- 1983a 'The Third Afghan Constitution. Part IX (March-August 1969)'. In: *Central Asia*, no. 13, pp. 41-59. University of Peshawar.
- 1984 'The Third Afghan Constitution. Part X'. In: *Central Asia*, no. 14, pp. 1-21. University of Peshawar.
- 1984a 'The Third Afghan Constitution. Part XI (Elections of 1969)'. In: *Central Asia*, no. 15, pp. 49-69. University of Peshawar.
- 1985 'The Third Afghan Constitution. Part XII'. In: *Central Asia*, no. 15, pp. 85-99). University of Peshawar.
- 1985a 'The Third Afghan Constitution. Part XIII'. In: *Central Asia*, no. 17, pp. 1-21. University of Peshawar.
- 1986 'The Third Afghan Constitution. Part XIV'. In: *Central Asia*, no. 18, pp. 59-75. University of Peshawar.

Khan, M.F.

1977 'The Life and Times of Hajji Sahib of Turangzai'. In: *Islamic Studies*, vol. XVI, no. 1, Spring 1977, pp. 329-341.

Khan, S.M.

1900 (1980) *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, vols. I-II. Karachi.

Khattak, P.D.

1986 'The Impact of Islam, Islamic Fundamentalism and Marxist-Leninist Ideology in Afghanistan'. In: Majrooh, S.B. and Elmi, S.M.Y. (eds): *The Sovietization of Afghanistan*. Peshawar, pp. 61-70.

Klimburg, M.

1966 *Afghanistan*. Wien.

Kopecky, L-M.

1982 'The Imami Sayyed of the Hazarajat: The Maintenance of their Social Elite Position'. In: *Folk*, vol. 24. Copenhagen.

Korgun, V.

1981 'The First Stage of Afghanistan's Independent Development'. In: *Afghanistan: Past and Present*. Moscow, pp.130-157.

Kristiansen, K.K. and Rasmussen, J.R.

1988 *Fjendebilleder and Fremmedhad*. FN-forbundet.

Laclau, E.

1977 *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory*. London.

Lewis, P.

1984 'Pirs, Shrines and Pakistani Islam'. In: *Al-Mushir. Theological Journal of the Christian Study Centre, Rawalpindi*, no. 1, vol. XXVI, pp. 1-23.

1984a 'The Shrine Cult in Historical Perspective'. In: *Al-Mushir*, no 2, vol. XXVI, pp. 54-76.

1984b 'Sufism: Impact on, and Interaction with Wider Society'. In: *Al-Mushir*, no. 3-4, vol. XXVI, pp. 101-131.

1984c 'Saints and Shrine Cult: Credentials, Critics and Continuity Impact'. In: *Al-Mushir*, no. 3-4, vol. XXVI. pp. 131-161.

Mackenzie, A.

1965 *Poems from the Divan of Khushal Khan Khattak*. London.

Macmunn, G.

1928 'Afghanistan and the Outer World'. In: *The Nineteenth Century and After*, vol. CIII, no. 613, pp. 344-354.

1929 (1977) *Afghanistan. From Darius to Amanullah*. Quetta.

1933 'The Tragedy of the Afghan Throne'. In: *The Nineteenth Century and After*, vol. CXIV, no. 682, pp. 668-678.

Maconachie, R.R.

1920 'A Precis on Afghan Affairs', part I, in L/P & S/20/B 285: pp. 29-31.

Magnus, R.

1974 'The Constitution of 1964: A Decade of Political Experimentation'. In: Dupree, L. and Albert, L. (eds): *Afghanistan in the 1970s*. New York.

Maiwandwal, M.H.

1967 'Progressive Democracy. A Philosophy of Action'. In: *Kabul Times Annual, 1967*, pp. XXV-XXXIV.

Majrooh, S.B.

1986a 'Education in Afghanistan. Past and Present, a Problem for the Future'. In: Majrooh, S.B. and Elmi, S.M.Y. (eds): *The Sovietization of Afghanistan*. Peshawar, pp.126-142.

1986b Background of the Communist Coup in Afghanistan and Present Development. In: Majrooh, S.B. and Elmi, S.M.Y. (eds): *The Sovietization of Afghanistan*. Peshawar, pp. 24-60.

Majrooh, S.B. and Elmi, S.M.Y. (eds)

1986 *The Sovietization of Afghanistan*. Peshawar.

- Makal, M.**
1954 *A Village in Anatolia*. London.
- Male, B.**
1982 *Revolutionary Afghanistan*. London.
- Malozemoff, A.**
1958 *Russian Far Eastern Policy 1881-1904*. Berkeley.
- Mannan, M.A.**
1970 *Islamic Economic Theory and Practice*. Delhi.
- Mardin, S.A.**
1971 'Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution'. In: *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 2, pp. 197-211.
- Martin, F.A.**
1907 *Under the Absolute Amir*. London.
- Marwat, F.R.**
1986 'History of pirs and mullahs in Afghan politics'. parts I-II. In: *The Frontier Post*, 26-27 April.
- Masson, C.**
1974(1842) *Narrative of Various Journeys in Baluchistan, Afghanistan and the Punjab*. vol. I-III. London.
- Maududi, S.A.A.**
1955 *Process of Islamic Revolution*. Lahore.
1964 *Political Theory of Islam*. Delhi.
1967 *Islamic Way of Life*. Delhi.
1973 *A Short History of the Revivalist Movement in Islam*. Delhi.
1978 *Fundamentals of Islam*. Delhi.
1979 *Challenge of the Modern Age and the Youth*. Aligarh.
1980 *Islamic Law and Constitution*. Lahore (7th. edition).
1982 *Human Rights in Islam*. Delhi.
- Mehra, P.**
1987 'Nachrichten aus Afghanistan'. In: *Afghanistan Tribune*, no. 6, 9.jhg.
- Metcalfe, B.**
1978 'The Madrasa at Deoband: A Model for Religious Education in India'. In: *Modern Asia Studies*, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 111-134.
- Minault, G.**
1982 *The Khilafat Movement. Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilisation in India*. Delhi.
- Misra, K.P. (ed.)**
1981 *Afghanistan in Crisis*. London.
- Mitchell, R.P.**
1969 *The Society of Muslim Brothers*. London.
- Mohammad, F.**
1914-15 *Seraj-ul-Tawarikh*. vol. I-III. Kabul.
- al-Mojaddedi, S.**
1986 *Political Settlement and Government in Exile*. Peshawar.
- Moltman, G.**
1982 *Die Verfassungsentwicklung Afghanistans 1901-1981*. Mitteilungen des Deutschen Orient-Instituts, no. 18, Hamburg.
1986 'Die Verfassungsentwicklung Afghanistans von 1901 bis 1986'. In: *Jahrbuch der öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart*. Neue Folge, Bd. 35. Tübingen, 1986, pp. 509-575.

Momen, Moojan

1985 *An Introduction to Shi'i Islam*. New Haven: Yale U.P.

Mozaffari, M.

1987 *Authority in Islam. From Muhammad to Khomeini*. New York.

Muhammad, Gul

1897 *Mou'az-i-Afghani*. Kabul.

Muhammad, S.

1981 *Successors of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan - Their Role in the Growth of the Muslim Political Consciousness*. Delhi.

al-Mujaddidi, M.S.

1929 (1983) *A brief Biography of the Martyr Mawlānā Abdur Rahman*. n.p.

Mujaddedi, S.

1986 *The speech delivered by Sibghatullah Mujadidi, leader of the National Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan in condemnation of the Saur coup d'état*. n.p. (Persian).

Muslehuddin, M.

1977 *Sociology and Islam*. Lahore.

Muzammil, M.Z.

1981 *Reason of Russian Occupation and Dimension of Resistance in Afghanistan*. Hezb-i Islami.

Nägel, H.

1971 *Privatinitiative beim Industriebau in Afghanistan*. Bochum Schriften zur Entwicklungsforschung und Entwicklungspolitik. Düsseldorf.

Nasr, S.H.

1980 *Living Sufism*. London.

Neale, J.

1981 'The Afghan Tragedy'. In: *International Socialism*, vol. 12, pp. 1-32.

Negargar, M.I.

1986 'Afghanistan and the Nightmare of Communism'. In: Majrooh, S.B. and Elmi, S.M.Y. (eds): *The Sovietization of Afghanistan*. Peshawar, pp. 2-23.

Newell, N.P. and Newell, R.S.

1981 *The struggle for Afghanistan*. Ithaca.

Newman, J.

1988 'The Future of Northern Afghanistan'. In: *Asian Survey*, vol. XXVIII, no. 7, pp. 729-740.

Oesterdiekhoff, P.

1978 *Hemnisse und Widersprüche in der Entwicklung armer Länder. Darstellung am Beispiel Afghanistans*. München.

Ohadi, A.

1988 'Major Trends in Modern Dari Literature'. In: *Neue Beiträge zur Afghanistanforschung*. Liestal.

Olesen, A.

1983 'The Saur Revolution and the Local Responses to It'. In: Breckle, S-W. and Naumann, C.M. (eds): *Forschungen in und über Afghanistan*. Mitteilungen des Deutschen Orient-Institut, Nummer 2, Hamburg.

1988 'Afghanistan: The Development of the Modern State'. In: Ferdinand, K. and Mozaffari, M. (eds): *Islam: State and Society*. London, pp. 155-170.

- 1988a 'Islam and Politics in Afghanistan'. In: *Neue Beiträge zur Afghanistanforschung*. Liestal.
- 1989 *Afghanistan og krisen i den gamle samfundsmosaik*. Center for Kulturforskning, Arbejdsrapport nr. 53, Aarhus.
- 1991 'Silkebrevs-konspirationen'. In: Dybbroe, Møller *et al* (eds): *Klaus Khān Bābā*. Aarhus Universitetsforlag, pp. 83-100.
- Pastner, S.L.**
- 1980 'The Competitive Saints of the Baluch'. In: *Asian Affairs. Journal of the Royal Society for Asian Affairs*, vol. XI (old series vol. 67), part 1, pp. 37-43.
- 1984 'Feuding with the spirit among the Zikri Baluch: the saint as champion of the despised'. In: Ahmed, A.S. and Hart, D.M. (eds): *Islam in Tribal Societies. From the Atlas to the Indus*. London, pp. 302-310.
- Pennel, T.L.**
- 1909 *Among the Wild Tribes of the Afghan Frontier*. London.
- Peters, R.**
- 1979 *Islam and Colonialism. The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History*. The Hague.
- Poullada, L.B.**
- 1970 *The Pushtun Role in the Afghan Political System*. Occasional Paper 1. The Afghanistan Council of the Asia Society.
- 1973 *Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919-1929*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Puig, J-J.**
- 1984 'La Résistance afghane'. In: Centlivres *et al* (eds): *Afghanistan - La colonisation impossible*. Paris, pp. 213-247.
- Rahel, S.**
- 1967 'Constitutional Developments'. In: *The Kabul Times Annual, 1967*. Kabul, pp. 15-17.
- Rahin, S.M.**
- n.d. *Afghanistan. Die Unterwerfung einer Nation*. Bochum.
- Rahman, Amir Abdur**
- 1887 *Sarishta Islamiya Rum*. Kabul.
- Rashid, A.**
- 1992a 'Behind the veil, again'. In: *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 23 April, p. 28.
- 1992b 'Warriors of the north'. In: *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 23 April, pp. 12-13.
- Rahman, H.**
- 1971 'Jihad dar Islam'. In: *Auqaf Magazine*, vol. 1, no. 4.
- Rauf, A.**
- 1887 *Kalimatu Amir-il-Biland Fil Targhib-i-ila-ul-Jehad*. Kabul. In: For.Dept., Front B, no. 175, Dec. 1893.
- Raverty, M.G.**
- 1888 (1976) *Notes on Afghanistan and Parts of Baluchistan, Geographical, Ethnographical, and Historical*. London (Quetta).
- Reardon, P.J.**
- 1969 'Modernization and Reform. The Contemporary Endeavor'. In: Grassmuck *et al* (eds): *Afghanistan. Some New Approaches*. Ann Arbor, pp. 149-204.

Reisner, I.

- 1981 Specific Features of the Development of Feudalism among the Afghans. In: *Afghanistan: Past and Present*. Oriental Studies in the USSR (no. 3), Moscow.

Reshtia, S.Q.

- 1984 *The price of liberty. The tragedy of Afghanistan*. Rome.

Rhein, E. and Ghaussy, A.G.

- 1966 *Die Wirtschaftliche Entwicklung Afghanistan, 1880-1965*. Opladen.

Richter, W.L.

- 1981 'Pakistan'. In: Ayoob, M (ed.): *The Politics of Islamic Reassertion*. London.

Rizvi, S.A.A.

- 1978 *A History of Sufism in India*. vol. I. New Delhi.
 1983 *A History of Sufism in India*. vol. II. New Delhi
 1980 *History of The Dar al-Ulum Deoband*. Deoband.

Rodinson, M.

- 1974 *Islam and Capitalism*. Harmondsworth.
 1979 *Marxism and the Muslim World*. London.

Roshan, N.

- 1986 'Unbezähmbarer Freiheitswille und nie erlahmende Kampfbereitschaft'. In: *Afghanistan Tribune*, no. 6, 8. jhg.
 1988 'I had a dream...'. In: *Afghanistan Tribune*, nr. 1, jhg. 10.

Rothermund, D.

- 1978 'Nationalismus und sozialer Wandel in der Dritten Welt: Zwölf Thesen'. In: Otto Dann (Hg.): *Nationalismus und sozialer Wandel*. Hamburg.

Roy, O.

- 1983 'La question de "l'Ideologie" Islamique'. In: *Les Nouvelles d'Afghanistan*. March.
 1985 *L'Afghanistan. Islam et modernité politique*. Paris.

Rubin, B.R.

- 1992 'Political Elites in Afghanistan: Rentier State Building, Rentier State Wrecking'. In: *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, no. 24, pp. 77-99.

Saikal, A.

- 1981-82 'Kemalism: Its influence on Iran and Afghanistan'. In: *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 25-33.

Samimy, S.M.

- 1981 *Hintergründe der Sowjetischen Invasion in Afghanistan*. Bochum.
 1987 'Zaher Shah - Kompromiskandidat der Supermächte oder echte Alternative im "Afghanistan-Konflikt"'. In: *Afghanistan Tribune*, no. 3, jhg. 9, pp. 7-15.
 1987a 'Najibullahs Krönung durch bestellte "Loya Jirga"'. In: *Afghanistan Tribune*, nr. 6, jhg. 9, pp. 6-9.
 1987b 'Comeback eines König?'. In: *Afghanistan Tribune*, no. 3, jhg. 9.
 1987c 'Afghanische Intellektuelle in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland'. In: *Afghanistan Tribune*, no. 4, jhg. 9.
 1988 'Dimensionen des Afghanistan Konfliktes'. In: *Afghanistan Tribune*, no. 1, jhg. 10, pp. 6-14.

Samuelson, J.

1975 *Islam i Afghanistan*. Stockholm.

Sawitzki, H-H.

1972 *Die Elitegruppe der Akademiker in einem Entwicklungsland dargestellt am Beispiel Afghanistans*. Meisenheim am Glan.

Sarwari, M.S.

1974 *Afghanistan zwischen Tradition und Modernisierung*. Bern.

Schinasi, M.

1979 *Afghanistan at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century*. Naples.

Schleifer, S.A.

1983a 'Understanding Jihad: Definition and Methodology'. In: *The Islamic Quarterly*, vol. 27, no. 23, pp. 117-132.

1983b 'Jihad and the Traditional Islamic Consciousness'. In: *The Islamic Quarterly*, vol. 27, no. 4, pp. 173-203.

1984 'Jihad: Modernist Apologists, Modern Apologetics'. In: *The Islamic Quarterly*, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 25-47.

Schwager, J.

1932 *Die Entwicklung Afghanistans als Staat und seine zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen*. Leipzig.

Schwartzberg, Joseph E. (ed.)

1992 *A Historical Atlas of South Asia*. New York.

Seton-Watson, H.

1967 *The Russian Empire 1801-1917*. Oxford.

Shah, I.A.

1928 (1982) *Afghanistan of the Afghans*. London.

1933 *The Tragedy of Amanullah*. London.

1939 *Modern Afghanistan*. London.

Shahrani, M.N.

1984 'Causes and Context of Responses to the Saur Revolution in Badakhshan'. In: Shahrani and Canfield (eds): *Revolutions and Rebellions in Afghanistan*. Berkeley.

Shahrani, M.N. and Canfield, R.L. (eds)

1984 *Revolutions and Rebellions in Afghanistan. Anthropological Perspectives*. Berkeley.

Shaikh, M.H.

1986 *Maulana Ubaid Allah Sindhi: A Revolutionary Scholar*. Islamabad: National Institute of Cultural Research.

Shariati, A.

1981 *Martyrdom: Arise and Bear Witness*. Tehran.

Shils, E.

1968 'Ideology'. In: Sills, D.L. (ed.): *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 7. New York: Macmillan Press.

Shpoon, S.

1983 *Islamic Fundamentalism in Afghanistan*. (unpublished manuscript). n.p.

Sigrist, U.

1980 'Paschtunwali - das Stammesrecht der Paschtunen'. In: *Mardom Nameh. Jahrbuch zur Geschichte und Gesellschaft Mittleren Orients*. Frankfurt/Main, pp. 264-279.

Simonsen, J.B.

1983 *Islam. Politik og Religion i Mellemøsten*. Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag. Copenhagen.

Sirat, A.S.

1969 'Sharia and Islamic Education in Modern Afghanistan'. In: *Middle East Journal*, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 217-219.

Smith, D. E.

1971 *Religion, Politics and Social Change in the Third World*. New York.

1974 *Religion and Political Modernization*. New Haven.

Smith, W.C.

1946 *Modern Islam in India*. New York.

Snoy, P.

1972 'Der Islam und sein Einfluss'. In: Kraus, W. (ed.): *Afghanistan*. Tübingen.

Solodovnikov, V.G. and Bogoslovsky, V.

1975 *Non-capitalist Development. A Historical Outline*. Moscow.

Spain, J.W.

1963 *The Pathan Borderland*. The Hague.

Steul, W.

1981 *Paschtunwali. Ein Ehrenkodex und seine rechtliche Relevanz*. Wiesbaden.

Stewart, R.T.

1973 *Fire in Afghanistan 1914-1929*. New York.

Strand, R.

1984 'The Evolution of Anti-Communist Resistance in Eastern Nuristan'. In: Shahrani, M.N. and Canfield, R.L. (eds): *Revolutions and Rebellions in Afghanistan*. Berkeley, pp. 77-94.

Sykes, P.

1940 *History of Afghanistan*. vols. I-II. London.

Tabibi, L.

1980 'Staatliches und traditionales recht in Afghanistan: Probleme und Materialien'. In: *Mardom Nameh. Jahrbuch zur Geschichte und Gesellschaft des Mittleren Orient*. Frankfurt/Main, pp.236-249.

Taillard, F.

1929 'La révolte afghane'. In: *L'Asie Française*. Janvier.

Tapper, N.

1983 'Acculturation in Afghan Turkestan: Pashtun and Uzbek Women'. In: *Asian Affairs*, vol. XIV, part I, pp. 35-45.

1983a 'Abd al-Rahman's North-West Frontier: The Pashtuns' Colonisation of Afghan Turkestan'. In: Tapper, R. (ed.): *The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan*. Beckenham, pp. 233-262.

Tapper, R.

1983 *The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan*. Beckenham.

1984 'Holier than thou: Islam in three tribal societies'. In: Ahmed, A.S. and Hart, D. M. (eds): *Islam in Tribal Societies. From the Atlas to the Indus*. London, pp. 244-266.

Taraki, N.M.

1979 'New Year Speech'. In: *Democratic Republic of Afghanistan Annual*. Kabul, pp. 352-358.

- Tarzi, M.S. and Ahang, M.K.**
1970 'Is it Pand Nama-i-Donya wa Din or Taj-ot-Tawarikh?' In: *Afghanistan*, vol. XXIII, no. 3, pp. 73-81.
- Tarzi, S.M.**
1991 'Politics of the Afghan Resistance Movement: Cleavages, Disunity and Fragmentation'. In: *Asian Survey*, vol. XXXI, no. 6, pp. 479-495.
- Tate, G.P.**
1911 (1973) *The Kingdom of Afghanistan. A Historical Sketch*. Karachi.
- Tavakolian, B.**
1984 'Religiosity, values and economic change among Sheikhanzai nomads'. In: Ahmed, A.S. and Hart, D. M. (eds): *Islam in Tribal Societies. From the Atlas to the Indus*. London, pp. 287-302.
- Therborn, G.**
1980 *The Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology*. London.
- Thompson, J.B.**
1984 *Studies in the Theory of Ideology*. Cambridge.
- Tibi, B.**
1983 'The Renewal of Islam in the Political and Social Development of the Middle East'. In: *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 3-14.
- Toepfer, H.**
1972 *Wirtschafts- und sozialgeographische Fallstudien in ländlichen Gebieten Afghanistan*. Bonn.
- Toprak, B.**
1981 *Islam and Political Development in Turkey*. Leiden.
- Ulfat, A.**
1979 *Jihad wa dastha-i posht-i pardeh*. n.p.
- Utas, B.**
1977/78 'Recent Events in Afghanistan'. In: *Annual Newsletter of the Scandinavian Institute of Asian Studies*. no. 11/12. Copenhagen.
1980 'Notes on Afghan Sufi Orders and Khanaqahs'. In: *Afghanistan Journal*, Jg. 7, Hft. 2, Graz.
1980a *Islam och Massmobilisering - Afghanistan och Iran*. Internationella Studier, no. 1. Stockholm.
- Vambery, A.**
1868 (1971) *Sketches of Central Asia. Additional Chapters on My Travels, Adventures and on the Ethnology of Central Asia*. London (Taipei).
- Vercellin, G.**
1985 'Crime de Silence et Crime de Tapage'. In: *Panorama des lectures sur l'Afghanistan contemporain*. Napoli.
- Vogel, R.**
1976 *Die Persien- und Afghanistan-expedition Oskar Ritter v. Niedermayer 1915/16*. Osnabrück.
- Voll, J.O.**
1983 'Renewal and Reform in Islamic History: Tajdid and Islah'. In: Esposito, J.L. (ed.): *Voices of Resurgent Islam*. Oxford, pp. 32-48.
- Waardenburg, J.**
1978 'Official and Popular Religion in Islam'. In: *Social Compass*, XXV, no. 3-4, pp. 315-341.

Warburton, R.

1900 (1975) *Eighteen years in Khyber, 1879-1898*. Oxford.

Weinbaum, M.G.

1977 'The Legislator as Intermediary: Integration of the Center and Periphery in Afghanistan'. In: Eldrigde, A.F. (ed.): *Legislatures in Plural Societies*. Durham, pp. 95-121.

1980 'Legal Elites in Afghan Society'. In: *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 12, pp. 39-57.

Wheeler, G.

1964 *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia*. London.

Whitaker, R.

1994 'A city that must die alone'. In: *The Independent*, 25 March, p. 21.

White, E.

1978 'Legal Reform as an Indicator of Women's Status in Muslim Nations'. In: Beck and Keddie (eds): *Women in the Muslim World*. Harvard, pp. 52-69.

Wiebe, D.

1973 'Grundlagen und Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten der Industrie in Afghanistan'. In: *Orient*, vol. 14, pp. no. 2, pp. 52-63.

Wilber, D.

1952 'The Structure and Position of Islam in Afghanistan'. In: *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 41-48.

1962 *Afghanistan*. New Haven.

Wild, R.

1932 *Amanullah - Ex-King of Afghanistan*. London.

Wilson, D.

1969 'Afghan Literature. A Perspective'. In: Grassmuck, G. et al (eds): *Afghanistan. Some New Approaches*. Ann Arbor, pp. 81-99.

Yapp, M.E.

1962 'Disturbances in Eastern Afghanistan', 1839/42. *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, vol. 25, pp. 499-523.

1980 'Contemporary Islamic Revivalism'. In: *Asian Affairs. Journal of the Royal Society for Asian Affairs*, vol. XI, pp. 178-195.

Yousefzai, B.

1974 'Kabul University Students: A Potential Political Force?' In: Dupree, L. and Albert, L. (eds): *Afghanistan in the 1970s*. New York, pp. 167-182.

Yule, H. and Burnell, A.C. (eds)

1886 (1986) *Hobson-Jobson. A Glossary of Colloquial Anglo-Indian Words and Phrases, and of Kindred Terms, Etymological, Historical, Geographical and Discursive*. New edition by W. Crooke. Calcutta.

Zadran, G.

n.d. *The Lessons of the Front*. n.p.

Zubaida, S.

1982 'The Ideological Conditions for Khomeini's Doctrine of Government'. In: *Economy and Society*, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 138-173.

Anonymous Publications

- 1924 *Roydad-e Loya Jirga-e darussaltana-e Kabul*. Kabul.
- 1928a *Aman-e Afghān*, 29.08.1928
- 1928b *Aman-e Afghān*, 30.08.1928
- 1928c *Aman-e Afghān*, 31.08.1928
- 1929 *Maramnameh wa surat-i tadwir-i majlis-i Jamiyat ul-'ulema-i Afghanistan*.
- 1967 *The Kabul Times Annual*. Kabul.
- 1973 *Area Handbook for Afghanistan*. 4th. ed.
- 1974 *The Afghanistan Republic Annual*. Kabul.
- 1975 *The Afghanistan Republic Annual*. Kabul.
- 1979 *Democratic Republic of Afghanistan Annual*. Kabul (ed. by A.M. Baryalai).
- 1980 *Conference of Ulemas and Clergy of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan*. Kabul, June-July 1980.
- 1981 *Al-Sobh*, no. 1, June 1981
- 1982 *Al-Sobh*, no. 2, April 1982
- 1982 *Documents and Records of the National Conference of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan*. Kabul, March 14-15 1982.
- 1982 *The True Face of Afghan Counterrevolution*. Editorial Office of the Newspaper *Haqiqat Enqelab Sawyer*. Kabul.
- 1983 *The Jihad Rays*, vol. 2, no. 4.
- 1983a *The Jihad Rays*, vol. 2, no. 5.
- 1983b *The Jihad Rays*, vol. 2, no. 6.
- 1984 *Achievements of the April Revolution*. Information and Press Department. Kabul.
- 1984 *Al-Sobh*, no. 6/7, Febr. 1984.
- 1985 *Afghanistan Today*, no. 2, 1985. Kabul.
- 1986 *Afghanistan Today*, no. 3, 1986. Kabul.
- 1986a *Afghanistan Today*, no.6, 1986. Kabul.
- 1986 *Afghanistan Tribune*, no.6, jhg. 8. (Unbezähmbarer Freiheitswille und nie erlahmende Kampfbereitschaft). Interview with N. Roshan.
- 1987 *Afghan Jihad. Quarterly Magazine of the Cultural Council of Afghanistan Resistance*, vol. 1, no. 1, June-Aug.
- 1987 *Afkar Inquiry*, vol. 4, no. 7, July 1987.
- 1987 *Afghanistan Today*, no. 3, 1987. Kabul.
- 1987 *Al-Noor*, 22.06.1987
- 1987 *Al-Noor*, 29.06.1987
- 1987 *Mujāhid Uluṣ*, 23.07.1987
- 1987 *Shehadat*, 10.06.1987
- 1987 *Udkast til Grundlov for den demokratiske Republik Afghanistan*. (English text published in photocopy form by APN bureau in Copenhagen).
- 1992 *Afghanistan Info*, no. 32, October. (Schweizerisches Komitee zur Unterslützung des afghanisches Volkes).
- 1992 *Afghanistan Information Centre Monthly Bulletin*, nos. 132-135, March-June.
- 1992 *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 18 February.
- 1992 *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 18 March.
- 1993 *The Economist*, 6-12 February: 61.
- 1993 *The Economist*, 13-19 February: 72.
- n.d. *Afghanistan. Multifaceted Revolutionary Process*. Kabul: Government Printing Press.
- n.d. *Ahkām-i Jihad. 'Ulema-i Riasat-i Dar ul-Iftah Ettehad-i Islami-ye Mujahedin-i Afghanistan*.
- n.d. *Manifesto of the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan*.
- n.d. *Martyred for the Cause of the Truth. The true Moslems murdered by the "Mujahedin"*. Islamic Affairs Department. Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Encyclopaedias

Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1985.

Encyclopaedia of Islam, vol. 1 (1960), vol. 2 (1965), vol. 3 (1965), vol. 4 (1973), vol. 5 (1979). Leiden.

Enzyklopaedie des Islam, vol. 3 (1936), vol. 4 (1934), Leiden.

International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, D. L. Sills (ed.), Macmillan, New York, 1968.

National Archives of India, New Delhi

Foreign Dept., Secret Suppl., Pros. February 1880, nos. 325-330.

Foreign Department, Pros. June 1880, nos. 202-203.

Foreign Dept., Secret (Suppl.), June 1880, nos. 304-340.

Foreign Dept., Secret Suppl., Pros. July 1880, nos. 256-280.

Foreign Dept., Secret (Supp.), Nov. 1880, nos. 107/13.

Foreign Dept., Secret E, Pros. January 1883, nos. 483-485.

Foreign Dept., Secret E, Pros. February 1883, no. 211.

Foreign Dept., Secret E, Pros. April 1883, nos. 46-50.

Foreign Dept., Secret E, Pros. May 1883, nos. 103-106.

Foreign Dept., Secret E, Pros. July 1883, nos. 40-41.

Foreign Dept., Secret E, Pros. October 1883, nos. 448-450.

Foreign Dept., Secret E, Pros. December 1883, nos. 130-138.

Foreign Dept., Secret E, Pros. January 1884, nos. 214-217.

Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. May 1884, nos. 270-272.

Foreign Dept., (F and P), Secret F, Pros. January 1885, nos. 209-213.

Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. March 1886, nos. 128-191.

Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. September 1886, nos. 300-314.

Foreign and Pol. Dept. - Secret F, Pros. January 1887, nos. 119-198.

Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. April 1887, nos. 399-495.

Foreign and Pol. Dept. Secret F, Pros. July 1887, nos. 155-169.

Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. July 1887, nos. 283-294.

Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. July 1887, nos. 570-571.

Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. February 1888, nos. 505-584.

Foreign Dept., Frontier A, Pros. February 1888, nos. 30-31.

Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. March 1888, nos. 81-88.

Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. April 1888, nos. 69-72.

Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. May 1888, nos. 12-26.

Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. June 1888, nos. 35-48.

Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. May 1889, nos. 226-234.

Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. August 1889, nos. 99-100.

Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. September 1889, nos. 301-302.

Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. April 1890, nos. 8-21.

Foreign and Pol. Dept., Sec. F, Pros. May 1890, nos. 44-45.

Foreign and Pol. Dept., Sec. F, Pros. Nov. 1890, nos. 152-166.

Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. May 1891, nos. 155-173.

Foreign and Pol. Dept., Pros. October 1891, nos. 1-34.

Foreign and Pol. Dept. - Secret F, Pros. October 1891, nos. 368-404.

Foreign Dept. - Frontier B, Pros. November 1891, nos. 27-30.

Foreign and Pol. Dept., Pros. April 1892, nos. 107-126.

Foreign and Pol. Dept., Sec. F, Pros. June 1892, no. 432-474.

Foreign Dept., Frontier B, Pros. October 1892, no. 52.

Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. December 1892, no. 28-45.

Foreign Dept., Frontier A, Pros. September 1892, nos. 1-8.

Foreign Dept., Secret f, Pros. September 1892, nos. 498-627.

Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. January 1893, nos. 511-539.

Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. May 1893, nos. 37-80.

Foreign Dept., Frontier B, December 1893, no. 175.

Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. July 1894, nos. 245-271.

Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. August 1894, nos. 57-79.

- Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. June 1895, nos. 719-759.
Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. June 1895, nos. 767-786.
Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. February 1896, nos. 107-115.
Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. May 1896, nos. 349-368.
Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. June 1896, nos. 274-284.
Foreign Dept., Secret F, pros. August 1896, nos. 1-14.
Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. October 1896, nos. 382-439.
Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. November 1896, nos. 132-162.
Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. May 1897, nos. 41-57.
Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. September 1897, nos. 253-973.
Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. October 1897, nos. 293-305.
Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. March 1898, nos. 313-324.
Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. June 1898, nos. 494-500.
Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. July 1898, nos. 1-87.
Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. August 1898, nos. 10-13.
Foreign Dept., Frontier B, Pros. August 1900, nos. 1-19.
Foreign Dept., Frontier B, Pros. February 1902, nos. 314-346.
Foreign Dept., Frontier B, Pros. October 1902, nos. 5-41.
Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. February 1903, nos. 50-52.
Foreign Dept., Frontier B, Pros. April 1903, nos. 358-396.
Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. June 1903, no. 200.
Foreign Dept., Frontier B, Pros. August 1903, nos. 386-420.
Foreign Dept., Frontier B, Pros. May 1904, no. 215-254.
Foreign Dept., Frontier B, Pros. May 1905, nos. 8-10.
Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. October 1905, no. 132-133.
Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. October 1906, nos. 27-50.
Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. February 1907, nos. 1-56.
Foreign Dept., Frontier B, Pros. Feb. 1907, nos. 142-175.
Foreign and Pol. Dept., Frontier B, Pros. April 1907, nos. 191-231.
Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. May 1907, no. 98.
Foreign and Pol. Dept., Secret F, Pros. October 1907, no. 13-111.
Foreign and Pol. Dept., Secret F, Pros. October 1907, nos. 152-159.
Foreign and Pol. Dept., Frontier B, Pros. January 1908, no. 189-216.
Foreign Dept., Frontier B, Pros. May 1908, nos. 91-112.
Foreign and Pol. Dept., Secret F, Pros. May 1908, no. 70-148.
Foreign Dept., Frontier B, Pros. July 1908, nos. 289-325.
Foreign Dept., Frontier B, Pros. October 1908, no. 192.
Foreign Dept., Frontier B, Pros. April 1909, nos. 54-78.
Foreign Dept., Frontier B, Pros. August 1909, nos. 17-45.
Foreign Dept., Frontier B, Pros. October 1909, no. 100.
Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. February 1910, no. 5.
Foreign Dept., Frontier B, Pros. July 1910, nos. 17.
Foreign Dept., Secret F, Pros. May 1911, nos. 61-63.
Foreign Dept., Frontier B, Pros. March 1912, no. 24.
Foreign Dept., Secret Frontier, Pros. August 1913, nos. 8-12.
Foreign Dept., Frontier B, Pros. October 1913, nos. 59-65.
Foreign Dept., Frontier B, Pros. March 1914, nos. 3-13.
Foreign Dept., Frontier B, Pros. October 1914, nos. 22-35.
Foreign and Pol. Dept., Secret War, Pros. March 1917, nos. 540-550.
Foreign and Pol. Dept., Secret Frontier, Pros. June 1919, nos. 1-158.
Foreign and Pol. Dept., Secret Frontier, Pros. July 1919, nos. 1-235.
Foreign and Pol. Dept., Secret Frontier, Pros. August 1919, nos. 201-422.
Foreign and Pol. Dept., Secret Frontier, Pros. September 1919, no. 6-195.
Foreign and Pol. Dept., Secret F, Pros. November 1920, nos. 1-582.
Foreign and Pol. Dept., Secret Frontier, Pros. June 1921, nos. 60-61.
Foreign and Pol. Dept., File no. 51-F, 1928.
Foreign and Pol. Dept., no. 237-F, 1928.

India Office Library and Records, London

- L/MIL Military Department Records, 1716-1957
 L/P & S Political and Secret Department Records, 1756-1950
 L/P & S/10 Departmental Papers: Political and Secret Separate (Subject) Files, 1902-31
 L/P & S/12 Departmental Papers: Political (External) Files and Collections, c. 1931-50
 L/P & S/18 Political and Secret Memoranda, c. 1840-1947
 L/P & S/20 Political and Secret Department Library, c. 1800-1947
 R/12/1-114 Records of the British Legation, Kabul, Main Series, 1930-40
 R/12/115-158 Records of the British Legation ..., Main Series, 1941-47
 R/12/159-162 Records of the British Legation ..., Confidential Series, 1941-42
 R/12/189-190 Records of the British Legation ..., Miscellaneous Files
- L/MIL/17/13/23.
 L/P & S/10/22: File 281/1904, Pts. 8 and 9.
 L/P & S/10/200.
 L/P & S/19/201: Afghan and NW Frontier Diaries, 1913.
 L/P & S/10/202: 1914-16.
 L/P & S/10/203: Afghan and NW Frontier Diaries, 1916-19.
 L/P & S/10/633.
 L/P & S/10/1066, 1922: File 1685/1922, Pt. 16, 1924-30.
 L/P & S/10/1085, 1923: File 860/1923. Afghanistan. Diaries of the Military Attache (1922-24).
 L/P & S/10/1112, 1924: File P. 1360/1924, Pts.: 1,2,3,4. Afghanistan: Khost Rebellion.
 L/P & S/10/1120, 1924: File 3570/1924. Kabul Military Attache's Diaries 1924-25.
 L/P & S/10/1203, 1927: File 135/1927, 1927/29. Afghan Series Pt. xxi-xxvi.
 L/P & S/10/1207, 1927: File 627/1927. Kabul Military Attache's Diaries 1927-29.
 L/P & S/10/1285, 1929: File 53/1929, Pts. 1,2. 1928-31. Afghan Rebellion 1928-29.
 L/P & S/10/1286, 1929: File 53/1929, Pt. 3, 1928-29. Afghan Rebellion 1928-29.
 L/P & S/10/1287, 1929: File 53/1929, Pt. 4, 1928-29. Afghan Rebellion 1928-29.
 L/P & S/10/1288, 1929: File 53/1929. Afghan Rebellion 1928-29.
 L/P & S/10/1312: File 459/1931. Afghan Series xxxv-xlii, 1931-32.
 L/P & S/10/1308: File 3955/1930. Kabul Military Attache's Diaries, 1930-31.
 L/P & S/12/1262.
 L/P & S/12/1563.
 L/P & S/12/1658.
 L/P & S/12/1750: Coll. 3/153, 1936-46. Situation in Afghan Eastern Provinces.
 L/P & S/12/1760: 1939.
 L/P & S/18: Political and Secret Memoranda, 1840-1947.
 L/P & S/20: Political and Secret Dept. Library, 1800-1947.
 R/12/19: 317/II. General Development in Afghanistan. British Legation, Kabul.
 R/12/20: 317/II. General Development in Afghanistan. British Legation, Kabul.
 R/12/20: 317/III. General Development in Afghanistan. British Legation, Kabul.
 R/12/22: File no. 334-R, 1930.
 R/12/34: no. 361, Pt. 1, 1930.
 R/12/43: no. 383, 1930.
 R/12/119: No 208/41. The Fakir of Ipi, 1941-47.
 R/12/161: C-27, no. 110. Loe Jirgah of 1941.
 R/12/162: File no. C4/42, 1942.
 R/12/194.

Index

A

- Abdali (tribe) 21. *See also* Durrani
- 'Abduh, Mohammad 16
- Abdul Rahman, *Sayyid* 97
- Abdur Rahman, *Amir* x, 61, 93, 281, 298, 299, 300–301, 302
- absolutist rule (1880–1901). *See also* legitimacy
based on strong army 138, 223, 251
divinely based 62–64
enforced by Islam 67–68, 106, 118, 121
enforced by *jihād* 68–71, 245
legacy 62, 89–90, 94, 95–96
- British and
*amir*ship recognized by British 27
control of foreign policy 27–28
subsidies paid to *Amir* 27, 116
- educational policy 75–76, 98
- expanded state power 66. *See also* co-option of religious leaders (below)
creation of standing army 68, 89. *See also* conscription, military
increased taxes 73
- Islamic policy
Islam used to unify population 62, 68, 100
Islamization of legal system 65–68
jihād against Shi'as 78–80, 102
promotes religious orthodoxy 75–81, 90
- legendary cruelty 71
- religious leaders and
co-option 62, 90, 105, 184
expropriation of income 72–73
relationship with *'ulamā* 81–88
subjugation of *'ulamā* 71–75, 107, 128, 271
- tribal leaders and 63–64, 107, 172
- aesthetics of reception 15–18, 269–272, 300–303. *See also* legitimacy: perception of
- Afghan Information Centre 282
- al-Afghani, *Sayyid* Jamal ud-Din 16, 99, 107, 119, 246, 250
- Afghanistan
before 1880
decline of urban culture 43
early history 21–28
religious situation 36–56
rise of landed interests 43
tribal forces 29–36
- modern era
boundaries drawn 28. *See also* Britain: expansion; Durrand Line; Russia: expansion
British control of foreign policy 27–28, 101, 106, 113, 114
ideological crisis in society 216–219
neutrality in World Wars 100–106, 194. *See also* War Party; World War I and II
- Afridi (tribe) 97. *See also* Frontier tribes
- Ahmad *Khān*, Sir *Sayyid* 119, 122, 245
- Ahmad *Shāh* Durrani 21, 195
- Ākhund* of Swat 15, 52, 84, 108, 250
- Al Azhar University (Cairo) 192, 233
- Ali, Mohammad 100
- Ali, Shaukat 100
- Aligarh. *See* Anglo-Oriental College (Aligarh)
- Amanullah, King x, 111–166, 179, 182, 251, 298, 299, 301
- anti-corruption campaign 124–125
- British and 172–173, 175
anti-British activities in World War I 101, 113–114. *See also* Silk Letter Conspiracy; War Party; World War I
subsidies rejected 173
- educational policy 128–129, 186, 187
- later attitudes to 174, 239–240, 260
- modernization policy

- constitutional measures 120–126, 138–144. *See also* Constitution: 1923
 pan-Islamism 113–116
 secularization 126–133, 181, 196
 religious leaders and 133–138, 184
 rule (1919–29)
 accession 111–113
 lingering support after 1929 193, 201
 overthrown 144–166 *passim*, 173. *See also* Bacha Saqqao; rebellion
 tribal leaders and 133–138, 172
 Amin, Hafizullah 257, 270, 272, 288, 290, 302
 Anglo-Afghan wars 81, 88
 effects of 28
 first 23, 56
 second 27, 61
 third 113, 114, 115, 133
 Anglo-Oriental College (Aligarh) 44, 99, 100, 188
 leftist movement at 228
 Ansari, *Khwāja* Abu Ismail Abdullah 44
 anti-colonialism 102–106. *See also* Frontier tribes: attacks on British
 Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal 118, 131, 144, 165
 authority 1, 8, 34. *See also* legitimacy
- B**
- Bacha Saqqao 149, 157, 158, 159, 161, 162, 165, 170, 171, 172, 174, 180, 239
 Balkh 46
 Balkhi, *Sayyid* Ismael 229
 Baluchistan 102
 Bank-i Milli 200
barakat 13–15. *See also* *pīrs*
 Barakzai (sub-tribe) 22, 24. *See also* Durrani (tribe); Pashtuns
 Basmachi movement (Turkestan) 116, 289
 Behishti, *Sayyid* 285
 Bokhara 43, 44
Amīr of 116
 Britain. *See* Anglo-Afghan wars; anti-colonialism; Frontier tribes: attacks on British; India
 control of Afghan foreign policy ended 113, 114
 established 27–28
 moves to end 101, 106
 expansion 22–28, 88. *See also* India
 divisive issue in Afghanistan 100
 ‘forward policy’ 22, 25, 102
 relationship with *amīrs*
 Abdur Rahman 27, 116
 Amanullah 172–173, 175
 Habibullah 97, 173
 Nadir *Shāh* 172
 subsidies paid 27, 116, 173. *See also* Afghanistan: neutrality
 British India. *See* India
- C**
- Caliphate 100, 116, 118, 128, 132, 133
 Abbasid 118
 child marriage 138–139, 145. *See also* marriageable age
 Chishtiyya order 44, 45, 50
 Chitral 102
 citizenship vs tribal affiliation 123–124. *See also* tribe
 Committee of Islamic Scholars 140, 141, 148, 154
 conscription, military
hasht nafari system
 abolished 180
 established by Abdur Rahman 68, 136
 reformed by Amanullah 140
 unpopularity 135, 136, 146, 154, 155
 traditional basis 31, 154
 used to create standing army 89, 91
 Constitution x, 299
 1923 120–126, 127, 138, 141, 153, 176, 242, 254
 1931 176–183, 182, 185, 189, 190, 199, 224
 1964 199, 206–212, 220, 221, 223, 224, 226, 242, 251, 258, 264, 265, 282, 286, 300
 1977 199, 220, 221, 223, 226, 264, 266
 1980 (interrim) 258
 1985 263–266
 Curzon, Lord 100
 customary law
 relationship to *Shari‘a*
 modern legal decline 65, 78
 traditional predominance 31, 83
 source of opposition to
 Ammanullah’s reforms 131

D

- Daoud, *Sardār* Mohammad 213, 303
 President (1973–77)
 constitutional measures. *See*
 Constitution: 1977
 leftist support 220. *See also*
 PDPA
 overthrown 220, 224. *See also*
 Saur Revolution
 palace revolution 219, 224
 repressive rule 223
 Prime Minister (1953–63)
 accession 202–203
 economic policy 192, 200–201
 social reforms 195
 repressive measures 196, 208
 resignation 198
 religious leaders and 208, 221
 Dar al-Taʿalif 99
 Dār ul-ʿUlūm Deoband 43, 44, 45, 50,
 96, 99, 107, 144, 188, 198, 228
darwishes 41
 Deoband. *See* Dār ul-ʿUlūm Deoband
 Din Mohammad. *See* Mushk-i Alan,
 Mullah
 Disraeli, Benjamin 25
 Dost Mohammad, *Amīr* 23, 63
 Dostam, General 269, 295
 Durand Line 28, 35, 58, 114, 195
 Durrani (tribe) 21, 33. *See also*
 Pashtuns
 Durrani empire ix, 21, 32
 tribal nature of 29

E

- education
 female 191
 introduced 128
 reforms cancelled 180
 reform policies
 Abdur Rahman 75–76, 98, 129
 Amanullah 128–129, 187
 Habibullah 98–99, 118, 129
 Musahiban dynasty 181, 186–
 192, 211, 217–218
 PDPA 256
 religious, reform of 186–190
 traditional situation 41–44. *See also*
 madrasa, maktab
 Education, Ministry of 205
 Egypt 229. *See also* Al Azhar Univer-
 sity (Cairo), Islamic movement,
 Ikhwan ul-Muslimin

F

- fatwā*, use of 153. *See also* *jihād*: use to
 legitimize absolutism; legiti-
 macy: of revolt
 Faizani, *Mawlānā* Ataullah 229–231
faqīrs 41
 ‘forward policy’. *See* Britain
fiqh 186–187. *See also* Hanifi code
 Frontier tribes 35, 56, 58, 97, 175. *See*
also Afridi; Ghilzai; North-West
 Frontier; rebellion; Shinwari;
 Waziris
 attacks on British 25, 194

G

- Gailani
 Abdul Qader 46
 Pir Sayyid Ahmad 263, 284, 286,
 287, 291
 Gailani family 46, 60, 249
 Gandamak, treaty of 27, 28, 101
 German overtures
 World War I. *See* Niedermayer
 mission
 World War II 194
ghāzī 108
gharbzadegi 227
 al-Ghazali, Abu Hamid Muhammad
 17
 Ghaznavid empire 21
 Ghilzai (tribe) 33, 82, 86, 194. *See also*
 Frontier tribes; rebellion
 Ghurid empire 21
 Gorchakov, Prince 25. *See also* Rus-
 sia: expansion

H

- Habibiya College 98, 128
 Habibullah, *Amīr* x, 94–108, 116,
 167, 298, 302
 British and. *See also* Afghanistan:
 neutrality; anti-colonialism; Silk
 Letter conspiracy; World War I
 British attitude 97
 rejects Durand Line 28
 rule (1901–19)
 assassinated 101, 111
 education policy 98–99, 118, 129
 policies 95–100
 political groupings under 100–
 102. *See also* War Party
 religious leaders and 96, 184

- Habibullah II, *Amīr*. See Bacha Saqqao
- Hadda Mullah. See Hadda-i *Sāhib*
- Hadda-i *Sāhib* 46, 81, 84–85, 97, 108, 133, 250
- Hājji Bāshi*. See Naqshband, Mullah Ghulam
- hākim* 59
- Hanafi code 33, 59, 124, 127, 130, 131, 140, 179, 208, 210. See also Sunni Islam
established as official creed 78
promoted by Abdul Rahman 75
- Harabiya. See Royal Military College (Harabiya)
- Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami 284
- Harakat-i Islami Afghanistan 285
- hasht nafari* system. See conscription, military
- al-Hassan, *Mawlānā* Mahmud 107, 113
- Hazarajat 302
conquest of 78, 79
- Hazaras 54, 55. See also rebellion
nationalism 280
- Hazrat Sāhib* of Chaharbagh 106
- Hazrat Sāhib* of Shor Bazaar. See Mujaddidi family
- Herat 22. See also passim
- High Council of *‘Ulamā* 259, 262, 264
- hijra* from India (1920) 115
- Hikmatyar, Gulbuddin 231, 244, 261, 263, 268, 284, 287, 291, 292, 294, 295
- Hindus 124, 130
- Hizb-i Islami 268, 269, 277, 284, 289, 291, 292, 294
- Hizb-i Wahadat 292, 293
- I**
- ideology, concept of 3
- Ihtisāb*, Department of 185
- ijmā*, as source of Shari‘a 10. See also *‘ulamā*
- ijtihad*
interpretation. See *‘ulamā*
reopening the gate of 237
source of Shari‘a 10
- Ikhwan ul-Muslimin 229, 231, 236, 241, 243, 246, 248, 257, 288. See also Egypt, Islamic movement
- imām* 41
- Inayatullah, *Sardār* 112, 116, 149, 156, 162
- India 99, 100, 103, 105, 108, 110. See also Mughal empire
British consolidation and expansion in 23
- Indian Mutiny 23
- Iran 7, 171, 227, 236, 252, 260, 273, 274, 277. See also Persians
- Islam. See also Hanifi code, Shari‘a, Shi‘as, Sufism, Sunni Islam
as unifying social force 57. See also *umma*
creeds. See Shi‘as, Sufism, Sunni Islam
Islamic law. See Hanifi code, legal system, *qāzī*, Shari‘a
Islamic polity, concept of 6–8. See also *umma*
re-entry of into Afghan politics 212–216
use to enforce obedience 67–68, 106, 119
use to justify rebellion 82–84, 196
- Islamic movement 217, 219. See also Islamists
background 227–229
development 229–234
ideological basis 236–240
membership 235–236
- Islamic Revolution 243, 303
- Islamists 287, 302. See also Islamic movement
concept of *jihād* 245–246
concept of martyrdom 245–246
differences with *‘ulamā* 237–238, 239–240, 246. See also *rawshanfīkrān*, *ruhānīān*
model of power 240
modernist position of 239–240
strength 283
- Islamization 128, 298. See also Abdur Rahman
- Ittehad-i Islami barai Azadi-ye Afghanistan 284
- Ittihad-i Islami Mujahedin-i Afghanistan 290
- J**
- Jabha-i Inqilab-i Afghanistan 291
- Jabha-i Nejat-i Melli 284, 292
- jāgīr* system 32
- Jama‘at-i Islami (Pakistan) 229

- Jami'at-i Islami 231, 245, 269, 284, 292
- Jami'yat al-^cUlamā 180, 184–185, 194, 196, 198, 215, 228, 233, 242, 258, 288
 established by Nadir *Shāh* 242
 Mujaddidi family a moving force 233
- Jami'yat al-^cUlama-i Mohammadi 234
- Jan, Mīa Gul 280
- Jawanan, Kalab-i 229, 231, 234, 244
- Jawanan-i Muselman 231
- Jews 124, 130
- jihād* 67, 107, 299
 concepts of
 greatest form of worship 278
 historical 11–13
 Islamist 245–246
 logical outcome of *umma* 9
 types
 defensive 68–69, 245
 greater 11, 70
 lesser 11
 'offensive' 69, 245
 use
 as mobilization agent 57
 by Abdul Rahman 68–71, 88
 declared against PDPA 276
 in power struggles 57
 to enforce orthodoxy 78
 to legitimise absolutism 70
- jirga* 34, 35, 125, 178–180. *See also* Constitution: 1931; Loya Jirga; tribal leaders
- Justice, Ministry of 185
- K**
- Kabul 97, 101, 104, 106, 109, 110
- Kabul University 191, 216, 218, 229, 282
 Faculty of Shari'ā. *See* Shari'ā, Faculty of
 Law Faculty 189, 190
- Kafiristan (Nuristan) 302
 conquest 78, 79, 88, 102
- Kandahar 195
- Kandahari, *Shaykh* Asef Mohseni 285
- Karmal, Babrak 214, 254, 265, 270
- Kazim Bey 105
- Kemal, Mustafa. *See* Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal
- Khān-i 'Ulum* 94, 106
- khāns* 32, 63, 96
 abolition of rank and titles 132
 basis of tribal leadership 29
 strongest in west. *See* tribal leadership
- Khales, *Mawlawī* Mohammad Yunus 284, 288, 291
- Khan, *Sayyid* Ahmad 99, 107
- Khilafat movement 100, 115
- Khoda-i Khidmatgaran 175. *See also* Frontier tribes
- Khomeini, *Ayatullah* Rohullah 229, 260, 273
- Khost Rebellion. *See* rebellion
- Khuddam al-Fuqan 230, 233
- Khyber Pass 97, 102. *See also* Frontier tribes
- Koran. *See* Qur'ān
- L**
- leadership. *See* religious leaders; tribal leaders
- leftist movement 218, 219, 223, 228. *See also* PDPA
- legal system
 constitutions. *See* Constitution
 courts
 magistrates ~ introduced 130
 precedence of civil ~ 209
 Shari'ā ~ 179
 secularization 127, 129–131. *See also* legislation: Civil Code
 secular law made supreme (1967) 209
 traditional position
 importance of custom. *See* customary law, Pashtunwāli
 judges. *See* *qāzi*
 Islamization 65–68. *See also* Hanifi code, Shari'ā
- legislation. *See* Constitution
 Civil Code (1977) 209, 221
 Penal Code. *See also* legal system
 1924 125, 129, 134
 1976 221
 1977 209
 Political Parties Law 211
 Shari'ā codified (1971) 209
- legitimacy x, 172, 286, 298
 and Islam 105, 106, 299–303
 models
 classic Islamic 8–10, 63–64, 153
 in 1923 Constitution 122

- in 1931 Constitution 176–180
 - in 1964 Constitution 207
 - Islamist 240–245
 - Daoud's 222, 266
 - PDPA 263–268
 - 'Pious Sultan' theory 9, 63, 67, 241, 298, 299. *See also* classic Islamic (above)
 - tribal (*jirga*) 34, 62–64, 121, 153, 179–180, 299–303
 - of revolt 82–84, 153. *See also* rebellion
 - perception of 18, 300–303. *See also* aesthetics of perception
 - traditional attitude of *'ulamā* 240
 - use of *jihād* 70
 - Liberal Parliament 202
 - liberalization, political
 - demanded 201–203
 - denied 181, 195, 223
 - Loya *Jirga* 127
 - nature and functions 126, 221–222, 265, 266
 - as source of legitimacy 266
 - downgraded by PDPA 264
 - original tribal basis 222
 - tribal basis eroded 222, 226
 - sessions 180, 212
 - 1924 124, 130, 134, 138–144, 156, 254
 - 1928 126, 144, 146, 162
 - 1941 194
 - 1964 206, 208, 209
 - 1977 221
 - 1987 265
- M**
- madrasa* 41–44, 247
 - curriculum and methods 41, 188
 - individual tutoring 42. *See also* *mawlawī, tālib*
 - historic situation
 - decline 42–43
 - main centres 43. *See also* Bokhara; *Dār ul 'Ulūm Deoband*; Samarkand
 - vs esoteric knowledge of *pīrs* 38
 - state *madrāsas*
 - conflict with private ~ 235
 - established 187–190
 - private *madrāsas*
 - conflict with state ~ 235
 - survival 187–190
 - Madrasa-i Qur'ān* 230
 - Mahaz-i Melli Islami 284, 286
 - Mahmud, Shah 202, 230
 - Maiwandwal, Mohammad Hashim 210
 - maktab* 41
 - maliks* 125. *See also* tribal leaders
 - abolition of rank and titles 132
 - Marriage Law
 - 1923 131, 181
 - 1934 181
 - 1971 210, 215
 - marriageable age 145
 - martyrdom 70, 276
 - Islamist concept of 245–246
 - ultimate goal of *mujāhidīn* 278
 - Mashrutiya (Constitutional) group. *See* Young Afghan Movement
 - Massoud, Ahmad Shah 269, 285
 - Maududi, *Mawlānā* Abu A'la 238, 243
 - mawlawī* 42. *See also* *madrasa*
 - mawlawī-tālib* relationship 50, 52
 - Mizan al-Tahqiqat 96, 105, 140, 184
 - modernism 203–206. *See also* secularization; Tarzi, Mahmud; pan-Islamism; Westernization; Young Afghan movement
 - Mohammad Zahir, King. *See* Zahir *Shāh*
 - Mohammadi, *Mawlawī* Mohammad Nabi 284
 - Mohammadzai lineage 22, 24, 35
 - muhtasib* 37, 128
 - muftī* 37. *See also* religious leaders
 - Mughal empire 21, 203
 - muhājir* (exile), identity as 276
 - mujāhid* (holy warrior) 108
 - identity as 276
 - mujāhidīn* (Islamic resistance) 268, 269
 - alienation of liberal middle class 282
 - divisions and infighting 272, 281–296
 - Hazara/Shi'a parties in Quetta 285
 - Islamabad agreement 293
 - Sunni-based parties in Peshawar 284, 290
 - few intellectuals in 282
 - PDPA attacks against leaders 260–263
 - religious formulations of 275–281

- Mujaddidi
 Fazl Mohammad 133, 135, 146, 147, 162
 Fazl Omar 135, 141, 146, 162, 164, 166, 182, 186, 195, 213
 Mohammad Ibrahim 214, 230, 233, 275, 280
 Sebghatullah 215, 233, 234, 263, 284, 286, 287, 292, 297
- Mujaddidi family 48, 133, 146, 249, 275
 co-option within state 185
 descent 48, 49, 60. *See also* Sirhindi, *Shaykh* Ahmad
 hereditary title as *Hazrat Sāhib* of Shor Bazaar 48
 most prominent 20th century *pīrs* 51, 133
 moving force in *Jami'iyat al-ʿUlamā* 233
 role in fall of Amanullah 162–165
- mullahs 63, 65. *See also pīrs*
 activist ~ 15, 19. *See also* anti-colonialism; Frontier tribes
 disappearance xi, 192–198
 examinations of qualifications 74–75
- murīd* 127
- Musahiban
 dynasty (1930–73) 175, 182, 186, 193, 196, 224, 298
 accession 163, 164, 172
 made permanent 177–178
 overthrown 219, 224
 family 94, 112, 113, 114, 163, 167
- Mushk-i Alam*, Mullah 81, 82, 85–87
- Muslim, Ismat 267
- N**
- Nadir *Shāh* 101, 112, 172–197, 242
 army commander
 hero of Third Anglo-Afghan War 114
 opposes Amanullah's accession 132
 refuses to put down Khost Rebellion 138
 rule (1930–33)
 accession 163, 164, 172
 assassinated 174
 British and 172
 co-opts and silences Young Afghans 201
 education policy 181, 186–188
 economic changes 183
 fails to support Frontier tribes 174–175
 modernization policy 180–183
 religious leaders and 179, 182
 tribal leaders and 178, 182
- Najibullah, President 256, 265, 268–269, 292
- Najm al-Din Akhundzada 84. *See also* Hadda-i *Sāhib*
- Naqīb* of Baghdad. *See* Abdul Rahman, *Sayyid*
- Naqshbandiyya order 46–48, 50–51, 249. *See also* Sufism
- Nasrullah, *Sardār* 96, 98, 102, 103, 106, 111, 112, 160
- National Fatherland Front 264, 265. *See also* PDPA
- nationalism 181, 203–206, 211
 Hazara 280
 Pashtun 217
- Niazi, Abdul Rahim 232, 233
- Niazi, Ghulam Mohammad 231
- Niedermayer mission 101, 105, 106. *See also* Ottoman empire; Silk Letter Conspiracy; Turkey; World War I
- North-West Frontier
 anti-British turbulence 25
 Province 88, 103
 tribes. *See* Frontier tribes
- Nur al-Mashayikh*. *See* Mujaddidi: Fazl Omar
- O**
- obedience 245–246. *See also* Islam; legitimacy; rebellion
- Ottoman empire 100, 107, 108, 115, 133, 251. *See also* Turkey
 Russian advances 22
- P**
- Pakistan 195, 274, 276, 277, 283
- pan-Islamism 16, 99, 100, 101, 102–106, 107, 113–116, 116, 118, 119, 175, 194, 196, 239, 260. *See also* *Siraj al-Akhbar*; Tarzi, Mahmud; Young Afghan movement
- Pasha, Enver 105
- Pashtunistan issue 195
- Pashtuns 58, 278
 basis of royal power ix, 29, 123
- Pashtunwālī* 36, 131, 136, 278, 280, 298, 301
 relationship to *Sharīʿa*

modern legal decline 65, 78
 traditional predominance 31, 33–34, 83

PDPA 16, 226, 295, 298, 302, 303
 factions
 Khalq 244, 268, 269
 Parcham 220, 268, 269, 290

ideology
 discourse of class struggle 256, 257, 270
 Islamic strategy 257
 loss of ideological war 269–272. *See also* aesthetics of perception
 pro-Islamic stance of 258–260
 symbolic desecularization 270

party
 loss of vanguard role 265
 transformed into Hizb-i Watan 268. *See also* National Fatherland Front

regime
 attacks on opponents 260–263
 attitude towards Iran 273
 fall 268–269, 292
jihād declared against 276
 reforms 275, 278–279

Penal Code. *See* legal system; legislation

Persians 22, 79. *See also* Iran, Safavid empire

‘Pious Sultan’ theory. *See* legitimacy: models

pirs 14, 41, 108, 127. *See also* religious leaders; Sufism
 ‘maraboutic’ 51–53
 as patrons 52
 political involvement 52–53. *See also* mullahs: activist ~
 often *mawlawī* 42
pir-murīd relationship 50, 52, 249
 vs exoteric knowledge from *madrasas* 38

polity. *See also* secularization
 dominance 76, 184, 265, 298
 expansion 89, 187, 264, 298

polygamy
 campaign against 138–139, 145
 reform cancelled 180

Popalzai (sub-tribe) 22, 24. *See also* Durrani (tribe); Pashtuns

Punjab 22, 23

pardah 145, 195. *See also* veiling
 abolished 132
 reinstated 180

Q

qāzīs 37, 41, 65, 209, 210. *See also* legal system; Shari‘a school for 129

Qāzī al-Quzāt 101, 104, 106. *See also* Razzaq, Hājji Abdur

Qadiani sect 124, 141–142, 169

Qadiriyya order 46, 50, 52. *See also* Sufism
pirs 193

Qizilbash 54, 55, 78, 92. *See also* Shi‘as

Quddus Khan, Abdul 101

Qur‘ān 17, 118
 interpretation. *See* *‘ulamā*
 source of Shari‘a 10

R

Rabbani, Burhanuddin 231, 244, 263, 284, 292, 295

Ranjit Singh, *Maharaja* of Punjab 23

Rasul, Abdul Sayyaf 284

rawaj. *See* customary law

rawshanfikrān 108, 118, 119
 challenge to traditionalist monopoly on Islamic interpretation 166, 228. *See also* *ruhāniān*

Razzaq, Hājji Abdur 101, 105, 112

rebellion
 use of religion. *See also* *fatwā*
 to condemn 67–68, 102, 106, 119
 to sanctify 82–84, 196

revolts. *See also* Bacha Saqqao
 Ghilzai (1880s) 82, 83, 87
 Ghilzai (1930) 174
 Hazara (1890s) 78
 Khost Rebellion (1924) 120, 124, 126, 134–135, 136, 138, 142
 Safi Rebellion (1945–46) 196, 198
 Shinwari (1882–92) 87
 Shinwari (1928–29) 148, 150, 153, 158
 Shinwari (1930) 174

religious leaders xi, 36–41. *See also* legitimacy; rebellion; *‘ulamā*
 Abdur Rahman and 71–75, 81–88
 co-option 62, 90
 strained relations 81
 Amanullah and 133–138
 Daoud and 208, 221
 authority 38
 economic position
 traditional wealth and dependence 38–39

- worsened under Abdur Rahman 72
- Habibullah and (improved situation) 96–97, 102
- Nadir *Shāh* 179, 182
- Islamists and. *See also* Islamists differences 237–238, 239–240, 246
- monopoly on Islamic interpretation challenged 166, 228
- PDPA and 258–260, 262–263
- traditional position
- authority 38
 - ephemeral nature of power 40
 - monopoly over education 41, 90
 - no formal organization 37
- Republican Party 202
- Revolutionary Council 259, 263. *See also* PDPA
- 'rightly guided caliphs' 50. *See also* Caliphate
- Royal Military College (Harabiya) 98, 128
- ruhānīān* 108, 118, 119. *See also* *ulamā*
- challenge from *rawshanfīkrān* 166, 228
- Russia. *See also* Basmachis; Soviet Union
- expansion 22–28, 88
- S**
- Sa'addin *Khān* 106
- Saddozai lineage 22, 24
- Safavid empire 21, 203. *See also* Persians
- Safi, Ghulam Hassan 213
- Samarkand 43, 44. *See also* *madrasa sardārs* 63. *See also* tribal leaders
- abolition of rank and titles of 132
 - powerful position 35. *See also* *jirga*; Loya Jirga
 - role 59
- Saur Revolution ix, 224, 274, 290, 303. *See also* PDPA
- sayyid* 96. *See also* religious leaders
- Sazman-i Nasir-i Islami 285
- secularization 199. *See also* Islamization
- functional 127, 128–129
 - institutional 127, 127–128. *See also* education
 - legal 127, 129–131. *See also* legal system
 - symbolic 127, 131–133, 180, 181, 270
- Shams al-Mashayikh*. *See* Mujaddidi: Fazl Mohammad
- Shari'a 16, 129, 105, 131, 187, 188, 209. *See also* Hanifi code; legal system
- codified (1971) 209
 - courts. *See* legal system; *qāzīs*
 - modified by *Pashtunwālī* 31, 33
 - modified by customary law 31
 - promoted by Sufism 48–51
 - sources 10
 - teaching of. *See* *madrasa*; *mawlawī*
 - total application 237. *See also* Islamization
- Shari'a, Faculty of (Kabul University) 192, 231, 232, 235, 248
- established (1952) 188
- Shawra-i Inqilab-i Ittifaq-i Afghani-
stan 285
- Shaykh al-Hind* 105, 113
- Sher Ali, *Amīr* 27, 63
- Shi'as 7, 53–56, 124, 281
- Hazaras. *See* Hazaras
 - Imami 53, 60
 - Ismaili 55, 60
 - mujāhidīn* groups 284, 291–292
 - persecution
 - Abdur Rahman's *jihād* 78–80
 - by Sunnis 55
 - Qizilbash. *See* Qizilbash
- Shinwaris. *See* Frontier tribes; rebellion
- shirkat* 200
- Shuja ul-Mulk, *Shāh* 23
- Sikhs 22, 48
- Silk Letter Conspiracy 113, 114, 143, 194. *See also* Sindhi, *Mawlānā* Obaidullah; World War I
- Silk Road 43
- Sindhi, *Mawlānā* Obaidullah 51, 104, 105, 113, 114, 194
- Siraj al-Akhbar* (newspaper) 100, 101, 107, 116, 121, 124, 133, 165. *See also* pan-Islamism; Tarzi, Mahmud; Young Afghan movement
- Sirhindi, *Shaykh* Ahmad 47, 48, 49, 51, 249, 288. *See also* Mujaddidi family
- Soviet Union 192, 287. *See also* Russia
- forces withdrawn 268
 - intervention (1979) ix, 257
 - occupation 250

- state. *See* polity
- Sufism 11, 15, 17, 38, 280
 decline of orthodox ~ 51
 Islamist rejection of 246–250
 'maraboutic' 51–53
 relationship to orthodox Islam 47, 48–51
 Sufi orders 44–48. *See also*
 Chishtiyya order;
 Naqshbandiyya order; Qadiriyya
 order; *tariqat*
 suppression by Abdul Rahman 80
- sunna*
 interpretation. *See* *ʿulamā*
 source of Shariʿa 10
- Sunni Islam 12, 124, 281. *See also*
 Hanifi code
 dominant creed in Afghanistan 33
mujāhidin groups 284, 290
 persecution of Shiʿas 55
 political theory. *See* legitimacy:
 classic Islamic model
- T**
- tālib* 42, 188. *See also* *madrassa*
- taʿzīr* 210
- Tajikistan 294
- tariqat* 50. *See also* Sufism
- Taraki, Nur Muhammad 256, 257, 287
- Tarzi, Mahmud 124, 178, 203, 228, 251
 early years
 anti-British activities 99–100, 101
 return from Turkey 107
 pan-Islamic vision 116–120, 121, 124, 126, 131, 133, 157, 166, 178, 203, 228, 251, 271. *See also* pan-Islamism; *Siraj al-Akhbar*; Young Afghan movement
 failure to challenge traditionalist monopoly on Islamic interpretation 166. *See also* *rawshanfikrān*
- Timur *Shāh* 118
- tribal leaders. *See also* *jirga*; *khāns*; *maliks*; Loya Jirga; *sardārs*; tribes
 abolition of rank and titles 132
 Abdul Rahman and 63–64, 172
 Amanullah and 124, 133–138, 172
 traditional position 29–33
- tribes. *See also* citizenship; Frontier tribes; Hazaras; Pashtuns; tribal leaders
 as source of legitimacy. *See* legitimacy: tribal model
- institutions. *See* *jirga*; Loya Jirga
 powerful position 107, 123, 172
 traditional situation ix–x, 29–36
- Tudeh Party 228, 229, 273
- Turkey 100, 104, 120, 122, 126, 128, 130, 132, 165, 201, 228, 251. *See also* Caliphate; Ottoman empire
 modernization ideal for Muslim countries 120
 secularization 126, 132
 legal 130
 subjugation of religious institutions 128
 support for in World War I 100, 104. *See also* War Party
 Turkish Revolution 132
- U**
- ʿulamā* 38, 102, 121. *See also* religious leaders
 and Abdur Rahman
 co-option 96
 increased power 65, 83
 relationship 81–88
 subjugation by 71–75
 differences with Islamists 237–240
 institutions. *See* High Council of *ʿUlamā*; Jamiʿyat al-ʿUlamā; Mizan al-Tahqiqat
 role of in society 139
 traditional position
 inter-regional links via *madrassa* 43
 interpreters of Shariʿa 10, 59, 166, 228. *See also* *rawshanfikrān*; *ruhāniān*
- Ulfat, Gul Pacha 204
- umma* 9. *See also* *jihād*
- United States 192
- Uzbeks 21
- V**
- veiling
 abolished 131, 136, 145, 154, 213
 no Islamic basis 132, 195
 reinstated 180
- W**
- Wahhabis 108, 110, 247
 suppression by Abdur Rahman 80–81
- Waliullah, *Shāh* 249
- War Party 101, 106, 111, 112
- Waziris (tribe) 194. *See also* Frontier tribes

Westernization 126, 218, 247, 250
women, emancipation of 279
World War I 100–101. *See also* War
Party
World War II 194, 201

X

xenophobia 57, 81, 255. *See also* anti-
colonialism, Anglo-Afghan wars
absent before 1839 56

Y

Yaqub Khān 27

Young Afghan movement 113, 116–
120, 126, 127, 133, 154, 166, 178,
182, 201. *See also* pan-Islamism;
Siraj al-Akhbar; Tarzi, Mahmud

Young Turks 119, 120, 121, 126. *See
also* Atatürk, Mustapha Kemal;
Ottoman empire; Turkey

Z

ziyārat 14. *See also* *pīrs*

Zahir Shāh 188, 197, 239, 261, 287,
297. *See also* Musahiban